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                                            GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Background to the study 
 
      The region of the African continent commonly designated as ‘tropical Africa’, ‘Sub-
Saharan Africa’ or ‘the Sahel’ has the notable characteristic of being predominantly occupied 
by black Africans. Thus, if the name of the continent is derived from the colour of the skin as 
some people would want us to believe, then this part of the continent can be described as the  
‘original’ Africa, without intending to exclude our geographical brothers and sisters in the 
northern part of the continent. Another prominent feature of Sub-Saharan Africa, apart from 
the skin colour of the inhabitants, which has more or less the same effect on the lives of the 
people, is the widespread problem of poverty. The gravity of this problem led a group of 
British students in 1988 to conclude that “to think of Africa is to think of poverty”. The Africa 
being referred to in this assertion is Sub-Saharan Africa. The species of poverty in the Sahel 
region of the continent appears to defy every attempt at eradication, to the extent that some 
economists have declared the case insoluble and some countries have given up hope on the 
improvement of the lot of Africans. At a time when the economies of other countries are 
growing, the situation in Africa is degenerating. The United Nations General Assembly 
organised a special session in 1986 with the sole aim of finding a solution to ‘the critical 
economic situation in Africa’. Many years after this session, the effects are yet to be seen. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s poorest countries, regardless of the criteria that are used 
to measure it. Consequent upon the material poverty are the problems of  hunger, disease and 
illiteracy, which have deprived the majority of the people in this part of the continent of every 
claim to human dignity. The dearth of medical facilities and personnel has led to an escalated 
mortality rate for both children and adults. There is a high level of insecurity as jobless youths 
take to armed robbery and banditry; while young girls take to prostitution as a way of making 
ends meet. Similarly, many African young men and women lose their lives in an attempt to 
escape the difficult conditions by migrating to countries in the West. Instead of finding 
solutions to this social malaise, political leaders are preoccupied with how to perpetuate 
themselves in office and amass more wealth for themselves and their cronies. Present 
conditions effectively exclude the poor from the compact that otherwise binds society 
together. If we are to insist that the poor hold up their end of the social contract, then society 
as a whole must do the same. For without a realistic sense of a better future, there is neither 
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rime nor reason to conform to the mores and expectations of mainstream society; little or no 
reason to aspire to its benefits when the reality of one’s existence precludes their attainment.   
 
It is therefore not surprising that violent conflicts define the life of the people in their struggle 
to earn a living amidst scarce resources or as a way of demonstrating their dissatisfaction with 
the status quo. There is hardly any country in this region without a problem of tribal conflict 
and civil wars, always with the ugly balance of people killed in the thousands, and children 
drafted to fight as soldiers, who at the end of the war come back as social deviants and deeply 
traumatized. The traditional African family system is broken down as most pater familias 
desert their families to fight in inter-tribal clashes or move to distant places in search of food. 
The community structure with its respect for life and hospitality is disintegrated or rendered 
moribund in some places where some traces of it are seen. The battle line is difficult to define 
as the political-party and religious affiliations compete with the traditional ethnic affiliations 
thereby complicating the situation. Is it justified to attribute the social disquietude in the Sub-
Saharan Africa today to material poverty alone? Can the cultural and spiritual values for 
which Africa is known stand the onslaught of the horrible effects of materialism? Is not the 
restoration of the dignity of the human person the precondition for the genuine efforts at 
poverty eradication and the prevention of violent conflicts? 
 
II. Motivation for the study 
          This work was motivated by the fact that the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are 
seriously confronted by abject poverty and violent conflicts despite the immense human and 
natural resources with which she is blessed. Many years after attaining independence from 
foreign administration, the region is facing a host of insurmountable problems from which we 
have singled out poverty and violence. Closely related to these is the problem of corrupt and 
irresponsible leadership. Having been disappointed by their leaders, most people no longer 
make reference to ethical or moral criteria in their decisions and actions. Of course, this 
manner of behaviour can only lead to the destruction of the society and its values. Hence the 
urgent need to call attention to factors that are indispensable for peaceful co-existence in any 
social setting, one of which is the protection of life and the just distribution of social amenities 
and opportunities. 
 
First of all, it has to be stated that many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are not poor, because 
they do not have resources, but because these are unjustly distributed. And there is no other 
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way peace can be restored than a just distribution of resources. If leaders can overcome a 
winner-takes-it-all mentality and work to see that resources are equitably distributed, such that 
each person is given what is basic for the sustenance of life, then there would be fewer violent 
conflicts. But we have to state pointedly that Africa’s poverty goes beyond material poverty to 
include non-material forms of poverty like marginalization, which haunts most African 
countries on the international level, but which equally exists between individuals or group of 
individuals living in the same African country.  
 
Besides, the awareness that the state is there for the welfare of all and not that of a few can 
engender national pride and the goodwill to contribute to state develpment in terms of 
infrastructure and ideas. This implies first and foremost the restoration of the respect for the 
human person based on his/her dignity. For there can be no real development without 
reference to those fundamental principles that guarantee the basic human rights founded on 
human dignity. Poverty anywhere anytime is a man-made problem and can be solved by same.  
  
III.  Objectives of the study 
         The purpose of the work at hand is not to catalogue individual cases of poverty and 
violence in tropical Africa, because they are simply legion. Apart from that, other disciplines 
like economics and sociology, and institutions such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund have carried out or sponsored more detailed research in this regard. Our aim 
is rather to highlight the importance of moral values in the effort to overcome poverty and 
violence. The problem of poverty and violence is much more a problem of the neglect of these 
values and inasmuch as this neglect perdures, it will be impossible to eradicate poverty or 
prevent violence. It is simply futile to try to fill an open-sided sack without first of all sewing 
the bag together. The avarice of leaders and that of people needs to be checked.  
 
As the countries of Africa enter the third millennium, intense effort has to be made to set the 
priorities of the continent right. This study intends equally to identify the causes of poverty 
and violence and make recommendations towards their reduction. We would like to focus our 
attention on the need to restore moral values as expressions of the dignity of the human 
person, the recognition of and respect for which are indispensable for social co-existence. 
 
Furthermore, we would endeavour to establish to what extent poverty can lead to violence, 
and then question the importance of human freedom, as a basis of human dignity, in a 
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situation where one is constrained to act contrary to his/her free judgment. Following this, the 
research will try to establish the correlation between the causes of material poverty and 
anthropological poverty. It could be compared to the Freudian theory of the relationship 
between the conscious and the unconscious in the metaphor of the “tip of the iceberg”. 
 
IV.  Methodology 
       The method employed in the work at hand is mainly that of an interpretative and 
theoretical analysis of the concepts with a view to highlighting the implications of carrying on 
business as usual both for individual persons of Sub-Saharan  Africa and the continent as a 
whole. In concrete terms the division of the work into three parts was principally informed by 
this motive as we shall see in the outline that follows. 
 
The first part deals with the two major concepts of poverty and violence, placing them in a 
global, but also African context. It is divided into three chapters for the purpose of detailed 
study. The first chapter focuses on the definition or rather explanation of poverty with a clear 
distinction between relative and absolute poverty. We come to the conclusion that relative 
poverty is seen all over the world, but it is only in Africa and some other countries of the third 
world that absolute poverty is experienced. Next to this we distinguish between different 
dimensions of poverty, including first of all socio-economic poverty, which refers to material 
poverty and social exclusion and secondly theological poverty, where we narrate the historical 
development of the theological understanding of material poverty. Here we see how the 
historical context of each epoch gave rise to a different understanding of material possession 
vis-a-vis the goal of human life. We then introduce what we call anthropological poverty to 
designate any act of discrimination of person(s) which violates his/her basic human rights. As 
a conclusion to this chapter, we deal with the theory of basic human needs and what it means 
to be poor.  
 
The second chapter analyses the internal and external causes and consequences of poverty in 
the region of the continent under consideration. Poverty is not caused by one factor, rather it 
is a culmination of different factors ranging from geographical, demographical to socio-
political. A greater part of the blame for the persistence of absolute poverty in Sub-Saharan 
Africa since independence is to be attributed to corrupt and irresponsible leadership. In view 
of this scenario we discuss how the roles of some foreign institutions, especially the IMF & 
World Bank and international bodies could aid and abet poverty in the entire continent. The 
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neglect of such intervention would mean not only more difficult times for the populace but 
equally for the rest of the world in this time of globalization.  
 
The most pronounced impact of material poverty on any society is the decline of social 
cohesion with its concomittant effect of social insecurity. This observation leads us logically 
to the third chapter that focuses on violence, but before then we singled out women for the 
purpose of emphasis as the most affected group in Sub-Saharan Africa. Any effort at the 
reduction of poverty in Africa that fails to acknowledge the role of women in the changing 
economic structure will end up in failure. This calls for rethinking the cultural status of 
women in most African countries, where they are denied the right to possess land or engage in 
limited forms of trade and only reduced to the role of house keepers. 
 
In chapter three we dwell on the nature and forms of violence. One aspect of the project of 
objectively explaining the notion of violence that makes it difficult is that of cultural 
valorisation. Some practices which are violent in themselves are given cultural or religious 
interpretation like female circumcision or the mock fight. But even at that, it is indubitable 
that those who have to undergo such violent practices in the name of culture or religion would 
prefer an alternative, should there be any. These forms of violence that have their roots in 
religio-cultural practices are in any case not the outcome of material poverty. The major forms 
of violence predominant in the area of our study include ethnic and political violence, socio-
economic, and religious violence (religious fundamentalism). As in the case of poverty, we 
see that women and children are the most vulnerable groups in any and every form of 
violence. Violence against women in particular is linked to economic power. 
 
The second part of our research is divided into two chapters and considers the correlation 
between poverty and violence in  post-colonial Africa south of the Sahara. The fourth chapter 
tries to provide a background to the understanding of poverty and violence by taking a look at 
the African world view. Inasmuch as it may be incorrect to deny violent practices in the 
traditional African society, we see that the values of community spirit, hospitality, respect for 
life and group work helped the individuals affected by poverty to cushion the otherwise 
painful experience of being in lack. This is opposed to the modern individualistic and self-
centred society. The traditional African society was egalitarian in structure. 
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In chapter five, we take a survey of the first contact of the Africans with both the Western 
culture and that of the Near East served on the dishes of the Christian and Islamic religions. 
While the latter came to Sub-Saharan Africa first, the former seems to have had more 
influence on the people owing to the introduction of science and technology. However, before 
the appearance of these two religions on the continent, there was the misinformation from 
ethnologists about the Africans and Africa that helped to aid slavery and eventually 
colonialism. The stigma of these two historical experiences is yet to be wiped completely 
from the psyche of the Africans. We subject the legacies of colonization to an objective 
critique and find that even though the mission of civilizing the natives is generally regarded 
by most African scholars as a failure in terms of socio-economic upliftment, Africa had 
something to benefit from the colonial experience, namely, the languages, the art of writing 
and the message of the Gospel. On the other hand, we note that many years after 
independence, the African post-colonial leaders have not demonstrated their autonomy, 
especially in the areas of the economy and politics. Some of them are still repeating the 
mistakes made by the colonial authorities, that is, transporting alien policies to Africa without 
considering the cultural discrepancies. Of course, one does not need much time to come to the 
conclusion that the result of this is identity crisis. There is a socio-cultural hotch-potch which 
constitutes the basis for the greater part of the problems in that continent. The chapter ends 
with the dialectics of foreign aid, which is but a reflection of the relationship hitherto between 
the West and Africa, which is more or less that of mutual suspicion and uncertainty. 
 
The third and last part of our research is devoted to the issue of the discourse on the dignity of 
the human person vis-a-vis the challenges of the social problems of poverty and violence in 
Africa today. The primary motive of this section is to explain the core elements that constitute 
the dignity of the human person and to uncover the reason(s) why some persons fail to 
acknowledge this in their dealings with others of their kind. For here lies the challenge for 
religious and cultural leaders in Africa and elsewhere to motivate their followers to meet 
others on the plane of reason and mutual respect, while remaining true to themselves and their 
own beliefs. The term “dignity” is not originally African (what actually is original?), but 
Western; hence we borrowed it to describe the practices peculiar to African culture which 
demonstrate the Africans’ respect for life and the human person.  The sixth chapter of the 
work makes a re-appraisal of the term from the theological and philosophical perspectives, 
relating the arguments therefrom to concrete social questions. Two philosophers of the 
Enlightenment, John Locke and Immanuel Kant, were singled out and treated separately with 
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reference to their views on what constitutes the dignity of the human person according to the 
Judeo-Christian Lehre on the same subject. To talk of dignity does not imply speaking of a 
life without hardship or suffering. One could suffer in dignity. To buttress this point we look 
at the example of the Biblical Job. This dovetails into the key points of the social teaching of 
the Church. Since the Church is only a part of the larger society, we try to situate what the 
Church teaches in the wider society where other people who are not members of the Church 
live and work. This shift gives us another nuance, namely, the basic rights of the human 
person. On a deeper analysis we see that a person has rights, because he/she has dignity. 
Although there is no consensus opinion as to what the components of human dignity are, there 
is nonetheless a general view that the human person has a quality which is peculiar only to 
humanity and is not shared by any other creature. 
 
The last chapter, chapter seven, takes a look at the problems of poverty and violence in the 
face of the African sense of community and Christianity anthropology. The African 
understanding of the community could be a step in the reduction of poverty and violence, but 
this model is limited by the fact that membership in the traditional community is traced to a 
common ancestor. In a multi-plural society, this form of grouping is obsolete. The Christian 
anthropology that considers everybody as a member of one family is proposed. One may 
contend that there are other people who do not share the Christian faith, however there are no 
people who are allergic to good deeds or kind words. Insofar as this is what Christianity 
stands for, it has more chance of reaching more people than the traditional community, even 
though both of them emphasize the principle of the mutual acknowledgment of the dignity 
inherent in the human person. It is equally on this acknowledgment that the human society as 
a communion of persons can thrive. 
 
In view of this we try to situate Sub-Saharan Africa in the context of the world community of 
persons, paying attention to the efforts made to alleviate African poverty in the forms of aid, 
and the possible effects of globalization on the African condition. We survey the contribution 
of environmental degradation and resources management – as a kindred factor to the 
globalization process – to the issues of poverty and violence. 
 
In the general conclusion, we try to mirror the image of Africa in the 21st century in the 
tension between hope and resignation. While some people have given their verdict on Africa 
as a forgotten continent, we want to state, on the contrary, that Africa has prospects in the 
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third millennium. But to make this a reality and not a delusion, the basic human values based 
on the dignity of the human person have to be restored in the socio-economic and political 
programmes of that continent. The recognition of the right of the human person based on the 
theory of the natural law is the bulwark against arbitrariness of power and the illusion of 
ideological manipulations. African leaders have to take this into consideration in their efforts 
to build the nation-states. The leaders have their own roles to play, but to leave the affairs of 
the entire continent or rather Sub-Saharan Africa in the hands of political leaders alone 
without the co-operation of other stakeholders and institutions is not sufficient. Africa needs a 
renaissance, which has to commence from within, because the major causes of the continent’s 
problems are internal and not external.   
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Part one: Poverty and Violence as Global Social Phenomena 
 
      
                                                   CHAPTER ONE 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF POVERTY 
 
1.0   Introduction 
 
         In this chapter we shall endeavour to define the term “poverty” as it is to be applied in 
this work, not without taking into consideration the innumerable nuances the term has 
acquired in the course of studies on social development. Poverty as a social problem has its 
tentacles well rooted in the society and the changes that take place therein. As a result of this 
connection to the changes in the society, most definitions of poverty are limited to material 
conditions. While the material aspect cannot be ignored in the understanding of poverty, to 
limit the concept of poverty to the material context alone is tantamount to a partial knowledge 
of the human person, who is the subject of poverty. Hence, this chapter will also focus on the 
anthropological dimension of poverty, which is often neglected in the socio-economic 
researches on poverty. Closely related to the anthropological is the theological notion of 
poverty, also designated as evangelical poverty. A considerable portion of the work is 
dedicated to this last theme, with the historical development of the Church’s teaching on 
poverty being narrated with reference to scriptural texts, the Church Fathers and the influence 
of the protestant Reformers. 
 
1.1     Definitions of Poverty 
 
Defining poverty would, at first sight, seem to be a straightforward and simple task. Poverty is 
obviously understood to be the lack of something, a deficiency in necessary properties or 
desirable qualities. Common synonyms include paucity, scarcity, dearth, scantiness, 
destitution, want, privation, penury, indigence, insufficiency, and meagerness. To be poor is 
to be without.1 Golomb defines poverty as “a continuous lack of the important means of life 
either for an individual or for a group; it is the sustenance of life on barest minimum 
                                                 
1 Devine A. J. and Wright D. J., The Greatest of Evils: Urban Poverty and the American Underclass. New York: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1993. 2 
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resources.”2 What is in question here is the material and economic basis required for the 
fulfillment of life purposes. To define poverty as a lack of material resources needed to live is 
perhaps suitable for inofficial usage and everyday language, but this remains inadequate for 
scientific use. To approach the issue of poverty scientifically requires spelling out exactly 
what the relevant material resources are, and how much of those resources one needs to enjoy 
a reasonably safe and comfortable existence. This demands in turn further explanation of what 
“reasonably safe and comfortable existence” means.  
 
 The official definition of poverty could be referred to as that which the Bureau of Census 
requires in order to produce its reports. Such definition of poverty is employed in all 
government reports and statistical series and also used by most non-governmental researchers 
working in the poverty area. Although it is designated as official, this definition contains 
numerous arbitrary elements making it therefore incomprehensive. In any case, we shall 
examine a few of those definitions with a view to the objective of this work, which is a 
theoretical rather than an empirical analysis of the concept of poverty. The difficulty involved 
in defining poverty, according to Townsend, is that it is a relational term and hence needs to 
be constantly redefined as situations change.3 This means that whatever is said of poverty 
varies immensely with reference to the spatio-temporal context. Such a definition as “man is a 
rational animal”, which is valid irrespective of space and time, cannot be applied to poverty. 
Perhaps,  it is wiser to follow the counsel of Altimir, who, considering the different and 
changing faces of poverty, concluded that a definition as such was impossible, but asserted 
“we can manage no more than an explanation of each isolated symptom.”4 Subsequent to this 
advice, we shall now try to explain the term “poverty” along two generally accepted divisions 
namely, absolute and relative poverty. 
 
1.1.1     Absolute Poverty. 
 
 In order to understand poverty as absolute, the first thing to consider is whether some truly 
basic (absolute) standard of existence can be defined such that any and all who fall below that 
standard are poor. Devine and Wright both argue that the major problem to be encountered in 
defining poverty as absolute is the question of how to set the standard amidst competing 
                                                 
2 Golomb, A., Armut, in: Klose, A., Mantl, W., Katholische Soziale Lexikon, Innsbruck, Wien, München: 
Tyrolia, 1982. 142. 
3 Cf.Townsend, P., The International Analysis of Poverty, Toronto, 3 
4 Altimir, O., The Extent of Poverty in Latin America, World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 522, 
   Washington D. C. 1992, 5. 
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social factors and the difference in time associated with it.5 This problem notwithstanding, to 
regard poverty as absolute is one of the two ways in which poverty could be assessed and it 
refers to people whose means of material support  is totally inadequate to meet their needs.6 
Absolute poverty is a condition of acute physical want such as lack of food, clothing, shelter 
and the absence of medical services.7 It is a condition in which one survives on the barest 
minimum of material resources. An absolutely poor person does not know where the next 
food will come from. He/she depends entirely on the generosity of others, which is not always 
guaranteed.   
 
Absolute poverty is also referred to as “primary poverty” and defined by Rowntree as a 
condition in which “total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessities for the 
maintenance of mere physical efficiency.” 8  Rowntree distinquishes this from “secondary 
poverty” under which he classified the families whose earnings would be sufficient for the 
maintenance of mere physical efficiency, were it not that some portion of it is absorbed by 
other expenditure, either useful or wasteful.9 Absolute poverty is also called “indigence” or 
“destitution”. 
 
The World Bank Report, “Voices Of The Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us?” based on research 
with over 20,000 poor people in 23 countries defines absolute (extreme) poverty as “living on 
less than $1 per day and moderate poverty as less than $2 per day estimating that in 2001, 1.1 
billion people had consumption levels below $1 a day and 2.7 billion lived on less than $2 a 
day”.10 This presupposes, however, that the purchasing power of the dollar remains constant. 
Sometimes one meets wretched situations that defy verbal description of absolute poverty. 
Two examples will suffice here: The first is the reply of a poor man in Kenya to an interview 
team doing research on poor peoples assessment of their situation. To the question of what is 
poverty, the man retorted, “don´t ask me what poverty is because you have met it outside my 
house. Look at the house and count the number of holes. Look at my utensils and the clothes 
that I am wearing. Look at everything and write what you see. What you see is poverty.”11 
                                                 
5 Cf. Devine, A. J. and Wright, D. J., Op. Cit. 3 
6 Cf. Lourdino, A. Y., Mission in the Context of Endemic Poverty: Papers of a Consultation on Mission in the     
Context of Poverty and in Situations of Affluence, Philippines 1982, 19 
7  Cf. Moynihan, D. P., On Understanding Poverty, New York 1989, 36 
8  Rowntree, B. S., Poverty: A Study of Town Life, in: Hastings, J. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics,  
    vol. 10, 139 
9  Ibid, 139 
10  Narayan, D., Patel R. et al., Voices of the Poor : Can Anyone Hear Us? New York: Oxford University Press,  
     Inc. 2000, 35 
11  Ibid, 30 
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The next is the mental picture painted by Leonardo Boff in the first chapter of his book, 
“Introducing Liberation Theology.” According to Boff, “a woman of forty, but who looked as 
old as seventy, went up to the priest after Mass and said sorrowfully: “Father, I went to 
communion without going to confession first”. “How come about, my daughter?” asked the 
priest. “Father,” she replied, “I arrived rather late, after you had begun the offertory. For three 
days I have had only water and nothing to eat; I’m dying of hunger. When I saw you handing 
out the hosts, those little pieces of white bread, I went to communion just out of hunger for 
that little bit of bread.”12 Those two instances bear out to what extent absolute poverty can 
completely change the life and worldview of the person affected, rob him/her of his/her 
freedom and reduce the person’s capacity to reason. Contrary to the World Bank standard of 
less than $1 per day, there are those who may not even see a single cent in three days, as in 
the case of the woman in the above example. Absolute poverty is peculiar to developing 
countries, both as lack of real income and as a lack of access to social services.13 Incidentally, 
the above examples are drawn from “third world” continents, Africa and Latin America. 
According to the World Bank Report of 1997, about 45 percent of the population in Sub-
Saharan Africa live in absolute poverty.14 We shall discuss this form of poverty in greater 
depth later in this work; it is the question of the dignity of the absolute poor person to which 
this investigation is finally directed. Suffice it to say that absolute poverty is manifested in 
malnutrition, sickness, illiteracy and a standard of living which denies basic human dignity.15  
 
1.1.2 Relative Poverty 
 
 Relative poverty views poverty as determined mainly by the society and dependent on the 
social context. It is the poverty of a person or group of persons relative to other people in a 
given society. It is vehemently argued that any realistic, workable definition of poverty must 
be relative to a society’s existing level of economic, social, and cultural development. Hence, 
no sensible definition of poverty can be indifferent to history, society, and culture. There is no 
single definition of poverty that can suffice for all times and places. 16  Defining relative 
poverty is more problematic than defining absolute poverty, since different people lack 
                                                 
12  Boff, L. and Boff, C., Introducing Liberation Theology (vol. 1) translated by Paul Burns,  Britain: Burns and  
     Oates 1987, 1 
13 Cf. Ascher, H., Natural Resources Policy making in Developing Countries, Durham 1992, p. 32 
14 Cf. World Bank Report, 1997, 21 
15 Cf. Schönherr, S., Armutsorientierte Entwicklungspolitik – Ansatzpunkte zur Verbindung von Wachstum und  
    Armutsreduzierung durch Förderung kleinbäuerlicher Zielgruppen, Volkswirtschaftliche Schriften, Heft 335,  
    Berlin 1983, 24 
16 Cf., Devine, A. J. and Wright, D. J., Op. Cit., 3 
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different things in different places and according to the different circumstances in which they 
find themselves. This implies that “assessment of an individual’s or group’s situation depends 
largely on the standard of living enjoyed by the reference groups with which they are being 
compared.”17 One thing that is constant in the description of relative poverty is that the social, 
cultural and political factors that define it are continuously changing. Needs that are relative 
to a society as a whole are also relative to the set of social sub-systems to which the 
individuals belong.18  At the same time, extremely relativized conceptions of poverty are 
equally problematic. For instance, we could define poverty relative to a society’s given 
distribution of income, considering those in the bottom quintile of the distribution as poor 
regardless of the absolute level of their incomes. In this case, we are defining a poverty 
income relative to the average income. This approach implies by definition that no society can 
ever eliminate poverty, since in any empirical distribution of income, 20% must lie in the 
lowest income quintile. To maintain, following this analysis, that one-fifth of all people in all 
societies at all times and places are “poor” is neither a useful nor a satisfactory conclusion.19  
 
 Relative poverty could be understood as subjective deprivation relative to some pertinent 
reference group. This approach conceptualizes poverty as comparative disadvantage, but here 
the comparison is to other people or reference groups rather than to a statistical average. In 
this approach, people are poor if they think of themselves as poor or if they are thought of as 
poor by others. The latter is the situation prevailing between the third world countries and the 
first world (the West). This view of poverty as relative subjective deprivation calls attention to 
the psychological dimension of poverty and raises questions of how people come to define 
themselves or others as poor. And because in this view poverty is defined against some 
reference group or standard, the approach directs attention to broader income-distributional 
(or equity) issues. The problem with the relative deprivation approach in the definition of 
poverty is that everyone is deprived relative to someone else, excepting only the single richest 
person in the world.20 Not even in Marxist utopian classless society is an absolute absence of 
deprivation obtainable. Care should however be taken that the discussion of relative poverty 
does not end in absurdum, whereby one falls into the conclusion that since everybody is 
relatively deprived, therefore everybody is poor. The way out of this danger will be seen in 
our treatment of the theory of basic needs later in this work. It is to be noted that a truly 
                                                 
17 Jones, C. and Novak, T., Poverty, Welfare and Disciplinary State, New York 1999, 24  
18  Amin, A., Globalisation and Regional Development: A Relational Perspective. Magazine of Change and  
      Competition 3 (1998) 1-2 
19  Devine, A. J and Wright, D. J., Op. Cit., 3 
20  Ibid., 4 
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workable, satisfactory definition of poverty can be neither entirely absolute nor entirely 
relative. A balanced definition has to be sensitive to a given society’s level of development 
and also show a demarcation of people truly in need according to some objective standard. It 
is with this in view that we need to explore the socio-economic aspect of poverty under the 
three different dimensions within which poverty is generally discussed. 
 
1. 2.    Dimensions of poverty 
 
This section aims at considering poverty in its socio-economic, theological and 
anthropological dimensions. From these three main dimensions which incorporates all other 
forms of poverty, we shall be able to gain a comprehensive view which becomes a basis for 
assessing the impact of poverty on the dignity of the human person. We discuss each of these 
dimensions in turn below. 
 
1. 2. 1.   The socio-economic dimension of poverty 
 
Human society as developed through history owes its structure to the interplay of economic, 
social, political and, of course, religious orders. The changes we note in the society are 
determined to a large extent by the changes in the social and economic spheres. The industrial 
revolution and Marxist economic theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
respectively, even though they may not be accepted in their entirety, buttress this thesis. Each 
society is structured and operates in certain ways which are necessitated by a number of 
objective conditions. These conditions include, inter alia, methods of production and 
distribution which in turn depend on raw materials, industrial techniques, climate, size of 
population, political and geographical factors, and cultural traditions.21 Against this backdrop, 
the average man or woman of today obtains his or her sense of identity from his/her belonging 
to the society rather from his/her being a human person. The loss of the sense of belonging is 
often described as being poor on the social level. Social poverty is therefore the socially poor 
standing of a person.22 Individuals, families and groups in a given society are designated as 
poor when they lack the means to participate in the activities and the living standards which 
are customary in the society to which they belong.23 Maintaining the social cohesion may be 
                                                 
21 Cf. Fromm, E., The Sane Society (2nd. Ed.) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1991, 77 
22 Cf. Morris, C., The Welfare State: Putting the Records Straight, London, 1994, 33 
23 Cf. Lewis, S., Social and Economic Effects of Poverty, London 1993, 46 
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what the poor need most, sometimes even more than material things. The inability to generate  
this social capital24 can lead to the loss of respect within the social group. And when this 
situation persists one can quickly lose his/her identity and be forgotten. Social poverty can 
exist as either absolute or relative poverty. 
           
 The discussion of social poverty is inextricably bound to economic poverty. There cannot be 
any true research into social poverty without reference to economic conditions and vice versa. 
This means that focusing on economic poverty in this work is a continuation of the discussion 
of social poverty as the two overlap profoundly. Economic poverty is what is generally 
understood when we talk of poverty, because poverty is commonly considered as material in 
nature.25 Although economic poverty has material lack as its basis, it can be manifested in 
other forms like relative shortage of goods and services.26 According to Mariz, “the poor are 
those who do not earn enough to survive physically, or those who spend their entire income to 
obtain only the basic needs.”27 In South Africa, the poor are characterized as “those who do 
not have secure jobs”, and poor communities are characterized by widespread absence of 
formal employment. Furthermore, the poor have “numerous small, often dangerous jobs, 
rather than one job.” 28  The consequences of the foregoing is the fact of “economic 
inferiority”29 on the part of the poor and the subsequent stratification in the society. With 
reference to this, Moynihan, in his study of poverty in the United States, defines the poor as 
“those able-bodied persons and their dependents whose lack of income and wealth places 
them at the bottom-most layer of the society and whose sources of income lie in either welfare 
payments or in unskilled and poorly paid occupations.”30 The poor who find themselves in 
this category are regarded as the “underclass” in some societies. The term entered the 
vocabulary of public debate in the early 1980s and has since been appropriated by  various 
authors who use the term in different and sometimes inconsistent ways. In general, the 
underclass comprises those persons who are at the bottom of the economic and social barrel, 
but most would include the urban criminal and drug-dealing elements within the underclass 
                                                 
24 The idea of social capital is employed to explain such factors as norms, values, and informal networks, as well  
     as in local organizations such as farmers groups, burial societies, informal lending associations,  
     neighbourhood support networks, and other associations. It is believed that these mechanisms can be relied on  
     to lift poor individuals and communities out of their poverty. (cf. Voices of the Poor.... World Bank Poverty  
     Report, 2000, 130). 
25 Narayan, D., Voices of the Poor, 37 
26 Seccombe, D. P., Possessions and the Poor in Luke-Acts, Linz-Austria, 1982, 30  
27 Mariz, C. L., Coping with Poverty, Pentecostal and Christian Base Communities in Brazil, Philadephia, 1994,  
    31 
28 Narayan, D., Op. Cit., 37 
29 Marris, D., The Nature of Poverty, Oxford 1993, 21 
30 Moynihan, D. P., On Understanding Poverty, New York, 1989, 36  
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even though their incomes are frequently substantial.31 Further distinction of the poor is made 
along socio-economic lines between the “deserving” and the “undeserving” poor. While the 
former refers to victims of circumstances and unfavourable economic trends who deserve 
sympathy and assistance, the latter describes the lazy and shiftless who could “do better” for 
themselves if they wanted and who therefore merit contempt.32 A society that has a high 
percentage of the undeserving poor can be anything but a stable society. The corollary to this 
group are those who have taken from the society more than they have contributed as 
individuals or as institutions. The latter condition refers to such government policies on 
poverty that are not influenced by the findings of research or intellectual debate, but by wider 
political, ideological and economic considerations and sometimes by individual self interest.33 
Faced with such a situation whereby politicians enrich themselves more by organising 
programmes on the theme of poverty without concrete steps towards its reduction, we can 
appreciate the contribution of Clemens Sedmak, who challenges us to reflect upon an ethics of 
thinking about poverty. According to him, “such an ethics will concentrate on commitments 
implied in the thorough analysis of poverty. There are epistemic commitments implied in the 
analysis of poverty. These epistemic commitments include the acceptance that we cannot 
adequately analyze poverty if we take poverty to be a ‘phenomenon’ out there, ‘far away’”.34 
In contrast to this attitude, poverty is to be looked as a problem of human persons like 
ourselves. Not until this sensitivity is awakened can there be a concrete programme towards 
the reduction of economic poverty. It is important to note that we are not talking about a 
problem in the kitchen sink when we talk about poverty, we are talking about people. And 
these people are primarily persons, who happen to live under poverty conditions, they are not 
primarily poor.35 As a result of this neglect from the policy makers in the society, Sedmak 
understands poverty basically as “a situation where people experience the fact that both 
individual people and institutional structures have not entered into adequate commitments 
towards these people (commitments deprivation)”.36 What this implies is that the institutions, 
be it at the national or international level, have to demonstrate their commitments in the 
society by making basic provisions which can enable people to do something for themselves. 
Jeffrey Sachs captures this vividly:  
                     
                                                 
31 Devine, A. J. and Wright, D. J., Op. Cit., 77 
32 Ibid., 78 
33 Vic, G., Wealth, Poverty and Starvation: A World Perspective, England 1988, p. 87 
34 Holztrattner, M. and Sedmak, C. (Eds.), Humanities and Option for the Poor, vol. 1, Wien: LIT Verlag, 2005,  
    9 
35 Op. cit., 10 
36 Op. cit., 11 
 17
                       When the preconditions of basic infrastructure (roads, power, and ports) 
                        and human capital (health and education) are in place, markets are 
                        powerful engines of development. Without those preconditions, markets 
                        can cruelly bypass large parts of the world, leaving them impoverished and 
                        suffering without respite. Collective action, through effective government 
                        provision of health, education, infrastructure, as well as foreign assistance 
                        when needed, underpins economic success.37 
 
But while Sach’s position may be regarded as a necessary condition for the alleviation of 
poverty, it is not to be understood also as a sufficient condition. The political will to put the 
basic things in place and formulate just economic policies is imperative. This lack has 
continued to exist in the many years of partnersip between the developed and the 
underdeveloped countries, and even between the rich and the poor in any given country. What 
is responsible for this imbalance? Sachs supplies an answer, which even though it may be 
contested, cannot be denied entirely. According to him, “progress is hard enough to achieve in 
the world without being perceived as a danger. One of the ironies of the recent success of 
India and China is the fear that has engulfed the United States that success in these two 
countries comes at the expense of the United States. These fears are fundamentally wrong and, 
even worse, dangerous. They are wrong, because the world is not a zero-sum struggle in 
which one country’s gain is another’s loss, but is rather a positive-sum opportunity in which 
improving technologies and skills can raise living standards around the world.” 38   This 
disposition can affect commitments on the part of the rich to assist the poor within a country 
or even influence the support from the developed countries to the developing ones. Economic 
relationships are almost entirely profit-oriented and every businessman prefers monopoly to 
competition. To maintain this gap there is a lot of production on the part of the rich countries 
as a way of increasing wealth; and since wealth entails not only consumption but also waste, 
not only production, but also destruction, the space we live in is constantly threatened.39 The 
possible way of check-mating this trend would be to reconsider the criteria for measuring 
poverty and to endeavour to re-unite economic and normative ethics. In discussing economic 
poverty and its social effects, two factors have to be taken into consideration. The first of 
these factors is the problem of finding a reliable method of measuring poverty. The other 
factor is the nature of liberal capitalism as the prevailing economic system of our time. 
                                                 
37 Sachs, J., The End of Poverty: How we can make it happen in our time, England: Penguin Books, 2005, 3 
38 Sachs, J., Op. Cit., 16 
39 Landes, D. S., The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why some are so rich and some so poor, New York: W.  
    W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999, xx 
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Socio-economic poverty is a multidimensional and complex human phenomenon that cannot 
be forced into a particular framework of measurement, owing to the constantly changing 
conditions of the society and the economy. The difficulty associated with the measurement of 
poverty hinges mainly on how to define the “minimum” necessary to live on.40 It is with 
reference to this difficulty in the measurement of poverty that Dörings advocates for different 
forms of poverty measurement for different nations and people who for a short period suffer 
poverty, ie., a passing poverty or distinguish between them from those of permanent 
poverty.41 
 
 As much as this view may be accepted, one still has to contend with the influence of cultural 
and political assumptions of researchers. Principally, poverty measurement is politically 
organised and sponsored to enable the government in question to formulate policies, the goal 
of which is to be informed for action. Where poverty is extensive it will be the focus of 
concern, and policies need to be developed to remove or ameliorate it.42 But even at this level 
of policy formulation, there are factors that significantly affect the reports of researchers, like 
their class, culture and political power vis-a-vis the people being studied.43 All these and 
similar factors not withstanding, there are some theories of poverty measurement which are 
scientifically accepted. We shall briefly consider two of these theories in this work, because 
of their particular relevance. These include the quantitative and the qualitative measurements 
of poverty. 
 
Most  researchers on poverty employ the instrument of quantitative measurement of poverty. 
This is owing to the fact that economics as an independent discipline deals with verifiable 
data on the one hand; and on the other hand the formulation of policies by the government 
needs statistics based on empirical findings. In the words of Townseed, “quantitative 
measurement of poverty is a method which is primarily based on existing statistical 
information gathered by government or other agencies for different purposes.”44 Highlighting 
the advantage of this method, Alcock states that, “a statistical survey, if it is large enough and 
if the sample of respondents providing the data is carefully chosen, can provide an objective 
                                                 
40 Cf. Marris, R., Ending Poverty: Prospects for Tomorrow, Britain 1999, 2 
41 Cf. Hemmer, H. R. and Kötter, H., Armutsoriente kirchliche Entwicklungsarbeit: Eine sozio-ökonomische  
    Analyse, Miseror Dialog, Aachen 1990, 32 
42 Cf. Lipton, M., Poverty, Undernutrition, and Hunger, World Bank Staff Working Papers, no. 597, Washington  
    D. C. 1983, 4 
43 Alcock, P., Understanding Poverty (2nd Ed.)., London 1997, 23 
44 Townseed, P., op. cit., 92 
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and arguably scientific picture of the broader group or society from which it has been 
selected.” 45  Furthermore, Murrey also considers that “the major advantages of the 
government statistics are their accessibility and authenticity. They are usually free and carry 
the authority of the official status.”46 There is no doubt that the quantitative measurement of 
poverty has tremendous advantages, but the problem with its predominance in poverty 
research reflects the reification (Kant: Verdinglichung) of the target group of this science, the 
poor. Poverty remains an end in itself as long as poverty research does not focus on local-
level qualitative research that brings the people concerned to the centre of attention and gives 
them a voice. This practice has, unfortunately, been followed in many approaches over time.47 
The personal touch, which quantitative measurement lacks, is supplied by the qualitative 
measurement of poverty, which treats the poor as ethical subjects with autonomy. Qualitative 
measurement of poverty therefore involves: 
                                                
  
                          A focus on the people concerned, their environment and local 
                          peculiarities is important for the interpretation of their situation. 
                         Therefore, poor people now are seen as experts with the highest 
                         amount of knowledge about their situation, surroundings, problems, 
                         and fears. Simultaneously, endowing poor people with autonomy in 
                         the poverty research process is the first step towards sustainable poverty  
                         reduction. Poverty research processes which contradict this principle 
                         are counter-productive and unethical.48 
 
This may have some disadvantages, but it suffices to say that the involvement of the poor in 
the study about them goes a long way to helping them assert themselves, though there are 
cases where the poor shy away from confronting their reality. But where this has been 
overcome, the feeling of self-worth amplified through mutual interaction can work as an elixir 
in the lives of the poor. With the qualitative theory, the poor instead of being talked about are 
talked to. As in the case of the quantitative measurement, the qualitative method of poverty 
measurement has, as stated its deficiencies. In the first place, the scale of coverage is 
generally very limited. As a result of this, “the description these measurements offer, in most 
 
45 Alcock, P., op. cit., 116 
46 Murrey, G., Disability, Household Income and Expenditure, Oxford 1994, 61 
47 Cf., Böhler, T. and Sedmak, C., Armutsforschung und Armutsminderung: Eine Bestandsaufnahme aus einem  
    ethischen Blickwindel, Facing Poverty 7, Universität Salzburg, 2004, 56 
48 Böhler, T., The Preferential Option fort he Poor and Amartya Sen´s Capability Approach: Two Attempts to 
    Link Economics with the Interdisciplinary Field of Poverty Research and Reduction, in: Holztrattner, M. & 
    Sedmak, C. (Eds.), op. cit., 212 
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cases, cannot represent poverty in any scientific manner.” 49  This is a big minus for the 
qualitative measurement of poverty, despite its persuasive power, because they can be easily 
dismissed by critical academics or unsympathetic politicians as being, without a scientific 
basis.50  There is, in fact, no standard means of evaluation with regard to the qualitative 
measurement of poverty. 
 
The above discussion shows that both the quantitative and the qualitative measurements of 
poverty are needed in any research that intends to address comprehensively the reality of 
poverty in the society. The two approaches as we have mentioned above represent the 
economic and ethical study of poverty respectively. Both should be viewed in the light of 
attempts to integrate the economic and ethical aspects of human life. And we notice that, “as 
soon as economics is integrated into an interdisciplinary approach in the analysis of poverty, 
ethical considerations come into play. Originally, ethics and economics emerged from the 
same scientific goal: economics wanted to understand preferences and choices of all people 
who are participating in the market place. It valued factors of production (land, labour, capital 
goods, know-how). (Normative) ethics came up with moral codes and with a theory of value 
that judged certain things as intrinsically good.”51 Amartya Sen argues in this regard that 
economics, as it has developed, can be made more productive by paying greater and more 
explicit attention to the ethical considerations that shape human behaviour and judgement. In 
the Royer Lectures at the University of California, Berkeley in 1986, Sen stated, inter alia: 
 
                  The methodology of so-called ‘positive economics’ has not only shunned 
                  normative analysis in economics, it has also had the effect of ignoring a    
                  variety of complex ethical considerations which affect actual human behaviour 
                  and which, from the point of view of the economists studying such behaviour, 
                  are primarily matters of fact rather than of normative judgement. If one examines 
                  the balance of emphases in the publications in modern economics, it is hard not 
                  to notice the eschewal of deep normative analysis, and the neglect of the influence 
                 of ethical considerations in the characterization of actual human behaviour.52     
 
Sen proposes the method of “Capability Approach” as a way of arresting this situation from 
further degeneration. This method, according to him, is “based on a broader concept of 
                                                 
49 Rowntom, O., Measurement of Poverty, London 1996, 21 
50 Cf., Alcock, P., op. cit., 127 
51 Böhler, T., op. cit., 213 
52 Sen, A., On Ethics and Economics, United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing Co. 1987, 7 
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poverty since it focuses on the overall quality of life and the standard of living (and not only 
economic well-being). Its goal is to create an alternative way of accessing non-economic 
categories of the standard of living by illuminating individual choices in the economy beyond 
utility theory.”53 The major goal of Sen’s theory is to “overcome the separation of economics 
and ethics in an applied manner.” 54  Sen views incomes and commodities as the wrong 
indicators for a good life, but elaborates instead three theoretical frameworks that include 
three basic indicators – resources, functionings, and capabilities – and emphasises the 
freedom of choice of the individual as the basis for the definition of poverty.55  It is the 
overemphasis on these wrong indicators for good living that has given rise to modern man’s 
poverty in the midst of plenty. This we shall see briefly below in the ineluctable force of 
liberal capitalism which is the second crucial factor to be considered in our discussion of 
socio-economic poverty.             
 
 The collapse of the feudal system and the rise of a new societal form carried with it chaos and 
disorder. The turbulence created brought with it different concepts of society based on various 
socio-politico-economic systems. Till this time the concept of society and citizenship was 
rooted in a strict theological world picture which, without doubt, understood God as the 
“causa finalis” of all that exists. The scholastic tradition prevalent at this time had little to 
offer as far as the empirical knowledge of man and the world was concerned. Working within 
the walls of the monastery on texts handed over to them, the theologians paid no attention to 
what happened in the day-to-day lives of the people. The citizens, challenged by the practical 
work on which their lives depended, could no longer rely entirely on the teachings of the 
scholastics, but thought of new approaches to life. The result was the replacement of 
scholastic thought by the new science (neuzeitliche Wissenschaft), which was based on 
empirical orientation and no longer on gray theological theory (die Theorie ist grau). This 
new pattern of thought was now managed by another group of thinkers who were not 
clerics.56  It was against this background that the industrial revolution was born, an event 
which brought a fundamental change in the social structure and economic life. Machines 
replaced humans in the process of production. The man who had more machines (capital) had 
more production. Thus was born the form of economic system that emphasised the 
accumulation of capital. Commenting on the early periods of capitalism, Fromm writes: 
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                        Speaking of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, two aspects must 
                          be mentioned which characterize this early period of Capitalism. First, that 
                          technique and industry were in the beginning compared with the development 
                          in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and second that at the same time 
                          the practices and ideas of medieval culture still had a considerable influence 
                          on the economic practices of this period. Thus it was supposed to be unchristian 
                          and unethical for one merchant to try to lure customers from another by force 
                          of lower prices or any other inducements.57 
 
The introduction of machines as ersatz for human labour was not welcomed with joy ab initio. 
Reason for the cold feet reception was the medieval ethics in which the good of man had 
primacy of place over other things. Explaining the situation further, Fromm documents: 
 
                          It is well known how skeptical people were in that period toward new 
                             machines, inasmuch as they threatened to take away work from man. 
                             Colbert called them “the enemy of labour,” and Montesquieu says that 
                             machines which diminish the numbers of workers are “pernicious.” The 
                             various attitudes just mentioned are based on principles which had 
                             determined the life of man for many centuries. Most important of all was 
                             the principle that society and economy exist for man, and not man for them. 
                             No economic progress was supposed to be healthy if it hurt any group 
                             within the society; needless to say this concept was closely related to  
                             traditionalist thought in so much as the traditional social balance was 
                             to be preserved, and any disturbance was believed to be harmful.58 
 
This condition was not to last long, as the improvement in the economic system was an 
irresistable attraction for machine owners. The desire to acquire more increased, amor 
habendi habendo crescit (the love of having increases by having), and of course the attitude to  
human values was pushed to second class. “The living human being with his desires and woes, 
loses more and more his place in the system, and this place is occupied by business and 
production. Man ceases to be ‘homo omnia mensura’ (the measure of all things) in economic 
production.”59 With the increased interest in production and accumulation of capital, workers 
are exploited, with the result that many go hungry. We shall take a look at this later under the 
                                                 
57 Fromm, E., op. cit., 82 
58 Ibid., 83 
59 Ibid., 83 
 23
causes of poverty. It suffices to conclude this section by stating that the proper function of the 
economy should be one of service. 60  And it is in this ambience that we talk of moral 
evaluations in the field of economics. There is a growing awareness and demand among 
individuals and groups, and not least among the very exponents of economics, that this sphere  
of human activity stands in need of an ethical orientation today more than ever.61 The current 
economic crisis which has torn the world asunder has its root in a moral/ethical crisis. 
 
We have dwelt extensively on the socio-economic dimension of poverty, because of the 
fundamental role which economic activity plays in the material existence of the human person, 
the absence of which can constitute misery for him/her. But the human person has other needs 
which are not material, such as spiritual yearnings which cannot be satisfied by tangible 
realities. What has been the relationship between the material and the spiritual aspects of man  
in the history of Christianity? To answer this question we shall now turn to the theological 
dimension of poverty.    
                          
1. 2. 2.   The biblico-theological dimension of poverty  
   
The understanding of poverty in the Judeo-Christian tradition has not followed a uniform and 
constant trend. On the contrary, it has been one of complex and at times contradictory 
perception, not uninfluenced in any case by the political atmosphere prevalent at the time. 
Viewed sometimes as a curse and at other times as virtue, poverty has continued to remain not 
only a social problem, but also a religious one. This section takes a look at the evolution of 
the concept of poverty from the first (old) Testament through the second (new) Testament to 
the patristic period, the teaching of the Church as presented in the Papal encyclicals and the 
quasi-political approach in the “fundamental option for the poor” as espoused by the 
liberation theologians. 
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1. 2. 2. 1.   The Holy Scriptures and the Faith Community. 
 
(a)   The Old Testament. 
        The Old (first) Testament is not to be seen as a book, but a compilation of many books 
which tells us about the history of a people God chose for himself.62 In the early stages of 
their existence, the age of the patriarchs, circa 2000 to 1700 BC, Abraham and his successors 
were semi-nomads who led their people from Mesopotamia to Canaan. Emigrating to Egypt 
under the leadership of Israel in a time of famine, they so flourished there that their hosts, 
fearful of them, oppressed them until, in about 1300 BC, Moses received the command from 
God to free them from their bondage and to form them into a nation, leading them through the 
desert for forty years.63 Both their lives in Egypt and their wandering in the desert brought the 
Israelites in direct contact with poverty in its various forms. Consequent upon this experience 
is the “large vocabulary for describing the poor man and his situation”64 There are various 
terms employed in the Old Testament to describe the poor man/woman in his/her poverty 
conditions or the hope which awaits him/her. Americo recounts that the word “poor” appears 
over 245 times in the Old Testament and is expressed in different Hebrew words. Some of 
these include, ani, anaw, anawim, dal, ebyon, and rash.65 These terms have both cultural and 
exegetical connotation, the analysis of which we will not undertake in this work since this 
task belongs to the biblical scholars. However, it suffices to note that all of them basically 
refer to the poor in the purely economic sense.66 The lack of material possession, or rather, 
the means for minimum existence makes them “victims of humiliation, abuse, and all kinds of 
injustice.”67 The “anawim Jahweh” is an expression that appears frequently in Old Testament 
studies and refers to the relationship between God and the poor. Because the anawim are 
trapped in great misery that makes them depend heavily on others, bringing them humiliations, 
and deprived of any means of defence, they rely entirely on God, hence they are described as 
“the poor of Jahweh” or “Jahweh’s own poor.” 68  This term had no religious meaning 
originally; it acquired its religious sense after the Exile when it was used for the “pious” and 
“faithful” of Israel.69 The reference to the period of Exile makes it imperative for us to take a 
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cursory look at the socio-cultural milieu from which the books of the Old Testament arose and 
which documented the major experiences that shaped the lives of the Israelites. 
 
The basis of the economy of the people of Israel was land, and so it was the ethics of land 
distribution and use which was at the heart of their economic ethic. 70  Right from the 
beginning of the book of Genesis, it is emphasised that land is a gift of God, providing from 
its agricultural and other riches the means needed for man’s support. It was understood as a 
gift for all mankind.71 The Lord God planted a garden and brought man into it.72 He was to 
fill the earth and conquer it,73 having been given all the plants74 and animals for food75; a gift 
which he was nonetheless required to account for. With this provision made, there were to be 
no poor among the people of God.76 Every family had its own share of land so that there was 
no economically oppressed class per se. The extended family, the clan, the tribe with its 
endowment of land provided for all. The unfortunate ones (the widows and orphans, and the 
strangers with no family connections which would give them a claim on land), were to be 
taken care of through other means.77 The third-year tithe was for them78 and the gleanings of 
harvests. 79  The same law permitted the poor to pick from the growing crops what was 
necessary to eat provided nothing was to be carried away.80 In addition to these provisions, 
the poor (mostly widows and orphans) had free access to whatever grew untended in the field 
during the sabbatical year, i.e, every seventh year.81 Furthermore, all were to be released from 
their debts in the sabbatical years and all Israelite slaves let free.82 Workers were entitled to 
prompt wages, and the taking of articles in pledge was not to lead to injustice or deprivation, 
nor to the humiliation of those pledging them.83 This was the simple social order of Israel as a 
nomadic people, which gave everybody a right to individual property. The difference in 
individual wealth was attributed to hard work. The Covenant between God and his people also 
implied the obligation to work. Idleness is sinful, as well as preventing others from working, 
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because such an attitude goes against the original injunction of Genesis to till the earth and 
make it fruitful. The social idea given by the Law was that every man should live under his 
own vine  and under his own fig tree.84 
 
The establishment of  the monarchy, however, changed the hitherto prevalent socio-economic 
order. The ordinary people had to support their king, his court, his officials and his army. 
What this meant in concrete terms was that they were to work for the king on his large 
estates.85 Gradually this brought about a structurally unjust political and socio-economic order. 
Israel began to emulate the neighbouring kingdoms, for instance the Canaanites, where the 
king owned all the land and the people held it as his tenants. This contact with the neighbours 
also brought an increase in trade, which also meant that the small land owners who were 
unable to pay their debts surrendered their land to the rich, thereby reducing the former to 
mere hired labourers at the mercy of the rich property owners. 86  The emerging social 
condition implied that the Law of Jahweh was no longer observed and the class structure 
widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Not only the individuals, but group farmers 
were involved in this problem.87 This was to provide the background for the mission of the 
prophets. 
 
 The history of Israel would be incomplete without the roles played by the prophets in the 
social, political and economic lives of the people. These “inspired” speakers were always sent 
by God to mediate in times of crises occasioned by social injustices or natural catastrophies. 
The social injustices, however, were always understood as responsible for the natural 
catastrophies. Prophecy as a socio-religious institution in Israel was not immune from abuse 
and misuse. Although there were even false prophets who claimed also to have been sent by 
God, they were, nevertheless, regarded as prophets, nabi the “one who is called” or the “one 
who proclaims.” The prophets  were known as the bearers and interpreters of the word of God. 
This word found its meaning when it addressed the living conditions of the people. The most 
common target of the prophetic message was the gap between the rich and the poor, caused by 
the former’s exploitation of the latter, as already noted above. In their condemnation of such 
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situations, the prophets never minced words about the rich.88 Of course, the prophets referred 
to in this context were the true ones and not the false prophets who were paid by the kings, 
and who had to stand by them and tell them pleasant things, since ‘he who calls the piper 
dictates the tune’. For the real prophets, the rich were “godless, haters of justice, persecutors, 
men of violence, plunderers, usurers. They fight the poor, lay in wait for them, catch them in a 
net, seize them in claws, traps or nets. They are like lions, snakes, adders; they are arrogant, 
full of curses.”89 The picture painted helps to make it clear that the relationship between the 
rich and the poor was not a friendly one. The ugly situation is captured better by the 
individual prophets in their condemnations of social injustices. The prophet Isaiah scolds 
those who manipulate the laws to their own advantages at the detriment of the poor thus, 
“Shame on you! You who make unjust laws and publish burdensome decrees, depriving the 
poor of justice, robbing the weakest of my people of their rights, despoiling the widow and 
plundering the orphan.”90 These two groups of people (the widows and orphans) are those 
generally referred to as poor in the time of the prophets. The meaning of the two terms 
“widow” and “orphan” may be taken not only literally, but are used also for those who have 
no refuge except in the Lord, hence Jahweh is the friend and protector of the poor.91 In a more 
direct diatribe against the kings, priests and false prophets, the prophet Jeremiah laments, 
“There is blood on the corners of your robe, the life-blood of the innocent poor.”92 He does 
not see it as a single individual act, but structural, “for among my people there are wicked 
men. Their houses is full of fraud, as a cage is full of birds. They grow rich and grand, bloated 
and rancorous; their thoughts are all of evil and they refuse to do justice, the claims of the 
orphan they do not put right nor do they grant justice to the poor.”93 The prophet Jeremiah 
mentions a particular point in the above quotation which Amos takes up, as we shall see 
below, and which underlines the whole prophetic mission in the religious tradition of Israel. 
The expression “to grant justice to the poor” means that the poor have a right to the wealth of 
the rich, at least to a certain degree. This claim goes back to the creation account where God 
planted a garden and put man in it, not as a master, but as a steward, to administer the goods 
of the earth.  
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The prophet Amos in powerful pictorial language denounces the ostentatious life of the rich 
and their oppression of the poor. The incontrollable avarice for wealth and commercial 
fraudulence make the rich “sell the innocent for silver and the destitute for a pair of shoes. 
They grind the heads of the poor into the earth and thrust the humble out of their way.”94 The 
prophet knew very well that the craze for wealth is the source of injustice in any society and 
did not grow tired in condeming it: “You that turn justice upside down and bring 
righteousness to the ground by levying taxes on the poor and extorting a tribute of grain from 
them. You who persecute the guiltless, hold to ransom and thrust the destitute out of court.”95 
The rich and powerful at the time of Amos did not escape his sharp criticism. He says, “Listen, 
you who grind and plunder the humble”96 or one would say the humiliated. The abuse of 
human rights and hence the violation of human dignity is always the spillover of excessive 
accumulation of wealth. This was already a serious problem in the society in which Amos 
lived circa 760 BC. A true son of the countryside, rough, direct, proud, his language rich in 
the imagery of country-dwellers, Amos condemned corrupt city life, social injustice and the 
deceitful consolations of insincere ceremonial.97 There was no place in the house of God for 
those who, “sell the righteous for money and the needy for a pair of shoes; they trample the 
heads of the poor and turn away the afflicted.”98 The identification of the poor with the 
righteous is to be remarked on as this would play a vital role in the understanding of the poor 
in later Judaism, a perspective which was taken up by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. To 
describe the poor as righteous meant that they were acceptable in the sight of God. With 
reference to this, Yuzon writes: “It is as though the righteous God of Israel were showing a 
curious bias towards all who are weak and oppressed, towards the down-trodden who cannot 
help themselves, the fatherless and the widow, the deaf and the blind, the stranger and the 
poor.”99 It was expected that the people of Israel as a nation chosen by God should imitate the 
righteousness of God in dealing with one another irrespective of social status or possession. 
The reign of justice and righteousness would be a confirmation that the people still retain their 
status as God’s chosen people. The prophets are to make sure that this is realised. Amos 
tracing the reign of justice to the throne of God declares: “Let justice roll down like water and 
righteousness like an ever flowing stream.”100  
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There were other prophets who prophesied against the social injustices occasioned by material 
possessions in Israel, but we have chosen the three above to represent the others, for though 
they lived at different times, their message was the same, namely that poverty was caused by 
greed and exploitation. 
 
The understanding of poverty as the consequence of one’s own sin101 or fate102 was a later 
development in the history of Israel. It is this understanding of poverty as punishment in the 
face of life-experience that would become a religious problem, and this became stronger in 
Israel as the belief spread that there was a possibility of balancing up everything in another 
world in the future. As a result of this development, there was a shift in the assessment of the 
poor after the Captivity. The circumstances in which Israel found itself contributed greatly to 
this. Israel was very poor and oppressed during the Exile. The poor became closely associated 
to God 103  to the extent that the term “poor” ( ares ) became a religious concept whose 
meaning shifted to ‘humility’.104 Poverty was thus conceived of as a thing of the mind instead 
of a physical condition. 105  To be poor and to be pious came to be identified with each 
other.106 The poor became the pious as opposed to the godless rich people.107 Even though 
this notion of the poor being pious continued till later Judaism, the trauma associated with 
poverty was not removed. This fact is buttressed by one of the most frequent rabbinical 
utterances that there was nothing as difficult in the world as poverty, for it is the most difficult 
among all the sufferings of the world ( Es gibt nichts schwereres in der Welt als Armut; denn 
sie ist das schwerste unter allen Leiden der Welt).108 Be that as it may, wealth was not seen 
from the point of view of material possession only. A man may be wealthy materially, but 
without knowledge of the law he is considered to be poor. In the strict sense, no one is poor 
apart from him/her who is poor in knowledge of Torah (Es gibt keinen Armen außer dem, der 
arm ist an Wissen an Tora – Kenntnis). Poverty in another guise, i.e. poverty as ascetic 
practice is not known in later Judaism nor in the entire Old Testament.109 This aspect was 
introduced in the New Testament and was taken up by the early Church and the church fathers 
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probably as a way of checking against greed; and also as an anticipation of the end time 
(parousia).  
 
 
(b)   The New Testament ( the Gospels and Epistles) 
         The New Testament does not deal extensively with social questions as does the Old 
Testament. The reason for this is not that social ethics was no longer an issue at the time of 
Jesus. On the contrary, the social milieu of Palestine at the time of Jesus was one in which 
power and wealth were in the hands of a religious aristocracy comprising the families of 
priests, and a secular aristocracy which was made up of the merchants and land-owners.110 
There were people of various social groups who were economically disadvantaged and hence 
socially marginalised. The ownership of large property was in the hands of a few people, 
while the greater majority were paid labourers who were often without fixed employment111 
Constrained by this situation, the poor from time to time banded together and waylaid the rich 
in order to wrest something from them to sustain their lives.112 There was an uneasy calm 
between the rich and the poor. This was the atmosphere within which Jesus carried out his 
mission. Even though there is no definite teaching of Jesus on the social problem of poverty, 
he exhorted the rich to share with the poor and praised the poor (in spirit) as blessed. The 
kingdom of God that Jesus preached was concerned primarily with the personal spiritual and 
moral life of man, the way to holiness for members, but paradoxically it is this orientation 
which in the long run has the most profound implications for social life. Man is 
communitarian by nature, being a social animal, and the moral law provides guidance for 
social life, too. Elements of a social ethic, and those which are to be regarded as fundamental, 
are therefore to be found in the teachings of Jesus.113 One may not find a treatise by Jesus on 
poverty, but the whole of his teaching is replete with the way the poor are to be treated. But as 
we have already pointed out above, Jesus was much more concerned with how people could 
enter his kingdom which was not of this world. This did not exclude material well-being in 
this world, nevertheless cannot be guaranteed by it. The Gospels present us with many 
instances in Jesus’ ministry where attention is focused on the poor. It is more appropriate to 
assert that the mission of Jesus was directed to the poor, here understood as those who were in 
lack, be that of health, food, clothing, shelter etc. It is, however, to be noted that Jesus refused 
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to make this a political issue, he rejected being crowned a king according to the people’s wish, 
since his kingdom was not of this world. 
 
At the beginning of his public ministry, Jesus declares: “The spirit of the Lord is upon me, 
therefore, he has anointed me. He has sent me to bring glad tidings to the poor, to proclaim 
liberty to captives, recovery of sight to the blind and freedom to prisoners, to announce a year 
of favour from the Lord.”114 Jesus’ promise to satisfy the poor and the hungry goes back to 
the messianic expectation in Jewish tradition, which the prophet Isaiah captures very well in 
the second song of the servant, the “ebed Jahweh”. The promise of Jesus revealed that the 
God of the poor spoken of in the Old Testament had come in his person.115  He was an 
embodiment of that which he preached; born in a manger, because there was no room in the 
Inn, 116  had no place to lay his head during his ministry, 117  he knew the meaning of 
deprivation. The evangelist Luke announces the seven characteristics of the Messianic age, 
which are; the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are 
raised to life, the prisoners are freed, and the poor have the gospel preached to them.118  
                                                
 
It is rather the Sermon on the Mount which is often referred to when the relationship of Jesus 
to the poor is talked about. This famous teaching of Jesus is recorded by two evangelists, 
Matthew and Luke. It forms the basis for Christian social teaching. The Sermon on the Mount, 
also known as the “Beatitudes” from the latin “beatus”, rendered in Greek as 
“makarios”(meaning happy or blessed), is generally to be understood as a proper internal 
disposition rather than a legalistic attitude to morality. The kingdom which Jesus preached is 
promised the humble and good people who suffered for their goodness.119 The Sermon on the 
Mount was an announcement of God’s decisive intervention in favour of radical change.120 
The quality of the prophetic proclamation of the Good News was the dominant element in the 
beatitudes, with little or no emphasis on poverty as a spiritual response.121 
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The evangelist Matthew spiritualised the poverty concept. The addition “in spirit” excludes all 
the more the material and social interpretations of poverty. What the expression “poor in 
spirit” stands for is not identical with the stance of the humble, who considers himself a 
begger before God.122 This and similar phrases found in the Sermon on the Mount constitute a 
great hermeneutic problem for the proper understanding of the message of the text as it 
concerns social problems. Both in the theoretical conception and practical application, there 
has been no unanimous acceptance of the text as a social paradigm. Can it, for instance, 
provide moral guidance for those in public life as well as private? As we shall see when we 
look at Christ’s own attitude to the defence of what is right and just, he does not deny the 
right of resistance where justice is concerned – and those who deal with matters of public 
order must pursue justice. But they must endeavour always to temper justice with mercy, lest 
it become hard and destructive.123 In the event of personal interest, I must not be aggressive or 
combative, but be prepared to concede even where right is on my side rather than cause futile 
confrontation or nurse bitterness if justice cannot be done; and when it can I must pursue 
personal interest with justice, not vengeance, in mind.124 The problem in the understanding of 
the Beatitudes is not only with the nature of the text, but also with the timing of the message. 
Is one to understand the message as applicable to the poor hic et nunc or is it something in the 
future? Does that imply that the poor are to live completely detached from the things of this 
world so as to gain the things promised them in the world after? What is the connection 
between the present world order and the world to come? Segundo Galilea does not see the 
Beatitudes as something that lies completely in the future. According to him, “...the beatitudes 
are a promise whose fulfilment begins right here and now, and any postponement and 
relegation to somewhere in ‘heaven’ voids them of their historical content, deprives them of 
their significance for today’s preaching of the gospel.”125 For Nissen, “the poor are blessed 
because the kingdom of God will put an end to their poverty by creating a new world of 
justice and fellowship. And this kingdom takes its beginning in the person of Jesus.”126 The 
gospel of Jesus is about hope; it is the good news of an ‘alternative economic order’ in which 
no one suffers lack, not necessarily because Jesus will establish factories to produce sufficient 
material goods for the people, rather because those who receive the message of Jesus will be 
prepared to share what they have with their brothers and sisters.127 The Gospel, which united 
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man to his/her God, therefore was also a Gospel of solidarity and botherhood. But over and 
above the spirit of sharing which the message of Jesus introduces, the poor will be satisfied in 
the sense that they will no longer be treated like inferiors on account of their material lack, but 
will be fully recognised as human beings. Commenting on this, Nolan states that the poor are 
not promised status or prestige but full recognition of their dignity as human beings.128 
 
Of special importance is the fact that Jesus demands from all those he had called to follow 
him a readiness (willingness) to freely give up all they possess.129 Whoever is called to an 
intimate followership of Jesus must sacrifice earthly goods, because they are of little or no 
significance for salvation, instead constitute an obstacle for the true following of Jesus, who 
himself was poor, though not destitute, from birth to death. However, the qualification for 
being a follower of his was not economic or social; the rich as well as the poor were among 
them; the essential requirement was to be humble of heart, charitable and just.130 The value of 
the poverty or lack of possession which Jesus demanded is not to be understood in the context 
of asceticism, but in that of the freedom and undivided dedication to the work for the kingdom 
of God. Before his public ministry, Jesus lived a life supported not by the luxuries of wealth 
but by manual labour which was common to the social stratum to which he belonged. He 
grew up among those who supported themselves and their families by manual work; and it 
was from this same calibre of people that he chose the majority of his Apostles. Jesus was 
therefore born of, lived, and found his largest following among the ordinary people. Yet he 
did not despise or cut himself off from the wealthy – they were among his followers, too. For 
example, Nicodemus was a leading Jew131 and Zaccheus was a wealthy tax collector,132 who 
on conversion donated half of his property to the poor and vowed to compensate four-fold all 
whom he had cheated.133 There were others like Joseph of Arimathea,134 who pleaded to take 
the body of Jesus after the crucifixion, and in whose tomb Jesus was buried; Mary Magdalene, 
Joanna, the wife of Herod’s steward, Susanna and several others who provided for Jesus and 
his followers from their resources.135 Jesus did not teach a fundamental detestation for or the 
complete rejection of wealth as is seen in Buddhism or as was practised by the Greek Cynics 
and Stoics. The salvation which Jesus brought was for both the rich and the poor. However, 
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he warned against the corrupting effect of riches which were very strongly described in the 
Old Testament, as we saw above. The riches in themselves are not evil, but they all too easily 
tempt us to think they are an end in themselves: possessing them, it is too easy to forget God, 
goodness, justice and mercy, in the illusion of total self-sufficiency.136 This was the problem 
of the rich young man of Matthew’s Gospel who asked Jesus what he could do in order to 
attain eternal life.137 And when he was told to go and sell all he had and give the money to the 
poor, he went away sad. His reaction made Jesus say that it would be easier for a camel to 
pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. 
 
 St. Paul’s concept of poverty is to be deduced from his teaching on the nature of work. He 
stressed the importance of manual work as a title for livelihood, using himself as an example. 
He worked with his hands as a tent maker in order to earn his living and not be a burden to 
others. The community in Thessalonica was instructed by Paul, “not to let anyone have any 
food if he refused to do any work.”138 Paul was of the view that having some useful work to 
do enables a Christian to have the means to help others and it also reforms thieves.139 Poverty 
which was the result of laziness attracted no sympathy in the theology of St. Paul. The 
Christian who works to sustain himself and others under his/her care fulfills God’s injunction 
in the book of Genesis that man should subdue the earth.140 But the apostle to the Gentiles did 
not fail to warn against the problem caused by the discrepancy between the rich and the poor 
in the Corinthian community, where the rich discriminated against the poor by refusing to 
share the food they brought to the Lord’s Supper.141 He appealed to the rich in the Corinthian 
community to show their generosity in aid of the poor of the church of Jerusalem, pointing out 
that those in Macedonia had already done the same. This help for other churches became a 
mark of Christian practice.142 St. Paul had no doctrine that presented material possessions as 
evil, but like Jesus warned against the danger of avarice and undue accumulation of wealth. 
Boff observed that, “although St. Paul warned against riches and their distractions, he did not 
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recommend total lack of possessions.”143 He instructed Timothy to warn the people not to set 
their hearts on money (radix maliorum est cupiditas), because “those who want to be rich fall 
into the temptations, snares and many foolish desires which plunge human beings into ruin 
and perdition. There are people who in craving for wealth have wandered from the faith and 
spiked themselves on many a thorny grief.”144 The obligation to share material possessions 
and the prudent use of wealth can be said to be at the center of St. Paul’s teaching about 
earthly goods. But it is also to be noted that all were called to build up the community; 
therefore, to refuse to work and only depend on the effort of others, where one is not impaired, 
is contrary to the spirit of the Gospel. 
 
St. James in a more radical way rebukes the rich for their insolent behaviour towards the poor. 
He warns the poor against the tendency to be over-respectful of the rich because of their 
wealth. A rich man can only merit respect not because of what he/she has, but because of the 
way he/she has used his/her wealth to help the less privileged. Besides, St. James knew that 
the acquisition of wealth is never devoid of social injustice, hence he scolds the rich in the 
following words: 
  
                        Come now, you rich, weep and howl for the miseries that are coming 
                         upon you. Your riches have rotted and your garments are moth-eaten. 
                         Your gold and silver have rusted, and their rust will be evidence against 
                         you and will eat your flesh like fire. Behold, the wages of the labourers 
                         who mowed your fields, which you kept back by fraud, cry out; and the  
                         cries of the harvesters have reached the ears of the Lord of Hosts. You  
                         have lived on the earth in luxury and in pleasure; you have fatted your  
                         hearts in a day of slaughter. You have condemned and have killed the 
                         righteous man; he does not resist you.145 
 
 St. James could be said to have done for the New Testament what the prophet Amos did for 
the Old Testament.The Law which demanded that we should love our neighbours as ourselves 
does not leave room for making distinctions at all. As soon as one makes distinctions between 
classes of people on any basis, except on the basis of wealth, one is already convicted of 
breaking the Law.146 Faith in God, St. James points out, is of little or no use if it is not 
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demonstrated in works of charity. If one of the brothers is in need and help is not given to him, 
what good is that?147 There is therefore no separation of faith from works of charity according 
to St. James. The issue of poverty has a prime position in the letter of St. James.148 But 
according to Marynard-Reid, St. James dealt with the literal poor and not strictly with the 
religious nuance as is widely advocated.149 The teaching of St. James helped immensely in the 
formation of the early Christian community where all who possessed land sold it and brought 
the proceeds to the common purse so that each person’s material and social need was met.150  
In this way the members of the early church lived within the small Christian family without 
experiencing absolute poverty. The fact that they faced a common enemy and were fighting a 
common battle held them together, thereby making it easier to bear with whatever lack would 
have posed a great problem for them. This solidarity was the secret of their success. 
 
1.2.2.2   The Fathers of the Church and the Theology of Poverty 
 
We have seen how the early church following the example of the Master, Jesus Christ lived as 
a family, providing with love for those members who were in need. This was made possible 
by their small number and the fact that the church was not yet confronted with the wider 
world and its challenges. But the situation was not to remain so. The church had to grow and 
spread to other parts of the world with time. This meant that the egalitarian way of life 
peculiar to the early church had to be reconciled to the changes in the wider society and the 
cultural differences of other people who were to embrace the faith. The theology of the 
Fathers, therefore, was developed to meet the challenges to which the Gospel was 
increasingly being exposed as it was preached more widely; hence the formulation of the faith 
was the main concern, not social issues.151 What we have from this period on the theme of 
poverty came in the form of homilies and not as treatises. Most of the writings in this era were 
on cultivating the right attitude to wealth and private property - which, in any case, addressed 
poverty indirectly - like St. Clement’s homily on Mark 10: 17 -31 “Who is the rich man that 
shall be saved?” (Quis dives salvetur?).152  However, there were a few exceptions to the 
documents that treated the theme of poverty, though not in a systematic way. To these we 
shall now turn our attention briefly.  
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The common characteristic of the documents to be considered below is their unanimity on the 
issue of wealth as something that is good. All agree that wealth is a gift from God but has to 
be used responsibly, since the rich will have to account for the use they made of their wealth. 
One of the oldest documents known as the “Pastor of Hermas” (‘the Shepherd’ by Hermas) 
which dates as early as 170 AD, recounts the importance of solidarity between the rich and 
the poor, examined in the light of the parable of the vine and the branches. “The rich man has 
much wealth, but is poor in matters relating to the Lord, because he is distracted about his 
riches; and he offers very few confessions and intercessions to the Lord, ...but the poor man is 
rich in intercession and confession, and his intercession has great power with God – then the 
rich man helps the poor in all things without hesitation; and the poor man, being helped by the 
rich, intercedes for him, giving thanks to God for him who bestows gifts upon him.”153  
 
Clement of Alexandria, one of the disciples and later head of the Catechetical School of 
Alexandria, addressing the problems of the ownership and use of wealth, stresses the 
Christian duty of being ready to share. According to Clement, the attitude of a Christian to 
wealth should be, “I have something, why should I not share it with those in need?” And not 
the contrary, “I have more than enough, why should I not enjoy it? God has given us power to 
use our possessions.”154  Writing in his already mentioned famous document, ‘Who is the rich 
Man that shall be Saved?’ Clement states, “Riches, which benefit our neighbours, are not to 
be thrown away. For they are possessions, inasmuch as they are possessed, and goods, 
inasmuch as they are useful and provided by God for the use of men; and they lie in our hand, 
and are put under our power, as material and instruments which are for good use to those who 
know the instrument.”155 The knowledge of the instrument which Clement refers to is the fact 
that, “God made human beings for the life of sharing with one another. It is therefore absurd 
for a person to live in luxury while many suffer from poverty.”156 The urgent interventions of 
Clement and other Church Fathers of this era are better appreciated when we consider the 
Roman property law prevalent at this period, which centred on the concept of absolute 
ownership and which bestowed on the owner of property the right to do with it as he pleases. 
What chance, then, did the poor peasants have in the society? Describing the ordeals of the 
                                                 
153 Roberts, A. and Donaldson, J., (eds.), Ante-Nicene Fathers: Fathers of the Second Century (Hermas, Tatian, 
     Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria) vol. 2, Boston: Hendrickson Publishers Inc.  
      2004, 32 
154 The Tutor, 2. 12. 120 Phan, quoted in Rodgers, C., op. cit., 86 
155 Clement of Alexandria, Who Is the Rich Man That Shall be Saved? Trans. by William Wilson, in : Roberts, A.  
      and Donaldson, J., Op. Cit., 595 
156 Grant, K., Early Christianity, New York 1996, 108 
 38
peasants, Jones writes that “they were exploited by the tax collector if they were freeholders, 
by the landlord’s agents if they were tenants. On the failure of the harvest they were still 
expected to pay their rent in kind; the tax collector and the agents compelled them to 
surrender their dues, even if this left them with nothing to feed their families.” 157  For 
Tertullian, the life of our Lord Jesus Christ is a shining example for all Christians: Though 
rich, he emptied himself to share human nature.158 
 
St. Basil of Caesarea was one of the Church Fathers who not only preached against the 
obvious injustices suffered by the poor at the hands of the rich, but demonstrated practically 
his love for the poor. St. Basil was a rich landowner, who later decided on religious life, sold 
his property, gave the proceeds to the poor and entered the monastery. He was consecrated 
Bishop of Caesarea in 370, an office he used fully in helping the poor. In his famous Homily, 
In illud Luce (on Luke 12: 18, “I will pull down my barns”), Basil explains that the rich man 
in question had received God’s bounty. It was God’s land, sun and showers, seed and oxen, 
which had made it possible for ‘covetous hands that tilled it’ to prosper. ‘And what is the 
reaction of the beneficiary?’ he asks. Selfishness: He had no thought of distributing his 
surplus to those in need, only in storing this wealth.159 St. Basil outlined the effects of the 
undue accumulation of wealth on the social cohesion: “Because of wealth, relatives and 
brothers look at each other with eyes of enemies and criminals; for the sake of wealth, the 
deserts breed robbers, and the seas breed pirates. Whoever gives in to the temptation of wealth 
shares in a system of oppression.”160 The theology of wealth which Basil proposed was that 
which centred on the just distribution of material possessions, but, cognizant of the fact that a 
greedy man can never be satisfied, he observed, “if each person were content with what is 
necessary and left the rest to the needy, we could have neither rich nor poor.”161 What is 
meant here is probably absolute and not relative poverty. Basil believed like St. John 
Chrysostom, whose teaching we shall consider later, that the excess of the rich was the right 
of the poor. However, one of the objections raised against Basil’s position is that he 
concentrated on the just distribution of wealth, paying little or no attention to the means of 
production. This criticism may be relevant in our time considering the sophisticated laws of 
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economics. It is nonetheless anachronistic to judge St. Basil who wrote in the fourth century 
by the economic laws of the twenty-first century.  
 
St. John Chrysostom is another outstanding personality of the patristic period. Chrysostom 
(the golden mouth, a name he earned for himself as a renowned preacher) ‘stands alone 
among the great ecclesiastics of the later Empire in that his supreme interest lay not in 
controversial theology but in practical ethics.’162 In the language of modernity, one could 
refer to him as a social critic, who condemned the social inequalities of his time even to the 
point of stirring up the poor against the rich, without intending that. His open condemnation 
of social injustices brought him into conflict with the Empress Eudoxia, which eventually led 
to his banishment for four years, which ended with his death. In his homily on the parable of 
Dives and Lazarus,163 he asserted that Dives had not robbed Lazarus by depriving him of 
what was his, but, by refusing him some of his own possession when Lazarus was in need, 
Dives was guilty of a species of robbery.164 Addressing the rich, St. John Chrysostom states, 
“the bread in your cupboard belongs to the hungry man, the coat hanging unused in your 
closet belongs to the man who needs it, the shoes rotting in your closet belong to the poor.”165 
It is to be noted that most of the rich people at the time of Chrysostom became rich through 
hard work. In other words, their wealth was acquired in a just way more or less. What could 
have been his position in our contemporary society where some rich people become rich 
through the exploitation of the poor? It is remarkable that St. John Chrysostom did not only 
preach against the rich, he equally addressed the poor in a hard and firm language concerning 
their misdemeanor under the pretext of being destitute: “Enough of stealing what is not yours, 
both rich and poor, for now I speak not only to the rich but also to the poor. For the poor also 
rob those who are poorer than they; the richer and stronger craftsmen exploit the more needy 
and less well-off, the tradesman exploits other tradesmen and those who sell in the market.... 
An unjust act is not measured according to the amount defrauded or stolen, but the intention 
of the one who robbed or defrauded.”166 The last sentence highlights one of the essential 
elements of human acts as far as moral judgement is concerned. Material things are good and 
they are meant to be shared; and it is hardly possible to become rich without injustice is the 
summary of Chrysostom’s teaching. He asks, “when we see possessors of good things guilty 
of fraud and robbery, shall we call them good? Clearly not, for if so, the greedier a man is, the 
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better must he be. But is this not plainly a contradiction?”167 It is only justly acquired wealth 
that can be called good. Like St. Basil, Chrysostom was criticised for not referring at all to the 
means of production of wealth, rather dwelling only on the proper means of its distribution. 
 
There were other theologians of the patristic period who commented on the issue of wealth 
and the rich-poor relationship, like St. Ambrose of Milan and St. Gregory of Nazianzus. A 
few of the Fathers have been selected to represent the others, because of their significant roles 
in the social problems of the time. It suffices here to summarise the teachings of these last two 
without going into detail as that would amount to repetition, since all of them taught the same 
thing. St. Ambrose had to distribute his wealth to the poor on his being consecrated a bishop. 
This singular action set a platform for his entire episcopate. He recapitulated his stand on the 
social problem of poverty and the attendant oppression of the poor by the rich in his De 
Nabuthae (On Naboth), which is a commentary on the First Book of Kings, in which the story 
of Naboth’s vineyard and King Ahab is recounted. The lesson is that this ancient problem is 
also a very modern one. Daily the rich and prosperous covet other people’s goods; they steal 
from the humble, robbing the poor of their possessions.168 Ambrose argued that the earth at its 
beginning was meant for rich and poor alike, and questions the right of the rich to monopolize 
the soil. It was for the common use of men, rich and poor that the earth was created.169  St. 
Gregory advised the rich to feed and clothe the poor, since by doing so they would be 
received in the eternal storehouses by the Lord, whom they fed and clothed in the needy.170  
 
The efforts of the Fathers of the Church to solve the problem of poverty in the early centuries 
of the Church’s life were immense, but their proposals and recommendations needed to be 
backed up with the corresponding political will. The same problem persists in our 
contemporary society in spite of many social advancements. It is, however, unimaginable to 
think of a single solution to the problem of poverty in any society. As a way of providing 
lasting solutions, there was a gradual shift from poverty to the ownership of property. There 
were different views on the issue of ownership of property among the Fathers. What was 
common to the Fathers in their treatment of economic issues was their concern that economic 
life should reflect solidarity, brotherhood/sisterhood, so that everyone could claim the means, 
or have access to the means to support life properly.171  Clement of Alexandria was clearly 
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not convinced that property could or should be denounced by all; the important thing was to 
see that it was used responsibly. St. Ambrose was of the view that ‘nature produced a 
common right for all, but greed has made it a right for a few.’172  “Since avarice and greed 
have produced private property”, he continued, “it is only right that those who own property 
should accept the responsibility for the poor, because property was given in the first place to 
all in common so that all might have enough to live on.”173 Both Augustine and Jerome, 
following the Platonic tradition, favoured the common ownership of property; however, the 
former, writing against the Manicheans, modified his position by stating that it is not wrong to 
have possessions; it is only wrong to love them inordinately so that we put them before the 
love of God and neighbour.174 Replying to the anonymous author of the Pelagian treatise De 
divitiis, who argued that the inequality that exists with respect to wealth is due not to divine 
favour but to human wickedness, hence wealth does not come from God, Augustine explains 
that wealth is distributed in apparently indiscriminate fashion to good and bad alike – to the 
good to console them on their journey through life, but not to the good alone, lest the wicked 
think that God should be worshipped in order to acquire wealth; and to the wicked to show the 
good how insignificant wealth is and to teach them to desire other things, but not to the 
wicked alone, lest the good who are weak hesitate to be converted for fear that they will lose 
their earthly possessions. But both good and bad are afflicted with poverty as well – the good 
for the sake of trial and purification, and the wicked so that the good who are hesitant might 
be moved the more quickly to conversion.175 Augustine was convinced that God’s hand is 
present, albeit invisibly, in all the details of human existence, even at times in the disparity 
between the rich and the poor. He believed that the ideal way of observing the counsel of 
voluntary poverty was in the form of a community established along apostolic lines, in which 
property would consist in the basics and be held in common. This position held by Augustine 
and other Fathers led to the accusation that the church at this time was socialist. It is better to 
talk of the church being solidaristic in her vision instead of socialistic. The controversy 
between communal and individual ownership of property was to continue in the Middle Ages 
and even beyond. Since the emergence of modern society owes a great deal to the Church, it 
has been argued that the debate on property gave rise to the two economic systems of 
capitalism and communism. How far this is true is yet to be established on a scholarly basis. 
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The Middle Ages developed systematic studies in the area of moral theology which made 
clear distinction between socially conditioned poverty and religiously conditioned or freely 
chosen poverty. All men are called to reduce or overcome the socially conditioned poverty in 
proportion to their economic possibilities as a duty to the common good and social justice. 
Economic theory as it is known today, was to emerge in the beginning of the fifteenth century. 
The model of economic life prior to this time was basically domestic; the word economy itself 
is taken from the Greek oikonomia (oikos – house; nomos – rule or order) which means the art 
of household management; it was the art practiced by the prudent head of the household, 
managing the income and expenditure for the whole family and the work by which the 
family’s needs are met.176  The canonists and theologians were concerned with economic 
morality only; the determination of the economic structures of society and their operation 
were for society to decide. At the same time, since these structures and policies of the State 
had important effects on the daily life of the individual, and in particular raised many moral 
questions concerning means and ends, dealing with them was very much the Church’s 
concern. The duty of adjudicating in such matters as Markets and profits, just price, usury and 
interest177 was the major theme in the moral teachings of the theologians and canonists on 
economic life. The aim of these teachings was to safeguard the interest of the poor and guide 
the conscience of the merchants; to safeguard the former from exploitation by the latter and to 
guide the latter in situations where their trade conflicted with the faith.  
  
Apart from their teachings on socially conditioned poverty, the medieval theologians dwelt 
extensively on spiritual or religious poverty. Around the 13th century, there was a renewal of 
interest in the life of the early Christians which led to the development of the practical 
activities in the religious orders, both male and female. There was a carry-over from the 
Patristic era as some people “wished to lead a religious life after the manner of the apostles 
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and based their ideas on the principles of the early Church.”178 The arguments of those who 
held tenaciously to the apostolic form of poverty was based on the Beatitudes, in which Jesus 
called the poor blessed. The theologians and the faithful of the Middle Ages had some 
difficulty interpreting this idea of poverty vis-a-vis the social setting in which they found 
themselves. A freely chosen poverty as it is practised in religious life was understood as a 
basic sign of the eschatological behaviour of the church and the expression of Christian hope. 
The ascetic dimension is meant to remove the obstacle that can arise from the attachment to 
earthly goods. 179  In spite of the differences in the practice of poverty among religious 
congregations, there were some elements common to all of them, such as the individual 
renunciation of earthly possessions, but the community was permitted to own property. The 
second variant is that which demands from the individual and the community the renunciation 
of possession of earthly goods; for example, the begging congregation. 180  Poverty was 
accepted as something to be lived with, and the poor clustered along the major roads waiting 
for alms from passing mendicant friars.181 The majority of the poor who depended on charity 
for their sustenance were comprised of the jobless, the disabled, the sick, the orphans, the 
widows, the aged and prostitutes.182 It was commonly believed by the monks that the external 
signs of poverty, like lack of money, scarcity of food, lack of clothing, poor health and 
sickness, when accepted in good faith were a special sign of their discipleship.183 This led to 
the development of the idea of the ‘pauper Christi’ – being poor for the sake of Christ. This 
concept was to condition the life of the monks since they believed that this kind of poverty 
was the best and surest means to come closer to God.184 This does not mean that they were to 
work; on the contrary they were to be engaged in hard work, but none had any claim on 
anything as his own. It was for the good of the community and to be used to do the works of 
charity. Most of the rich who had the monks as their spiritual directors were soon influenced 
by this pattern of life. Besides, the theologians stressed that the Lord will bless the giver in all 
he or she does.185 That means that whatever the rich do for the poor comes back to them. The 
poor therefore played an important role in the spiritual life of the rich.186 It was held that it 
would be difficult for the rich to enter paradise if the poor did not come to them for help. This 
view was not to be upheld for long because of the problems that came with it. In the first 
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instance, the monks who were seen as poor because of their individual renunciation of 
possessions became very rich as a community, receiving as they did alms from the rich and 
sometimes the entire property of the rich on their demise, where there were no heirs to inherit 
it. The rich, on the other hand, abused their charity inasmuch as they thought that giving 
money to the poor was sufficient to buy themselves salvation without corresponding 
repentance.187 This situation led to the radical poverty of St. Francis of Assisi and his friars. 
The first attempt to practice permanent poverty came much earlier from Justin, the Martyr (2nd 
century) who asserted that the behaviour of an ascetic is irreconcilable with wealth. As a sign 
of the rejection of the world, one has to give up possession of earthly goods.188 The radical 
poverty of the individual started with the congregation reform of Pachomios who founded the 
Koinbion – a form of monastery where monks had a common room as opposed to the Laura, 
which comprised individual cells.  Under this reform the community saw to the provision of 
necessary materials. The word ‘mine’ as an entitlement to personal property was put out of 
use. This form of poverty was not restricted to the monasteries, but was taken to the other 
faithful as an ideal form of religious life.189 
 
The unique example of St. Francis of Assisi with his “Beggers Congregation” in the 13th 
century was a decisive break-through in the new forms of poverty. St. Francis, the son of a 
wealthy merchant in Assisi190, grew to manhood at a time when the gap between the rich and 
the poor was not to be overlooked.191 St. Francis saw how the people lived in misery and how 
some others who could not put up with the situation resorted to crime, whereas others 
organised themselves, protesting against the unjust structures that gave rise to the extreme 
hardship. Neither the religious nor the social institutions were immune from the chaotic 
situation. Under this circumstance, St. Francis had a dream in which God asked him to go and 
put his house (the Church) in order, an experience which brought a radical change in him.192 
St. Francis held that material poverty expresses a much deeper and inner poverty.193 This 
means that abject material poverty affects the whole personality. However, he distinquished 
between three forms of poverty namely poverty in material things (pauper rebus), poverty in 
human relationship and poverty in relationship to God. With reference to material poverty, St. 
Francis admonished his friars not to regard the wages from their work as a right, but as 
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receiving what is necessary to sustain life.194 And when the payment for work was not given, 
the friars took refuge at the table of the Lord, by begging for alms from door to door.195 
Poverty in human relationship meant for Francis the elimination of drive and power, which 
takes a person as he or she is, acknowledging the dignity of the person and not seeking to 
have or use a person as an object. It is the way to genuine fraternity.196 This form of poverty 
involves also the readiness to enter into real human relationship without expecting to gain 
something. Hence people should not always look for personal gain in human relationships but 
should see their actions as a contribution to the good of others. 197  The reason for this 
disposition, according to Francis, is that everyone is a begger before God. Thus, Poverty in 
man’s relationship to God should eliminate jealousy and vainglory.198 St. Francis’ attitude to 
wealth is encapsulated in the statement that, whoever understands that he or she receives 
everything from God should not try to own anything.199 The deepening of religous life, which 
St. Francis and his friars championed, gave rise to poverty movements at this time. The Vita 
Apostolica was produced under the Gregorian Reform as a guideline for the monks at the time. 
 
The immense contribution of St. Francis to the understanding of poverty notwithstanding, 
there was not a unanimous acceptance of his teachings and practices within the religious 
orders in particular and the Church in general. Suffice it to mention the dispute between the 
Franciscans and the Dominicans on the issue of the right interpretation of evangelical poverty. 
The Dominican Johann of Belna (1321) rejected the view that Christ and the Apostles had 
either common or private property. The Franciscans opposed to this view appealed to Pope 
John XXII, who in his Ad Conditorem, 1322, and Cum inter Nonnullos, 1323, stated that for 
people to speak of poverty of Christ was heretical. The attitude to poverty outside the Catholic 
Church was essentially influenced by the respective teaching of different adherents to various 
philosophical systems regarding the faith. The Gnostics and the Manicheans, for instance, 
rejected every form of possession, because they believed that all material things were evil. 
This teaching had tremendous effects on the Manichean groups like the Albingensians, the 
Cathars and the Waldensians, who presented poverty as the distinguishing sign of the true 
Church. Joachim of Fiore, protested against the wealth of the Church and proclaimed that this 
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form of poverty was essential for the coming spiritual Church. 200  Somewhat earlier, St. 
Bernard of Clairvaux had formulated the guiding rules on the question of poverty as it 
concerned the religious life. St. Bernard stated that men and women who had taken the vow of 
poverty should be separated in different monasteries in order to maintain their good names 
and to enable them to fulfill their vows. For him, whoever refused to adhere to this was a 
heretic.201 This view of Bernard was long held in the Church and it helped to regulate much as 
far as the religious life in particular and spirituality in general were concerned.   
 
1.2.2.3 The Reformation and the Catholic Response to the Problem of Poverty   
   
 The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century brought a contrary interpretation of poverty. It 
rejected all forms of poverty in the way the congregations lived it and only upheld “poverty in 
spirit.”202 The Reformation referred to here is that initiated by Martin Luther and John Calvin, 
which led to the development of Protestantism. This religious revolution took place in the 
western Church in the 16th century, bringing with it political, economic and social changes.203 
The understanding of poverty in the era of the Reformation is contained in the theology of 
reform204 as expounded by Marthin Luther.205 
 
 Unlike Luther who taught that poverty was the consequence of sin, John Calvin believed that 
both wealth and poverty come from the hand of God and need to be accepted as such.206 The 
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greatest contribution of Calvin to Protestant theology is to be seen in his efforts at reconciling 
ethics and the demands of labour as vocation. Whereas the monks sought the perfection of 
Christian life in the monasteries, escaping from the world as it were, Calvin and his followers 
imposed a strict religious discipline on wordly activities and, in particular, in the area of 
economic ventures like work, use of possessions and money, and the proper relationship 
between production and exchange.207 Calvin accepted the market economy of his time and 
considered the development of economic enterprises as a divine blessing.208 It is in this regard 
that Max Weber remarked that the great ethical innovation of the Reformation consisted in 
transferring the Christian asceticism of the Middle Ages to the secular domain.209 Weber was 
deeply convinced that it was this inner-worldly asceticism from Protestantism which 
encouraged the development of capitalism at the beginning of industrialisation.210 Like his 
contemporary, Calvin affirmed that man is only an administrator of the riches that God places 
at his disposal. Wealth is not condemned, but its use has to be regulated.211  
 
The doctrine(s) of Luther and Calvin with regard to wealth, ownership of property and  
assistance to the poor brought some changes in post-Reformation society which also affected 
the Catholic Church. The role of the Church as dispenser of charitable aid continued during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries though it was only a partial remedy when compared 
with the overall problems of the poor. In her education of priests in seminaries, the Church 
focused her attention on the task of rebuilding the Church unity shattered by the Reformation 
and its consequences; the aspect that attracted much attention was the question of the social 
order in general and the problems posed by poverty in particular. Challenged by the 
Reformation on the one hand, and the Industrial Revolution on the other hand, there was the 
need to make an official statement on the prevailing circumstances. There were most 
importantly the social encyclicals issued by the Popes, which provided the background to the 
discussion on social problems during the Vatican Council II and thereafter. In the following 
we shall present an overview of the documents of the Council that focused on poverty and 
then of the encyclicals. 
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 Vatican Council II was convoked principally to redefine the mission of the Church in the face 
of existential social problems. The ecclesiological formulations of the Council showed a 
complete break away from the traditional Tridentine understanding of the Church as one that 
had nothing to do with the outside world.212 Inspired by the Holy Spirit, Pope John XXIII 
convened the ecumenical Council to discuss the manner and method of beginning a dialogue 
with the modern world (aggiornamento). The Council fathers saw the need for the Church to 
study “the signs of the times”213 and to share in the agonies of modern man so as to make the 
gospel credible and relevant, especially to the poor and the suffering.214 The Council was to 
awaken new sensitivity to the human and evangelical problems of poverty. Right from the 
onset, the Council was faced with the enormous problem of whether and how the Church 
could become the ‘Church of the poor’.215 Two of the conciliar constitutions, Lumen Gentium 
and Gaudium et Spes dedicated attention to the human problems of poverty, while Perfectae 
Caritatis concerned itself with the proper understanding of evangelical poverty in the 
contemporary renewal of the religious life. This last document did not have much impact as 
those addressed were limited only to priests and other religious. 
 
Lumen Gentium takes off from the Christological dimension of the nature and mission of the 
Church. The document challenges the Church to emulate the poverty of Christ, her Founder 
and Head.216 According to the Council fathers, “Just as Christ himself carried out the work of 
redemption in poverty and oppression, so is the Church called upon to follow the same path if 
she is to communicate the fruits of salvation to men.”217 St. Paul articulates this theology very 
succinctly in his second letter to the Corinthians: “You are well aware of the generosity which 
our Lord Jesus Christ had, although he was rich, he became poor for our sake, so that you 
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should become rich through his poverty.”218 The Christological basis for giving preference to 
the poor is to be found in the example of Jesus Christ, whose mission was to bring the Good 
News to the poor.219 In line with this, the Church should embrace with love all those afflicted 
with human misery; and do all in her power to address their need.220 Equipped in this manner, 
the Church will be able to accomplish her mission to the people of all nations. 
 
Gaudium et Spes, building on the christological basis of Lumen Gentium, spells out what the 
Church is and can be for all people in the larger society, a concrete sign of joy and hope. In 
the opening sentences of the document, the Council fathers, on behalf of the rest of the 
faithful, summarised their message of solidarity with all of humanity in the following words:    
 
                  The joy and hope, the grief and anguish of the men of our time, especially 
                    of those who are poor or afflicted in any way, are the Joy and hope, the grief  
                     and anguish of the followers of Christ as well. Nothing that is genuinely  
                     human fails to find an echo in their hearts. For theirs is a community composed 
                     of men, of men, who united in Christ and guided by the Holy Spirit, press 
                     onward towards the Kingdom of the Father and are bearers of a message of 
                     salvation intended for all men. That is why Christians cherish a feeling of  
                     deep solidarity with the human race and its history.221 
                 
Gaudium et Spes, more than any other document of the Council, showed a deep concern for 
the problem of the global rate of poverty, especially in the underdeveloped countries, although 
some scholars are of the opinion that in proffering solutions to this problem, it adopted only 
the Western model of economy as the solution.222 The reason for this view was that the poor 
themselves were not involved in matters concerning them. The Council, as it were, spoke 
more ‘about’ the poor than ‘to’ the poor.223 In fact, there was no perception that the poor 
themselves have anything to say about the problem of their poverty and the methods with 
which to combat them.224 According to Miguez, “the sharp dichotomy between theology and 
social teaching remained, and for this reason, the poor knocked on the Council’s door, but 
only got a glimpse inside.” 225  But this notwithstanding, the document is popular for 
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envisaging a new international economic order in which the poor countries would have a 
more equal share not merely of goods but also of power. By making this suggestion, the 
Council brings out the intrinsic connection between politics and the economy.226 Gaudium et 
Spes was not only concerned with principles, but made concrete proposals that could help 
combat poverty especially in situations where it is occasioned by undue appropriation by the 
rich to the detriment of the poor: “In several economically retarded areas, there exist large and 
sometimes very extensive rural estates which are slightly cultivated or not cultivated at all for 
the sake of profit, while the majority of the population have no land or possess only very 
small holdings and the need to increase agricultural production is pressing and evident to all. 
This practice deserves to be revisited if the problem of poverty is to be solved.”227  
 
Futhermore, the document cautioned against the exploitation of the labourers: “Not 
infrequently, those who are hired as labourers or who till a portion of the land as tenants 
receive a wage or income unworthy of the human being; they are deprived of decent living 
conditions and are exploited by middlemen. They lack all sense of security and live in such a 
state of personal dependence that almost all the chances of exercising initiative and 
responsibility are closed to them.” 228  What is then to be done? The Council fathers 
unanimously accepted that a reform was imperative, whereby “income must have to be raised, 
working conditions improved, security in employment assured, and personal incentives to 
work encouraged.”229 The Council fathers knew that for good advice to be effective, it must 
be accompanied by a good example, and challenged the Church to relinquish her privileges if 
necessary in order to make its witness sincere and effective. Ipsissima verba: “The Church 
does not rest its hope on privileges offered to it by civil authorities; indeed it will even give up 
the exercise of certain legitimately acquired rights in situations where it has been established 
that their use calls in question the sincerity of its witness or where new circumstances require 
a different arrangement.” 230  The realisation of this is what Breuning describes as the 
“culmination of Gaudium et Spes and a major challenge to the Church.”231 Of course, it is to 
be noted that such realisation is, to be understood as a process that demands time and patience; 
more important is the awareness that the Church leads by example in her dealings with people 
and countries socially disadvantaged. Expressing this hope in his address to the Council 
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fathers on 11th September, 1963, Pope John XXIII stated: “With respect to the 
underdeveloped countries, the Church appears as it is and wants to be, the Church of the 
people and, in particular, the Church of the poor.”232 For Barreiro, this remark from John 
XXIII is to be regarded more accurately as a ‘de jure’ affirmation than as a ‘de facto’ 
confirmation.233 Thus he concludes: “Concerning the present Church, both sociologically and 
as a whole, one would be inclined to say that it is the Church of everyone, but especially of 
the rich.”234 The facts of history show that the Church had not had it easy with issues that 
pertain to social questions in the course of time. It is either that the poor team up and accuse 
the Church of taking sides with the rich or the rich point fingers at the Church for encouraging 
class struggle. However, this is not to say that there is no via media which can be of help to 
the poor without hurting the rich. To demonstrate the middle way was the motif of the forty 
bishops from all over the world who gathered in the Domitilla Catacomb outside Rome on the 
16th of November, 1965. These bishops, just a few days before the end of the Council, vowed 
to change fundamentally their life style and their pastoral activities, especially with regard to 
the poor when they returned to their respective dioceses.235  
 
 Vatican Council II remains the peak of Catholic social teaching. The pre-conciliar papal 
encyclicals served as preparatio to the Council, while the post-conciliar encyclicals could be 
described as enormously enriched from the resolutions of the Council. We shall now look at 
the encyclicals briefly under these two perspectives and in that order. 
 
The history of Catholic social teaching began with the epoch-making encyclical of Leo XIII, 
Rerum Novarum (1891). To be able to appreciate the contributions of this encyclical to the 
teachings of the Church on social issues as far as the structures responsible for their existence 
are concerned, we need to take a look at the circumstances surrounding its emergence. The 
nineteenth century started and ended with animosities toward the hierarchical structure of the 
Church. Against the background of the emerging ideology of nationalism, there was an 
unrestrained anti-clericalism which led to conflicts between the Church and the state in many 
countries. For instance the Papal States were lost in 1870 to Italy as a result of such 
conflicts. 236  The main problem which the Church faced as a result of this was how to 
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understand the reality of a secular state, which was, in theory, neutral to all religions. But such 
neutrality was not always practical, a fact that is reminiscent of the German Kulturkampf 
(1871 – 1878) – used to describe the controversy between the Catholic Church under Pius IX, 
and the kingdom of Prussia under Otto von Bismarck. Then there were the ideologies of 
Marxism and Darwinism, which gave rise to various revolutionary movements with their 
dramatic social impacts. Thirdly, there was the Industrial Revolution, which commenced in 
the factories of Britain and later spread throughout Western Europe and beyond. This 
revolution, unlike the first two mentioned above was very significant for the lower classes, 
though its effects left no one untouched. There were basic trends which characterised the 
industrial revolution, such as the shift from the countryside to the cities, which caused 
massive social dislocation compounded by a lack of housing, and which left millions 
unemployed.237  
 
It was in the afore-described social atmosphere that the Pope wrote the encyclical Rerum 
Novarum, whose goal was to restore order and authority, and which aimed to preclude class 
preference and labour militancy. This was not to be an easy task, as the Church was perceived 
by some groups as already allied with the rich. Leo XIII categorically condemned both liberal 
capitalism, which released the individual from social and moral constraints, and socialism, 
which subordinated individual liberty to social well-being without respect for human rights or 
religious welfare.238 He attempted to counteract socialist efforts to usurp personal freedom. 
The socialist system demanded the transfer of responsibility for human productivity to the 
state in the name of protecting the poor. The aim of the Pope was to make it clear that 
economic life, like political life, should reflect the dualistic nature of the human person, 
providing for the physical needs as well as facilitating the quest for salvation. 239  The 
consequence of the dual nature is that both aspects must be taken into consideration in any 
venture involving man (the term “man” is used in the generic sense), because to emphasize 
one aspect while neglecting the other is to have a partial knowledge of the human person. The 
individual is dependent on the society, beginning with the family, for his/her upbringing and 
development needs a conducive atmosphere. This exigency is well presented by Pope Leo 
thus: “If the citizens of a State, that is to say, the families, on entering into association and 
fellowship, experience at the hands of the State hindrance instead of help, and found their 
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rights attacked instead of being protected, such associations were rather to be repudiated than 
sought after.” 240  Both the family and the state owe the individual the protection and 
safeguarding of the basic rights, crucial among which is the right to life and it sustenance. The 
common role of enhancing the good of the individual, and of course the common good, is to 
be played by both institutions in the right proportion. This means that, “if a family finds itself 
in great difficulty, utterly friendless, and without prospect for help, it is right that extreme 
necessity be met by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth. In like manner, 
if within the walls of the household there occurs grave disturbance of mutual rights, the public 
power must interfere to force each party to give the other what is due; for this is not to rob 
citizens of their rights, but justly and properly to safeguard and strengthen them.”241 But it 
happens often that the rights of citizens are abused and robbed by the state which should 
protect them. This takes various forms, among which is the use of human beings as mere 
instruments for financial gain by grinding them down with excessive labour so as to stupefy 
their minds and wear out their bodies. Generally, a workman and an employer should make 
free agreements, and in particular should freely agree as to wages; the encyclical observes that 
“if through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions because 
an employer or contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice.”242 
The encyclical underscored the fact that a greater number of people are made poor through 
this means than through any other means and hence advocated the formation of associations 
of working men, but observed at the same time that these so called societies are unfortunately 
in the “hands of invisible leaders”. 243  The only way out of this quagmire would be for 
christians to form their own associations which would be guided by Christian principles.  
 
Forty years after the appearance of Rerum Novarum, Pope Pius XI published the encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno (1931), which recapitulated the main themes of Rerum Novarum. 
Confronted by the problems arising from the Great Depression, the Pope called for the use of 
capital to expand employment opportunities and for a just wage that would allow for the 
eventual accumulation of wealth by the average working person.244 The conflicts between 
political freedom and economic security; between the economic elite and the working class; 
between economic expansion and moral values; and between the state and the individual, the 
Pope argued, could be solved if men and women turned to God, to Christ and to the church. It 
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is the sharing of this faith that would lead to the experience of unity, on the basis of which 
order and authority could be restored without losing “true” freedom.245 When these conflicts 
are resolved, social justice (an expression which the encyclical introduced), which demands 
the recognition of the common good246, would prevail. Common good (bonus Commune) is 
here to be understood as a good which included and did not contradict the authentic good of 
each and every person. It is in this regard that Archbishop Chaput holds that the common 
good is more than a political slogan.247 It is the prerequisite condition for the existence in a 
human community, where the fulfillment of personality is achieved through knowledge and 
love of other persons. The sheer expansion of economic goods, which does not take into 
consideration individual well–being cannot be described as promotion of the common good.   
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      fulfillment. This view was challenged by St. Augustine, who presented a treatise on another domain, the city  
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There are a number of other encyclicals that addressed the social problems of man which 
include the two outstanding encyclicals of Pope John XXIII: Mater et Magister(1961) und 
Pacem in Terris(1963). In the first encyclical, the bishop of Rome attempted to apply 
standards of social justice to the post-war world, where the social question had changed from 
one primarily related to the struggle of labour against capital to one which featured a complex 
effort to achieve balanced economic growth, providing sufficient profit to stimulate 
investment while insuring just remuneration for all the factors of production and providing a 
social balance among rural and urban, agricultural and industrial sectors of both the national 
and the international economy 248 . Unlike previous and later papal encyclicals Mater et 
Magister contains a lengthy section devoted solely to agriculture.249  
 
Pacem in Terris, the ‘peace’ encyclical, is generally believed to have appeared at the time the 
world needed it most. With the dangers of nuclear war, more apparent than ever before, the 
encyclical was widely received by the whole world, Catholics and non-Catholics alike. 
Shortly before this time, the world had been “to the brink” twice – over Berlin and over 
Cuba.250 The encyclical treats four major themes, which include the rights proper to each 
individual, the relationship between authority and conscience, disarmament, and the 
development of the common good. 251  The issues which John XXIII raised in these two 
encyclicals were taken up in Vatican II Council, which he personally convened, although he 
did not live to see its conclusion. 
 
Two years after the Council, Paul VI published his famous encyclical, Populorum 
Progressio(1967), which placed the social question in world-wide perspective. The Pope 
proffered an economic interpretation of the sources of war and argued for economic justice as 
the surest road to peace. Like many of his predecessors, he rejected unequivocally many of 
the basic precepts of capitalism, including unrestricted private property, the profit motive, and 
reliance on free trade in a world economy.252 More than forty years after Paul VI’s warning, 
the world faces an economic and hunger crisis, whose causes can only be linked to an 
unheeded appeal. By making profit the only motive for economic venture, the human person 
both as subject and object of economic planning is depersonalized and treated as a mere 
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number without life or feeling. But since the human person is neither a number nor a machine, 
he or she is bound to react, and such reactions can carry with them disastrous consequences. 
As a measure to avert such ugly outcome at the national and international levels, the Pope 
emphasized the rights in justice, of the poorer nations to the aid of the wealthier nations and 
suggested quite explicitly that, in an extremely difficult situation, the poor retain the right to a 
violent solution to their problems.253 This is, however, not to be understood as justifying 
violence or revolution, hence the text further clarifies, “A revolutionary uprising, save where 
there is manifest, long-standing tyranny which would do great damage to fundamental human 
rights and dangerous harm to the common good of the country, produces new injustices, 
throws more elements out of balance and brings in some new disaster. A real evil should not 
be fought against at the cost of greater misery.”254 The proportion of the means applied has to 
be commensurate with the good at stake. 
 
The encyclical, which is dedicated to the development of peoples, makes a clear analysis of 
the meaning of development, which does not come from increased possessions or technical 
advances but from a new humanism, allowing individuals to renew themselves by embracing 
higher values. True and integral human development aimed at liberating man from the chains 
of poverty consists principally of the following qualities: the acquisition of knowledge, 
culture, and the necessities of life; the desire for cooperation and peace, with a corresponding 
recognition of human dignity. Since human persons live in the context of social institutions, 
the encyclical argues that any development which is to have impact on human lives has to 
begin at the level of social institutions. Against this backdrop, the Pope traces the root of 
social problems to social institutions and regrets that these problems become worldwide.255 
He alludes to the effects of colonialism256  and the imbalance of power between nations, 
resulting in injustice in trade relations between them 257  as responsible for miserable 
conditions in the underdeveloped nations. He recognised the contributions of such bodies as 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Caritas Internationalis258 but remarked 
that, “it is not just a matter of eliminating hunger, or even of reducing poverty.... It is a 
question, rather, of building a world where every man, no matter what his race, religion, or 
nationality, can live a fully human life, freed from servitude imposed on him by other men or 
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by natural forces over which he has no sufficient control; a world where freedom is not an 
empty word and where the poor man Lazarus can sit down at the same table with the rich 
man.”259 The motif highlighted in this section of the encyclical which goes beyond material 
support to acceptance of the other as a human person with dignity, is essential for the entire 
work, hence we shall revisit it in the subsequent development of the themes of poverty and 
violence. Solidarity260, both at the individual and international levels, is the way out of this 
socio-economic quagmire, the encyclical cautioned. Insofar as this is not done, the world will 
continue to languish in its illness, which Paul VI diagnosed as consisting less in the 
unproductive monopolization of resources by a small number of men than in the lack of 
brotherhood among individuals and peoples.261 To this end, he appealed for the establishment 
of a world fund made up of money formerly budgeted for arms but now used to relieve world 
poverty.262 The question of solidarity as a solution to the world’s problem of poverty and 
hunger was taken up by Pope John Paul II in his encyclical, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis.  
 
The encyclical, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (the concern for social matters), was issued in 
December, 1987 by John Paul II to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of Populorum 
Progressio. It was, published in February, 1988. The encyclical take up the theme of 
solidarity, as its central message. It has six major parts. Following the introduction, the 
encyclical makes a review of Populorum Progressio, focusing particularly on the concept of 
development. Then there is a survey of the contemporary world, which highlights what the 
Pope views as significant failures. Next are a presentation of authentic human development; a 
theological interpretation of modern problems; and a concluding section, which makes 
recommendations on the road to follow in treating social matters.263 The encyclical attributed 
the problem of global lack of development to the East-West polemics. While the Eastern bloc 
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is characterised by Marxist collectivism, the Western bloc is predominantly based on liberal 
capitalism; and both are combined with industrialization.264  The consequences of such a 
system, the Pope asserts, are the stagnation of developing countries, unacceptably exaggerated 
concerns for security, arms trade, and the arms race. The encyclical does not leave us in 
despair, rather proposing a remedy which is to be found in authentic human development, 
focusing on the transcendence of the human being; and proposing as well a framework of 
freedom and solidarity based on the dignity of the human person. This is the path to peace and 
to authentic development.265 Development can be a solution to poverty only when this is 
directed to the well-being of the human person and not limited to material progress at the 
expense of the former. The encyclical makes a very crucial remark by referring to 
development as a matter of culture, and of a culture that promotes initiatives.266 Hence John 
Paul II emphasised education and easy access to information as among the most positive 
means of achieving development. The poor “by taking their future into their own hands 
through a determined will for progress, even if they do not achieve the final goal, will 
authentically manifest their own personalization.” 267  The Pope condemned outright the 
conflict between East and West, because it has inter alia diverted resources to excessive 
armament that could have been used for development in the third world countries.  
 
The most significant feature of the encyclical sollicitudo Rei Socialis is the very broad range 
of meaning it gives to the concept of development. Development is, of course, economic and 
social in its modalities, manifestations, and results, but it is above all a process within the 
human being; it is the expression of a moral dynamic. Thus the moral concept of development 
occupies a greater portion of the Pope’s reflection. John Paul II understands this not only from 
the point of view of the miseries of underdevelopment, which is unacceptable, but also as 
superdevelopment, which consists in an excessive availability of every kind of material goods 
for the benefit of certain social groups that easily makes people slaves of “possession” and of 
immediate gratification.268 The issue of poverty is not directly addressed in the encyclical, 
rather was subsumed under the broader theme of underdevelopment. But even with the 
question of underdevelopment, John Paul II, reiterating the arguments of his predecessor, Paul 
VI, stressed that the Church does not have technical solutions to offer for the problem of 
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underdevelopment.269 The Church as an ‘expert in humanity’ can only make proposals, which 
help her to extend her religious mission to the various fields in which men and women expend 
their efforts in search of the always relative happiness which is possible in this world, in line 
with their dignity as persons.270 The suitable instrument that the Church employs for attaining 
this goal is her social doctrine, which, according to John Paul II, is not a ‘third way’ between 
liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism, nor even a possible alternative to other solutions 
less radically opposed to one another: rather, it constitutes a category of its own.271 He further 
clarifies that the social doctrine of the Church is not a matter of ideology but of theology and 
particularly of moral theology.272 What this means is that the motivating concern for the poor 
must be translated at all levels into concrete actions, until it decisively attains a series of 
necessary reforms.273 By narrowing the social doctrine of the Church to the field of moral 
theology, it logically follows that attempts be made to reappraise the moral status of the 
human person and show how the neglect or radical denial of it can lead to what we would like 
to designate in this work as the anthropological dimension of  poverty. For as we shall later 
see, if the dignity of the human person could be essentially described as consisting in 
rationality and freedom, then it follows that to freely choose to be poor for religious reasons 
does not violate a person’s dignity, rather enhances it. But for one to be coerced into poverty 
by circumstances or other persons is a breach of this freedom and therefore a violation of 
one’s dignity. 
 
1. 2. 3  The Anthropological Dimension of Poverty 
 
Rowland Williams’(1817-1970) assertion that the ‘poor person is first a person’ expresses 
clearly what we intend to explore in this section, the anthropological dimension of poverty. It 
is the third dimension under which we intend to further our discussion of poverty in this work. 
It is, unfortunately, the least talked or written about. Most of the discussions on the theme of 
poverty focus entirely on the material deprivation of man, paying scarcely any attention to the 
human person as subject. Two errors are therefore perpetuated by this practice: One is that the 
poor person is treated as object; in which case a lot is said about him/her without hearing from 
him/her. In other words, participation is denied the poor in an affair which concerns them. 
The second is that all attention is directed only to the material aspect of the human person. 
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Human values are therefore reduced to material values. We must accept the obvious facts, just 
as David Jenkins said long ago in The Glory of Man, “I assume that our concern is with 
persons. If it is not, then I assert that our concern ought to be with persons. To refuse or 
ignore this concern is a failure to face up to what is involved in being a human being.”274 
Anthropological poverty is the complete or partial rejection of the value and significance of 
human beings. The worth of a person is therefore measured by what he/she has, instead of by 
the very fact that he/she is. The outcome of this is the tendency to classify persons according 
to material possessions and consequently treat them as ‘more human’ beings if they have 
more material possessions. It is at this level that the foundation for the future problem of the 
society is laid, when people find themselves stratified into social groups of ‘the haves’ and 
‘the have nots’ and the latter treated with disrespect. Here begins the anthropological poverty, 
with its attendant exclusion. The designation of a group as so-called ‘underclass’ by social 
anthropologists is a casus classicus, of anthropological poverty of which Wright writes: 
 
                  ...there is no single dimension that will serve to identify the underclass. 
                  In most applications, the term apparently refers to the intersection of a  
                  number of characteristics – some structural, some behavioural, some  
                  attitudinal, and some ecological. Futhermore, no subset of these character- 
                  istics is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for membership in the 
                  class. In general, the underclass comprises those persons who are at the 
                  bottom of the economic and social barrel, but most would include the urban 
                  criminal and drug-dealing elements within the underclass even though their  
                  incomes are frequently substantial.275 
 
The allusion to behavioural and attitudinal factors in the above passage calls our attention to 
the issue of the norms of human action. Are there norms of human behaviour valid for all 
peoples everywhere and always? Or is every individual left to his/her discretion in matters 
concerning behaviour? If the latter position is affirmed, what then defines the existence of the 
human society? For this reason, Wright went further to differentiate between the undeserving 
poor and the underclass, pointing out that our attitude to the former is that of ridicule and 
disdain, while to the latter it is one of fear or even hatred. 276  The so-called underclass 
constitute the group of people whose overall social value is negative, those whose activities 
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threaten the very fabric of social life.277 At any time, when the worth of the individual as such 
no longer counts either in the individual himself/herself or in the other person, we are 
confronted with anthropological poverty. What we find shocking in Albert Camus’s novel 
L’Etranger is not even that the hero has killed his mother, which seems here more pointless 
and incomprehensible than wicked, but that the only conclusion is his cry, ‘Nothing 
matters’278 Oppenheimer’s remark to this incident is sharp and clear: “To be unable to mind is 
pathological.”279  What happend to Camus’ hero on the individual level could take place 
among a group of people. When the values of a people are denied authenticity and treated 
with contempt, because of their non-correspondence to another set of values, mankind is left 
with nothing but relativism, the consequences of which are the indelible scars on the psyche 
and corpus of humanity in the history of civilization. As in the case of Camus’ hero, neither 
the people nor their values matter any more. This leads logically to oppression, which Sue-
Ellen Jacobs describes as attempts to prevent some people from having control or decision-
making powers over their current and future lives, as well as measures used to prevent people 
from developing natural human resources. Oppression involves keeping people in or putting 
people into positions of inferiority physically, mentally, or spiritually.280 In most cases, the 
victims of oppression are told that they do not count, that their ways of living are inferior, that 
they should either live according to ways dictated by others or expect recriminations.281  
Jacobs went further to distinguish the different forms which oppression can take, as ‘overt’ or 
‘covert’. It is overt when it involves exclusion from, withdrawal of or denial of resources, 
provision of inferior services or goods, and whatever else might keep a people from achieving 
their potential or having a voice in their own destiny. On the other hand, it is covert when it 
has to do with the manipulation of information about a people.282  Commenting on such 
manipulation of information which leads to derogatory treatment, Argyrou blames cultural 
anthropologists and ethnographers, because most of the time what ethnographers say about 
other people is not how they actually are – in themselves – but as they appear to be from the 
ethnographer’s perspective. Besides, the knowledge gained in this manner, which is 
historically contingent, relative and incomplete, is made absolute.283  This scenario which 
Argyrou depicts is reminiscent of the situation in the colonial era. However, it is erroneous to 
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limit it to that particular period or to a particular people. The reason is that even after many 
years of colonization, peoples of particular cultural groupings or ethnicities are still caught up 
in the same web of derogating and manipulating other targeted groups. And as already pointed 
out, it can have more drastic effects than material poverty. It is therefore not an overstatement 
to assert that the sense of human worth takes precedence over every other need, and that 
people of whatever race or religion will go to any lengths in defending their worth as human 
persons whenever it is infringed upon. 
 
It is an aim of this work to try to establish, based on the material and human dimensions of 
poverty already treated above, those things which are so basic to human existence without 
which the human person could be described as being poor. However, we pointed out that even 
those things which could be said to be basic to human existence may be rejected by a person 
for personal reasons, in which case such a person may not be categorised as poor.  This 
exercise leads us to the explanation of the theory of basic human needs, in order to delimit 
what could be referred to as a poverty-stricken condition with reference to the dignity of the 
human person. 
 
1. 3   The theory of Basic Human Needs and the Notion of Poverty 
 
There is unanimity among researchers that the goal of every poverty reduction programme 
whether it is carried out by the government or private persons is to enable the poor meet basic 
needs. But there is no generally accepted definition of what constitutes the basic human needs. 
The difficulty in establishing a common criterion that would be accepted everywhere is 
attributable to cultural plurality. But be that as it may, there are still certain elements which 
are understood as fundamental for all persons irrespective of cultural differences. For instance, 
food as a basic need is valid for all human persons everywhere, regardless of  whether it 
comes in the form of the African pounded yam (fufu), the Indian japadi, the Japanese rice, the 
German potato or the Italian pasta, to name but a few. As universal as this and other basic 
needs may be, we still have the problem of quantity and quality. The Copenhagen Declaration 
on Social Development284 describes absolute poverty as “a condition characterised by severe 
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deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, 
health, shelter, education and information.”285 In line with this clarification, the World Bank 
in its annual report of 1997 went further to employ monetary value as a measurement and 
identifies “extreme poverty” as the condition of people who live on less than $1 a day, 
whereas “poverty” refers to the condition of those who live on less than $2 a day. This 
standard for evaluating extreme poverty, that is, the inability to meet basic needs, and 
ordinary poverty understood as merely satisfying the most basic needs, does not justify the 
realities of everyday life. Judging by this standard, 21% of the world’s population was in 
extreme poverty, and more than half the world’s population were poor in 2001. 286  The 
problem that arises from the above standard is that it cannot be applied to all people in all 
places and at all times. In other words, this standard cannot be absolutized. Besides, the worth 
of one US dollar is not stable, rather it fluctuates alongside other international currencies. 
Furthermore, this view fails to take into consideration immaterial needs of the human person, 
such as mutual respect. 
 
The views of two famous psychologists, Abraham Maslow and Henry Murray, on the theory 
of needs will be useful in our endeavour to understand what basic human needs are about. Let 
us begin with Maslow. In his paper, “A Theory of Human Motivation” published in the 
Psychological Review almost seventy years ago, Maslow outlined what he called the 
“hierarchy of needs”. According to him, every human person has five essential needs 
hierarchically ordered which he or she strives to satisfy. These include physiological needs, 
safety, love/belonging, esteem and self-actualization. These needs are arranged in a form of a 
pyramid with the physiological needs occupying the base of the pyramid. Maslow identified 
the basic human needs with the basic physiological needs and enumerated them to include: 
breathing, food, sleep, sex, homeostasis and excretion.287 He went further to argue that the 
higher needs come into focus only when these basic needs are satisfied. Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs failed to take cognizant of the spiritual aspects of man and hence incapable of being 
generalized. By making sex a basic need, for instance, he contradicts the teaching of many 
world religions like christianity that exalts chaste and pure life. It is the ability to control such  
instincts that constitutes moral strength, that distinguishes man from other animals. Therefore 
to make the satisfaction of these needs a conditio sine qua non for the maturity and well-being 
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of the human person is to negate the traditional teaching on the human virtues which date 
back to ancient Greek philosophers. 
 
Henry Murray’s understanding of basic human needs is based on his definition of the word 
‘need’. According to Murray, “a need is a construct which stands for a force ... in the brain 
region, a force which organizes perception, apperception, intellection, conation and action in 
such a way as to transform in a certain direction an existing, unsatisfying situation. A need is 
sometimes provoked directly by internal processes of a certain kind ... but more frequently by 
the occurrence of one or a few environmental forces.”288 The foregoing helps us to focus our 
attention on another dimension of the issue of basic needs. They are not to be seen as 
something imposed from outside. The internal mechanism of the brain is involved in 
determining what constitutes fundamental needs. Murray he went further to make a distinction 
between what he described as primary or viscerogenic needs and secondary or psychogenic 
needs.289 The primary or viscerogenic needs are linked to characteristic organic events and 
typically refer to physical satisfaction, while the secondary or psychogenic needs are derived 
from the primary needs and are characterized by a lack of focal connection with any specific 
organic processes or physical satisfactions.290 An important point in Murray’s theory of need 
is the fact that the failure to satisfy the basic human needs leads to agitation and then 
aggression. Because man is a being endowned with reason, the process of resolving the 
conflict between the ‘world of desire’ and the ‘world of limit’291 ought to be moderated by 
moral decisions. 
 
A more general classification of basic human needs includes shelter, food, health, education 
and love. Shelter here refers to a place of last resort, where one feels free and secure. It does 
not necessarily matter what standard, but more important is the fact that one has a place to call 
his or her own. It was in this vein that Nelson Mandela observed in his autobiography that ‘an 
African is not considered really a man until he builds his own house’ or put in another way, 
till he finds a shelter that he can call his own. The statement is not only valid for Africans, but 
for all mankind. It is equally pertinent to observe that a European can live in an apartment 
where he/she pays rent monthly and be happy even if he could afford to build a house from 
his resources. The matter is, however, different for an African, with whom present cultural 
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influence and/or competitive spirit make it at times difficult to draw a line between what one 
actually needs and what one desires out of greed. Topliste’s definition of basic needs in a 
narrow and a broad sense, respectively, as “those things necessary for survival”292 and as 
“those things reflecting the prevailing standard of living in the community” 293  is of 
importance here. Next to shelter is food, which is here understood to also include potable 
water. When these two conditions are fulfilled, next need is for health care, education and 
love, which are essential to the socialization process. While human beings share the need for 
food and shelter with all other animals, the need for health care, education and love is entirely 
and uniquely a basic human need. For it involves receiving and imparting values which 
distinguish us as human beings. The reception and integration of the values of a particular 
culture into which we are born makes us members of the same culture, albeit these values are 
liable to change through contact with the cultural values of other people of a different social 
context. Corroborating the necessity of the social context, Atkinson asserts that “the 
satisfaction of the basic needs as a universal imperative has sense only in a social context 
characterised by effective enjoyment of the fundamental human rights.”294 The concept of 
basic needs may change in a social context, but such a change may arise as a result of the 
improvement of the social living conditions, but never in the context of a reduction. 
 
The above analysis helps us to arrive at the conclusion that the basic human needs may differ 
in levels, but never in form since human beings are the same everywhere. Although food is 
considered to be the most basic need,295 it is impossible to survive on it alone.296 Besides, the 
emphasis on economics, as Golding remarks, has tended to blot out the ultimate policy goal, 
which is not only to eradicate physical poverty but also to provide human beings with the 
opportunity to fully realise their potential. 297  The main concern of the poor may not be 
necessarily to be provided with these basic needs, but much more to be given the opportunity 
to earn the basic needs by themselves. That is why the current demand for poverty reduction 
in particular and for development in general is directly focused on man and his/her needs for 
social justice as a major instrument.298 This dimension is imperative if human society is to 
know peace. For as J. F. Kennedy stated in his inaugural address: “To those peoples in the 
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huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge 
our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required – not because 
the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a 
free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”299 This 
is a duty the society cannot afford to neglect, since the consequences are grave. At the same 
time cultivating the virtue of self-control and being contented with what one has is very 
important in our contemporary world of consumerism and offensively conspicuous waste. 
 
1. 4      C o n c l u s i o n 
 
Underlying human struggle in socio-economic milieu is the goal of trying to escape the fangs 
of poverty. Paradoxically, the same struggle which enables some to escape this social problem 
creates it for others. In the above concluded chapter we saw that poverty is a social problem 
and not something natural to man. The degree of poverty from which a people suffers 
therefore varies from one society to another and is conditioned by various factors within each 
society. While we may talk of poverty as a global phenomenon, some countries are much 
more affected than others, and even within the same countries some individuals are not 
touched by the reality of poverty. Thus a distinction was made between relative poverty and 
absolute poverty, with the conclusion that when we talk of the problem of poverty, it is 
absolute poverty that is meant since, in the context of relative poverty, every poor person is 
poor relative to some others in the same social setting. This distinction helped to underscore 
the fact that all the concern about poverty is mainly about socio-economic poverty. To address 
this limitation we have broadened the understanding of poverty to include theological and 
anthropological poverty. The former which is also called spiritual or evangelical poverty 
concerns the self-denial of the right to private property for the sake of the kingdom of God. 
With reference to this form of poverty, we took a cursory look at the history of Western 
civilization and the contributions of the various religious orders to the question of poverty. 
Whether it is called askesis or the rejection of material possessions, the individuals or groups 
involved in that form of life made the choice freely. Anthropological poverty, on the other 
hand, refers to the discrimination or the humiliation meted out to the poor as a result of their 
material deprivation. It is used here to designate the pitiable state of man when the individual 
is blocked from all avenues to education in general and moral education in particular for the 
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sheer pursuit of material possessions. The trend whereby the human person is no longer 
valued for what he/she is, but for what he/she has or can do, is very dangerous for our human 
society judging from historical experience. The uncontrolled pursuit of material wealth 
without any reference to the demands of ethical principles is one of the major factors 
militating against the alleviation of poverty. 
 
To answer the question of who can be designated as being really poor, we took up the theory 
of basic human needs. Although it was difficult to establish a criterion of assessment of basic 
needs which is valid for all people at all times, certain elements like food, shelter and clothing 
are common to all peoples irrespective of colour, language or religion. These fall under 
primary basic needs. But to stop at this as the focus of poverty reduction or eradication in the 
21st century is to fail to move with time. Hence the secondary needs which we treated under 
socialization became imperative. This includes, inter alia, the education and training of 
children in various skills as a means of overcoming poverty. This is capability training. We 
concluded that the education of the human person in the virtues of hard work, self-control and 
contentment is the solution to the problem of poverty. After all is said and done, the really 
poor man is not he/she who has the least, but he/she who wants the most. It is therefore 
“wants” not “needs” that breed violence. 
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                                                       CHAPTER TWO 
THE ROOT CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF POVERTY IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
 
2. 0  I n t r o d u c t i o n 
 
In discussing the causes and consequences of poverty, few preliminary remarks are pertinent. 
The first is the fact that poverty is not caused by one single factor, but chains of inter-locking 
factors which range from social, political, economical, geographical and pathological.1 The 
next point to be noted is the reciprocal interplay between the factors which serve as both 
causes and effects of poverty. Take for example the issue of disease which can be considered 
as both a cause and an effect of poverty at the same time. The same reciprocal relationship 
exists between the causes and consequences of poverty. Finally, cognizant of the fact that the 
causes of poverty are numerous and vary from one region to the other, we would want to 
classify the causes under three broad themes: the geograpical and natural resources arguments, 
the disease and overpopulation arguments; the leadership problem and foreign policy 
arguments; and finally educational deficit arguments. 
 
2. 1   The Root Causes of Poverty  
2. 1. 1  Argument 1: Geography and Natural Resources 
 
One of the arguments adduced for the widespread poverty in the whole of Africa is the harsh 
climatic condition in that continent. The African tropical climate affects drastically not only 
the agricultural life of the people, but also the people themselves. This imbalance in nature 
has been seen by some scholars as the major cause of abject poverty which stands in contrast 
to the favorable conditions in temperate regions of the West. In view of the effects of the 
climate on the arable land in Africa in comparison to Europe, David Landes argues that 
Europe does have winters, cold enough to keep down pathogens and pests. Winter’s severity 
increases as one moves east into continental climes, but even the milder versions fend off 
morbidity. Endemic disease is present, he observed, but nothing like the disablers and killers 
found in hot lands. 2  Africa is confronted with the intensive tropical heat with its many 
                                                 
1 The term „pathological“ is here used to refer to different forms of incapacity resulting from bodily or mental  
      sickness, which impedes the person from living a normal life. 
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consquences as manifested in cyclical droughts and the advancement of the desert. Owing to 
the long absence of rains in some parts, the dry areas turn to desert, and the sands of the desert 
become an implacable invader, smothering once fertile lands on the periphery. Studies carried 
out around 1970 showed that the desert was advancing into the Sahel at the rate of 18 feet an 
hour. 3  Such expansion of wasteland constitutes a great problem for agriculture in the 
continent. The crops wither as a result of scarcity of water and the topsoil is blown away by 
wind. John Kenneth Galbraith’s remark on the enormous effect of this physical phenomenon 
is crucial: “If one marks off a belt a couple of thousand of miles in width encircling the earth 
at the equator, one finds within it no developed countries. . . . Everywhere the standard of 
living is low and the span of human life is short.”4 Paul Streeten corroborates this: 
 
                          Perhaps the most striking fact is that most underdeveloped countries 
                             lie in the tropical and semi-tropical zones, between the Tropic of Cancer 
                             and Tropic of Capricorn. Recent writers have too easily glossed over  
                             this fact and considered it largely fortuitous. This reveals the deep-seated 
                             optimistic bias with which we approach problems of development and 
                             the reluctance to admit the vast differences in initial conditions with  
                             which today’s poor countries are faced compared with the pre-industrial 
                              phase of more advanced countries.5 
 
With modern technology this problem could be addressed, but that demands capital 
investment, which the tropical countries cannot afford. Besides, it has been suggested that the 
pace of environmental destruction and desertification in Africa has been accelerated rather 
than retarded by the introduction of advanced farming technology in the colonial and post-
colonial periods. In addition, the situation is not attractive to foreign investors because of the 
fear of disaster, as nature does not enter into an agreement with man. The physical ecology 
not only militates against agro-economics, but determines the distribution of natural resources. 
Not only the physical environment is hampered by the climate, but also the human person. It 
is believed that the intensive sun and its concomitant heat make the people from the region 
lazy. But laziness is not the issue. The law of heat exhaustion applies to all, and only few 
people manage to work at full capacity when the weather is hot and wet. Recounting his 
experience, a Bangladeshi diplomat writes that in countries like India, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Nigeria and Ghana he felt enervated by the slightest physical or mental exertion, whereas in 
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4 Landes, S. A., The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, op. cit., 5 
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the UK, France, Germany or the US he always felt reinforced and stimulated by the temperate 
climate, not only during long stays, but even during brief travels.6   
 
The magnitude of the problem of inimical climate becomes obvious when we consider the 
fact that at least 80% of the more than half a billion people in Africa, south of the Sahara earn 
their living from agriculture.7 The uneven distribution of rain is equally a hinderance to both 
subsistence and large scale farming. Tropical areas generally have rainfall, but the timing is 
often irregular and unpredictable with heavy downpours. In some other places where the rain 
lasts for a longer time there is always the danger of flood that destroys farm crops. 
Furthermore, marshy areas make it impossible for roads to be constructed to help in the 
transportation of farm produce, thereby preventing farmers from marketing their produce. 
 
As plausible as the argument here discussed may seem, it is not a sufficient argument for the 
perduring acute poverty in the continent. On the contrary, it bespeaks the difficulty of 
insufficient education and acute lack of technical know-how, which are variables of the 
problem of poverty. There is, after all, no portion of the earth without its own physical 
problems. Some parts of the world which are better today owe their development to the 
sacrifices of a few individuals, who even at the cost of their lives were determined to find a 
solution to their peculiar difficulties. Some times when I reflect on what people go through in 
Europe in the cold seasons, I come to the conclusion that Africa would have been worse off if 
it had the winter of the West with its cost-intensive snow. Why is Europe not poor because of 
winter and the snow? 
 
2. 1. 2  Argument 2: Disease and Overpopulation 
 
Closely associated with the afore-discussed geographical factors as causes of poverty is the 
problem of disease and overpopulation. Research has established that the African tropical 
climate is very conducive for the breeding and transmission of certain vectors. One needs to 
think of the number of lives claimed annually by the most dreaded illness (before AIDS 
appeared in the 80s) malaria. Malaria is a potentially fatal protozoan disease transmitted by a 
specific kind of mosquito, the genus anopheles, which thrives mainly in Africa. The disease is 
treatable, yet, incredibly, it still claims up to three million lives per year, mostly young 
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children, about 90% of whom live in Africa. The rest of the deaths occur in other tropical 
regions of the world.8 There is a hypothesis that malaria had coevolved with humans in Africa, 
and the result was a special intensity of transmission unequaled in any other part of the 
world.9 Although we do not have facts to prove this, the degree of vulnerability of Africans to 
this disease tends to make the hypothesis credible. The female anopheles mosquito which 
transmits the disease, takes a blood meal from a person already infected with malaria. After 
being ingested by the mosquito, the parasite finds its way to the mosquito’s gut. There it 
undergoes a life-cycle metamorphosis, after which the parasite migrates back to the 
mosquito’s salivary glands, where it can be injected into another victim. The life-cycle change, 
called sporogony, is said to take roughly two weeks, which is equally the life-span of the 
mosquito. It can happen that the mosquito dies before the completion of the sporogony. The 
main ecological problem with this process and the reason why Africa is particularly affected 
is that the warmer the temperature, the faster the sporogony – and the more likely it is that the 
anopheles lives to become infective.10  
 
How can malaria cause poverty or vice versa?  There is obviously a dual relationship of 
causation between malaria and poverty. In the first place, poverty exacerbates malaria by 
leaving impoverished households and governments without the financial means to fight the 
disease. Richer households and governments can afford to spray homes with insecticide or 
install screen doors and windows to help ward off mosquitoes; or even buy insecticide-treated 
bed nets.11 Since only few people can afford some or all of these measures, most are exposed 
to the disease and many consequently lose their lives. Mention has to be made, in any case, of 
the lack of simple hygiene in the immediate environment which helps mosquitoes to breed at 
a high rate. Sometimes basic environmental cleanliness would have helped to ward off the 
insects and the disease they transmit, but it is often difficult to get people do something in a 
situation where the immediate result is not perceived. 
 
On the other hand, malaria causes poverty by causing absenteeism from work and school. 
Sachs, in his already cited work, recalls how malaria and yellow fever delayed the 
construction of the Panama Canal for more than thirty years.12 Malaria can therefore stop 
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9 Ibid., 198 
10 Ibid., 198 
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12 The first attempt, led by the great French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps, ended in tragedy when these two  
      mosquito-borne diseases struck down the work-force. Only after the United States invested heavily in a  
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investment projects and prevent foreigners from getting into any kind of business partnership 
with the people. The investment in human capital is equally not guaranteed, as children who 
suffer repeated bouts of malaria can suffer lifetime ill-effects caused by chronic anaemia and 
prolonged complications. This can disrupt their education and thereby affect their chances of 
getting a well-paid job. The high degree of uncertainty which malaria brings with it leads to 
high birth rates in rural areas. The fear that their children will not survive the onslaught of 
malaria makes farmers in the rural areas marry many wives and very early in order to beget 
many children whose survival then depends on fate. In other words, the fact that children die 
in large numbers make parents to overcompensate and have more children, with devastating 
results, namely inadequate funds to invest in the education of all of them. This course of 
action does not really follow, because it could be argued another way, namely that one who 
has not sufficient means to take care of two or three children makes the condition worse not 
better by begetting more. Malaria, nonetheless, is known as the biggest killer-disease in the 
whole world.  
 
Apart from the problem of malaria, Africa still has to contend with the HIV/AIDS pandemics 
which struck the continent in the early 1980s, with the first identified case in Uganda. Like 
malaria, HIV/AIDS has spread like wildfire and cuts across all age brackets, children, youths 
and the old; but unlike malaria, HIV/AIDS is not dependent on the tropical climatic factors. 
HIV is a biological entity that is responsive to medical intervention, but the epidemic has 
continued to expand largely due to the failure to tackle societal conditions that increase 
vulnerability and the risk of infection. In any case, poverty plays a very vital role in both the 
contraction and transmission of  this disease.  
 
There are several widespread hypotheses concerning the extreme cases of HIV/AIDS in 
Africa. These range from the supposition that the sexual networking is different in Africa 
(there are more relationships between older men and younger women and more concurrent 
relationships) to the view that HIV/AIDS is transmitted more easily in Africa because the 
population has other untreated ailments (malaria, other sexually transmitted diseases), or the 
                                                                                                                                                        
      mosquito-control effort guided by colonel William C. Gorgas was the canal constructed. Sachs further  
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frequent circumcision of girls.13 There is no research yet to establish the veracity of these 
hypotheses and their peculiarity to Africa. The fact, however, remains that HIV/AIDS is an 
unmitigated tragedy and a development disaster in the whole of Africa especially in the 
eastern and southern regions of the continent.  
 
A recent UNAIDS report states that the scale and trends of the epidemics in the different 
African regions vary considerably, with southern Africa most affected. In 2007 this region 
accounted for almost a third (32%) of all new HIV infections and AIDS related deaths 
globally, with national adult HIV prevalence exceeding 15% in eight countries (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in 2005.14 
The report went further to state that “more than three quarters of all AIDS deaths globally in 
2007 occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa.”15 South Africa is the country with the largest case of 
infections in the world. The country’s department of Health estimated that 18.3% of adults 
between 15 and 49 years were living with HIV in 2006. The majority of those affected were 
mainly young women and girls. Young women especially in South Africa face greater risks of 
becoming infected than men. Women, according to a study carried out by Rehle et. al., 
accounted for about 90% of the HIV infections, among whom were 15 – 29-year-old women, 
in 2005.16 The above data are meant to provide us with an idea of the enormity of the havoc 
which AIDS is causing in Africa, the degree of which was captured vividly by Johanna 
McGeary in the following lines, “Society’s fittest, not its frailest, are the ones who die – 
adults spirited away, leaving the old and the children behind. You cannot define risk groups: 
everyone who is sexually active is at risk. Babies too are unwittingly infected by mothers. 
Barely a single family remains untouched. Most do not know how or when they caught the 
virus, many never know they have it, many who do know don’t tell anyone as they lie 
dying.”17 This should not however, serve as a basis for blaming the victims in line with the 
age old moral model that the disease is a punishment for the sexually promiscuous. For if this 
argument had any validity, writes Bujo, then it could not be restricted to sexually transmitted 
illnesses, but all other diseases would have to be explained similarly. For instance, lung 
cancer would be categorized as God´s punishment for smoking.18 However, that does not 
exclude the fact that a change in sexual behaviour is an important step in the prevention of the 
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disease. And then to realise that the majority of those infected with HIV/AIDS are women 
calls for urgent attention to the problem of gender inequality and the lack of empowerment of 
women and girls in the whole continent of Africa.  
 
The AIDS epidemic is considered one of the most important issues related to poverty in 
Africa in recent times, with approximately 25.4 million people living with HIV and over 3 
million new infections occurring each year. The coping capacities of African households and 
communities are stretched beyond limit when confronted by AIDS in the face of already 
existing extreme poverty. Besides, there are other health concerns apart from AIDS: Measles 
alone kills over 500,000 African children each year, according to the Red Cross, and 11 
million children die before their fifth birthday each year as a result of mostly preventable 
diseases, including malaria, diarrhea and pneumonia. Speaking on this issue, Sustainable 
Development International observes that the record of African countries in dealing with 
disease is not encouraging. Millions of people in Africa simply do not have access to trained 
medical personnel, and even if they do, essential medical equipment and drugs are either not 
available or supplies are not sustainable.19 
 
Another factor which plays a crucial role in combating the problems of disease and poverty in 
Africa is overpopulation. Africa is the world’s second largest and second most populous 
continent, after Asia. With the population distribution at 30. 2 million square kilometer, it 
covers 6 % of the earth´s total surface area and 20. 4% of the total land area. The estimate in 
2007 put the African population at just over 934 million.20 It is possible that the actual figure 
is higher than this estimate, given the problems associated with census-taking in developing 
countries, ranging from lack of expertise to evasion. 
 
The booming population in Africa, if we can still describe it as such given the massive deaths 
caused by disease, is attributed primarily to lack of education. Africa occupies the unenviable 
first position as the continent with the highest number of illiterates. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (founded in 1945) in its regional overview 
on Sub-Saharan Africa in the year 2000 reported that only 58 % of children were enrolled in 
primary schools. 21  Further in the same report, it was observed that while illiteracy is 
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decreasing in other parts of the world, it is on the increase in Africa. For instance, illiteracy 
increased from 131. 4 million in 1990 to 136 million in 2000.22 The result of this situation is 
that, as female education has not been welcomed in some parts of Africa, young girls get 
married early and begin to ‘make babies’. The time spent in educational training, if this were 
available, would have been a check against early marriage. We can understand why such 
young parents, who are lured into begetting children by instinct or custom without adequate 
preparation, can only perpetuate poverty. This is what leads to generational poverty. Illiteracy 
is equally manifested in the upbringing of the children in terms of healthcare. Most mothers 
lack basic information on health-care and preventive measures against infant diseases. 
 
The next factor which contributes to the booming population in Africa is the marriage system 
which is still predominantly polygamous. The monogamous form of marriage which 
Christianity brought to Africa has still to take root even after so many years. Many factors 
contribute to the persistence of polygamy and hence to overpopulation in Africa. We cannot 
here go deeply into this area, but it suffices to say that large families (many children and of 
course more than one wife) are a status symbol in many parts of Africa even in the 21st 
century. The training of male children in Western education as lawyers or medical doctors is 
gradually creeping in as a rival to the traditional title-taking, but that will take some time to 
replace the old system. Polygamy prevails on the grounds of providing more hands for the 
farm work in the absence of machines. Besides, it is a source of security, because a child or a 
woman from a large family cannot be easily insulted or assaulted within the community. The 
family background from which the child or the woman comes is a source of protection and 
pride. The sense of community which is central to the African world-view seems to find its 
fulfillment in the promotion of large families. It is embedded in the philosophy of “So mu 
adina” ( I will not be alone ). Many married men in Africa, even the educated among them, 
still consider monogamy a Western imposition. An African woman, on the other hand, would 
‘prefer’ to get married to an already married man with many wives instead of remaining 
single, because of the cultural stigma on singleness. This is also not unconnected with 
economic and social security, which does not favour the women in the entire continent. We 
shall discuss this problem later in this work under the feminization of poverty. Let us now see 
how leadership and foreign policies prolong poverty in the African continent, more especially 
in the countries within Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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2. 1. 3    Argument 3: Leadership and Foreign Policy.  
 
The term “leadership” which is used in this section of the work to refer to political leadership 
or governance constitutes the major cause of poverty and an obstacle to poverty reduction in 
post-colonial Africa. If the fight against poverty is deeply a political issue, according to the 
United Nations Development Programme Report of 2001, then it follows that the persistence 
of poverty in the continent is closely linked to lack of good governance. It is an indubitable 
fact that poverty in most societies is all about disparities in the distribution of power, wealth 
and opportunity. To see that the opportunities are equitably distributed in a given society is 
the duty of a good governance. Good governance, even though entails a lot of things, may be 
defined simply as “the effectiveness with which a government performs its work and 
promotes the public good.”23 It is this effectiveness which is grossly absent in governance in 
Africa, hence the persistence of poverty. 
 
Certain factors could be said to be responsible for the lack of good governance in Africa. 
These factors include the inability to define an appropriate system of government that 
represents the values of the continent subsequent to decolonization; the incessant and 
protracted military leadership in post-colonial Africa; and the lack of vision among designated 
leaders, which gives rise to greed and corruption. Let us now take a look at each of these 
factors briefly and see how they contribute to the widespread poverty.   
 
Professor Ali Mazrui, quoting A. B. Assensoh in an essay on Pan-Africanism, democracy and 
leadership in Africa, described the historical development of leadership in Africa as 
conditioned by eight different styles of leadership, which include charismatic, mobilisational, 
conciliatory, housekeeping, disciplinary, patriarchal, technocratic, and the personalistic 
political leadership/monarchical styles of leadership.24 Without intending to go into a detailed 
explanation of what each of these styles of leadership means or which of the African leaders 
past or present was/is an embodiment of one or the other style, it suffices to state that the 
charismatic form of leadership was predominantly the system of leadership that gave birth to 
independence. Kwame Nkrumah, the man who led the first Black African country to 
                                                 
23 Anyang’ Nyong’o, P., Governance, Poverty and Sustainable Development in Africa: Paper prepared for the  
     Conference on “Towards African Strategic Thinking and Action on Sustainable Development, Governance 
     And Globalization.” Nairobi – Kenya, September 17 – 18, 2001. 
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independence was a symbol of the charismatic style of leadership. But Nkrumah was not a 
mobilisational leader. On the contrary Julius K. Nyerere was both a charismatic and 
mobilisational leader. Mazrui went further to underscore the fact that none of these styles of 
leadership had helped to make Africa better. This failure, he argues is traceable to two factors. 
The first is the fact that most of the afore-mentioned styles of leadership were directed 
towards the liberation of the African states from colonization. The only aim was to attain 
independence, which meant concretely to free the colonized from the colonizers. It was in this 
connection that one could understand the famous political slogan of Nkrumah at the time of 
the struggle, “Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all things shall be added unto you.”25 
That was a message of hope for a people who were yearning to have the right to preside over 
their own affairs. But has this hope been realised? The answer is no! Fifty-two years after 
Nkrumah made that statement, the situation, instead of improving, has deteriorated to the 
extent that the slogan could be reframed as follows, ‘seek ye first the political kingdom, and 
all else will be subtracted from it.’ Moreover, the inability on the part of the leaders of this 
period and those following them to switch over from styles of leadership to goals of 
leadership, from leadership of liberation to leadership of development has remained 
unaddressed. One African leader after another let Africa down in the struggle to improve the 
material well-being of the African people. The style of leadership which remains a challenge 
to Africa south of the sahara at the beginning of the 21st century is developmental leadership. 
That means a style of leadership whose sole aim will be how to make the living conditions for 
the Africans better using the available resources, human and material. 
 
The second factor responsible for leadership failure in Africa is the confusion arising from the 
difficulty in defining socio-political values in the context of pre-colonial traditions and post-
colonial legacies. In the above mentioned paper, Mazrui distinguished four different pre-
colonial traditions which have probably conditioned the style of leadership in post-colonial 
Africa. These include the elder tradition, monarchical tendency, the sage tradition and the 
warrior tradition.26 The various traditions are not problematic in themselves, but to resuscitate 
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and make them models for leaders in post-colonial Africa is simply anachronistic. The many 
decades of colonization of Africa south of the Sahara changed the mentality of the people and 
distorted their values, social, political and economic. Such a situation made it a herculean task 
for liberation leaders like Sekou Toure, Samora Machel, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame Nkrumah 
and their political minions to project a goal-oriented leadership. The political new wine 
needed a new wine-skin and no longer the old wine-skin. But there was none. The structures 
which sustained the colonies under the colonial masters had no trained manpower to take over, 
and the political leaders did not make any provision for that. It became clear to the first 
African leaders after independence that, “no matter how powerful politicians may seem to be, 
or may even believe themselves to be, they do not control all aspects of the societies they 
claim to own.”27 The reason is simply that ‘many of the social events in those societies are the 
product of economic decision-making which politicians often do not control.’28 
 
The series of military interventions and rebellious uprisings from opposition parties against 
incumbent regimes that characterises post-colonial Africa has made it difficult for any stable 
government to be constituted. The military is an institution whose duty is to guarantee the 
security of the citizens and defend the country against external enemies. The military 
personnel are trained to take orders and therefore are not amenable to discussion and debate 
after orders have been given.29 As we saw above, pre-colonial Africa already had a warrior 
tradition with clearly defined roles before the advent of the Europeans. The colonizers  made 
use of this already existent tradition to form the indigenous military institution which survived 
after independence. The military even constituted a force in the fight for independence, first in 
the North like the Tunisian war of independence (1952 – 1956) and the Algerian war of 
independence (1961 – 1974), both fought against France. West Africa, which lies on the 
Atlantic, was much more open to cultural and trade influences as well as to conquest by sea. 
The discovery of precious metals and minerals was an invitation to outside powers and often 
resulted in bloody clashes between the alien soldiers and those of the country. With the end of 
colonization, and the lack of vision by the indigenous leaders, the military began to usurp 
power arbitrarily in one country after the other, sometimes carrying with it ethnic influences 
which led to civil wars. The bloodiest of these wars in West Africa after independence was 
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the Nigerian – Biafran Civil War (1967 – 1970). Others were in Sierra Leone (1991 – 2002); 
Liberia (1986 – 1989); Guinea – Bissau (1998 – 1999); Cote d’ Ivoire (2002 – 2004),30  just 
to name a few. One thing is clear from all these, namely that there is no development in 
moments of crisis. When life is at stake, no one talks of a better way of living, primum vivere 
deinde philosophare. 
 
Why is it that Africa has not known any peace since independence despite the degree of 
poverty in the continent? This question brings us to the third and last factor in the problem of 
leadership as a cause of poverty in Africa. From all indications one could trace the root of 
every unrest or conflict in Africa to the struggle for power. The struggle may at times couch 
itself in ethnicism or military coup d’etat, but there is always in the background the desire for 
political power, since that is the key to a great fortune and to the future as far as Africa is 
concerned. Although some politicians may have leadership qualities, if they do not bribe their 
way into political office they will never ‘win’ an election. And once in office, they continue in 
an ‘official way’ what they started before they came into power. Corruption is the name of 
this disease and it has eaten its way deep into the fabric of the society.  
 
The word “corruption” (which is derived from the Latin, “corrumpere” – bribe or destroy) 
means dishonest or illegal behaviour.31 Corruption is an ‘impairment of integrity, virtue or 
moral principle; depravity, decay, and/or an inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful 
means, a departure from the original or from what is pure or correct, and/or an agency or 
influence that corrupts.’32 Our concern here is with political corruption and its allied ways of 
manifestation as bureaucratic and/or electoral corruption. Political corruption is the 
dysfunction of a political system or institution in which government officials, political 
officials or employees seek illegitimate personal gain through actions such as bribery, 
extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft and embezzlement. The end point of political 
corruption is a “kleptocracy”, which literally means “rule by thieves”.33 Without intending to 
paint the continent black than it is and with due regard to the neglibly few leaders who are 
making an honest effort, one can say that the only system of government that thrives in Africa 
is kleptocracy. Since this work is more a theoretical analysis than an empirical exposition, we 
are concerned more with causes than with social data, hence cases of corruption as 
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experienced in Africa Sub-Sahara will not be compiled here. It suffices to mention a few 
examples. Africa is not the only continent where there is corruption is the argument of some 
people. We may agree with this assertion, but go further to add that while corruption is more 
the exception in other continents, it is unfortunately a rule in most countries of Africa. 
 
On the 24th of February, 1966 Kwameh Nkrumah, whom we mentioned above as the man 
who led the first black African country to independence, was overthrown by a combined force 
of the police and the military for corruption. He was said to have inherited one of the richest 
countries of Africa, with a large reserve of foreign currency, but because of his financial 
misappropriation for nine years, Ghana became bankrupt, and food and consumer goods were 
in short supply. The Commission of Inquiry, which was set up by the National Liberation 
Council (NLC) in the same year revealed the details of the illicit practices among government 
officals: excessive mileage claims, over-inflated building contract estimates, unnecessary 
contract payments, inter alia.34 This was possible because the leader was involved in the same 
practice. When the head of the fish starts to rot, the rest of the body will later be affected. 
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is another country worth mentioning. Mobutu Sese Seko 
ruled Zaire from 1965 – 1997, looting his country’s wealth to an unprecedented degree 
without any qualms of conscience. Arnold Ludwig recounted an encounter with a relative of 
Mobutu who explained how the government illicitly collected revenue in these words: 
Mobutu would ask one of us to go to the bank and take out one million. We would go to an 
intermediary and tell him to give five million. He (the intermediary) would go to the bank 
with Mobutu’s authority, and take out ten. Mobutu got one, and we took the other nine35 It is 
alleged that Mobutu stole up to $4 billion while in office.36 On assumption of office in 2001, 
president Joseph Kabila established the Commission of Repression of Economic Crimes. Is 
Congo any better today years later? 
 
Kenya, untill recently after Tanzania, the apparently most stable African country, was spared 
cases of political corruption. The local chapter of Transparency International and the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), released a report in February, 2006, 
stating that between January 2003 and September, 2004, the National Rainbow Coalition 
Government spent about $12 million on cars that were mostly for the personal use of senior 
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government officials. The said amount substantially exceeded what the government spent in 
the same fiscal year on controlling malaria.37  
 
The case of corruption in Nigeria seems to be the most complex in the whole of Africa. It still 
remains a paradox for many people both within and outside the country that a country like 
Nigeria, richly endowed with natural and human resources, has more than 70% of its populace 
living on less than one dollar a day. Some attribute the cause to the rise of public 
administration and the discovery of oil as the two major events that have led to a host of 
sordid corrupt practices in the country. Corruption was prevalent in the first Republic of 
Nigeria, but was kept at a manageable level. The first case of corruption that attracted public 
attention was the 1975 corruption scandal surrounding the importation of cement. It was 
alleged that the officers in the Gowon administration falsified ship manifests and inflated the 
amount of cement actually purchased.38 The case of corruption in the country reached its peak 
in the time of Sani Abacha. After his death in 1998, French investigations of bribes paid to 
government officials to ease the award of a gas plant construction in Nigeria led to the 
freezing of accounts containing about $100 million dollars.39 Prior to this time, however, a 
Swiss Banking Commission report indicted Swiss banks for failing to follow compliance 
processes in allowing family and friends of Abacha access to the accounts and to deposit 
amounts totalling $600 million dollars into the accounts. The same year, a total of more than  
$1billion dollars were found in various accounts throughout Europe.40 This was not all that 
Abacha made away with nor is it to say that subsequent leaders were better. Wraith and 
Simpkins hypothesis that friends and kinsmen seeking favours may impose great pressure on 
the ethical disposition41 of leaders may be true, but in our opinion, not with regard to a case of 
corruption of this magnitude. Corruption continues to spread in Nigeria as many political 
office holders acquire wealth and properties in and outside the country. Many display wealth 
that is clearly beyond their means, but the society does not blink. Politics has become a 
lucrative business in Nigeria and in many other African countries, because anything spent to 
secure a political office is regarded as an investment, which matures immediately one gets 
into power.42 There are no longer ethical demands on political office holders. In his essay on 
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corruption in Nigeria, Victor Dike distinguished among three forms of corruption: political 
corruption (found among politicians and political decision makers); bureaucratic corruption 
(occurs in the public administration or in the implementation of political decisions, and is 
encountered daily in places like hospitals, schools, local licensing offices, airports, police 
stations and check-points, etc) and electoral corruption (which involves purchase of votes 
with money, promises of office or special favours, coercion, intimidation and interference 
with freedom of election).43 What this analysis shows is that corruption touches almost every 
bit of the social life in that country and the greatest danger is that it has become part of the 
people’s life. Corruption causes poverty and poverty can also lead to corruption. Politicians 
and government officials are not corrupt because they are poor, but because they are greedy. 
Sen argues that with clear systems of rules and penalties, along with rigorous enforcement, a 
difference could be made in the behaviour pattern.44 This has to begin with the leaders. It is in 
this regard that we can understand the following words of Alcock: “If poverty remains, then it 
means that politicians have failed either to identify it accurately or to develop appropriate 
policies in response to it. In that sense then, poverty is the result of political failure, or the 
failure of political will.”45 
 
There are, however, some economic decisions which fall outside the control of the political 
leaders. Some of these are at the level of foreign politics, where the countries who are 
supposed to benefit from such decisions are, most of the time, not consulted before the 
decisions are made. To what extent are the interests of the poor countries taken into 
consideration in the making of such decisions, where their views are not requested? What 
roles do the economic forces play in the reduction of acute poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Foreign policy as a factor in the problem of African poverty is a broad topic, which is not the 
direct concern of this work. However, it may be expedient to discuss briefly some specific 
aspects of foreign policy that have direct bearing on the problem of poverty in Africa and 
which take a stance on this matter that is sometimes ambivalent, a sort of ‘mixed messages’. 
We shall limit our discussion in this regard to the issues concerning the conditions of loans 
from the West and international financial institutions like, the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are also the sources of Africa’s debt burden. Then 
we will look at the question of security in Africa and in contadiction the supply of weapons 
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from foreign countries, the activities of some international organisations like the EZA in some 
African countries, and finally, the effects of global international trade policies as they concern 
the alleviation of poverty in Africa. 
 
(a)  Economic Policies and Foreign Debt Services 
       Let us begin with the last point. In his widely read book, “The End of Poverty”, to which 
we have already made several references in this work, Jeffrey Sachs called attention to the 
fact that the informal division of the world into first, second and third worlds is based on 
economic development and market policy. The first world comprises the countries (Europe, 
United States and Japan) that were already industrialized in 1945, when a new international 
trading system was established under U.S. political leadership. The success of the first world 
is attributed to the post-war reconstruction of a market-based trading system, which was a 
boost to rapid economic growth after two big wars that blocked trade and resulted in financial 
instability.46 The economic rebuilding in the first (rich) world did not mean a restoration in 
the global economy, instead political leanings were forced to follow the economic divisions. 
 
The socialist world, first forged by Lenin and Stalin in the wake of World War 1, then became 
the second world, with the most important characteristics being state ownership of the means 
of production, central planning of production, one-party rule by the communist parties.47 The 
third world, which later became synonymous with poor countries, refers to the post-colonial 
countries, most of which are found in Africa. The concept “third world” was used initially to 
refer to those countries emerging from imperial domination that chose neither to be part of the 
capitalist first world nor the socialist second world. The aim was to stay non-aligned and to 
establish their own system of economy. By choosing their economies, the third world 
countries closed themselves off from global economic progress and the advance of 
technology. 48  What this meant was that these countries were subjected to a system of 
economics that was imposed on them. When a product from a third-world country, there is not 
a balanced negotiation between buyer and seller, but a situation where the buyer determined 
beforehand what is to be produced and brought to the market, the quantity of what is to be 
offered and the price at which it is to be sold. Since the economies of most African countries 
are dependent on the production of a small number of primary commodities, it is easy to 
appreciate the magnitude of the dangers of leaving the prices of those commodities to the 
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control of international markets. A study of Sub-Saharan Africa estimated that for every 
dollar of capital inflow that enters  the region as aid, 51 cents make up for commodity price 
losses.49 This extends also to other areas such as the US position that makes food aid to 
African countries affected by famine contingent upon their acceptance of genetically modified 
foodstuffs. This kind of aid, according to many agricultural experts, could prove a costly ‘gift’ 
for African famine-ravaged countries. This is because the likely spread of genetically 
modified (GMO) seeds that would arise will force small farmers in those countries to pay 
large fees to the large US-based companies that own the seeds’ patents for subsequent 
production. 50  In a situation where the countries involved have no other option, these 
conditions are forced on them. The alternative would be to make room for effective 
participation of those countries in global economic decision-making.  
 
(b)  Bretton Woods Institutions and Poverty Alleviation Policies 
        Bretton Woods institutions are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
(WB), both founded in 1944 at Bretton Woods, in the US. At their inception, the two 
institutions had different tasks: While the one was meant to provide help to member countries 
with balance of payment deficits, the other offered loans for anti-poverty projects and 
remained a strong supporter of rural development programs. With the changes in the world 
economy from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, the activities of the two institutions were co-
ordinated. Jointly they introduced the austere policies51 known as the Structural Adjustment 
Program (SAP) and the Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which became the preconditions 
for granting loans to the countries in need. These strict conditions affect, in Africa more than 
elsewhere, especially such areas as loans, debt cancellation and aid. For example, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other organisations demanded cuts in healthcare, 
education and the privatisation of industries in some countries in Africa in order for them to 
qualify for loans in the first place. Even debt relief and rescheduling has been granted to 
countries that agreed to open up their economies to privatisation by multinationals in the West 
as well as to carry out neo-liberal policies. In Angola, for instance, water, which was free, 
now has to be paid for, which has led to disconnections and a subsequent increase in 
dysentery, cholera, etc. In Malawi the World Bank advised the government to sell off its 
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surplus grains as part of a debt restructuring deal, despite widespread starvation in the country. 
The same Malawi spends more on servicing its debt than it spends on health. This is at the 
time when 20% of Malawians are HIV positive. Sub-Saharan Africa on the whole pays back 
in debt repayments almost 100% of the aid it receives each year. There is therefore the 
temptation to conclude that Western capitalism thrives on the indebtedness of Africa and 
other nations.52 Real and effective help should begin by making sure that food and water as 
basic human needs are secured, with the issue of debt coming later. Unfortunately some 
purported aid to Africa did not really come to fruition in this direction. For example, about 35 
years ago, the UN set a target for all industrialised nations to provide 0.7% of their GDP in 
aid to the developing world. Only a few countries have complied with this directives, some 
others have made only a meagre contribution. Aid comes to only 0.15% of GDP. In total, 
high-income countries provide only 0.25% of GDP in aid. Almost all of that is in loans on 
which poorer countries can barely afford to pay back the interest. It means an ever-spiralling 
debt burden.53 Statistics show that African countries are spending more on debt payments to 
rich countries than on health and education for their own people.  
 
In its report on the conference held in London in September, 1987, the Institute for African 
Alternatives (IFAA) observed that although the IMF and World Bank have initiated many 
programs for the economic development of Africa, these have had only one result, namely the 
impoverishment of Africa. This is reflected in massive unemployment, falling real incomes, 
inflation, increased imports with persistent trade deficits, net outflow of capital, mounting 
external debts, denial of basic needs, and de-industrialization.54  This critique can not be 
accepted as completely true. It may be pertinent to acknowledge the fact that foreign policy, 
with reference to those institutions, has its own modus operandi, which the masses do not 
comprehend most of the time. Foreign aid is more often than not confused with charity, hence 
the partial judgments on the institutions responsible for aid. Arguing with reference to this 
topic, Guy Arnold states that aid by its nature is highly political. He goes further to remark 
that some people mistake it for charity, whereas aid is part of a bargain between donor and 
recipient. What this means is that the donors have a surplus of capital and know-how and are 
willing to make it available to developing countries at a price. The price varies. It may be a 
matter of influence or military base facilities, it may result in protection of trade, investment 
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or other interests; it is not done for nothing.55 We shall see more of this in our critique of this 
line of thought in the last chapter of this work. 
 
(c) Trade in Arms in Africa: An Ethical Challenge to Economic Globalization56 
      One area that very much affects the African poverty condition and contradicts the foreign 
assistance posture is the issue of trade in arms. From the 1980s to date, military spending has 
increased tremendously in the whole of Africa, with Western arms companies finding 
lucrative markets in a continent torn apart by violent conflicts. Within the period under review, 
the US government alone provided through grants and low-interest loans more than 1.5 billion 
dollars in arms and other security assistance to independent Sub-Saharan African countries, 
which were selected for their strategic importance in the Cold War duel.57  As would be 
expected, these arms fueled internal repression and military conflicts that led to the deaths of 
many hundreds of thousand of people, most of whom were civilians. Today the child-soldier 
syndrome has become common in most of the African countries plagued by civil war. It is 
very worrisome to see these children half-clad carrying sophisticated weapons. The cost of 
one such weapon can send a child to school and feed him/her for some months, were the 
money not used for arms.  
 
Research carried out by the United Nations International Children’s Education Fund 
(UNICEF) in Sierra Leone, one of the most conflict-ridden zones in Africa shows, that 
poverty and lack of access to educational or work opportunities are factors which make 
children join militant groups. However, the same study observes that the majority of the 
children recruited were under 15 years old and comprised those who were abused as workers 
in mines. Some were kidnapped, while others were forced to join to prevent the killing of 
family members.58 Between 10,000 and 30,000 children are said to have participated in the 
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conflict.59 That was only in Sierra Leone, but we know that Africa has an extremely high 
number of child soldiers as a result of the prevalent civil wars throughout the continent. Other 
African countries involved in the recruitment of child soldiers include Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, 
Cote d’Ivoire, among others.60  Trade in arms thrives because there are internal conflicts, but 
without these arms, violent conflicts would probably not escalate to civil wars and the 
recruitment of child soldiers. 
 
The ethical challenges arising from the above-described form of transaction under the 
auspices of economic globalization are enormous. In the first place, economic globalization 
aims at extirpating all forms of difference so as to guarantee equality in business transactions. 
This ‘reductio ad unum’ of the economy at the international level is unrealizable. The reason 
is that every form of economic equality is only affordable through money or its equivalent, 
which means everybody or every nation should have access to sufficient financial resources 
so as to compete fairly at the global level. But this is neither realizable nor necessary. Besides, 
every economic system is ruled by competition which sometimes tends to neglect social 
realities. Moreover, a market society thrives better when some of those in the competition fail 
or even are ruined, and the others who are successful then have the opportunity to enjoy fully 
their success. Thus market globalization, which means making goods available on the world 
market, demands a corresponding purchasing power from the participants. This, in any case, 
is not available to all participants. As long as economic globalization is concerned only with 
globalizing the sale of produced goods without a corresponding move at globalizing the 
means of production, it remains ethically unjust, because it serves the machinery of economic 
exclusion and marginalization of some regions61. The consequence, therefore, is the widening 
of the gap between the rich and the poor, which for some economic theorists like Friedrick 
Hayek 62  is the inevitable outcome of every economic system. This leads us to raise the 
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question as to whether the market economy is an end in itself or is it meant to be at the service 
of the society, hence of the human person. Is it possible to talk of economic ethics? Can we 
speak of ethical criteria in the process of globalization? Does ethics have a role to play at all 
in this process? 
 
There is no gainsaying the fact that economic globalization has brought with it some 
advantages to humanity such as the growth in world trade; growth in direct foreign 
investments; increase in the number of global players like the transnational corporations and 
the globalization of financial markets, among other things.63 The advantages of globalization 
are felt much more in the areas of communication and information technology, as every part 
of the world is connected to every other with just a press of the button either on the keyboard 
or the cell-phone. Nevertheless, we re-iterate that these global dividends need as a matter of 
urgency and necessity a global ethical framework, without which it is bound to create more 
social problems. 
 
A move in this direction is the UN Global Compact initiated by Kofi Annan in 1999, which 
made three demands on the global economic system namely, respect and support for human 
rights; the elimination of all forms of forced or child labour; and a response to ecological 
challenges. The threefold points enumerated by the Global Compact are in accordance with 
the ideas of the Chicago Declaration Toward a Global Ethic of the Parliament of the World’s 
Religions in 1993, which underlined the absolute respect for human dignity at the global level 
be it economic or cultural. It is through a global ethic that a global culture can be sustained, 
since only such an ethic can lead societies from confrontation to reconciliation, from 
degeneration of moral values to the restoration of the quality of life that restores the presence 
of transcendence in human life.64 John Paul II in his address to the Papal Academy of Social 
Sciences on 27th April, 2001 supported the need for a global ethic when he said: “As 
humanity embarks upon the process of globalization, it can no longer do without a common 
code of ethics. This does not mean a single dominant socio-economic system or culture which 
would impose its values and it criteria on ethical reasoning. It is within man as such, within 
universal humanity sprung from the Creator’s hand, that the norms of social life are to be 
sought. Such a search is indispensable if globalization is not to be just another name for the 
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absolute relativization of values and homogenization of life-styles and cultures”.65 The point 
we have tried to make here is that even though economic globalization is a plausible 
development, it needs a corresponding global ethical basis.66  
 
 (d) NGOs and the Politics of Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZA) 
       The role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the third world countries, but 
especially in Africa, can be said to be the only oasis in the desert, but sometimes government 
policies are a hindrance to the implementation of the programmes of the NGOs aimed at 
alleviating poverty. The activities of the NGOs are often perceived by the host governments 
as external interference with their sovereignty. Sometimes, policies which make the 
implementation of the projects impossible are put in place as an indirect way of preventing the 
NGOs from reaching the people who really need help. For instance, the rule restricting 
foreigners from having direct contact with the people for the fear that they could be spies.  
 
On the other hand, some people opposed to the activities of the NGOs cite the dependency 
theory as an argument against them. According to this theory, to be subjected to help 
perpetually can only prolong the poverty of the people. It is therefore better to allow the 
people to seek a workable way of solving the problem of poverty on their own. This stream of 
thought came from the influence of the liberation theologians of Latin America, some of 
whom believed that the best help to render to the poor was to help them be independent. In 
other words, the poor should be provided with the means for self-sustenance either by creating 
jobs for them or by assisting them to be self-employed. It is in line with this vision that the 
“Entwicklungszusammenarbeit” was established in the 1970s to assist the poor people of the 
third world countries to manufacture and sell their products internationally. The aim was to 
help bridge the social gap between the poor and the rich by marketing their goods at a fair 
price. On a more broader basis, EZA endeavours equally to correct the imbalance in trade 
between the first and third worlds. For the past thirty years, the EZA has distinguished itself 
as an effective system for fair-trade imports. It encourages small farmers to form co-
operatives and encourages them with loans and helps them at the same time to market their 
produce. The aims of this collaborative developmental work include, the prevention of the 
exploitation of children and forced labour. On the ecological level, it is opposed to the 
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introduction of GMOs and the overuse of much chemicals in the cultivation of crops; and 
encourages, instead, long term planning. Some of these policies are opposed to those of 
international trade bodies or even those of some host countries, which leads to frequent 
conflicts between those who support the policies and those who are opposed to them. 
 
The EZA, in a bid to overcome the problem of imbalance, encourages and sponsors research 
programmes directed at enhancing communication between the donors and the target groups 
in any development. This means dual projects that offer counseling services thereby 
correcting the asymmetrical relationship often associated with development projects. This 
asymetrical relationship goes back to the early history of Afro-European development that 
gave rise later to the British Colonial Development Act of 1929, where development was used 
as an object of colonial politics.67 Secondly, it opens up a new trend in the goals of NGOs, 
which places emphasis on bridge-building and capacity-building.68 As noble as these goals 
may be, the question remains how to define the terms of collaboration between the NGOs and 
the host government to avoid unnecessary bottle-necks or even direct confrontation. 
 
2. 1. 4 Argument 4: Inadequate Education and Lack of Technical Know-how 
 
The bottom line of every discussion on the causes of poverty is that of insufficient education 
and the lack of technical know-how. One can therefore argue that any and every effort 
directed at poverty alleviation in Africa south of the Sahara, that neglects the promotion of 
education is bound to end in futility. And when we talk of education as a vital aid to fighting 
poverty, we are confronted with two schools of thought. The first school represented by the 
few Western-educated Africans maintains that any effective system of education in Africa has 
to be indigenous. What this means is that it has to take into consideration those core African 
values like the affirmation of life, creation, community, person and work in its curriculum. To 
this effect, Fafunwa, one of the advocates of the indigenous system of education points out 
seven cardinal goals of indigenous education:  
 
                The development of the child’s latent physical skills; the development of 
                 character; the teaching of respect for elders and those in position of authority; 
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                 the development of intellectual skills; the acquisition of specific vocational 
                 training and the development of a healthy attitude towards honest labour; the 
                 development of a sense of belonging and the encouragement of active participation 
                 in family and community affairs; and the understanding, appreciation and  
                 promotion of the cultural heritage of the community at large.69 
 
This form of education is said to be holistic and spans throughout one’s life. The defenders of 
this position opine that for Western education to be productive in Africa, it has to build on this 
as a basis and not displace it. But the indigenous form of education which Fafunwa and like 
thinkers propose is informal education, which was meant to enhance socialization within the 
extended family, age-grade organizations and institutions of religious rites. Elleni Tedla, in 
her work “Sankofa: African Thought and Education”, argues that the development of 
education in the West and its achievements in science and technology was based on liberal 
culture.70 Thus, the argument of this group is that not only are many Africans without formal 
education, but that those who have received education according to the Western system have 
failed to integrate that with the core African values.  
 
This inability to apply acquired knowledge to the improvement of the standard of life is the 
argument of the second school of thought, which sees that as a justification for the hypothesis 
that the African is of inferior intelligence when compared to other human beings that inhabit 
the earth. Hence phrenologists and some ethnologists concluded that it was hopeless to train 
the African. For instance, the ethnologist J. W. Jackson suggested that the reason the black 
man’s faculties were not as well developed as those of the white man was that he lacked “due 
nervous development”. In other words, Jackson was convinced that owing to the absence of 
certain nerves in the brain of an African, Western education would in no way help the black 
man. 71  For this reason, some scholars of Western origin even went so far as to assert, 
“...perhaps in the future there will be some African history to teach. But at present there is 
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none: there is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness.... And darkness is 
not a subject of history”.72 If this assertion is to be upheld, it then means that the poverty 
condition of Africa can not be solved by western education, since the Africans are by their 
constitution ineducable. This fable, in any case, is no longer accepted among scholars 
anywhere in the world, for if it were tenable, then the efforts of foreign countries and 
international organisations like UNICEF in the educational sector in Africa would be a 
political farce. Besides, professionals of African descent are making their contributions in 
various fields of human endeavour across the globe as we shall see later in the section dealing 
with brain-drain.   
 
It has to be remarked that modern education in Africa south of the Sahara did not start early 
enough to have made the type of impact on the development of the continent that many 
people would have wished for. The first students to graduate from an African higher 
education institution (in the Western tradition) did so in 1879 from Fourah Bay College in 
Sierra Leone. And by the time most of the countries in this region achieved their 
independence in 1960, there were only six such institutions in the whole of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.73 This situation has improved tremendously in the sense that there are many more 
institutions of higher education, but there are still inadequate resources for applied research 
and greater outreach. We have already mentioned the need for the government to give more 
attention to education, making it accessible to a good number of people as a way of promoting 
personal development. What this entails is, among other things, to invest hugely in the areas 
of research on the programmes that could help reduce poverty by empowering the people. 
This equally entails modifying the methods of teaching and learning. As in most of the 
aspects connected with the problem of poverty, particular attention should be paid to the 
education of women, who are often the most disadvantaged. 
 
A modern African system of education, if it is to improve African conditions, will not either 
limit itself to the so-called indigenous education nor be alienated entirely from the context of 
African life. A possible approach to the reformation of the philosophy of African education 
has to take into consideration the points which Julius Nyerere raised in his speech at the 
Arusha Declaration, namely to integrate Western education into the life of the family and the 
community; to end elitism through a programme of universal primary education that 
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integrates Western and traditional systems of education; to inculcate the spirit of work and 
service to the community in the process of education.74  Some of these points have been 
overtaken by events, but the fact remains that much reform remains to be carried in the area of 
education as an instrument of social change. For according to Whitehead, the progress of a 
society depends upon its inclusion of three groups of people – scholars, discoverers and 
inventors.75 To this observation, one must add the remarks of Nicol Davidson, the permanent 
Respresentative and Ambassador of Sierra Leone to the UN, that the progress of a state is 
facilitated also by wise and benevolent leaders who offer their intellectuals an unparalleled 
opportunity to make significant contributions to those things which are noble, lasting and true 
in a changing world. The number of educated Africans has increased tremendously since 
independence. The UNESCO compedium of statistics on illiteracy in Africa at the beginning 
of the millennium shows a decrease in illiteracy in almost all the countries of Africa. This 
decrease is more significant in some countries than others. For instance, countries like Ghana 
had a 47. 2% illiteracy rate in 1985 and 26. 4% in 2000; the percentage of Burkina Faso’s 
illiterate population was rated at 85. 5% in 1985 and 72. 3% in 2000; Kenya had 35% and 23. 
8%, and Nigeria had 57. 3% and 34. 4% both within the same period. Madagascar had one of 
the best educational records with an illiteracy rate of 23. 1% in 1985 and 14. 5% in 200076. 
One thing we notice when the conditions in those countries are surveyed is that the rate of 
development has followed proportionally the decrease in the level of illiteracy. However, the 
impact of the gradual increase in the level of education still needs to be felt more with regard 
to the reduction of poverty and the general attitude of the populace. Next to this would be the 
need to bridge the gap between urban and rural education, with particular attention paid to the 
relevance of educational skills in different contexts.  
 
2. 2    The Consequences of Poverty for Human Behaviour 
 
The consequences of poverty, like its causes, are multiple, but more pervasive than the latter. 
In any given society one can escape poverty by overcoming the causes, but the same person 
cannot avoid the negative consequences of other people’s poverty; if he/she is not affected 
directly then certainly indirectly. The International Labour Organisation articulated this 
beautifully in its Philadelphia Declaration 2005 in the following words, “Poverty anywhere 
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constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere”. Let us examine the  truth of this statement by 
considering the various consequences of poverty under its different dimensions: social, 
economic, political and psychological. The first three may be treated as one since they form 
the external factors that influence human behaviour in the society, while the last has to do 
with the individual’s internalization of the influence and his/her response through manifest 
behaviours. We will thus discuss the consequences of poverty under the two broad themes of 
social decline and psychological stigmatization. 
 
2. 2. 1   The Decline of Social Cohesion 
 
One of the greatest consequences of poverty is the decline of social cohesion. The structures 
of social systems relate intimately to beliefs about human nature. And these beliefs are in turn 
used to justify both change and the status quo.77 A decline in these systems therefore implies 
a decline in beliefs and consequently a crisis in the understanding of human nature and human 
values. Accessibility to basic facilities like education, health care and employment 
opportunities becomes impossible. Migration becomes the next option. A high rate of 
migration from a particular social milieu to another is always an indication of poverty. People 
move from their places of birth in search of work opportunities. By doing this, family ties are 
broken willy-nilly. The more severe the degree of poverty, the greater the number of families 
affected. The result is that many communities are extremely divided, with little commonality 
in terms of needs and aspirations to the extent that the notion of community becomes very 
tenuous.78 To an African for whom the community plays a vital role in his/her world-view, 
this new form of existence needs time to be understood and accepted. Lamenting the harm 
caused to community life by migration as a result of poverty, an elderly man in Kagadi, 
Uganda says: 
 
                    Poverty has always been with us in our communities. It was there in the past, 
                      long before the Europeans came, and it affected many – perhaps all of us. But 
                      it was a different type of poverty. People were not helpless. They acted together 
                      and never allowed it to “squeeze” any member of the community. They shared 
                      a lot of things together: hunting, grazing animals, harvesting etc. There was  
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                      enough for basic survival. But now things have changed.79 
 
The above quotation, far from taking us back to the Jagd- und Sammeln Gesellschaf, intends 
to underscore the communal spirit which has been destroyed by migration. It may be that the 
much talked about globalization is nothing other than an attempt to recapture at the 
international level this social interconnectedness which is essential in human existence. But it 
is an illusion to believe that this can take place at the international level without a strong 
community base. The constitution of human society, like that of the human organism, begins 
with the cells (family), the tissues(community), the organs(nations) and the whole 
person(world). The man from Uganda is not alone in his observation. A group of rural women 
from Ghana decried the disappearance of social stability as a result of labour migration in the 
following words: 
 
                    In the past, men organised themselves in groups through communal labour 
                     to assist each other to build and roof houses. Women support each other to do 
                     farm work such as sowing, weeding, and harvesting. A woman who had recently 
                     given birth to a baby was always supported by young girls who cared for them  
                    and by older women who brought firewood and even treated the baby when it  
                    fell sick. Individual families tried to support each other. Women would work in 
                    groups in search of food to feed their children. Respect and authority was given 
                    to the chief and his elders.80 
 
The disintegration of social cohesion can have far-reaching consequences for normal life in all 
facets of the society, but especially in the educational, political and economic aspects. This is 
because social cohesion forms the connectedness among individuals and social groups that 
facilitates collaboration and equitable resource distribution at the household, community and 
state level. Social cohesion is important for societal stability as it affirms individual and group 
identities.  
 
In addition to the problem of migration and the attendant decline of social cohesion, there is 
also a significant manifestation of changes in the traditional gender roles in the family. 
Traditionally, the role of women across the centuries and in various countries, Africa 
inclusive, was considered to be that of home-making, tending to the family and taking 
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responsibility for the well-being of the children and husbands. The men, on the other hand, 
were the breadwinners. These traditionally socially defined roles of men and women are today 
not only unattainable, they themselves stand in stark contradiction to current reality. African 
women, in most cases, have taken over the role of men as breadwinners in a bid to sustain the 
family against the threat of hunger. Unlike men, women will do any type of menial job just to 
provide food for the children. The combined role of breadwinners and home-makers has 
placed women in many parts of Africa at the head of the families, at least in principle. Men 
feel emasculated by the new development. The reason is that the tie between a man’s self-
worth and earning capacity is so strong that it may be difficult for them to even acknowledge 
their dependence on women’s incomes.81 Many men in this situation feel ‘redundant’ and 
react to their loss of power as breadwinners by collapsing into drugs, alcohol, depression and 
domestic violence.82 Men generally experience the pressures of poverty as a threat to their 
social status, self-respect, and confidence in their economic role as providers for their family. 
As economic hardship forces men and women to adapt to new ways of living, the adaptive 
actions bring about change in the structure of the society. Values and relationship are being 
broken, tested, contested and renegotiated in silence, pain and violence.83 The lack of stability 
of family units is a result of these changes in the society. Whereas social cohesion is normally 
accompanied by political stability, which in turn signals the exercise of property and citizen 
rights, and which furthermore encourages private investment from local and foreign investors, 
its absence means insecurity and the denial of basic rights. We shall see how this is 
manifested in the later part of this work devoted to the link between poverty and violence. 
 
2. 2. 2    Social Exclusion and Psychological Stigmatization 
 
The social exclusion of the poor and its concomitant psychological stigmatization is one of 
the consequences of poverty. Social exclusion refers “to the norms and processes that prevent 
certain groups from equal and effective participation in the social, economic, cultural and 
political life of the societies.”84 It is mainly concerned with the role of relational features in 
deprivation and all forms of unequal treatment based on social status. Social exclusion can 
take the form of prejudice, which is the “unfavourable attitude towards a social group and its 
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members.”85 Hogg and Vaughan consider social exclusion, otherwise known as prejudice and 
discrimination, as the greatest problem faced by humanity, and bemoan the persistence of this 
problem in human society despite the advancement in science and technology thus: 
 
              We can put people on the moon, we can genetically modify living organisms, 
              we can replace dysfunctional organs, we can whizz around the world at an  
              altitude of 10,000 meters, and we can communicate with almost anyone anywhere 
              via the Internet. But, in recent history, we have seemed helpless in preventing the 
              Palestines and the Israelis from fighting over Jerusalem, the Catholics and Protestants 
              from tearing Northern Ireland apart, and various groups in Africa from hacking  
              each other to death with machetes.86 
 
The forms of prejudice highlighted by Hogg and Vaughan in the above paragraph concern 
differences in religious and tribal affiliations. Goffman, in line with the foregoing, outlines 
three forms of stigma commonly observed in any given society to include, “the physical 
stigma (deformities), tribal stigma of race, nation and religion, and the stigma of blemishes of 
individual character.”87 These forms of stigma make it difficult for interpersonal relationships 
in the society. The stigma of poverty on the other hand is a special type of stigma, which 
attributes to the poor a status of being “less than human” or “not quite human”88 and treats 
them as such. It is on this basis that the poor are cut off from the networks that provide access 
to power and resources, thereby making them vulnerable and increases their risk of being poor. 
Being poor is in itself a cause for social exclusion due to the social stigma poverty carries.  
 
The stigmatisation of the poor in the West can be seen to have taken a dramatic turn in the 
14th century in England. Up to this time, the view of the poor as deemed to be of the highest 
moral status and the rich as second class was promoted by the Church.89 But this was not to 
last long, as internal struggles within the Church led to a hierarchical classification of poverty 
and a hostile attitude toward begging.90 What this meant was that a person could be poor 
relatively, but going to the streets to beg for alms in order to survive was not tolerated. The 
situation became worse in the 16th century to the extent that hungry men were publicly 
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castigated as invincibly idle and were treated as people with a moral defect. Repressive 
policies to deal with the poor were subsequently adopted. 91 Supported by official fiat, the 
perception of the poor as being morally depraved became dominant at the time.92 The poor 
were blamed for their poverty and accused of being lazy, of stealing and of not being willing 
to get an education and improve their lots.93 Waxman further underscores the fact that the 
religious developments of the 16th and 17th centuries, which influenced the rise of modern 
capitalism, equally contributed to the increasing antipathy toward the poor.94 He observed that, 
“just as the Lutheran and Calvinist Protestant tenets of predestination led to a view of work as 
inherently positive and material rewards as a sign of chosenness and virtue, they 
unintentionally provided a new religious legitimation for the perception of the poor as 
immoral”.95 The material rewards for work was seen as a divine sign of moral worth and 
wealth therefore became identified with worth and the absence of wealth with the absence of 
moral worth.96 The stage was then set for the struggle to acquire more wealth so as to acquire 
more ‘moral worth’. This situation has continued to date, as the poor are not only castigated 
and socially excluded, they are also dehumanised by the rich. 
 
The rich and the poor live side by side in every society, and there is bound to be mutual 
suspicion whereby the rich suspect the poor of being capable of stealing their wealth, the 
prevention of which depends on maintaining the poor on relief. On the other hand, the poor 
attack the rich for depriving them of their own share of wealth and society’s benefits. Malthus 
theory of less eligibility is used as a measure to moderate this condition. This theory states 
that by maintaining the poor on relief, the food supply would run short, thereby raising its cost 
and ultimately subjecting the non-poor to impoverishment.97 It therefore restrains some rich 
people from engaging in relief programme. Where they do, it comes only as tokenism.98 The 
aim of the less eligibility theory, according to De Schweinitz, was to make relief detestable 
and therefore force the recipient to get off the relief rolls and become independent.99 The 
workability of this option is very much dependent on the social condition in which the poor 
find themselves. There are places where it is impossible to get off the rolls, because the socio-
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political atmosphere does not hold an alternative arrangement for the poor or that the rich 
make it difficult for them for fear of rivals. It is the same rich people who control the sharing 
of power and opportunities. 
 
The poor on the other hand accuse the rich of exploiting them and making it impossible for 
them to improve their living conditions. Some prefer to remain poor rather than raise their 
voice against their oppressors, lest they be oppressed still more.100 There is no doubt that such 
prejudice from the poor can lead to mischievious actions against the rich in the form of 
destruction of property, robbery or even assassination. It is widely alleged that most of the 
killing of wealthy and influential men in Africa and some other third world countries is done 
by those who feel that they are disadvantaged, because other people have kept them from 
advancing in the society. Some of them, however, become instruments in the hands of the rich 
who, for example, want to avenge a wrong deed, and so they are hired as assasins. Because of 
this unfriendly relationship between the rich and the poor, whether it is within a country or 
between countries, some people hold the view that “the war against terrorism is bound up in 
the war against poverty.”101 That would mean that it is the poor frustrated youths who gang 
up as terrorists. It is yet to be established to what extent poverty leads to violence or crime in 
a society. However, it cannot be negated that poverty leads to crime or violence, since to be 
poor means to be without work or to be underpaid in the place of work. As an ancient adage 
has it, “an idle man is the devil’s workshop”. Piven and Cloward corroborate this view by 
affirming that ordinary life for most people is regulated by rules of work and the rewards of 
work that pattern each day and week and season. Once cast out of that routine, people are cast 
out of the regulatory framework that it imposes. Work and the rewards of work underpin the 
stability of other social institutions as well. When men cannot earn enough to support their 
families, they may desert their wives and children, or fail to marry the women of their choice. 
And if unemployment is long-lasting, entire communities may disintegrate as the able-bodied 
migrate elsewhere in search of work. In effect, daily life becomes progressively deregulated 
as what Edelman calls the “comforting banalities” of everyday existence are destroyed. The 
first signs of the resulting demoralization and uncertainty are usually rising indices of crime, 
family breakdown, vagrancy, and vandalism.102 Lack of access to meaningful, adequately 
paying jobs upon graduation undermines the rationale for staying in school; in consequence, 
dropout rates often, for example, exceed 50% in inner-city public school systems in developed 
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countries like US. Widespread joblessness strongly enhances the appeal of crime or drug-
dealing as an economic alternative; for many youth in the inner-city, the drug trade and 
related criminal activities now represent nearly the only ‘plausible’ route to economic success 
and material well-being.103 The degree of the effects of poverty in the city differs greatly from 
that in the rural areas, as a result of the impersonal characteristic of the former, making it 
more conducive to crime. 
 
The next important point to be considered in analysing the consequences of povery and the 
association with violence is the issue of gender. It is common knowledge that in every society 
women generally suffer the effects of poverty more than do men. But the rate of crime and 
violence which is attributed to poverty is much higher for men than women. Why is this so? 
We shall now  take a cursory look at the effect of poverty women coupled with the attendant 
social prejudice which places women at a disadvantage especially in the less developed 
countries of Africa. The development of Africa in the 21st century will have to take the role of 
women into consideration and give them their proper place in the society.  
 
2. 2. 3   Social Insecurity and Violent Conflicts 
 
One of the outstanding consequences of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa is social insecurity. 
Africa is said to have the highest rate of civil wars in the world followed by Asia. Violent 
conflicts in Africa south of the Sahara are commonly attributed to the ethnic diversities of its 
countries. The reason for this attribution is the fact that most African rebel movements are 
almost always ethnically defined. But recent and more systematic analyses by social scientists 
show that political and economic factors are at the root of most violent conflicts. The struggle 
to control either the source of power or economy by the different ethnic groups gives rise to 
violent conflicts. When this happens, social life is paralysed, as nothing works and peoples 
lives, especially those of women and children, are highly threatened. According to the Human 
Science Research Council Review, the rivalry for resources, which is one of the major causes 
of violent conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa can take two forms. It can come in the form of 
traditional rivalries between herdsmen and farmers about land and water. This was actually 
the problem of the people of Darfur in Sudan, which unleashed a massive killing of innocent 
souls. In this case, the best means for restoring peace is through reconciliation customs. Then 
there is the more drastic form, which are those rivalries between enterpreneurs or elite groups 
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for access to wealth; for example through mining (diamonds, gold) or drilling for oil. This is 
the type of rivalry that is often linked to government leaders or clan leaders, who use private 
armies to protect their interests104. In such situations, there is no regard for law and order. The 
matter becomes even more complicated when foreign companies are involved. Life is made 
unbearable for everybody. Even where the conflict has been controlled, it still takes a good 
number of years for the people to return to normal life. Here the adage that prevention is 
better than cure describes the best line of action. 
 
2. 3    The Feminization of Poverty 
 
The expression “feminization of poverty” was coined in the early 1970s to refer to an increase 
in the role that gender inequality plays as a determinant of poverty. The disparity in social 
status as a result of gender difference is a social problem with a long history. In almost all the 
societies of the world, women are treated as second to men, not as equal. Not even in the 
developed countries of the world is this problem completely absent. But it cannot, in any case, 
be compared with what obtains in the developing and Islamic countries. There is a profound 
unequal treatment of women and men in the areas of employment as it concerns work 
opportunities, salary and promotions. Traditionally certain roles are assigned to women that 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for them to rise in positions of leadership even where they 
have the same qualification as men or are even better qualified. This discrepancy, which is 
described in social psychology as the “glass ceiling”105 effect, gives men more opportunity for 
economic improvement than women. This and other gender related problems led to the 
emergence of “feminism” in the late 1960s, to which feminization of poverty could be 
considered an extension. Poverty, generally understood as a deprivation of resources, denial 
of capabilities or freedom, which are often described as the dimensions or spaces of poverty, 
affects women more drastically than men in the countries of Africa. 
 
The expression ‘feminization of poverty’ was popularised by a study by Diane Pearce, which 
focused on the gender patterns in the evolution of poverty rates in the United States between 
the beginning of the 1950s and the mid-1970s. Pearce used the concept initially to mean “an 
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increase of women among the poor” and “an increase of female headed households among the 
poor households”.106 Feminization is to be understood as an action, a process of becoming, 
and like every other process, is dependent on factors which can enhance or deter its 
realization. In the case of poverty, education and equal job opportunities should be available 
on an even playing field for both women and men in the struggle for economic development. 
A change of mentality on the part of the society which places women at a disadvantage 
because of culture or convention is crucial. This is the platform for action adopted by the 
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, which identified the 
eradication of the persistent and increasing burden of poverty of women as one of the twelve 
critical areas of concern requiring special attention and action by the international community, 
governments and civil society. 107  A year after this conference, the United Nations 
Commission on the status of women discussed the issue of women and poverty at its fortieth 
session in 1996, and proposed further action to be taken by the UN member states and the 
international community, including the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in all poverty 
eradication policies and programmes. The Beijing Conference was an important breakthrough 
as there has been, following its conclusions, a recognition by governments that there is a 
greater dimension to poverty, taking into consideration not only minimum basic needs, but 
going beyond this to include the denial of opportunities and choices.108 Empowerment of 
women is a critical factor in freeing millions of people who are caught in the cycle of poverty 
and hunger. The provision of micro credits for rural women, which has become a very popular 
and successful strategy for the eradication of poverty, is a step in the right direction that needs 
to be expanded and sustained. 
 
The unique status of women in Africa for cultural or religious reasons, compounds the 
problem of poverty as it affects the women in that continent. In many countries of Africa 
women are not allocated land for cultivation, because it is against the culture. A man gets a 
portion of land and then leases it to a woman for farming. Furthermore, women do not have 
the right of inheritance, which places them at a disadvantage relative to their male siblings. 
Don Pogreba in his paper on “Poverty in Africa” observes that all of the problems facing 
Africa society are magnified in the condition of women, who often bear the brunt of poverty 
and its implications. He went further to argue that despite constituting more than 50% of the 
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total population of Sub-Saharan Africa, women are undervalued and often ignored in policy 
discussions.109 Women suffer very much in the rising poverty and unemployment besieging 
Africa. The International Labour Organisation annual report of 2007 succinctly summarizes 
the issue of poverty and African women thus: 
 
                   In developing countries, nearly 570 million rural women – 60% of the rural 
                  population – live below the poverty line. Recent research by the International 
                  Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) shows that in those countries, it  
                  is women who are nonetheless responsible for most food production. On the  
                 African continent, it is estimated that women produce 70% of the food. Poor 
                 women in these countries produce for sale as well as for subsistence; the poorer 
                 the household, the harder and more essential these two activities become.  
                 Analysis of the effects of structural adjustment programmes on African  
                 agriculture suggests that the increasing work load of women could provoke a  
                 new poverty crisis in which poor households will have record mortality levels 
                even as overall agricultural revenues increase.110  
 
The feminization of poverty in Africa is further compounded by gender inequality, which 
leaves many African women vulnerable to a range of other problems including HIV/AIDS. 
There are gender inequalities in personal relationships, in the community, within the 
workforce, and in political circles. Inequalities increase women’s vulnerability to poverty and 
vice-versa, and both hinder them from enjoying full human rights.111 Just as it is unacceptable 
to discriminate on the basis of gender so it is against the dignity of the human person to be 
discriminated on the grounds of poverty. A poor person is first a person before being poor.  
 
There is no society that has been able to completely eradicate the problem of poverty, but 
many have found the means and the political will to reduce the level of poverty. What this 
suggests then is that an approach as to how poverty can be reduced should not be an exercise 
in utopian fantasy, but rather a blueprint for practical action towards attainable goals. 
Therefore, desirability must be balanced against feasibility, merit against cost, good will 
against the practical economic, social and political realities. A discussion like ours on the 
problems of poverty like ours does not intend to propose an economic levelling. A degree of 
                                                 
109 Pogreba, D., „Poverty in Africa“, A topic paper prepared for  the National Debate Topic Selection  
     Committee of the NFSHA, (Unpublished Paper) 2006, 7 
110 Ibid., 7 
111 Ibid. 
 104
inequality in the distribution of the social good is a necessary feature of modern society. Some, 
that is, will have more and earn more than others; perfect equality is neither desirable nor 
attainable. Extreme material deprivation, however, is in no way essential or desirable and 
neither is extreme wealth. It is on this note that we want to reappraised the theory of basic 
needs or the so-called poverty line, below which a person is considered abjectly poor and so 
leads a life unworthy of human dignity.  
 
2. 4      C o n c l u s i o n 
 
In the just concluded chapter we outlined the root causes and consequences of poverty in the 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In the course of the discussion, we were able to establish 
that poverty is not caused by a single, but by several factors. From these many factors four of 
them (geographical, disease and over-population, leadership and foreign policies; and 
inadequate education and technical know-how) were discussed. Among these four, the 
leadership and foreign policy factor were given special attention as the interplay of internal 
and external policies has a major role to play in the African poverty condition. Internally, this 
involves wrong policies and misappropriation of funds by the leaders, while externally, it 
concerns the servicing of debts from foreign countries and institutions. Closely related to this, 
is the conflict that often arises from political policies and the NGOs. Finally, we underlined 
the fact that most of the root causes of poverty could be attenuated or eliminated with 
adequate education and technical know-how. In other words, illiteracy plays a great role in the 
persistence of poverty. Just as the prophet Hosea lamented that the people perish for lack of 
knowledge, one could say that Africans are poor for lack of education. One striking aspect of 
this lack of knowledge is the predominance of superstition that accounts for poverty as 
destiny or force people to move from one house of prayer to another in search of miracles. 
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                                        CHAPTER THREE 
   THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN A MULTI-CULTURAL SOCIETY 
 
3. 0  Introduction 
 
The incidence of violence, like that of poverty, poses a great threat to modern man and the 
peaceful co-existence of humanity. Contemporary human society is haunted by the fear of 
violence, despite the progress already made in the advancement of fundamental human rights 
and inalienable human freedom. Today it has become difficult to move freely on the streets in 
most parts of the world without the fear of being attacked by an unknown person or a group of 
persons. There are frequent reports of deaths through explosives and bombings; innumerable 
cases of killings; kidnapping; house-burning; rapes and other forms of both domestic and 
public violence which inundate the media. Although abhorred by all men and women, 
“violence is especially cruel, and often more frequent, when targeted at those groups of 
people who already find themselves disadvantaged or discriminated against in society”.1  
 
Scholars are unanimous on the fact that violence in its manifestations is part and parcel of 
human existence; in all likelihood a constituting element of human society used as a cement in 
processes of social integration it is. Everywhere history has been written in blood. And yet 
violent action as we find it in a variety of forms remains in all its complexity one of the least 
understood fields of human social life.2 According to general historical and social theories, 
violence occupies a central place as a factor in the constitution of human society and in the 
emergence of state civilizations. This assertion may be true in the uncivilized and primitive 
societies, but it is difficult to find any modern society where violence is legitimized as a way 
of life. However, the modern massive production of dangerous weapons of war drastically 
reduces the chances of attaining sustainable peace. How are we to understand this infinite 
capacity for self-destruction and the destruction of others manifested in the making of 
weapons and the prevalence of violence in view of the dignity of the human person as a 
rational and free being? 
 
                                                 
1. Brown, H., Violence against vulnerable groups: Responses to violence in everyday life in a democratic  
      society, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004, 7 
2. Aijmer, G.(ed.), Meanings of Violence: A Cross-cultural Perspective, New York: Oxford International  
       Publishers Ltd., 2000, 1 
 106
Our aim in this chapter is to consider the various ways in which violence can be understood as 
a social dynamic in a multi-cultural society with a particular interest in the ugly drama that 
has taken a centre stage in Sub-Saharan Africa after the colonial era. Violence is, however, 
neither natural nor endemic to African cultures. Nonetheless, a study of the prevalence of 
violence in the length and breath of that continent tends to demonstrate the contrary. There are 
various opinions as to the origin of the widespread violent conflicts in Africa. These range 
from the initial resistance of the natives to colonialism, the struggle for independence to the 
patriarchal family system.  What does it mean to be violent? How do we reconcile the 
‘violent’ customary practices in Africa, especially against women and children, with the 
integrity of the human person? To what extent does the problem of violence in Africa 
contribute to the hunger and poverty which has bedevilled that continent and vice versa? 
 
3. 1  The Meaning of Violence and the Nature-Nurture Controversy 
 
The ambiguities associated with the term ‘violence’ makes its definition far from being simple. 
Such ambiguities stem from the fact that violence is an interdisciplinary terminology, the 
hermeneutical understanding of which is dependent on the particular branch of studies that is 
under consideration. While each discipline has its own distinct contribution to make to the 
study of violence – the new developments in criminal sociology, law, ethology, history, 
psychology and human evolutionary biology cannot be ignored – the challenge, however, is to 
integrate some of them into a larger whole and to reshape our perception of the nature and 
causes or relevant factors of violent behaviour. Furthermore, owing to the diversity of culture, 
what is considered an act of violence in one culture may be embraced as a way of life in 
another culture. For instance, the process of selecting a bride by the nomadic Fulanis of 
northern Nigeria, which involves the use of rods by two young men with each other in a mock 
fight with the goal that whoever wins takes the bride, would leave a stranger nonplussed. 
Another difficulty encountered in explaining the term ‘violence’ has to do with its 
measurement and categorization. This is captured by Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe 
Bourgois in the introduction to the book, Violence in War and Peace. According to them, 
“violence challenges categorization. It can be legal or illegal, visible or invisible, necessary or 
redundant, illogical or rational and strategic. The most that can be said about violence is that 
like madness, sickness, suffering or death itself, it is a human condition. Violence is present 
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(as a capacity) in each of us, as is its opposite – the rejection of violence”.3 This may be 
considered a step toward an understanding of violence, but the difficulties associated with its 
definition have not been overcome. This notwithstanding, it would be the height of pretence 
to conclude that we do not know what violence is, merely because of the afore-stated 
conceptual difficulties. 
 
Violence, etymologically, comes from the Latin, violentia (vis – force) and usually refers to 
great force, excessive force, or constraint. The first two of the three meanings are derived 
from the standpoint of the agent’s activity, while the third is derived from that of a passive 
object affected adversely by the activity of the agent. The latter is Aristotle’s concept of 
violence which Thomas Aquinas took over and made use of in all his works. In this strict 
sense, the principle is mainly extrinsic and the thing suffering violence contributes nothing.4 
Following this train of thought, we see that two principles are involved in violence, namely 
the constraining and the constrained, the latter, though always passive relative to the agent 
inflating violence, may suffer violence either as an active or as a passive principle. As an 
active principle, it suffers violence when it is forced by an extrinsic agent to act contrary to its 
own inclination or prevented from acting according to it. The inclination denotes the intrinsic 
source of activity, which is represented by the will for rational beings and by sensory desire 
for brutes. On the other hand, if it is a passive principle (that means that it requires an external 
agent to move it to action), it suffers violence when it is moved to an act opposed to the one to 
which it is naturally, though passively, inclined to or prevented from receiving from a 
corresponding natural agent its proper act to which it has a natural passive inclination. Since 
inclination necessarily involves End, violence, in this strict sense cannot be understood 
without reference to Final Causality. 5  The foregoing expose´ raises two fundamental 
questions with reference to our understanding of violence: Can violence be understood as an 
act of the will, in other words, a rational act? Is there any connection, direct or indirect, 
between a violent act and the human person’s striving towards an End? That is to say, has 
violence any meaning? 
 
David Riches succinctly described violence as, “...contestably rendering physical hurt”.6 The 
issue of the contestability of a particular act as ‘violent’ which is not only encountered in the 
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definition of the word, but also in the description of the act, is here underscored. But limiting 
violence to only physical hurt is superficial and incomplete. In his commentary on this 
definition, Jon Abbink says that violence refers to social interaction whereby intentional harm 
is done, and where the views of perpetrator and victim (and witnesses) are the issue of dispute, 
these parties being conscious of the problematic aspects and of different views on the 
(il)legitimacy of the harm done. The definition, he argues, points also to the fact that violence, 
even in its most crude and apparently aimless forms always has an aspect of ‘communication’ 
– be it as a statement of social protest, intimidation, terrorizing, or self-assertion – and thus of 
certain cultural representations or values. Moving a step further from the definition, Abbink 
adds that violence in most cases is tied to questions of social honour and of the integrity of the 
person or the group as these concepts are defined on a personal or cultural level.7  
 
In his essay on, “Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic”, James Gilligan (former 
director of Massachusetts prison mental health services and a one-time faculty member at 
Harvard Medical School) defines violence as: “The increased rates of death and disability 
suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of the society, as contrasted with the 
relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them.” 8  Gilligan’s 
description of ‘excess deaths’ as ‘non-natural’ and their attribution to the stress, shame, 
discrimination and denigration that results from poverty and hence lower status is very 
significant. But this is not yet a definition of violence. He, however, draws from Senneth and 
Cobb who examine the ‘contest for dignity’ in a context of dramatic inequality. Exclusionary 
practices could be seen as both the cause and the effect of violence, which in any case are 
preceded by stigmatisation. This is what Anton Blok describes as ‘ritualization of violence’, 
which involves according to him “attempts to avoid moral responsibility for killing ‘fellow’ 
human beings. Special names for opponents and victims, like animal names (‘dogs’, 
‘cockroaches’ and the like), offensive nicknames and other abusive terms serve to 
dehumanize them, set them apart from ordinary people and remove them from the moral 
community”.9  
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated how tedious and almost a futile attempt it is to try 
to define the term ‘violence’ as far as it remains a too open and abstract notion. It therefore 
needs relocating historically and into certain socio-cultural relations and structural systems of 
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power. Edna Bay shares this view by arguing that, “violence is an elusive subject for scholars 
in multidisciplinary settings. Definitions are hard to pin down: Is violence physical or bodily 
force alone, and force directed toward whom? Should the definitions of violence include the 
structural violence of poverty, or of institutions that place individuals in disadvantaged classes 
or in disadvantaged gender or racial and religious categories? Can political and domestic 
violence be equated? Who has the right to define and describe violence?”10 There is, in any 
case, a connection running through all these dimensions of looking at violence which Bay 
raises in the above quotation, because the study of violence as physical does not exclude the 
context of structural violence of poverty or the institutions whose indifference makes the 
persistence of violence inevitable. Donham’s two-fold approach to the subject of violence as 
‘reality and concept’, and as ‘event and word’ is a step further in understanding the concept. 
He defines violence as a “force that threatens bodies and the bare life of bodies”. 11  He 
remarks that violence is always culturally defined, along with its implicit moral condemnation. 
Indeed, coercive power and legitimate force are euphemisms for acceptable violence 
conducted by states; discipline and correction are equivalents in domestic parlance. Both are 
related to authority and its recognition, which give legitimacy to certain forms. 12 Our task in 
this work is not so much the exposition of the different cultural notions of violence and their 
sometimes superficial simplistic moralistic approaches as that of proposing a norm for 
evaluating violence, which norm has the dignity of the human person as its determining factor 
in an emerging new world order. Whether we look at it from the point of cultural perspective 
or from linguistic analysis, the concept of violence denotes a deviation from order; a violation 
of integrality and/or integrity. The search for the meaning or the goal of what is performed in 
any act of violence or violation should be undertaken at a deeper level; which can lead to the 
question of the end justifying the means. At this point, it is pertinent to situate our further 
discussion of violence in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa after the period of colonialism. In 
doing this we shall try to outline the various forms of violence that are to be found in Africa, 
their cultural rootedness and how socio-political situations have modified the hitherto 
accepted ‘harmless’ cultural practices. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Bay, G. E. and Donham, L. D.(eds.), States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa, 
   Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 2006 2 
11 Ibid., 3 
12 Ibid.  
 110
3. 2.   The Nature and Forms of Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
The understanding of the nature and forms of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa requires a 
clarification of some background information. In the course of the above hermeutical excursus 
into the meaning(s) of violence, we saw that in no human society or social formation is 
interpersonal aggression, physical threat, assault, or armed conflict and homicide completely 
absent or totally banned; at the same time some seem to be affected more than others in terms 
of degree and variety. Africa, more specifically Sub- Saharan Africa, may be classified as a 
continent with a unique history of violence. Two factors can be said to be at the background 
of this uniqueness. 
 
The first discrepancy to be noted in any description of violence in Africa is that between the 
reporter (ethnographer) on the one hand and the perpetrator(s) and victim(s) on the other hand. 
Ethnographers have always had the problem of making a clear-cut distinction between what 
constitutes the cultural life-style of the people and a case of violence. Coming from a different 
cultural context, ethnographers perceive some practices as irrational and therefore not worthy 
of human beings. But for the people concerned it is through such practices that their life can 
be defined as meaningful, therefore to eliminate them means to deny their life of cultural 
identity or meaning. It is impossible therefore to downplay the tension generated from the 
perception of cultural practices by ethnographers in Africa and the representation of the 
validity of such practices. Thus the basic task to bear in mind, borrowing from Edward Said, 
is to situate ethnogaphers within a certain ‘geopolitical’ entity and to show how this 
situatedness accounts for both the relativity of their discourse and its ideological nature. The 
‘general liberal consensus’ that scholarship produces non-ideological, non-political 
knowledge becomes untenable judging from the works of scholars in this area. Consequently, 
Said remarks that, “no one has ever devised a method for detaching the scholar from the 
circumstances of life, from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with a class, 
a set of beliefs, a social position, or from the mere activity of being a member of a society”.13 
If it is true  that all academic knowledge is somehow tinged and impressed with, violated by, 
the gross political fact, the fact, that is, of the scholar’s inevitable involvement in life, as 
Argyrou wishes us to believe, then it follows that ‘no production of knowledge in the human 
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sciences can ever ignore ... its author’s involvement ... in his own circumstances’14 ,and it 
must also be true that for an ethnographer of foreign extraction studying the phenomenon of 
violence in Africa, there can be no disregarding the main circumstances of his/her actuality. 
Thus conditioned by his/her facticity, a social and historical construct, it becomes difficult for 
him or her to see the world through disinterested eyes. It is against this background that one 
can understand the controversial statement of the cultural anthropologist Levy-Bruhl, that 
“die Geistesart der Naturvölker vor allem mystisch ist”.15 Levy-Bruhl’s assertion that the 
most fundamental characteristic of native mentality is mystical sets up a dichotomy between 
‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ minds. To say that the natives are incapable of reasoning according 
to Levy-Bruhl, is to say that they only exist in a way that does not allow them to conceptualise 
themselves as entities at once in, and also distinct from the world.16 The implication of this is 
that, bereft of reason, which is traditionally said to be the major distinction between man and 
brutes, the natives are regarded as less human,  driven by basic instincts and grossly violent, 
hence are incapable of a cultivated way of life. Violence, and the colossal suffering associated 
with it, is viewed by its opponents as degeneration into irrationality, barbarity and horror, an 
anathema to the very ideals of the Enlightenment – justice, humanity and freedom.17 But this 
position is completely opposed to real life, as the degree of violence among human beings 
whether ‘primitive’ or ‘civilised’ has surpassed that of the animals. This view of Levy-Bruhl 
has few dissenting voices, among which, however is that of Evans-Pritchard, who argued that 
“given the circumstances under which most natives live, it is hardly possible for them to lead 
a life enveloped in mysticism ... they live closer to the harsh realities of nature, which permit 
survival only to those who are guided in their pursuits by observation, experiment and 
reason”.18 Besides, the natives no longer appear to be hopelessly immersed in mysticism and 
magic; nor do Western societies any longer appear to be an exclusively rational domain of 
thought and action. Evans-Pritchard therefore concluded that Levy-Bruhl failed to make a 
distinction between perceptual and conceptual analogies in his study of the natives.19 We shall 
come back to this in the later part of this work when we shall be discussing the first contact of  
Westerners with the native Africans and the impression that contact has left on the psyche of 
both parties. 
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The second observation has to do with the problem of reconciling the cultural institutions of 
the natives with contemporary modern values, which entails a construction of new identities. 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the native Africans who subject their daughters and/or 
their sons to mutilation as a part of integration into the society mean well for them. They are 
only trying to hand over that which they received from their forefathers. The rejection of these 
rites of passage to adulthood, in some cases, whether in the form of skin scarification or organ 
mutilation is in most cases perceived as a rejection of tribal or communal identification and all 
the benefits that go with it. What may appear meaningless in the eyes of a stranger becomes 
the pivot on which the entire life of the people rotates. Be that as it may, there are certain 
crucial questions to be raised concerning these practices where they still perdure. How 
plausible is it to defend such practices that violate the integrity of the human person in the 
name of tradition or cultural identity in the 21st century? Are there no other ways in which 
such processes of identification could be carried out apart from violent acts? Can a process of 
change be brought about through the use of violence or through education and enlightenment? 
In any case, these questions concern only those forms of violence that are rooted in the socio-
cultural cum religious institutions of the people. And in this regard, Sub-Saharan Africa can 
boast of a good number of such institutions with a long history and undocumented cases of 
violence, except where they escalated into inter-tribal wars. But there are other cases of 
violence that arise from political and economic struggles. Let us now consider the different 
forms of violence as they pertain to this work. 
 
3. 2. 1   Historico-Cultural Violence and Its Valorization 
 
The term ‘culture’ is empirically plural and conceptually diversified. It is commonly 
understood as the entire way of life, material and non-material, of a human society. Culture is 
said to be essentially social, the product of a society’s tradition and its interaction with other 
societies. Culture is therefore not a static but a dynamic reality.20 Futhermore, culture refers to 
the arts and other instances of human intellectual achievement regarded as a whole.21 It is also 
used to designate ‘the arts, customs, ideas, etc. of a nation, people, or group’22 In one of the 
earliest definitions, Sir Edward Tylor summarises the elements of culture as, “that complex 
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, moral, law, custom and any other capabilities 
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and habits acquired by human beings as members of society.”23 The conclusions that can be 
drawn from the above definitions are, firstly, there are no people without a culture. Secondly, 
culture is dynamic since it involves constant interaction with those of other societies and a 
revision of the society’s traditions in line with evolving contexts. In this regard therefore, 
culture is constantly learnt, hence B. F. Skinner’s concept of culture as the learned aspect of 
human behaviour. The third conclusion that follows from the afore-stated definitions is the 
fact of cultural pride and identity. In its openness to innovations, every culture struggles to 
retain its identity. When can an aspect of culture be designated as violent? What does cultural 
violence refer to or how could a people’s culture contribute to violence? 
 
The expression ‘cultural violence’ refers, according to Johann Galtung, to “any aspect of a 
culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form. It means those 
aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and 
ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science – that can be used to justify 
or legitimize direct or structural violence”.24  Galtung’s analysis does not imply that any 
culture could be described as violent, but that some violent acts could be permitted under the 
auspices of culture. Just as political science is about two problems, namely the use of power 
and the legitimation of the use of power, so violence studies are about two problems: the use 
of violence and the legitimation of that use.25 Our discussion so far has shown that violence is 
a social problem that has to be fought and overcome, because it is an ill-wind that does not 
blow any man any good. But every effort geared at combating violence in a given society or 
in the world is paralysed when violence is justified as being part of the culture of the people. 
This part of the work intends to explore only two aspects of  culture that lend credence to the 
use of violence ad intra et ad extra, from which the people of  Sub-Saharan Africa are not 
immune. These aspects include the preservation of a society’s tradition on the one hand and 
the interaction with other societies with their own independent traditions on the other hand; 
and the role of religion as a vital system of African culture.  
 
Let us begin by taking a look at what constitutes the cultural traditions of any given society. 
To talk of traditions (latin, tradere – to hand over), is to refer to those elements of culture with 
their rites and rituals handed over from previous generations. The passage of time adds weight 
to such practices. It does not really matter whether the particular practice that falls under this 
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category is ‘reasonable’ or not. Its only justification is simply that it has always been done 
like this and it does not have to be discontinued in ‘our time’. In some cases the particular 
practice that is accepted as tradition is simply tolerated, because it is through such that the 
individuals who undergo it are identified as members of the same society. This forms the 
basis of cultural rituals, which are considered as occasions in which the ties of identity, 
belonging, and solidarity are reinforced through an elaborated ceremony presented in a 
dramatic form, in which feelings and emotions are shared.26 Although such rituals entail some 
bodily cuts and pains, they are accepted nonetheless as proof of identity and maturity. This is 
described by Arnold van Gennep as the rites of passage that involve rituals in which the 
community helps individuals to take a step forward in life, that is to say, to pass from one 
status or role to another status or role.27 Shorter explains that the ritual is anti-structural and 
status is suspended for the time being. It de-emphasizes sex. It is characterized by poverty and 
nakedness, by submissiveness, and by a strong sense of community, which creates a bond 
between age-mates. It is an authentic form of African asceticism.28 A typical example of this 
is the process of initiating office-holders and chiefs in some parts of Africa, “where the 
candidate is seized, seculded, instructed, beaten for the last time, anointed, invested, brought 
out, introduced to the living and the dead”.29 Once more, we underscore the fact that it is the 
strong sense of community that acts as the propelling factor in the submission to ritual 
violence. The ritual circumcision of young girls (initiation into social strata) before marriage 
in many parts of Africa may be better understood in this context, which is, however, not to be 
seen as an approval of the practice. Our position is more of an attempt to bring out the crucial 
role of cultural rituals (even where they are perceived as violent) as carriers of the people’s 
world-view and meaning of existence. It is because of this fact that the meeting of two 
cultures some times crystallises into violent encounter. 
 
Karl Popper’s classification of the human society as either ‘open’ or ‘closed’ is a key to 
understanding the roots of some forms of violence predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
According to Popper, the “open society” is one in which competition is present, and in which 
there are alternative courses of action. Forces for radical change exist within the society. 
Outside influences give innovators the opportunity to bring about change. The “closed 
society” on the other hand is one in which radical change is unthinkable. There is no planning. 
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Alternative courses of action are not available. New elements are absorbed into previously 
existing tradition or even totally rejected. Such societies, he added, are open to modernization. 
However, Popper concluded that there is no human society or culture so completely closed 
that change is totally impossible. 30  The Popperian closed society bespeaks the African 
condition, where the attempt to bring new elements into the cultural repertoire gives birth to 
violence. One aspect of culture where this is very obvious is in the area of religion.  
 
Religion is an essential part of African culture, such that it is not easy to find any aspect of the 
peoples’ life that is not rooted in religious belief. Thus Africans are said to be notoriously 
religious. The people living in the vast area South of the Sahara had already sustained rich 
systems of belief and practice long before the arrival of Christianity and colonialism, and 
certainly in some cases before the Muslim expansion from the Arabian Peninsula. Islam made 
its way into Sub-Saharan Africa in the 8th century, and within six hundred years of the death 
of the prophet Mohammed had penetrated from the Sahara to the Sudanic belt, and from the 
Atlantic to the Red Sea, making its presence felt among the indigenous peoples who inhabited 
this expanse. This, however, was everything but peaceful. Christianity, on the other hand 
came to North Africa earlier than Islam, but was extended to the rest of Africa in the 19th 
century in the period of colonialism; a coincidence which has made some authors regard the 
work of the missionaries, unfortunately, as a means employed by the colonialists to subjugate 
the Africans and thus render them docile and porous to European exploitation.31 Three main 
streams of religious belief and practices are to be discerned in contemporary Sub-Saharan 
Africa, each commanding a large number of followers. These include, the indigenous African 
religions (also called traditional African religion); World Religions (Baha’i, Buddhism, 
Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Sikhism and Zorastrianism); and the New Religious 
Traditions or African Independent Churches. Unlike the African traditional religion, the other 
two groups are mainly proselytic in nature, and the process of proselytizing is sometimes 
accompanied some times by violent conflicts which often provoke intra/inter tribal clashes. 
The Arabic word ‘jihad’ refers to war or struggle against unbelievers in Islam, which 
describes the pattern of conversion peculiar to this form of religion. Since what is implicit in 
the use of the word jihad is that the unbeliever in Islam (infidel) should be converted or killed, 
one is moved to come to the conclusion that it is utopic to think of any practice of this religion 
that is devoid of violence. In his commentary on Dr. Daniel Pipes’ article on “Violence is an 
integral component of Islam”, Kenneth Besig remarks, “Islam of any kind, without a strong 
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and pervading component of violence would not be Islam as it is commonly known and 
practised by Moslems throughout the world”.32 To buttress this assertion, Besig recounts that 
Islam is the only religion which teaches that husbands may beat their wives for just about any 
reason. Furthermore, the same religion demands that the male family members murder their 
female relatives for immodesty or even the suspicion of improper sexual behaviour, the so-
called honour killing.33 On a more objective note, Ali Mazrui attributes violence in Islam to 
what he described as the ‘radicalising trend’ in Islam. Mazrui identifies two trends in Islam: 
the revivalist trend and the radicalising trend. While the former is conservative and politically 
accommodating, the latter is more recent and politically explosive. Both trends are to be 
found in Somalia, Eritrea and Kenya (where they bombed the US embassy in 1998); and in 
Nigeria, where they are gradually emerging from the dominant revivalist group.34 Mazrui’s is 
that the radical trend in Islam is attributable to such factors as poverty, corruption and 
political alienation.  
 
The religious invasion that was championed by Christianity and Islam dethroned the African 
traditional religious system, in which each ethnic group located in a particular territory 
developed its religion, usually associated with places of origin, with particular myths, with 
different ways of understanding God’s role in its localised societies, and with the role of the 
spiritual world in its communal and social life. The different ethnic groups had different 
accounts concerning their origin, as well as ritual specialists who knew how to communicate 
with the world of the divine, and with the spirits, and who also had access to places associated 
with their religion. The world of the spirits exercised a constant intervention in the world of 
humans, especially in the life of their descendants and therefore needed to be consulted. All 
this ceased, though not completely, with the coming of Christianity and Islam. There is a 
continual attempt to convert new members, while some old members drop out. Of course, we 
know that Islam imposes the death penalty on anyone who leaves the religion. Both Islam and 
Christianity consider their mission of evangelization in Africa as a competition where each 
group struggles to outdo the other in the conversion of more members which at times results 
in violent conflicts and unrest. This fact makes us raise the question of whether the zeal to win 
more members in Africa by these two world religions is purely religious or has a political 
undertone. For Raymond Ibrahim, the holy war (jihad) is a religious duty, which has the goal, 
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among other things, “to gain power over other nations”.35 In light of the foregoing, let us now 
consider the admixture of ethnic conflicts and political violence often appearing in religious 
guise in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
3. 2. 2   Ethnic Conflicts and Political Violence 
 
More than two third of the cases of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa fall under the broader 
division of ethnic conflicts and political violence. Even where they assume a socio-economic 
and/or religious aspect, they are, in the long run, considered to be rooted in ethnic diversity 
and political rancour. Ethnic identity and ethnic consciousness are strong traits that define the 
existence of every African. It is a common belief among most Africans that belonging to a 
particular ethnic group or tribe determines their personal development or socio-political status. 
This belief leads to the exclusion and treatment of people of other ethnic groupings with 
contempt. Although there may be no real differences between them, the fact that they have 
been taught to believe that there is a difference breeds problems. It is a usual human 
experience that if people believe something to be real, when it is actually not real, the 
consequences of that belief are real enough. Writing on the importance of ethnic identity, 
Amartya Sen in his book, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, observes that: 
 
                        A sense of identity can be a source not merely of pride and joy, but also 
                          of strength and confidence. It is not surprising that the idea of identity 
                          receives such widespread admiration, from popular advocacy of loving 
                         your neighbour to high theories of social capital and of communitarian 
                         self-definition.36 
 
In this regard, the positive feelings of belonging to a particular group, be it a nation, a race, a 
religion, a tribe or even a clan, can be a source of pride, joy, strength and confidence for each 
one of us, if the mentioned group is seen positively on the international, national, tribal or 
ethnic levels. Even where there is a negative stereotype, the people who are so classified (the 
in-group) hold together and tend to defend their commonality or roots against all forms of 
derogatory remarks or treatment. Ludwig Bertsch recalls an incident during the Vatican II 
Council, when an Italian Cardinal, in the discussion on Latin as the only possible language for 
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the liturgy, said, “Is it not an honour, for example, for an Indian Christian who can say: ‘As a 
Catholic I am really a Roman citizen (Cives Romanus sum)’ ”. To this remark an Indian 
bishop replied: “Your Eminence. Our Indian culture was before your culture. My honour is, as 
an Indian, I am a member of the Catholic Church”.37 Identity consciousness can therefore be a 
source of discord if belonging to one group carries with it the perception of distance and 
divergence from other groups, even though the different groups may be found living together 
in one geographical area. But ‘within-group’ solidarity can fuel ‘between-group’ discord only 
when there is something at stake, be it economic empowerment or political position. It is 
against this background that we can understand the problem of ethnic conflicts and the 
concomittant political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the threshold of an election, ethnic 
awareness is increased and the tendency to move from the general to the particular prevails; 
and people are informed that they are not only Rwandans but Hutus and Tutsis; not only 
Kenyans but Luos and Kikuyus; not only Liberians but Americo-Liberians and the native 
Africans; not only Nigerians but northern Hausa/Fulani and  southern Igbos and/or Yorubas. 
The struggle for political power and the control of national wealth becomes the Auslöser of 
the already latent ethical differences. And when the ethnic group that feels that it is its 
birthright to rule fails to win an election, it unleashes violence on the other. The genocide of 
the Tutsis and the massacres that claimed almost one million lives in Rwanda between April 
and July 1994 will ever remain in the psyche of the two parties as the most unfortunate 
consequence of ethnic ideology at the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st 
century. But how are we to understand such a mass slaughter of men, women and children 
only on the basis of their belonging to a particular ethnic group? 
 
Etymologically, the word ‘ethnic’ derives from the Greek ‘ethnos’, meaning ‘people or 
nation’. It is said to have entered the French language in 1896, where it derived its standard 
definition as “a language, an area, customs, values, a name, a shared lineage and an awareness 
on the part of its members that they belong to the same group”.38 In most cases this type of 
claim is not historically established as researchers end up in myths. Still ethnic or tribal 
stereotypes persist in Africa as a reality that cannot be wished away along with their tragic 
consequences. Ted Gurr defines ethnic groups as “groups whose members belong to a 
psychological community. The members of this community share a history, an identity, 
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cultural values, beliefs, a language and a motherland.”39 It is the feeling of psychological 
nearness that makes united action feasible in times of conflict. However, Gurr and Marshall 
attribute the prevalent cases of conflict in Africa to the combined factors of poverty, weak 
states and institutions. Kaufmann highlights the defining elements of an ethnic group to 
include a common name, the belief in a same line of descent, habits or colour.40 The fact of a 
common name makes ethnic identification obvious. In a more consensual approach, Smith 
outlines six aspects of ethnic identity to include: the name, the common past, the history, the 
culture, the territory and the solidarity.41 Conflict then arises when group interests or values 
based on ethnic aspects have to be defended in the face of other competing groups. Ethnic 
conflicts according to Michael Brown refer to quarrels between two or many ethnic 
communities about important litigations related to economic, politics, social or territorial 
questions.42 When all is said and done, it is the political element that sparks off violence in 
ethnic conflicts, as we have already mentioned above. 
 
In view of the major role played by politics in ethnic conflicts/violence and civil wars in post-
colonial Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, scholars both of African and non-African 
origin are unanimous that the arbitrary creation of modern states in the colonial era is to 
blame. This is, however, not to say that ethnic conflicts and inter-tribal wars were not known 
in pre-colonial Africa. But the point which these scholars wish to make, which is backed up 
by a reasonable degree of consensus in the literature is that colonialism contributed 
immensely to the present ethno-political problems in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa. Three 
areas stand out in considering the impact of colonialism on the problem of ethnicity. The first 
is the arbitrary creation of nation states out of different and diverse ethnic groups, which was 
contrary to the pre-colonial process of integration and assimilation of ethnic groups. 
Commenting on the impact of this action, Okwudili Nnoli writes that “colonialism brought 
the various ethnic groups under one political administration through a process which was 
quite arbitrary. In some cases the ethnic group was split into parts administered by different 
colonial powers or under different administrative units run by the same colonial power. Not 
only that, in some cases the already assimilated groups were separated into the original 
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components while others were segregated in different residential areas of the city.”43 This did 
not, however, constitute much of a problem for the colonial administrators, as they had 
sufficient administrative machinery to contain any resistance from the natives. With their exit, 
all hell was let loose as the post-colonial ruling class manipulated the different ethnic groups 
and other loyalties in their struggle for power and other material advantages. Such a struggle 
was naturally carried out along ethnic affiliation. The parallel governing structure which was 
to be provided by the presence of Christianity, unlike in the areas dominated by Islam, did not 
work, as the first Christian converts made by the former were people who had no social 
standing. Achebe captures this well when he wrote that, “none of his converts (referring to the 
white missionary) was a man whose word was heeded in the assembly of the people. None of 
them was a man of title. They were mostly the kind of people that were called efulefu44, 
worthless, empty men.”45 
 
The next issue was that of the appropriation of arable lands that hitherto had belonged to the 
indigens. The construction of satellite towns and the establishment of production units 
demanded that some acres of land be taken from the natives. Regarding the experience of the 
Kenyans, Walter Oyugi documents that, the belief that requisite technology did not exist 
locally resulted in the initiation of white settlement and the appropriation of some of the most 
fertile land in the territories of the present Nakuru, Uasin Gishu and others. The socio-
economic consequences were immediate and far-reaching, as what was traditionally 
Massailand that served as grazing land was taken away from the Massai people thereby 
constraining their economic activities.46  At the beginning, this move met with resistance, but 
was later welcomed by the people as they came to realise that it was for their good as it such 
places became centres of development. Things augured relatively well as long as the colonial 
administrators were there, but by the time they left, the original owners of the land moved in 
to reclaim it. The colonial administrators were a neutral body unlike their post-colonial 
successors, whose ethnic groups were known to the people. Many violent ethnic conflicts in 
Sub-Saharan Africa still take the form of struggling for land and its resources.   
 
The third point was the introduction of commodity production and a cash economy. The 
advent of colonialism changed the traditional way of assessing wealth. The measurement of 
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wealth was now to be based on cold cash. And the means to acquire it was dependent on the 
learning of various skills which presupposed the acquisition of a Western education. 
Consequently, competition was introduced among the different ethnic groups as each group 
struggled to be represented in the cities, where the colonialists had made modern amenities 
available. Some distinguished themselves more than the others and therefore earned 
recognition for their ethnic groups. In most of the cases the ethnic groups that had not had 
much to show in the traditional mode of assessment of fame, based either on the 
demonstration of physical prowess or the possession of herds of cattle and large acres of land, 
were now to take the lead. It did not long for certain ethnic groups to be associated with 
certain qualities. For instance, the Belgian colonial ideology categorized the Tutsi as Hamitic 
pastoralists who came from the north and were endowed with beauty, intelligence and 
leadership qualities. The Hutu, on the other hand, were presented as Bantu cultivators who 
were timid, lazy and fit to be ruled by the superior Tutsi. The Twa were described as an old 
and fatigued race of dwarfs doomed to extinction. 47  The Tutsi, as a result of this 
categorization, gained popularity among the colonialists and were given job opportunities 
which they made available to their own kin. It is alleged that they even opposed the struggle 
for Rwandan independence, because they feared losing their position of leadership and control 
over the country’s wealth. But the other two ethnic groups, that is the Hutu and the Twa did 
not approve of this idea. The development of ethnicity under colonialism has been described 
as a product of the process of establishing and consolidating both the colonial economy and 
the colonial administrative systems.48 Under the division of labour, that was done according 
to ethnic groups, the development of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness was facilitated. The 
struggle for the control over the means of production left by the colonialists, which also meant 
the political control or vice versa with a heated atmosphere of ethnic diversity ushered in 
independence. The ethnic differences escalated and became even worse in the post-colonial 
period.   
 
To sum up this discussion: Ethnic conflicts and political violence in Sub-Saharan Africa may 
have their roots in the legacy of artifical boundaries created by the colonial powers and other 
factors ennumerated above, but their evolution is purely the product of the greed of African 
leaders. Furthermore, every form of politics whether in the ancient city-state of Athens or in 
the modern nation-state of America entails some degree of violence.  To this effect Hannah 
Arendt remarks that whereas violence can be justified, it can never be legitimised. But the 
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brutality with which the acts of political violence are carried out in the independent states of 
post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa defies any rational justification. 
 
3. 2. 3     Socio-Economic Forms of Violence 
 
The concept of socio-economic violence refers to those acts of maltreatment(physical 
violence) or abusive words(verbal violence) perpetrated against an individual or a group of 
individuals, because of their social standing. The victims of socio-economic violence are 
mostly people who are economically disadvantaged or socially vulnerable. When we talk of 
social vulnerability here, we think of people who by belonging to a particular ethnic group, 
class, or gender are in danger of being maltreated. Violence is said to occur when an 
individual or group acts unilaterally, imposing its opinion and action without allowing space 
for negotiation; when the power of the two sides is not equal. Such an imposed action can 
affect the body, life, plans or future of the other, whether an individual or group. Some 
scholars define as social violence the violence exercised by oppressed or dominated groups in 
society against the legally established order with the goal of bringing about social change. 
Social violence in Sub-Saharan Africa has many faces which are dynamically manifested as 
physical, sexual and psychological; individual and group; domestic and public; brutal, vulgar 
and perfidious; spontaneous and premeditated; and create the impression of a world populated 
by perpetrators and victims only, or by human actors incapable of stepping, with respect to 
each other, into any other roles.49 For the purpose of approaching the subject systematically, 
we intend to consider the problem of socio-economic violence under two perspectives; as 
either organised(state) violence or common(domestic) violence.  
 
State or organised violence, also called institutional violence, involves the use of government 
security organs to victimise the poor. With the advent of a market economy, social evils like 
poverty and unemployment became rampant. The poor and those without work take to 
roaming the streets. In the event of any incidence of crime, they are the first to be accused. 
Thus, combating social evils came to be associated with fighting the poor and jobless who 
embodied them. This often gave rise to bloody clashes between the organs of security like the 
police force and the jobless in the major cities and on the streets. Under the pretex of social 
control, innocent souls are extra-judicially murdered. By so doing, the state which ought to 
help fight the social problems of poverty and unemployment, ends up fighting the poor and 
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unemployed. In some cases, it is their own dissatisfaction and anger with the system that the 
security men transfer onto defenceless civilians. George Ehusani in his reflection on the social 
insecurity in Nigeria laments that, “our land is now held under siege and ruled by fear. We are 
living today perpetually haunted by death, sudden death, violent death. On the highways, 
innocent Nigerians are exposed to the deadly harassment of drunken security operatives who 
brandish their fully loaded guns menacingly at oncoming vehicles as if at warfront. Now and 
again these thugs in uniform empty the content of their barrels on innocent citizens and blame 
it on accidental discharge, if the victim is not framed up as an armed robber attempting to 
escape.”50  The same state security apparatus is used to prevent individuals or groups of 
individuals from expressing dissatisfaction with such obvious injustices. The accumulation 
resulting from these cases of injustices led to the emergence of rebel groups which through 
their demand for a change in the system, bring about social rebellion and civil disorder that 
metamorphose into civil wars. In no other part of the world are civil wars so widespread and 
deadly as in Africa or more precisely Sub-Saharan Africa. The statistics from the year 2000 
show that over 300,000 people throughout the world died as a result of conflict and war; and 
over half of those deaths were in Africa.51  
 
Another aspect of state or institutional violence in Sub-Saharan Africa is manifested in the so 
called amoral familism hypothesis. Amoral familism is a term coined by social 
anthropologists to designate the practice whereby some traditional cultures operate with 
double moral standards. According to this hypothesis, the ‘partyocracies’,52 the communities 
based on kinship and tribal loyalty have been known to prescribe one set of ethical norms to 
their members in their relationships with one another and a different set of norms for relating 
to the people from other groups or the outside world.53 Supported by the philosophy of the 
‘the limited pie mentality’, which holds that there is a fixed quantity of resources and that the 
only way for one to have more is if one’s neighbour (a member of another group) has less. 
The implication is that social interactions degenerate to competition and rivalry that 
occasionally result in clashes and the loss of lives. Politically examined, amoral familism is 
the exact opposite of democracy in as much as the latter implies reciprocity in social 
                                                 
50 Ehusani, G., Nigeria: Years Eaten by the Locust, Ibadan: Kraft Books Limited, 2002  65/6 
51 Habeeb, M. W., Africa: Progress and Problems, Civil Wars in Africa, Philadelphia: Mason Crest Pub., 2007 
     14 
      
52 This expression is coined by the author and used to refer to the tendency by a ruling party to be much more  
    concerned for the interest of the members of the party than that of the general public. The success of the  
    government is measured by the well-being of the members of the ruling party. 
53 Banfield, E. C., The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, New York: The Free Press, 1958 quoted by Toma  
      Tomov, op. cit., 
 124
interactions.54 This is clearly manifested in the case of Zimbabwe where the relationship 
between the two armies that fought for independence and the political leaders is characterised 
by violence and suspicion.55 Those who fought for independence believe that  political leaders 
have to be those who participated in the struggle for independence or those nominated by 
them. All sorts of arguments are put forward to justify this claim ranging from the conspiracy 
hypothesis that classify those who oppose perpetuation in office as anti-nationalists. 
According to them, no matter how the government is run, people should be satisfied, because 
the people now govern themselves, there is no longer a colonial government. Defenders of 
this view make reference to the situation of the Israelites in the desert away from the abundant 
food in Egypt. But this argument is in itself opaque and elusive for two reasons: First, the 
statement implies the shortcomings of the post-colonial leaders. Besides, the goal of a people 
is not simply to be governed, but to be governed well. Second, the Israelites had a goal, they 
were on their way to the Promised Land, hence could put up with any type of suffering in 
order to attain it. 
 
Finally, amoral familism leads to organised criminal institutions like secret societies and 
mafia, where members united by a common bond operate clandestinely to bring into office 
political leaders of their choice or strive to prevent any government policy that does not 
favour them, and work to protect their own interests. Such organised bodies systematically 
eliminate through various means persons or group of persons whose activities are perceived to 
be contrary to theirs. It is believed that economic interests sustain the existence of these 
groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the entire wealth of the region is in few hands, mostly 
members of the same group. Some trade unions which began as honest organisations become 
secretive and exclusive with changes in the social conditions. A society torn apart by group 
interest at the expense of the common good can only be a theater of violence, a paradigm of 
the Hobbesian state of nature. The moral question raised by this condition is how a Christian 
can compete on a neutral basis either in politics or in the area of work or trade without 
identifying with such groups. We may not go into this issue in detail, but suffice it to say that 
a Christian has the moral duty to protest against an unjust structure or regime, provided he/she 
deploys peaceful means so as to avoid creating more problems, for two wrongs can never 
make a right. 
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Unlike state or institutional violence which is organised, common or domestic violence is 
unorganised and spontaneous. Common violence, as its name implies is the most prevalent 
kind of violence and can take place in any place at any time, among friends as well as among 
strangers. There is always a limit to human endurance in response to social pressure and 
changes. When the social conditions of the people degenerate, the only way the ordinary 
person can express his/her dissatisfaction is through protest, which sometimes leads to 
violence. Common violence is manifested in street fighting, wife-beating, rape, banditry, 
arson and other destruction of private and public property. In some cases, common violence is 
taken as entertainment or as part of the culture of the people and therefore institutionalised. 
We have treated this above under the section dealing with culture and violence. But since it is 
sometimes difficult to make a clear-cut distinction between what falls within the ambience of 
culture from that of social life, a repetition becomes unavoidable here. Besides, as the Igbo 
people of eastern Nigeria say, “Njo gbaa aro, o bulu Omenala” (an evil deed that perdures 
for a year is taken to be part of the culture), the persistence of some of the violent acts in the 
social life of the people invariably becomes grafted onto their cultural repertoire. Within the 
individual cultural context, this would not constitute a problem, but since the world has 
become a global village, it becomes expedient to evaluate such practices in the interest of 
others. A typical example of such violence that is perceived as an aspect of the people’s social 
life is the Chai body treatment among the Suri people of southern Ethiopia, which involves, 
inter alia, the piercing of lips and ear-lobes with sticks and inserting big wooden and clay 
discs; the making of scarifications with a razor blade on the arms, back and abdomen of 
women; the kicking out of lower incisors with a stone, and the ‘honorific’ rido-scarifications 
(carved in the skin by an age-mate) for people who have killed. Although blood flows and 
pain is inflicted in all these cases, it is not seen as an infliction of harm to be contested. It is 
part of self-conscious cultural body aesthetics.56 Closely related to this, but carried out in 
another context, is the practice of cattle raiding among the Kuria of Kenya. This is a practice 
where “a small group of men from one clan area raid into the territory of another, bringing the 
cattle back under the shelter of night into their own territory where they are able to cross over 
the border into Tanzania. The cattle may then be exchanged with cattle raided by their 
Tanzanian clansmen, with these Tanzanian cattle then smuggled back into Kenya, on occasion 
even on the same night”.57 For those people it is part of their culture, but in reality it is the act 
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of theft. Now, it is such social elements as seen in the life of the Suris and the Kurias that 
form the people’s habitus 58 , which is incorporated into action, feeling and thinking of 
individuals in their specific societies.  
  
Apart from these forms of common social violence where there is some degree of acceptance 
by the practising group, there is another form which may be described as generated by the 
complex question of the interplay between individual minds and  changes in social contexts. 
The major change that can easily lead to violence is that of unemployment. To be without a 
job is to be without a means of existence. But since the first law of every living creature is 
that of self-preservation, the human person is propelled from within to seek ways to overcome 
conditions of scarcity or directly unleash his/her anger at any obstacle on the way to this goal. 
When this condition perdures such that people begin at very tender age to experience the 
harsh aspects of life, they grow up knowing no other better way of living than being  
continuously traumatised and violent; which inevitably leads to traumatic identity.  
 
The notion of traumatic identity refers to the effects on mental life of coercive human 
environments, where violence is practised in a way that is not immediately obvious. A few 
examples of this include: Possesive parents, controlling partners, secret societies, totalitarian 
regimes, etc., etc. In these settings of disguised violence, coercion comes in a subtle way with 
a mystifying semantic envelope and has a devastating and long-lasting effect on its victims, 
who in turn devise a means, either intentionally or unintentionally, to take revenge on others 
for what they have experienced. Sluzki argues that the profound effect of traumatic identity 
results from two factors, namely “the perpetration of violence by the very agency entrusted 
with the care and protection of the individual”; and secondly, “a context of discourse that 
mystifies meanings, so that the shift from protection to violence is impossible to recognise”.59 
Living in such coercive human environments can lead to the development of ego structures 
and defences that arise as a result of failed containment and experience of rejection. The 
consequences include the impairment of behaviours of interpersonal and social relating that 
are consistent with the restrictive norms of coercive settings and ensure the survival of the 
individual. In such a context, the acquisition of traumatic identity becomes necessary for 
survival and eventually becomes the norm. And by the same token, such environments are 
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     a process of internalization of external ‘objective’ social conditions. But since the society is not a static reality, 
     the human dispositions change as the society changes. 
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doomed to reproduce generation after generation of individuals with traumatic identity. In this 
way a culture of violence is born which cannot be changed easily.60 This fact accounts for the 
pessimism that accompanies any discussion on topics relating to poverty or violence is Africa. 
There is always the tendency to throw in the towel and fall into resignation. Two areas where 
the effects of traumatic identity and its consequent violence in Sub-Saharan Africa are felt 
more are the institutions of higher learning and social security, the former plagued by secret 
cults while the latter is haunted by vigilantism. Both of them are, however, very closely 
related to each other with the one acting as preparatory ground for the other.  
 
The phenomenon of violent vigilantism in the whole of Africa, but more especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa shows that it is security not poverty that constitutes Africa’s major problem. It 
is yet to be scientifically established whether the peoples of this region are poor because of 
the violence or whether they are violent because of the widespread poverty. The issue could 
be argued either way, but it suffices to note that the degree of violent vigilantism on the 
continent is beyond imagining. Violent vigilantism is the product of an ineffective 
government, since the first duty of any government is to provide adequate security for its 
citizens. Where this is not done, individuals and groups of individuals take the law into their 
own hands, holding the populace to ransom in the name of trying to bring about civil order. 
The historian Richard Brown described vigilante groups as “an organised, extralegal 
movement, the members of which take the law into their own hands”.61 He further pointed out 
that although vigilante groups have an organised structure, they are semi-permanent and 
illegal; regardless of their intended purpose, they have no legal authority to enforce the law or 
morals or tradition.62 Even where they appear to be offering an important security service to 
the society, vigilantism can become socially destructive and anarchic. There is no law guiding 
their activities, hence there is no limit to what they can do under the cover of maintaining 
order. Two examples help to illustrate the point we are making here with regard to the 
brutality of vigilantism: The one is the barbaric way in which war victims in Sierra Leone 
were amputated, which Martha Carey described as ‘a form of violence found only in that 
country’63 The other is the operations of the ‘Bakassi Boys’64 in south-eastern Nigeria, which 
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clearly grew out of and gave expression to frustrations over a widespread sense of insecurity 
in the country. The activities of the Bakassi Boys, which started in the late 1990s in the city of 
Aba, were an expression of anger and discontentment over the extent of extortion and violent 
robberies perpetrated by an increasingly powerful group of criminals. This group made up of 
young boys embarked on the mission of ridding the market of violent criminals, publicly 
executing dozens of alleged criminals in the area. They killed these alleged criminals with 
machete blows, dismembering their bodies and then burning them at the site of the 
execution.65 These executions, termed ‘instant justice’ in conventional language, took place in 
prominent public places, such as major intersections or market centers, attracting large crowds 
of observers of every age bracket.66 By employing such barbaric means in ‘enforcing justice’, 
the vigilante group was sowing a seed of violence in the minds of the populace – which 
provides the condition for the development of traumatic identity already discussed above. 
 
The moral question in the two cases presented above, which constitutes the deciding criterion 
for assessing the quality of violence in an act, is not the intention, the will or the resolution of 
the acting agent, which is to bring about social order in the case under consideration. What is  
decisive are the consequences for the person(s) concerned, the persons on the object-side, 
whether they are wounded or destroyed, whose will and the right for self-determination and 
personal integrity are destroyed. It therefore means that, no matter the degree of good 
intention behind the works of the vigilante groups, the fact that they are not lawfully 
constituted and the inhuman manner in which they carry out their activities cannot be morally 
justified. It is not proper to try to overcome violence with violence. Besides, the Bakassi issue 
was a paradigmatic example of the effects when in any society a group of people brand 
another group in order to humiliate it, for the Bakassi Boys eventually turned out to be worse 
than the robbers they were out to get rid of.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
     this name as an umbrella to fight the menace of armed robbery in the city and redress other social problems in  
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3. 2. 4.   Violence Against Women and Its Relationship to Economic Power 
 
 Violence against women, which is also called gender-based violence and will be used 
interchangeably in this work, is one of the forms of violence prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Gender-based violence includes all the acts of violence in the form of physical, psychological 
or sexual violence perpetrated against a person specifically because of his or her sex.67 It is 
said to constitute ‘one of the most widespread human rights abuses and public health 
problems in the world today, with devastating long term consequences for the victims’ 
physical and mental health’.68 According to Green, whether it is manifested in the form of 
physical violent acts, threat or intimidation, the intent of all violence against women is to 
promote and perpetuate hierarchical gender relations. It may occur in several forms, he argues, 
but all serve the same end, namely the preservation of male control over resources and 
power.69 Although much attention is paid to the use of force and physical violence in gender 
violence, the greater harm concerns the emotional and psychological abuse, which Mary 
Maynard describes as ‘the sophisticated and systematic wearing down of women’s autonomy 
and self-esteem. It involves a range of mechanisms that may be subtle or obvious, it enforces 
gender roles and is ultimately geared at reinscribing the relations of power’.70 There may be a 
few cases where women are the perpetrators of gender violence, but in general, the expression 
‘gender violence’ invokes the image of a male perpetrator and a female victim. Men are 
therefore regarded as the primary perpetrators of violence against women, and are equally 
considered critical partners in eliminating it, both as members of families and communities, 
and as individuals involved in upholding or changing social norms. 
 
Gender-based violence is practised at the three levels of gender-structured relationships, 
which include the family, the economic system and the state. Our subsequent discussion on 
this theme will proceed in this order, but first, it is pertinent to point out that accurate study 
and statistics on violence against women in Sub-Saharan Africa are militated against by 
cultural mores which forbid reporting abuse especially within the family and sometimes 
within the community to a public office. The matter is much more difficult in Islam, where 
the victim is expected to provide two eye-witnesses, which is impossible to obtain in matters 
of sexual abuse, without which the complainant stands the risk of being stoned to death. 
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Besides, what may be considered by an outsider as abuse in a domestic relationship could be 
culturally approbated. For instance, husbands beating their wives is not looked upon as abuse 
in many traditional African societies. 
 
Gender violence in the family takes two forms, namely, wife-battery and female genital 
cutting. To understand the problem of wife beating, it is necessary to situate it in the broader 
spectrum of marriage, which is commonly viewed in much of Africa not as a union of two 
individuals but of two lineages. The ‘traditional’ African marriage is commonly understood as 
an alliance between two kinship groups for the purposes of realizing goals beyond the 
immediate interests of the husband and wife, namely procreation and survival.71 This position 
is strongly criticised by radical feminists who oppose the belief that collective ends should 
take precedence over individual interests. However, with reference to the feminist stance, 
Janice Boddy remarks that Western assumptions of the person as the locus of natural rights 
are bound to clash with African notions of self, in which the person is unthinkable except in 
relational terms.72 This relational dimension makes the issue of wife beating complicated, 
because it is not only the husband that is the perpetrator, but the family members are often 
summoned to collectively beat the woman/the wife of a relation in the name of discipline. 
What constitutes wife beating? Wife battery/beating is commonly described as the violent 
victimization of women by the men to whom they are married or with whom they share a 
marriage-like relationship. It usually involves a variable combination of the threat of violence, 
emotional violence, forced sex and physical assault. 73  For their own part, most African 
women south of the Sahara still believe that husbands have the right to beat them, since they 
have ‘a right over their bodies’ following the payment of the dowries74 to the parents of the 
women. One South African woman described the particular kind of torture she endured thus:  
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 131
 
                My husband has always abused me. He has a drug and alcohol problem. I stayed  
                because I am a catholic and because we have six children, until he kicked me out. 
                He used to tie me to the bed so I couldn’t go out. I wasn’t allowed to answer the  
                phone. One time, he beat me so bad that he cracked my head and broke one of my 
                fingers. Another time, he burned me with boiling water.75 
 
There is also the traditional opinion among many Africans that it is the duty of the woman to 
make the man happy. Hence the guilt feeling among some African women when a man beats 
his wife, that it is because she has not done her duty of making the man happy. In line with 
this view, a Gikuyu woman from Kenya blames herself for her abuse in these words: 
 
             Sometimes I used to be beaten, and if it was me in the wrong I would try to change  
              and never repeat that thing again. When a wife is beaten, it is because she has not  
              made her husband happy, so she tries to change her ways.76 
 
Not infrequently connected with wife beating and the self-recrimination of the victim is the 
issue of child-bearing. The erroneous and superstitious belief that the problem of childless 
marriage is always the fault of the woman still finds acceptance in many parts of Africa. A 
woman who is barren is regarded as a witch and therefore bad luck for the husband. And the 
only way to get rid of her is to keep on beating her until she dies or runs away. Dorcas, a 38-
year-old Tanzanian woman married for ten years, rationalizes her treatment in this way: 
 
              He calls me ‘barren’ and attacks me at the slightest excuse. Because I cannot have 
               children I just remain silent and accept it. It is really my fault – if I had borne him 
               children, perhaps he would have been kind to me. He has children by another wife, 
               but because he had to pay a lot of bridewealth (dowry) for me and we were married  
                in church he says he cannot divorce me. Despite this he promises to go on beating me  
                until I die.77 
 
The situation in which a battered woman views herself as a child that needs correction and 
often feels at fault and tries to find a reason to justify her maltreatment presents a definite 
psychological problem which might be let out in other ways, particularly with reference to the 
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strict upbringing of the children. Moreover, the fact that most of the beatings take place before 
the children, and there is no psychological intervention thereafter makes the perpetuation of 
this form of abuse inevitable. Our previous discussion above on the effects of traumatic 
identity comes to mind here. 
 
The next form of violence against women that takes place at the family level is that of female 
genital cutting, also called female genital mutilation or female circumcision. Despite the 
efforts of human rights organisations the world over, estimates suggest that between 85 and 
114 million girls have been subjected to female genital cutting in the past couple of decades. 
Consequent upon this are various cases of medical complications ranging from pain, 
prolonged bleeding, infections, obstetric complications and psychological trauma.78 Unlike 
wife beating which may be influenced by drugs or alcohol, female genital mutilation is seen 
as purely part of the culture with some religious background. It is commonly assumed in these 
cultures that circumcised women are less wayward than uncircumcised women. Radical 
feminists, on the contrary contend that female genital cutting is part of the strategy applied by 
the society to maintain men’s control over women in a world whose family system is 
principally patriarchal. They argue that the patriarchial appeal to ‘tradition’ or ‘nature’ is 
nothing short of pernicious ideology. Furthermore, the feminists point out that the woman’s 
sexual autonomy is connected to her economic autonomy; hence to be robbed of this 
autonomy in a male-dominated world is to be robbed of all, including economic power. 
According to Maynard, what indicates that gender-based violence is connected to economic 
power, is that it is during periods of economic, political, and social upheaval and uncertainty 
that violence against subordinated groups escalates.79 This illustrates how gender violence 
expresses the economic relations of power. It is this fact that forms the basis of Marxist 
feminism, which is based on Engel’s argument that women’s oppression has coincided with 
changes in the means of production and the emergence of male control over wealth, namely 
the emergence of private property and capitalism.80 The connection between gender violence 
and economic control may not be completely denied, but to situate female genital mutilation 
in male-controlled economic machinery is historically untenable. Most of the cases of female 
genital mutilation are, in any case, carried out by older women relatives in the community and 
not their male counterparts. 
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There is, however, sufficient empirical evidence to show that most men deploy their economic 
power to foster violence either in defence of their status or as a way of statisfying their bestial 
passions. Violence perpetrated against women not only because they are women, but also that, 
being women, they are made to be economically dependent on men, is a widespread problem 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Chapter one of this work, we underscored the fact that in most parts 
of Africa, women have no right of inheritance or the right to acquire land. Even where they 
have the money to buy plots of land for personal use, they have to arrange the purchase 
through men. 
 
A survey conducted in several countries of Africa shows that women are frequently abused by 
the men in places of work or in the schools, either in the form of direct physical violence (rape) 
or making offers in money or goods as a means of having access to the girl-child/woman in 
question. According to this survey, 40% of Ugandan women, 60% of Tanzanian women, 42% 
of Kenyan women, 40% of Zambian women and 46% of Nigerian women report regular 
physical abuse.81 It is therefore not an overstatement to assert that gender-based violence is 
directed towards females who lack the economic and social status to resist or avoid it. Sexual 
exploitation of young people is frequently facilitated by their lack of economic power and job 
opportunities. Young women are vulnerable to coercion into sexual relationships with older 
men who take advantage of the girls’ lack of economic resources by promising to help with 
their expenses in exchange for sex. These circumstances make the exercise of human freedom 
impossible, as alternative choices are denied.  
 
Campbell argues that when confronted by economic hardship men are forced to migrate 
which is a way to escape the threat to their power within the family on both the material and 
the decision-making fronts posed by the hardship. This threat to male power in the family 
relationship occasioned by economic hardship is what Campbell calls “crisis in masculinity”, 
which he says gives rise to various forms of ‘remasculinization’, which includes acts of 
individual and collective violence against women.82 With the economic shifts associated with 
technological development and industrialization in Africa, it is becoming increasingly 
common for women, whether by choice or necessity, to undertake roles and perform tasks that 
displace men from their roles as breadwinners of the family, thereby increasing men’s 
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violence against women. What is required is not violence as a solution to the changing roles, 
but adjustment. 
 
The state may contribute to gender-based violence by failing to promulgate and enforce strong 
laws punishing cases of violence against women, as is the case in most countries of Africa. It 
is not an overstatement to assert that because the laws of most if not all the countries of the 
world are made mainly by men and enforced by the same, women are rather placed at 
disadvantage in matters that pertain to them. Violence against women in the forms of rape and 
battery are treated with kid gloves in various courts of law especially in the developing 
countries. They are either tagged as domestic issues or shifted to the private domain. 
Women’s rights are also human rights. Scholars hold, and rightly so, that there can be no 
development, no peace and no social justice as long as gender inequalities persist in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Efforts have been made by some countries in this region by making laws to 
protect women from violence of all forms, but time is needed to get them properly enforced. 
 
There are other forms of violence directed at the so-called ‘vulnerable groups’ in the society. I 
use this term with much hesitation, because to refer to a group of people as such is, in my 
opinion, a form of verbal violence, which we purposely did not explore in this section, but 
which we intend to treat under causes of violence in the subsequent section. In any case, the 
people who are normally classified as ‘vulnerable’ in the society are children, women and 
elderly people. Having devoted a reasonable portion of this section to gender-based violence, 
we are left with the conditions of children and old people in Africa. The latter might not be 
considered a part of the vulnerable group in Africa, because the more advanced in age one is 
in Africa, the more respect he/she is accorded in the family and also in the society at large. 
Violence against children in Africa is principally manifested in two areas: the child labour 
syndrome and the child soldier malaise. While the former is the outcome of liberal capitalism 
and the cash economy, the latter is the offensive consequence of civil wars, in which many 
children, some as young as eight years of age, have been recruited into, or forced to join, 
militia groups and even official government armies. International organizations working in 
Africa put the estimate of children involved at over 100,000 child soldiers  that actively 
participate in civil conflict and add that even the youngest of them carry weapons.83 It is 
difficult to think of a reintegration in the society, as virtually all child soldiers suffer severe 
psychological trauma from their experiences, and without an intensive psychological 
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intervention risk becoming hardened criminals lacking the ability to form healthy human 
relationships.84 
 
Central to all the various forms of violence is the fact of power play. Every form of violence 
presupposes and is vindicated by the use of force. This force may serve the goal of masculine 
chauvinism or be used as a means to economic gain. And the nature of violence involved in 
any given situation is determined by the goal at stake. Studies coupled with common 
knowledge show that men are more prone to violence than women. It is erroneously believed 
by some that violence, either inflicted on others or received from them, is the measure of 
manhood, in line with the saying ‘boys don’t cry’. Thus violence is often considered, even by 
women, an expression of male identity. The following section will focus on the causes of 
violence in the individual and in the society according to the classical theories.    
 
3. 3   The Aetiology of Violence: Its Individual and Social Perspective 
 
The causes of violence are not always easy to pinpoint, as almost every act of violence 
whether directed towards the individual self or towards other persons, is as a result of an 
accumulation of multiple factors. In discussing the roots of violence, it may be pertinent to 
pay special attention to the changing interaction between the individual and his/her 
environment during the process of psychological development, which is technically called 
‘object relations’. Crucial to this point is the question of the immensely complex interplay 
between individual minds and social contexts, such as families, groups, organisations and 
institutions. In sum, one can say that the philosophico-ethical debate on the relationship 
between the individual and the society is historically based on this complexity. However, our 
concern here will be to see how the different phases of this interaction can lead to violence. 
Whether the act of violence is in-born or a product of the environment is still a matter of great 
controversy among social scientists. Below are some of the arguments proposed by scholars 
in support of either the genetic constitution and/or the environment (human and physical) as 
the cause of violence. Over and above this polarity is the postulation that different 
Weltanschauungen can facilitate violence. 
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3. 3. 1   Innate Factors Arguments 
 
The innate factors arguments hold that every human individual has the potential to be violent. 
In other words, one is equipped from birth with this trait and it is that which helps the 
individual to survive his/her harsh environment. Two schools of thought espouse this position, 
though from different dimensions. The first of these is the Freudian school of thought which 
holds that there are two diametrically opposed instincts in the depth of the human personality, 
namely, the instincts of life and death,85 also called the pleasure and pain principle. According 
to Sigmund Freud, the death instinct manifests itself in the forms of aggression directed either 
against oneself in the nature of suicide attempts and other, mere minor, acts of self-hatred or 
toward others in the nature of violent acts and in the extreme case, Mordversuch. The social 
contexts in which each individual finds himself/herself, like the family, organisations and 
institutions have the duty of moderating these instincts through education, which Freud 
believes ends up most of the time in internal conflicts which lead to acts of violence. Freud’s 
theory of the human personality has its merit for being a breakthrough in the study of the 
nature of the constituents of human personality and the latent motivation behind human 
actions. Nonetheless, the theory is grossly reductionistic, as it fails to acknowledge the 
spiritual dimension of the human person and his/her inalienable freedom. 
 
The second school of thought attributes the roots of violence to a defective aspect of the 
individual make-up or the outcome of a biological process ‘designed’ for the preservation of 
species. The first school called phrenologists, that link human behaviour en general to 
physical characteristics, dates back to the Italian criminal anthropologist, Cesare Lombroso, 
who popularised the notion that violent individuals possessed distinct physical features 
indicative of primitive or inferior development known as atavisms.86 We know, without a 
doubt, that some acts of violence are caused by physical defects like damage in the brain 
system, but we can argue, though metaphorically, that all who engage in acts of violence 
suffer some defects. Just as Jesus would say of his persecutors that “...they do not know what 
they are doing”.87  
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Others argue that aggression, which gives rise to every form of violence is common to all 
animals without any exception. The various forms of aggression and the degree of its 
expression are determined by evolutionary development. While lower animals may express 
their aggression in biting and kicking, the much more advanced human species makes 
weapons of war and mass destruction. From an evolutionary perspective, human violence may 
represent a context-sensitive solution to particular problems of social living that may ebb and 
flow in accordance with changing conditions. With reference to these adaptive conditions, 
Buss and Schackelford describe problems for which violence may have evolved as a solution, 
including co-opting the resources of others, defending against attack, inflicting damage on 
same-sex rivals, negotiating status and power hierarchies, and deterring rivals from future 
aggression. 88  It is in this line of thought that Konrad Lorenz holds aggression to be a 
necessary biological aspect of all living organisms.89 But one has to underscore the fact here 
that although there can be no violence without aggression, not every aggression leads to 
violence. What we want to point out is that endowed with reason as he/she is, man can control 
his/her aggression so that it does not result in violent acts. There are a lot of other ways open 
to him/her through which conflicts can be resolved rationally.  
 
3. 3. 2   Socialization Factors Arguments 
 
Socialization refers to the process through which a person learns patterns of thinking, 
behaviour, and feeling through his or her early life experiences. It involves learning the 
“scripts” for specific social behaviour, along with the rules, attitudes, values, and norms that 
guide interactions with others in a specific community.90 The key issue at stake here is that 
anti-social behaviour and aggression are often equally learned, which is a contrast to the 
tenets of the proponents of innate factors. The social psychologist Erich Fromm is of the view 
that the social context in which one finds himself/herself can have positive or negative 
influence in the shaping of a person’s behaviour. According to Fromm, it is the changes in the 
socio-economico-political conditions in the society that give rise to violence. One must add 
that it also depends on which side of the society one finds onself on. If the person is on the 
bottom of the ladder or at the edge of the society, the reaction to adverse economic changes is 
likely to be violent. But if the person is at the upper end of the ladder in the society or 
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materially well off, the changes which affect him/her positively will of course be defended 
and promoted.  
 
The mass media play a crucial role when it comes to the issue of learned violence. It is a 
known fact that the simplest means through which a child learns new things is through 
imitation. The multiple means of communication in our time, thanks to technology, are 
turning into a curse for our children. The volume of violent acts to which the children are 
exposed, whether in the internet or through the television is nothing short of a time bomb, 
which can explode anytime. One cannot imagine the fascination with which young children 
gather in a typical African village in the house of an average rich man who has a television set 
and an electrical generator to watch films in which people are shot or stabbed. The children 
are left on their own with nobody to censure what is watched. The few elderly people who 
gather around are equally entrapped. Let there be a little quarrel in the middle or primary 
school and they begin to practice on each other what they have seen on the screens. 
 
According to group relation theorists, most individuals do not really learn violence from the 
social conditions, rather the social milieu provides the favourable environment that enables 
the individuals to project their internal conflicts onto persons in the external world by means 
of projective identification. They may equally re-internalise the course and outcome of 
externally experienced conflict by means of introjective identification. In other words, 
unresolved personal conflicts could be unleashed on the society. This is experienced mainly 
among the group of people who feel hurt by the society and feel the need to carry out a 
revenge mission in violent ways. The prevalent cases of Amoklauf in our society have their 
roots in this situation. What makes this factor crucial as far as Sub-Saharan Africa is 
concerned is the great value that is placed on community spirit, which no doubt has its 
advantages when it comes to building up the society, but which at the same time has 
enormous drawbacks in times of violence.  
 
In conclusion, the socialization arguments present two basic conditions that are very crucial 
for the eruption of violence in any social milieu. On the one hand, there is the belief that a 
child who has experienced hurt is more likely to experiment that which it has suffered on 
others. For example, a child who has been spanked, hit or beaten or threatened with violence 
has a greater tendency to be violent than a child who was never exposed to any violent act. On 
the other hand, the inability of the child hurt to express the emotions resulting from hurts can 
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also lead to violent actions. In other words, being victims of some acts of violence can lead to 
further violence only when the pains arising therefrom have not been expressed and resolved. 
It is as a result of this that we talk of the situational factors argument, which focuses on those 
peculiar conditions in a social context that breed violence. After all is said and done, the 
social groups which tend to violent reactions are mostly those which do not benefit from the 
promised material improvements. Violence is after all nothing but a distorted expression of a 
person’s rage or terror in an environment where it is not safe to reveal or release strong 
feelings. What that means is that the first duty of any given institution or society is to prevent 
violence and/or develop strategies for containment where it becomes inevitable. But this is 
only possible when the situations that can lead to violence are known. We shall now turn to 
the situational factors argument for more explanation of those situations that make the 
eruption of violence unavoidable even when it is glaring that the outcome will be disastrous 
and that the tensions of the moment could have been resolved through dialogue in which 
rational solutions may be found.  
 
3. 3. 3   The Situational Factors Arguments 
  
The situational factors argument steers a middle course between the innate and socialization 
factors arguments. According to this position, the source of violence is to be sought neither in 
the human person nor in the environment alone, but in the different situations in which 
individuals find themselves. What that means is that although the changes in the social 
contexts produce the necessary condition for violence, without the human factors there is no 
sufficient condition for acts of violence to take place. This point was highlighted by Pope Paul 
VI, in an address to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See, thus: “We do not forget 
that many individual and collective acts of violence spring from serious injustices and 
disorders which themselves amount to acts of violence against human rights and, in part, 
provoke the chain reactions we deplore”.91 According to the Pope, treatment of symptoms 
cannot and should not excuse us from action which effectively deals with the real causes.  
 
Situational factors refer equally to characteristics of the environment such as stress or 
aggression in others that encourage or engender violent behaviour. Unpleasant situations such 
as continuous loud noise, repulsive odour, crowded and unpleasant living conditions can 
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provoke aggression and violence in those subjected to them. Other situational factors include 
the presence of weapons, and a deprived environment where poverty and frustration are 
prevalent. The increased rate of violence in Africa is attributed mainly to the situational factor 
of abject poverty and frustration, which is mainly a man-made condition. Studies testify that 
children who grow up in a deprived environment are much more prone to violence than other 
children. This follows the natural tendency to experiment on others what one has personally 
suffered. Abused children, for instance, usually grow up to be child-abusers themselves. 
Violence is carried out as a revenge mission. There are thousands of cases of this form of 
situational violence spread over Africa. And that is why it will not be an easy task to stop acts 
of violence without proper redress, involving confession of guilt, compensation and plea for 
forgiveness. This means, in a word, keeping open a space for dialogue and rational solutions.  
Children who have lost one or both parents, either in inter-community clashes or as the 
victims of extra-judicial killings by security men on the roads, can hardly grow up to be non-
violent, without adequate treatment of the trauma and proper reintegration in a normal social 
life. 
     
3. 3. 4   Religio-Cultural and Ideological Arguments 
 
The argument that religion, culture and ideology are the main causes of conflicts and violence 
in our world of today is maintained by many scholars. This view has received greater 
attention since the attack of the 11th of September, 2001 when a large amount of literature on 
the issue of violence and religion flooded the market. For some, it was a clash of civilization 
or culture. Whatever name one may choose to give to what happened on that fateful day, one 
thing that cannot be ruled out is the fact of strong religious influence.  
 
The ambivalence of violence in the content of religion is a phenomenon that is not very easy 
to comprehend, but the reality of which we live with in our contemporary society. That 
religion which is supposed to preach love and peace, should at the same time foment violent 
actions is self-contradictory. This undeniable fact brings out the meaning of the prophecy of 
Isaiah that the people would “hear, indeed, but do not understand; see, indeed, but do not 
grasp” (Isaiah 6: 9). Throughout history human beings have tried to perceive and interpret the 
divine message in ways that may be considered to be against the will of God. But the greater 
irony is that “religious violence throughout history has not been caused by the ‘moral 
incontinence’ of believers failing to live up to what they perceive to be good. It has, rather, 
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been occasioned by believers being true to what they considered to be the truth, and we are 
astounded by the lengths to which believers went to defend their faith from both internal and 
external attack”.92 It beats human imagination to think of the many persons who have given 
up the comforts of hearth and home to travel over land and sea to support the cause of the 
faith and engage in acts of violence against perceived enemies and the many lives lost in such 
exercise. 
 
The three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam have a long history of 
violence perpetrated in the name of religion. One needs to think of the genocide against the 
Canaanites as documented in the Old Testament, or the Crusades of the 11th century and the 
Jihad of the 15th and 16th centuries. A consideration of these and similar historical incidents of 
religious violence, which are repeated in different forms today, makes one wonder with Paul 
Anderson in the following words: 
 
                   If God (Jahweh or Allah) is the one commanding either murder or non-violence, 
                    such a presentation has moral implications for those seeking to follow the will of 
                    God (Jahweh or Allah). If indeed God (Jahweh or Allah) commands both actions, 
                    God (Jahweh or Allah) seems contradictory, or at least inconsistent, and the  
                    struggle then becomes how to decide which of those directives should be followed. 
                    What results from these considerations is that the Bible (Torah or Koran) is often 
                     interpreted variously, and it ceases to speak with a clear and authoritative voice 
                     on a historically important matter, especially with relation to the Bible’s (Torah or  
                     Koran) role in supporting or resisting violence.93 
 
The crux of the matter is not religion per se, but the human understanding or should we say 
misunderstanding of religion and its role in a multicultural world. Not only is religious 
violence perpetrated against people who do not share the same faith, but even members of the 
same faith are sometimes victims of religious excesses. When violent actions are carried out 
among the people of the same belief system, it is usually occasioned by the interpretation of 
the holy book of the particular religion. While some adherents would want to maintain a 
strict/verbal interpretation of the holy writ, others would prefer a liberal/contextual 
application of the message of the holy book. The positions of the two groups are technically 
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designated as religious fundamentalism (or what Karen Armstrong calls militant piety94) and 
Liberalism. Harold Ellens describes the objective of religious Fundamentalists as that of the 
promotion of an orthodoxy which is very strange to us, and observes that fundamentalism is 
equally to be found in other fields of human endeavour. According to him, fundamentalism is 
first of all a psychological phenomenon and only secondarily religious. One can find 
fundamentalism, of course, in religion in the world. An essential component of this 
psychology is a rigid structuralist approach that has an obsessive-compulsive flavour to it. 
Ellens further argues that it is the “mark of those who have very limited ability to live with the 
ambiguity inherent to healthy human life; or have no capacity for that at all”. 95  
Fundamentalism is therefore psychopathology which constructs a delusional model of reality 
in terms of which it fashions its worldview, that is, the source of an unreal picture of the truth 
about the matter to which it pertains – religion, science, ethics. Soren Kierkegaard traces the 
roots of fundamentalism to the dynamics between the objective and the subjective. Human 
history is replete with the ugly memories of the effects of fundamentalism particularly 
noticeable in religion and ethics. One might cite the history of the Spanish monks who 
mounted the Inquisition of the late Middle Ages, some of the Gnostic forms of early 
Christianity that sought to suppress others, the Hassidim in Jewish religion, and the framers of 
the doctrines shaping al Qaeda today.96 In Christianity, however, the prominent forms of 
fundamentalism arose out in the United States. This mind-set was then exported everywhere 
in the world97, especially in Africa in her contacts with the West. The work of the early 
missionaries in  Sub-Saharan Africa was hampered by the activities of the fundamentalists, 
who were bent on turning the “pagans” into Christians at once by destroying their objects of 
worship. This manner of conversion was not only to cause a big division between the 
missionaries and the natives, but was to leave a gap in the way the Gospel was received 
among the people. The same thing was applicable to Islam, which waged a war of conversion 
of the natives through the Jihad. Central to the beliefs of Islamic and Christian exponents of 
religious violence is a hatred of those who think differently, for which they claim divine 
authority. The presence of Christianity and Islam in Africa (a different culture) coupled with 
the fact that the two religions have not had a harmonious co-existence in the past, breeds 
social tension and conflicts. Nigeria is an ugly example of the persistent cases of unrest and 
conflict between the two religions. Researchers on the modern dimensions of violence and 
                                                 
94 Armstrong, K., The Great Transformation: The Beginning of Our Religious Traditions, New York: Anchor  
    Books, 2006, XVI 
95 Ellens, J. H., The Destructive Power of Religion: Violence in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, op. cit. 120 
96 Ibid., 121 
97 Ibid., 121 
 143
terrorism question whether it is faith alone or other factors in combination that account for 
them. For, if it is faith alone that compels Muslims to violence and terror, they argue, then 
there are important lessons to be learned for those who seek to promote global projects 
founded on liberal democratic values with their inherently secular biases.98  Quite on the 
contrary, a considerable amount of literature demonstrates that violence currently associated 
with Islam can be explained in other ways and thus de-couples it from core spiritual values 
identified with the faith system. 99  One of the ways in which violence in Islam can be 
explained is through political ideology. 
 
It is principally the ideological manipulation of religion for political ends that is the real 
catalyst for tension and division and eventually violence in the contemporary society. Islam 
provides the best example of this both in its internal organisation and external relationships. 
With reference to internal organisation, it is common knowledge that the struggle between the 
Sunnis and the Shi’its is a political one100, the so-called fragmentation of the Muslim Umma 
(brotherhood). And like every political struggle, at least in Africa, it is accompanied by 
violent actions. With regard to the external relationship, it is not an over-statement to say that 
the relationship of Muslims to other people has been geared towards political domination. 
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod discusses the importance of Islam as a political force. In his analysis of 
the introduction of Islam into Africa and the later political struggle for independence, he 
concludes that “while Islam and its civilisation might play a unifying role among groups of 
states that share this common ground, by the same token it might impede an overall Pan-
African movement should this ever become a serious possibility”101 But even the unifying 
role which Abu-Lughod alluded to is not tenable when we think of the afore-mentioned 
internal disharmony which characterises Islam. The claim of Abu-Lughod is further criticised 
by McKay, who in his study of the impact of Islam on relations among the new African states, 
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opined that “Islam is not a useful instrument of foreign policy”. Of note, he went on to say, 
“in the Sudanic belt is the dichotomy between a Muslim population in the north and a 
Christian and/or animist population in the south, in such states as Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, 
and the Sudan”.102 Whether it is in Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia or Ethiopia, it is indisputable that 
Islam hardly makes a separation between its religious and political objectives. In his lectures 
on Islamic government, Khomeini argued that ‘Islam as a religion must include a 
governmental system’ – according to Zubaida Khomeini believed that the “functions which 
are integral to the Islamic religion require a government”.103 The governmental system which 
Islam demands is nothing short of the imposition of the religious law, the Sharia, which can 
only breed conflicts and violence, as is witnessed often in Nigeria where 50% of the 
population are Muslims and 50% Christians. When such religious view-points as this are 
made political policies, the inevitable consequence becomes the abuse of human rights and 
the rejection of democracy based on dialogue. One outstanding instance is the Islamic 
terrorism whose dogmatism breeds suicide bombings and overall insecurity. Harold Ellens 
articulates the situation thus: 
 
                   Violence is always the product of such worldviews. Whether it is violation  
                    of the truth, or violation of persons, property and appropriate procedures 
                    for human social and juridical order, it is violence. Whether it destroys 
                    persons, the necessary conditions of healthy human existence, or useful 
                    understandings of the real world, it is violence. Whether it corrupts freedom, 
                    constrains legitimate liberty, or fouls the human nest with mayhem and 
                    bestiality, it is violence. Whether it oppresses persons or peoples with the 
                    force and power of empire building, represses hope and the resilience of 
                   the human spirit with mass-casualty fear and intimidation, or terrorizes 
                    the tranquility of children with media reports of those kinds of mayhem, 
                    it is phenomenally destructive violence.104 
 
Another aspect of violence supported by Islamic ideology that is against the dignity of the 
human person is the maltreatment of women. The following lines from the Koran bring out 
clearly how women are perceived in Islam: “Men are the managers of the affairs of women, 
for that God has preferred in bounty one of them over another, and for that they have 
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expended of their property. Righteous women are therefore obedient guarding the secret for 
God’s guarding. And those you fear may be rebellious admonish; banish them to their 
couches, and beat them. If they then obey you, look not for any way against them”.105 The 
often quoted parallel passage in the Bible from the letter of St. Paul to the Ephesians that 
“wives should be subject to their husbands as to the Lord”106 is modified in the later part of 
the letter where Paul says, “...but I am applying it to Christ and the Church”107 where the 
Church is the wife and Christ is the husband/head. In any case, there was no instruction that 
one should beat the other, as clearly stated in Islam. The afore-quoted passage from this Sura 
is an evidence that violence is made sacred in the broadest sense of the term, and a strong 
correlation to the culturally dominant framework of the patriarchy can be demonstrated, 
which stands in opposition to the equality of all men and women. However, what makes this 
‘problem’ difficult to solve is the ambivalent interpretation which the practice receives from 
both insiders and outsiders. According to the former, it is a religious practice and for the latter 
it is an act of violence against women. The controversy that punctuates any discussion on 
violence against women in Islam was underscored by Milton-Edwards in the following lines: 
 
               For those outside, particularly in the liberal West, where feminist interpretations 
                of violence have begun to impact culturally and legislatively to alter the ‘acceptability’ 
                of violence as a form of behavioural regulation as well as an expression of power 
                and authority in the private realm that which is understood as ‘Islam’s position’ is  
                considered inhumane and unacceptable. The debate within Muslim societies centres 
                on the force-violence distinction and the continuing interpretation of Koran and hadith 
                not only by traditional male scholars but also by a small and new generation of Muslim 
                women as well. In some Muslim locales women have also disputed the force-violence 
                distinction through the public realm of the courts, which have, in turn, also prompted 
                debate in some Muslim legislative and other forums.108  
 
Force and violence by men against women and in some, although rare, cases by women 
against men can be found anywhere in the world. The danger, and that is the reason why we 
cited Islam as an example in this section, is to deploy faith as the sanctioning force for such 
behaviours. The result is nothing short of the distorted image of a God/Allah who created man 
and woman, and at the same time empowers the man to maltreat the woman. Vickers 
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considers the matter differently. For him, “it is in the separation of human values into 
categories of masculine and feminine, as a way of making social and cultural distinctions 
between men and women, that the roots and the perpetuation of violence are to be found”.109 
The bottom line is that, whether it is as a result of faith system or influenced by gender 
stereotypes, women are always the victims and not the perpetrators.  
 
3. 4    C o n c l u s i o n 
The result of our discussion in this chapter leads us to make certain conclusions about 
violence. First of all, we established that violence is to be found in every human society, but 
like poverty, it varies in degree and form from one society to the other. Two explanations 
presented as underlying the violent tendency in man are the theological  and scientific 
explanations.  The one traces the roots of violence to the effect of original sin following the 
fall of our first parents, Adam and Eve. The other maintains that violence is an intensified 
form of aggression, which is a basic instinct that human beings share with other animals. 
However, the expression of aggression among human beings has a more complicated 
dimension than in lower animals, since their means of survival is known to be much more 
sophisticated than that of other primates. 
 
It is human beings that organise societies, cultivate fields, build schools, construct markets 
and plan their government, among other things. And by doing these they fashion a way of life 
otherwise known as culture that suits them and their environment. This process, unfortunately, 
has never been known to take any smooth course in the history of human society. It has been 
characterised by struggles either for power (political or economic) or the desire to preserve 
cultural identity and/or religious orthodoxy. 
 
 Sub-Saharan Africa, like other human societies, has had and continues to have its share of the 
struggles for self-definition and consolidation. The struggle for self-definition and 
independence from colonial rule ended about two decades ago. The struggle for consolidation 
of independence won is stillborn. The quest for political and economic power by the so-called 
political elite is the cause of the unimaginable degree of violence in that continent. Since the 
majority of the people are poor and the access to power means access to wealth, the struggle 
to grab power becomes the only lucrative business in Africa. It is a game without rules. 
Elections are rigged, poll boxes are removed, candidates are kidnapped, houses are burnt, all 
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in the name of politics. Most of the time, religious or ethnic resentments are whipped up just 
to destabilize the electoral process, when the loss of an electoral post is feared. Religious or 
ethnic violence is generally camouflaged political violence. Belonging to one ethnic group or 
religion is in itself harmless. The problem begins when there is political advantage attached to 
this belongingness. Hence, Mahmood Mamdani in his article “Making Sense of Political 
Violence in Postcolonial Africa” makes a distinction between ethnicity as a cultural identity 
and ethnicity as a political identity. While the one is consensual, voluntary and based on a 
shared culture, he argues, the other is enforced by the legal and administrative organs of the 
state110 . It is in this regard that he blames the colonial powers for some of the cases of 
violence that still plague Africa even after many years of her independence. Amartya Sen 
does not see any problem in a person sharing different identities, what it requires is ‘deciding 
on what our relevant identities are and weighing the relative importance of these different 
identities. And both tasks demand reasoning and choice”.111  This appears to be the only 
alternative in a multicultural  society like Africa.  
 
 We observed that women and children suffer most in moments of violence and war, which is 
the aggravated form of violence. Besides being victims of wars, some forms of violent acts 
are simply directed against women for being women both in the private and public spheres. 
This mindset will have to be reversed in order to restore the dignity of man, which cannot be 
limited to the men. We need each other like Bonhoeffer would say. This needing of each other 
transcends gender difference, political, religious or ethnic affiliations. We need each other, as 
persons with dignity and basic human rights. The denial of this to any person or group of 
persons also in terms of tangible goods or opportunities can only lead to violence. And the 
hard lesson which history has continued to teach is that violence begets violence. The role 
which religion can play in Africa, a continent in agony, is that of working to prevent violence. 
Instead of serving as instruments of conflict and violence, the different religious bodies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa can be a beacon for dialogue in areas of education, public management, 
the struggle against poverty and corruption. By doing this, the ideals of religion which 
includes inter alia being good neighbours, honesty and rendering help to the less privileged 
will be highlighted as indispensable values for peace and order in the society. Past memories 
need to be healed and a new path charted for harmonious co-existence of peoples irrespective 
of their different identities in the twenty-first century. 
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Part two: The Correlation between Poverty and Violence in Post-Colonial 
Africa South of the Sahara 
 
 
 
                                                            CHAPTER FOUR 
A BACKGROUND TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF POVERTY AND VIOLENCE IN 
THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN WORLD-VIEW 
 
4. 0    I n t r o d u c t i o n 
 
The second part of this work sets out to investigate the relationship existing between poverty 
and violence in postcolonial Africa, South of the Sahara. But since it is not always easy to 
evaluate what ‘is’, without a sufficient knowledge of what ‘was’, we have opted to take a 
brief look at the African ‘world’ before, during and after her contact with the West and the 
East. To this effect we have divided this part of the work into two chapters. The one focuses 
on the traditional African world-view, which is very central to our reflection on poverty and 
violence, since according to Husserl every thematic understanding presupposes a horizon or 
background; whereas the second chapter focuses on the effect of the early contacts of Africa 
with the West and the near East. Our concern will be more on the contact with the West, and 
the East mentioned in passing, because Sub-Saharan Africa, the area of our work, had much 
more to do with the West than the northern part of Africa which imbibed the Arabic culture 
very early. It is therefore not an overstatement to say that the division of Africa into north and 
south of the Sahara was necessitated by these two foreign contacts. 
 
Two crucial questions confront any scholar who wishes to carry out a study on Africans and 
their world-view. These include whether the north Africans could be truly described as 
authentic Africans given the early and enormous influence of  Arabic culture through Islam. 
The next is the difficulty associated with generalizing any value(s) for the rest of Africa. In 
other words, apart from the skin colour, can anything be said to be common to all Africans 
south of the Sahara. The first question falls outside the scope of this work and may be 
recommended for further research. The second question, on the other hand, calls for deeper 
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elaboration so as to provide a broad and solid basis for our subsequent discussions on African 
value systems. 
 
The peoples of Africa south of the Sahara, also called the black Africans, have diverse ethnic 
groupings and languages that tend to present more of a heterogeneous than a homogeneous 
picture to any visitor. But beneath this apparent disparity, the people of this region share many 
cultural values in common. Such cultural values which cut across ethnic and linguistic 
diversity, and to which foreigners testify as peculiar to Africans south of the Sahara, include: 
belief in hospitality, belief in the sacredness of life, belief in community life made manifest in 
the “communalistic custom of holding land in common with relatives” 1 , belief in the 
sacredness of the physical environment and religious consciousness. We shall, however, limit 
our discussion here to three of the above mentioned values namely, sense of sacredness of life 
as manifested in the human person, then the community life, and the respect for the physical 
environment, as the matrix for both human and physical life. This will be followed by a short 
reflection on  the nature of work in the traditional African society, which will help us to 
understand why nobody was considered ‘poor’ in the society even in the midst of a paucity of 
material goods. The aim of this exposition is not to take Africa of the twenty-first century 
many centuries backwards, rather it is to recapture those human values which are being lost in 
the present age and the result of which is anything but positive for either the individual or the 
community. 
 
4.  1   The African Concept of the Human Person 
 
 The African concept of the human person is expressed in the belief in the sacredness of 
human life. Hence African anthropology could be described as religious anthropology. For an 
African, the human person is not a product of evolution, but a vital force with its origin in the 
Supreme Being. There are many myths varying from one culture to the other in the whole of 
Africa that trace the origin of man/woman to a supernatural being. Life is held sacred from 
conception till death. Even when physical life ceases, the life-less body is treated with honour 
as could be witnessed in the elaborate burial rites in all African culture. The reason for this is 
the belief in life after death. In view of this special status which the human person enjoys, acts 
of violence that involve shedding of blood are abhorred. When they occur, the land which has 
been desecrated has to be purified through some prescribed rites. According to Amadi, “In 
                                                 
1 Wiredu, K., Philosophy and African Culture, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 7 
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many (African) tribes the killing of a kinsman, the antithesis of caring for him, was not only a 
crime but also an abomination. After the murderer had been executed, his family would have 
to perform sacrifices and rites to remove the stain of evil and ward off the anger of the gods”.2 
The unintended killing of a relative or kinsman was punished by banishing the culprit from 
the clan. However, the life of the person who poses a threat to the community was taken to 
ensure that peace prevailed. This has to do with those regions in Africa where the belief in 
Witchkraft is still strong. Killing of the human person was nonetheless ‘permitted’ in times of 
war between communities or tribes.  
 
The African concept of the human person is further presented in the African onomatology (a 
study of the system of naming) which varies from place to place, but at the same time reflects 
the  underlying affinities running through the different African cultures. Among the Igbos of 
southern Nigeria, the human person is prized above material things as is designated by the 
name Mmadu ka Aku or Ndu ka Aku (‘the human person is greater than wealth’ or ‘life is 
greater than wealth’). A little play on the word for the human person in the same language 
gives deeper insight into the status which he or she enjoyed. The word for the person in Igbo 
language is Mmadu also written as Madu. The former which is held to be the more correct 
form is said to derive from the Igbo words for beauty and life which are Mma and Ndu 
respectively. Following this linguistic analysis, we could say that life (understood as referring 
to all living things), without the human person, loses its beauty. When we associate this 
pattern of thought with the Genesis account of creation, we notice that it was only after the 
creation of man/woman (the human person) that the expression “God saw all that he has made, 
and indeed it was very good” (Gen. 1: 31) was used. The creation of the other things prior to 
the creation of the human person was concluded with, “God saw that it was good”(Gen.1: 21). 
 
In his article, “The Human Person and Immortality in Ibo (African) Metaphysics”3, Richard 
Onwuanibe discusses in detail how the concept of personhood underlines the entire life of the 
Africans using the Igbos (Ibos) of southern Nigeria as a case study. Two central ideas are 
highlighted in the article as far as the notion of the human person is concerned, namely 
“presence” and “passage”.4 With reference to passage, Onwuanibe argued that the Igbos are 
                                                 
2 Amadi, E., Ethics in Nigerian Culture, Ibadan: University Press, 1982 58 
3 This article was first presented as a paper at the East Central Conference of the American Catholic  
   Philosophical Association, November 11, 1979 and later published in Philosophy Research Archives, Bowling  
  Green State University, Ohio and republished in African Philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd edition  
  from where this analysis was made.  
4 Onwuanibe, R. C., “The Human Person and Immortality in Ibo (African) Metaphysics” In: Wright, A. Richard  
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not totally materialists in their fundamental views of reality, especially with regard to the 
human person, judging from their understanding of the human soul (mkpuru obi) and spirit 
(mmuo).5 He pointed out, however, that even though neither can be identified with the body, 
they are related to it; hence they bear out the transcendence of the human person from the 
metaphysical point of view, which cannot be reduced to a materialistic basis.6 Similarly, the 
Igbo conception of the human person involves the notion of presence. What this means is that 
life, whether that of the self or of the other is displayed and acknowledged through warm 
greetings. It is therefore insulting not to be greeted. Applying Heidegger’s terminology, man- 
in-world is not merely ready-to-hand, that means functionalized. The existence (Dasein) of 
man transcends the level of a role to be played or its utility. The life of the human person is a 
form of participation in which a distinction is made between the ontological and the ontic, 
between humans and animals. To reduce the one to the status of the other is to be 
depersonalized. The distinction between humans and animals with reference to presence is 
shown in corresponding attitudes: for one does not greet animals in Africa even if they are 
highly regarded pets.7 Not to be greeted, or merely to be looked at (in terms of the notion of 
Sartre’s ‘gaze’) is not part of the culture. It is considered a form of depersonalization, an I – It 
relationship in Buber’s terminology; an action which has less meaning among the Europeans. 
This analysis of presence according to Igbo metaphysics shows the distinction of the human 
person as subject and not as object. While object-oriented thinking aims at controlling and 
exploiting the other, subject-oriented thinking feels the demand of the freedom of the other. 
This reminds us of Kant’s designation of the self in this case as ‘Transcendental Ego’, as pure 
subject as ‘Transcendental Apperception.’8 
 
The relevance of the on going analysis is that personhood is a manifestation or presence 
through a body, but never identifiable with it. And even though it may be difficult to analyze 
the human person as such, this inability cannot constitute an argument for its non-existence. 
On the contrary, it serves as an axiom for its ‘transcendence’ or ‘no-thingness’ (used here to 
mean that it is not and cannot be identified with any thing) just like the term dignity, which 
we shall discuss later in this work. Consequently, the essential greatness of any culture 
consists in its commitment to personhood and to all that it stands for, such as human rights, 
                                                                                                                                                        
  (ed.), African Philosophy : An Introduction, 3rd edition, Lanham – New York – London: University Press of 
  America Inc., 1984, 183 – 197. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N. K. Smith, New York: St. Martin’s Press, A107, 136. 
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human aspirations and development. Conversely, a decline in the consideration of personhood 
is symptomatic of the decline of a culture. The periods of high culture, philosophical systems 
not excluded, give expression to the transcendence of the human person and his/her dignity, 
for no culture is essentially materialistic. This implies that a culture which emphasizes 
materialistic achievements can attain mechanical perfection without an adequate idea of 
personhood. In African culture, for instance, the transcendence of the human person finds 
expression in egalitarian spirit, which binds one to all.9 The African notion of transcendence 
is intrinsically bound up with the concept of immortality. Thus, the major problem which 
confronts the African with regard to poverty alleviation and prevention of violent conflicts 
often occasioned by the unbridled quest for wealth is how to integrate modern scientific and 
technological achievements with the traditional values without losing sight of the ‘no – 
thingness’ of the human person.10 
 
For Placide Tempels, the human person in the Bantu philosophy, is ‘muntu’11. The work of 
Tempels, La Philosophie Bantoue, whose motive was to demonstrate the existence of an 
African philosophy, using the Bantus of the Belgian Congo as a case study, made ‘vital force’ 
the key concept for understanding the human person and the entire cosmos in Africa. 
According to him the notion of force is for the Africans what the concept of Being is for the 
European philosophers, but while the one can be said to be a dynamic system of thought, the 
other is static. Tempels’ research contains the classical divisions of Scholastic philosophy 
such as ethics, psychology, epistemology. Although this work has the merit of being the first 
effort in delineating a path for an African philosophy, it has been criticised as a new version 
of the theory of the mentalite primitive, ideologically motivated, but especially because it 
pretends that this philosophy is a philosophy of the collective subconscious, an ethno-
philosophy. 12  Moreover, apart from trying to open up a conceptual framework for 
understanding the otherwise very inaccessible magical world of the Africans by formulating 
an ontology whereby a fundamental interlocking of being and force sustains a dynamic 
universe, the theory of vital force permits hardly any clear and distinct conceptual 
determination of the unmediated African world. It is limited to a very small ethnic group and 
                                                 
9 Onwuanibe, R. C., op. cit. 189 
10 Ibid. 
11 However, a distinction is further made based on the status of the person in the society between ‘muntu     
mutupu’ (a person of middling importance) and ‘muntu mukulumpe’(a person with great deal of force, a very 
powerful person). We shall return to this later when we shall be considering the relationship between the 
individual and the community in the African world-view, where the latter plays a vital role in the maturation of 
the former. 
12 Okere, T., African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its Possibility,  
   Lanham – New York – London: University Press of America Inc.,  1983, 1 
 153
can equally be said to be guilty of the distortion of language and meaning. 13  Besides, 
Temples’ choice of the Luba people in the then Congo and now Zaire, using them to stand in 
for all the Bantu-speaking people spread across Africa south of the Sahara 14 , has been 
criticised as incomplete. In addition, it is to be noted that linguistic unity among the Bantu 
speaking people does not necessarily mean cultural homogeneity, when we consider the fact 
that the Bantus in Cameroon behave differently from the Bantus in Gabon, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Angola or South Africa, where the majority are to be found.15 
 
The Akans of Ghana exalt the human person by making a distinction between the concrete 
bodily aspect and the intangible spirit called the okra. In his book The Mind of Africa, W. E. 
Abraham explains that, “the okra is the guiding spirit of a man, the bearer and instrument of 
his destiny, that in a man which antecedently to the incarnation takes its leave of God. The 
okra is also that whose departure from the living man means death, and marks the completion 
of his destiny. It returns to God to justify its earthly existence.... Only human beings have an 
okra”16. This is similar to the concept of chi17 among the Igbos of Nigeria. Neither the Okra 
nor the chi is educable. To fill this gap of educability for the purpose of co-existence in the 
community, there is the sunsum18  Implicit in this metaphysics of the human person is moral 
accountability, a certain level of comportment is expected of him/her, because noblesse oblige. 
Abraham corroborates this view in the following paragraph: 
 
                     From the Akan theory of man it is evident that human personality and 
                      character were seen by them to rest on a number of factors and influences; 
                      comprising the okra, which above all was the ineducable and unswervable 
                      element; the sunsum, which was educable through precept and a system 
                      of punishment and reward, and was the foundation of personal and moral 
                      responsibility.19 
 
                                                 
13 Alexis Kagame wanted to correct this error of distortion of language and meaning by studying the Rwandese  
  language structure as a means of comprehending their philosophy of being, while Mbiti focused on idea of time. 
14 The other major groups in this region being the Hottentots and the Massai; and the Hamitic tribes.  
15 Nkurunza, R. K. D., Bantu Philosophy of Life in the Light of the Christian Message: A Basis for an African  
   Vitalistic Theology, Frankfurt am Main – Bern – New York – Paris: Peter Lang, 1989, 30. 
16 Abraham, W. E., The Mind of Africa, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962 59 
17 The chi is an invisible life-force that directs each individual person guiding him/her in the whole journey  
   through life. It is believed that whatever happens to the person in his/her lifetime is determined by the Chi. 
18 Sunsum is a spiritual substance responsible for suban, character, genius, temper and quality. Sunsum is  
   therefore educable and moral in its operation. 
19 Abraham, W. E., op. cit. 61 
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The above separation of the different ‘elements’ that make up man is made for the purpose of 
study and are not to be taken strictly as entities. The African concept of the human person is 
holistic. N’daw in his article, “Is it possible to speak about an African way of thought?” 
argues that ‘the conception of man is different among Africans and, unlike that of Cartesian 
Europe, is never dualistic or dichotomic. There is never the separation between body and soul 
found elsewhere’.20 
 
This African view of the human person leads us to a better understanding of the African 
personality, which generally refers to the manifestation of cultural uniqueness among 
Africans, as manifested in their behaviour, social norms, customs, values, beliefs, religious 
zeal, attitudes, explanations of the universe and the supernatural both historically and in 
contemporary terms.21 It is in this vein that Kenneth Kaunda opines that while the Westerner 
has a problem-solving mind, the African has a situation-experiencing mind.22 This means that 
the African is immersed in the totality of the social/community life and the strong belief in 
nature and the ancestral spirits. The being of an African is a being-with. 
 
4.  2    The African and the Community Life 
 
The traditional and unbiased view of the human person in the African context is one that 
considers him/her as a member of the community. It is in the community that the person is 
born. In the same community he/she grows up learning its values and ethos. The community 
accords him/her rights and privileges as he/she advances in age. When he/she dies, his/her 
final wish is that he/she be buried in the same community, except in the case of women who 
are married outside their community of birth. In such cases they wish to be buried in the 
community in which they have become members through marriage. So strong is the sense of 
belonging to a community that relations could spend a fortune to transport the body of a 
deceased member who dies in a foreign country in order to bury the remains among his/her 
own people. The African notion of community goes beyond the living to include the dead 
invisibly present, and the unborn, who are naturally awaited when couples get married. One of 
the reasons for such insistence that the dead be buried in their community is to to be found in 
their strong belief in immortality; another form of existence after life. However, this cannot be 
                                                 
20 N’daw, A., “Is it possible to speak about an African way of thought?” In: Presence Africaine, vol. 30, no. 58 
  1966 38 
21 Asante, M. K. & Asante, K. W. (eds.),  African Culture: The Rhythms of Unity, London: Greenwood Press,  
  1985 193 
22 Kaunda, K., cited in: Asante, M. K. & Asante, K. W. (eds.), op. cit. 87  
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compared to the more refined Christian belief in the after-life in heaven, nevertheless it is an 
aspect of their belief system which shapes the people’s lives.  
 
A typical African community consists of families (of course extended families, rarely nuclear) 
who trace their roots to a common ancestor. Apart from their individual and/or family land, 
they possess land in common which could be leased to the family units for agricultural 
purposes rotationally. Both the men and women of a particular age group from the same 
community come together to form unions for the purpose of assisting one another in farm 
work. This is done during the planting periods as well as the harvesting periods. Other kinds 
of work, like helping a new couple to build a house are not excluded. Group work strengthens 
the community spirit and this is performed joyfully occasionally punctuated by folk songs. 
The period separating the farming and harvesting seasons is used for social life in the 
community. Describing the peculiar form of social life in his work on comparative African 
literature, Egbulefu writes: 
 
                      In mancher Gegend blasen die Trompeter das ganze Dorf zusammen und die 
                        Menge trifft sich (im Freien) zum fröhlichen Spielen, Singen und Musizieren 
                        bzw. zur Feier der Nacht und des kunstvollen Handwerks des Schöpfers; die 
                        Trommler spielen immer heiter, die Seelen vibrieren mit dem Tempo, es wird 
                        fröhlich gesungen, es wird unermüdlich getanzt; auch von Mutter Erde, von  
                        der ganzen Natur und ihrem Ursprung wird erzählt, wie es die Ahnen mündlich 
                        überliefert haben.23 
 
The community bond is also strengthened through the celebration of various feasts 
commemorating different events and seasons. During such celebrations, presents are 
exchanged among members of the extended family and in the entire community among 
friends. In his celebrated work already cited, Achebe describes one of those feasts: 
 
                    Men and women, young and old, looked forward to the New Yam Festival, 
                     because it began the season of plenty – the new year. On the last night before 
                     the festival, yams of the old year were all disposed of by those who still had 
                     them....Yam foo-foo and vegetable soup was the chief food in the celebration. 
                     So much of it was cooked that, no matter how heavily the family ate or how  
                     many friends and relations they invited from neighbouring villages, there was 
                                                 
23 Egbulefu, J., Die Schwarzafrikanische Literatur: Ihre Originalität und das Problem Ihrer Beziehung zu Europa, 
    Darmstadt: Thesen Verlag, 1981 56  
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                    always a huge quantity of food left over at the end of the day.24 
 
The spirit of sharing highlighted in the above passage was not restricted only to the members 
of the family, but extended to strangers who might be passing by during the celebration. There 
were no beggers on the street in the traditional African community, as everybody was 
supported by his/her neighbour to make sure that food was daily afforded. As in times of 
celebration, the members of the family or community in serious cases, gather in moments of 
sickness to take decisions on what can be done. There were no modern hospitals, but there 
were the medicine men who took care of the sick. The primary aim was to save life. The 
mode of payment was discussed when the patient was cured. In the event of the sick man 
dying, the close relatives took over the negotiation of what could be paid the medicine man 
for his efforts. This was, in any case, settled amicably between the two parties. This strong 
spirit of solidarity made Steve Biko assert that “poverty was a foreign concept”25  in an 
African community, – and even when it is “brought about to the entire community by an 
adverse climate during a particular season. It never was considered repugnant to ask one’s 
neighbours for help if one was struggling. In almost all instances there was help between 
individuals, tribe, chief and chief, etc. even in spite of war”26  
 
In the foregoing, we see that the community serves as the custodian of the individual and as a 
result he/she must always struggle to preserve his/her membership in the community. For 
outside the community, there can be nothing but “void in strong and ever present contrast. 
Outside this ancestrally chartered system there lay no possible life, since ‘a man without 
lineage is a man without citizenship’: without identity, and therefore without allies...; or as the 
Congo put it, a man outside his clan is like a grasshopper which has lost its wings”.27 This 
strong sense of community is further clarified by Bujo who called attention to the fact that the 
individual African knows himself/herself to be immersed in the community to such an extent 
that personality cannot develop except in it and through it. However, this development, he 
further argues, does not take place in an asymmetrical way but is based on reciprocity.28 In 
other words, one has the obligation to help build up the community that nurtured him or her. 
This can take place either actively by performing great deeds that bring honour to the 
community, or passively by avoiding acts that may damage the good name of the community 
                                                 
24 Achebe, C., Things Fall Apart, op. cit., 35 
25 Biko, S., I write what I like, New York, 1978, 42 
26 Ibid., 43 
27 Davidson, B., The African Genius, Boston, 1969, 58 
28 Bujo, B., The Ethical Dimension of Community: The African Model and the Dialogue between North and  
    South, Nairobi: Paulines publications Africa, 1997, 182 
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or even cause harm or sickness to the inhabitants. Everybody’s behaviour and ethical action 
have consequences for the whole community: the good contributes to the increase of life, 
while evil destroys or at least reduces life.29  Hence, the interpretation of misfortune and 
sickness, on the one hand, and blessings, on the other hand, is particularly integrated into this 
attitude toward life and the entire cosmos. 
 
Membership in the community can be ‘lost’ temporarily or permanently mainly on the 
grounds of abominable acts like murder or incest. As we mentioned above, a distinction is 
made between the murder of a kinsman/kinswoman and the murder of a stranger. It is the 
former that causes the expulsion of the culprit from the community, because his/her 
abominable act has disturbed the community peace and, if unpunished, would attract the 
wrath of the earth goddess, Ala.30 Closely related to the murder of the kinsman/kinswoman is 
the murder of the innocent, and then the case of incest. All these acts are destable to the earth 
goddess and call for immediate reparation, which includes, among other things, banishment 
from the community, whenever they occur.  
 
 Thus the individual who is expelled from the community to save the life of the entire 
community is more or less a dead person until he/she reunites with the community. The 
traditional African sees, therefore, no dichotomy between sickness and sin. Most of these 
views would not be accepted today in the light of Christian ethics of universal brotherhood 
and the suffering of the innocent. Despite the mentioned short-comings, the African sense of 
community should be carried beyond the ethnic groupings and even to the wider world, since 
we all belong to the one human family, a project which the contemporary idea of 
globalization should aim to actualize.  
 
In summary, we could assert that this sense of community is so deeply rooted in every African 
that wherever he/she lives in the world, he/she is inclined to seek the company of others. Biko 
justifies it thus: 
                         
                  We regard our living together not as an unfortunate mishap warranting endless 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 182 
30 This is the Igbo name for the earth goddess. Among the traditional Africans, especially the Igbos of eastern  
    Nigeria, the earth was worshipped as a fertility goddess that yielded fruits for the nourishment of man and  
    animals. This function was believed to be disturbed by the shedding of innocent blood, incest or other  
    abominable acts. When this happened a process of reparation was called for, failure to carry it out spelt  
    disaster for the community concerned. The Ala was equally regarded as the final arbiter in cases of dispute  
    between two members of the community.  
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                    competition among us but as a deliberate act of God to make us a community of 
                    brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for a composite answer to the varied 
                    problems of life. Hence in all we do, we always place man first and hence all our 
                    action is usually joint community oriented action rather than individualism.31 
                     
As much as the positive elements of community life are to be highlighted, it is equally 
important to note that over-emphasis on these can stifle individual freedom and creativity. 
Part of the problem of poverty (in the modern understanding) in Africa is certainly not 
unconnected with heavy emphasis on community spirit. Living in a community is good and a 
positive sense of community should be encouraged, but room should at the same time be 
made for personal freedom and individual creativity. It is, however, a point of controversy 
among scholars of African extraction to determine the degree to which the individuality of the 
person is influenced by the community. Ifeanyi Menkiti considers the issue of community a 
very crucial distinction between the African view of the human person and that found in 
Western thought.32 Placide Tempels’ claim that “the individual is necessarily an individual 
adhering to the clan”33 is not unanimously accepted. Bujo argues that the position of Tempels 
in this regard fails to underscore the fact “that African ethics does not define the person as 
self-realization or as ontological act; rather, it describes the person as a process of coming into 
existence in the reciprocal relatedness of individual and community, where the latter includes 
not only the deceased but also God”.34 The reciprocal relatedness which Bujo alludes to is not 
                                                 
31 Biko, S., op. cit. 177 
32 In his article on ‘Person and Community in African Traditional Thought’, Menkiti argues that whereas status  
    of personhood is attained through a process of incorporation in the community, Western though defines the 
    human person with reference to such concepts as rationality, will, memory, freedom etc. Without their being 
    incorporated into the community, individuals are regarded as danglers to whom the description of person does 
    not fully apply. Personhood in various African societies is that which has to be attained in direct proportion as  
    one participates in communal life through the discharge of various obligations defined by one’s status. It is the  
    carrying out of these obligations that transforms one from the it-status of early childhood, marked by the  
    absence of moral functions, into the person-status of grown-up, marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense, 
    without which personhood is an floating concept. He likens his trend of thought to John Rawls’ reference to   
    the general ethical requirement of respect for persons who are capable of a sense of justice as those owed the  
    duties of justice, with this capability, however, construed in its broader sense of potentiality. It is, as Rawls  
    observes this potentiality, which brings the claims of justice into play. And the sufficient condition for equal  
    justice is the capacity for moral personality. The concept of morality, in any case, has its relevance within a  
    given community. Hence the Sartrean concept of the human person as a free unconditioned being is totally  
    unafrican. From this perspective we may conclude that the African asserts the ontological independence to the 
    human society, and moves from society to the individuals, the Western view moves instead from individuals  
    to society. It is thus easier to understand why African societies are organized around the requirements of  
    duties, while the Western societies tend to be organized around the postulation of individual rights. Although  
    it may be difficult to advocate for a complete change of mentality with reference to the relationship of the  
    person to the community in Africa, there are a lot of things Africans can learn from the Westerners.  
33 Tempels, P., Bantu-Philosophie: Ontologie und Ethik, Heidelberg, 1956, 67; cf. Mulago, V., Un visage  
    africain du Christianisme: L’union vitale bantu face a l’unite vitale ecclesiale, Paris, 1965, 121 
34 Bujo, B., Foundations of African Ethic: Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality, trans. by  
    Brian McNeil, Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2003, 114 
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to be understood in the sense of active participation only, there is also the subtle and passive 
relatedness from the unborn and the dead. It is from this perspective that we can understand 
the contribution of the physical environment to the formation of the African personality 
within the ambient of the community, as discussed in the following. 
 
4. 3   The African and the Relationship to the Physical Environment     
 
The physical or natural environment completes the triadic dimension of the African world-
view, the other two being the human and the supernatural worlds. For the African, these three 
dimensions do not form separate entities, but rather build up a network of interrelationship, 
which is unbreakable. In the just concluded section, we treated the world of the humans as 
expressed in the community life, which forms the matrix for individual development and 
identity. Every community has its myth of origin which is not unconnected to the portion of 
land the community inhabits. In this way a sort of spiritual relationship exists between the 
members of the community and the land on which they live and cultivate their crops. 
 
Against this background, it becomes easier to understand the role of the physical environment 
as a source of sustenance for the Africans south of the Sahara, whose main occupation is 
agriculture. The expression ‘physical environment’ is here used to include both living and 
non-living objects that surround man in his environment. Central to his/her relationship to the 
physical environment is the land, which is deified and worshipped in most parts of Africa 
south of the Sahara. It is on land that houses are built to provide shelter for people; food and 
cash crops are cultivated on the land; both domestic and wild animals depend on the land for 
their feeding; fruit trees and forests grow on the land. All these make the land indispensable 
for the sustenance and survival of human life on earth. This natural rhythm is not taken as a 
mere physical process by the Africans, but as directed by the spirits, who live among men and 
act as agents of the Supreme Being35. The earth-goddess, also called ‘mother earth’, takes a 
                                                 
35 The issue of the notion of a supreme Being is very much controverted not only by foreign scholars of African  
    religion and culture but even among African scholars. J. S. Mbiti in his ‘Introduction to African Religion’  
    asserts that all African peoples believe in God; a belief which is taken for granted since the contrary was  
    unimaginable (cf., J. S. Mbiti, Introduction to African Religion, London: Heinemann, 1975, 40). The Western 
    encounter with Africa and the difficulty in understanding the African way of life extended to the area of  
    religion, giving rise to such questions as to whether there is an African concept of God. And if yes, what God  
    or which God do the  Africans know? Is the African God the real God? (cf., E. B. Idowu, African Traditional 
    Religion: A Definition, New York: Orbis Books, 1975, 55). The dispute on the notion of the Supreme Being is  
    complicated not only by the various names used to designate God, but also by the various rituals of worship  
    some of which are either inadequate or conflicting like the Nyame of the Akan, Olodumare of the Yoruba and 
    Chukwu of the Igbo.   
 160
prominent place among these spirits or deities for yielding rich harvest to feed human beings. 
Next to her in rank is the sky-god, who is responsible for the rains, without which the earth 
cannot bring forth rich harvest. It is believed among traditional Africans that severe cases of 
drought, and consequently crop failure was a result of an abominable act ( called alu among 
the Igbos of Nigeria) in the community. Hence “according to the myth and the belief, the 
earth-goddess, Ala, sent the drought when the people had sinned against her. It was why the 
chief was to offer sacrifice to the gods and to the ancestors at the beginning of the year, to ask 
them to pardon the sins of the people”.36 With the sacrifice offered, the cosmic process took 
its normal course. Such sacrifices involved the use of animals and some other elements like 
kola nuts, herbs, etc., which are in turn produced by the physical environment. One observes 
how the entire range of nature participates in many African rites: “All beings, organic and 
inorganic, living and inanimate, personal and impersonal, visible and invisible, act together to 
manifest the universal solidarity of creation”.37     
 
Another dimension to the interdependence between the human person and his/her physical 
environment concerns the traditional way of healing the sick. Just as the failure of rains is 
attributed to a serious offence in the community, the African believes that sickness is always 
as a result of sin, either personal or, in the case of epidemics, communal. To restore the health 
of the sick person, the medicine man/woman makes use of certain herbs from the forest and 
other elements like mineral substances and organic materials. The aim of this is to underline 
the fact that “one can actually remain healthy in a holistic sense only by living in harmony 
with the whole of creation”.38 As a result of this, “the traditional healer in Africa does not 
only include the community of the living and the dead into his healing practice, but also uses 
natural elements like minerals, plants, pieces of wood, animal bones, teeth and hair, etc., in 
order to emphasize that effective healing is only possible where reconciliation with the entire 
cosmos has taken place”.39 This African view of the physical world testifies to the saying that 
nature makes nothing in vain. 
 
The problem with the above view is that such relationship with the physical environment 
often degenerated to fetishism. It is because of this that scholars have continued to debate 
                                                 
36 Aligwekwe, P. E., The Continuity of Traditional Values in the African Society: The Igbo of Nigeria, Owerri:  
    Totan Publishers Limited, 1991, 90 
37 Bujo, B., The Ethical Dimension of Community: The African Model and the Dialogue between North and  
    South, Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 1998 210 
38 Ibid., 211 
39 Ibid. 
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whether the traditional African is polytheistic or monotheistic in his/her religious orientation. 
This discourse falls outside the scope of our work, but it suffices to reason with Nkemnka that 
the God of the Africans is only one, because of the fact that God is always the God of the 
community, the people. It is therefore not possible to have more than one God for the same 
people. The rites of worship may differ from tribe to tribe or from village to village, but they 
are not different  gods.40 We recommend that future research on the Africans and their way of 
life take up this topic. However, we should not lose sight of the contribution such a world-
view could make to the contemporary discourse on environmental ethics: the problem of 
global warming and what should be our proper relationship to nature. It is anachronistic to 
advocate for a revival of the worship of the earth-goddess in order to increase agricultural 
produce or to resort to native medicine as an alternative to orthodox Western medicine, but a 
certain modicum of respect for the physical environment is urgent if our world is to be saved. 
The world can learn something from the Africans in this regard. 
 
Elaborating on this need, Benezet Bujo argues that the Christian-theological teaching that 
within the world of creation all creatures depend on each other and ensure the harmony of the 
whole is very much in agreement with the African world-view. But he laments that with the 
collosal break-through in technology, “it has become a trivial observation that people indulge 
in self-destruction by pursuing solely the total domination of the world and the reckless 
exploitation of nature”.41 Furthermore, he cautions that “people should be prepared to account 
for the technical achievement attained so far and ask themselves the question whether nature 
is really regarded as a co-creature in this process”.42 The point being made here is that any 
form of technological development that neglects to appreciate the sacred dimension of the 
ecosystem will eventually end up destroying itself and dehumanising the human person. A 
way out of this disaster is that technology incorporates ecological ethics into its programme, 
which involves the respect for other cultures and their values. This is important, because it is 
“the future of those values that promote culture that will shape the future of humanity, since 
they alone can enable the human person to be a creator – creator of one’s fate, creator of 
history, and creator of technology in its broadest sense. Only those values that promote 
culture are the carriers of a promise of Resurrection for humankind, and without them there is 
no future, not even for technology”.43 If the sole aim of technology becomes how to produce 
                                                 
40 Nkemnka, M. N., African Vitalogy: A Step Forward in African Thinking, Nairobi: Paulines Publications  
   Africa, 1999 152 
41 Bujo, B., op. cit. 215 
42 Ibid. 
43 Mveng, E., L’Afrique dans l’Eglise. Paroles d’un croyant. Paris, 1985 43 
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more and how to produce faster in order to satisfy an insatiable consumer-oriented society, the 
result is that the human person, enslaved by technology, deals with nature and with other 
human persons as means and not as ends. What matters is profit and the moment humans fail 
to yield profit, they lose their worth and dignity. This is a form of poverty which, like 
cankerworm, is eating deep into the fabric of the reciprocal relationship that exists between 
the human person and the cosmos. Technology and its transfer has to make restoration of the 
dignity of the human person and not profit its norm. In response to world economic structures, 
Africans south of the Sahara have been compelled to engage in deforestation as a means of 
improving their living conditions. This example shows how the previously existing unity 
between the African and his/her environment has been gravely impaired. Does this represent 
the idea of work original to Africans? This is discussed below. 
 
4. 4    The Concept of Work as Promotion of Group Solidarity 
 
The traditional African understands work as part of human nature. Hence by doing manual or 
mental work, he/she performs that function which belongs to man/woman as man/woman. 
The Genesis account of work as God’s punishment upon our first parents for their sin of 
disobedience: “In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt earn thy bread” is contrary to the African 
concept of work. According to the African world-view it is not work that is punishment, but 
the lack of work, joblessness; because by having no work, man fails to carry out that activity 
which naturally characterises him/her. Thomas Aquinas held that man/woman has a natural 
inclination44 to manual labour and went further to give four goals to which work/labour45 is 
directed as: ‘first and principally to obtain food; secondly, it is directed to the removal of 
idleness whence arise many evils’, hence the saying that an idle mind/hand is the devil’s 
workshop. ‘Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence; inasmuch as it is a means 
of afflicting the body and fourthly, it is directed to almsgiving....’46  
 
Being agrarian in nature, the traditional African society engaged mostly in farm work 
principally to obtain food: clearing the field with machetes, cultivating the cleared farmland 
with hoes, sowing various seeds, weeding the fields and finally harvesting the crops at harvest 
time. All these forms of work were carried out in groups divided according to sex and age. 
                                                 
44 St. Thomas Aquinas, however made a distinction between work before and after the fall of man; whereas the  
    former was characterised by pleasure, the latter was characterised by pain. 
45 Labour and work are used here as synonyms without delving into the perennial philosophical anthropological 
    debate which classifies only manual activities as labour and mental cum manual engagements as work.  
46 Summa Theologia, I-II, art. 20 
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The men had a separate work group from the women. And even among these different groups, 
there were still further division of the work groups into young and older men; and young and 
older women work groups. At the age of fourteen a boy or girl is considered mature enough to 
participate in community activities, hence can join a work group. In some parts of Africa this 
began even earlier. But the decisive factor was circumcision, which served as an initiation 
into adulthood. The aim of every work group is the mutual help of the members, the support 
of other members of the community. Describing the work groups among the Wolof of Gambia, 
David W. Ames states that “the solution of problems by communal effort, which is common 
in Wolof, nay African life, is exemplified in the activities of the groups which provide mutual 
aid in labour and economic ‘insurance’ (or better assurance) for their members”.47 Apart from 
assisting the members to meet their personal needs, the work group enables the members to 
fulfill heavy obligations of work for their in-laws. In traditional Africa and still in some 
regions at present, part of the marriage contract involves labour in the fields of the father-in-
law. Considering the fact that the family system in most parts of Africa is patriarchal, not 
much emphasis is placed on the work for the mother-in-law.  
 
Under their leaders, the work groups worked for the entire community whenever the need 
arose. It formed the nucleus of the labour force on those tasks considered to be the community 
responsibility, like constructing and repairing rest places in the village squares, clearing bush 
paths to neighbouring villages and so on. This is mainly done by the male work group. Every 
young man anticipates contributing his own quota in building up the community and he is 
naturally proud of this. By so doing he integrates himself into the community into which he 
was born. It is simply wonderful to witness this where it still exists. Young boys, with joy and 
enthusiasm amidst songs and jokes, tackle a difficult task until it is completed. Group work of 
this nature is not paid for, but the members receive acknowledgment from the chief of the 
community, who occasionally made some presents of goat or ram to them. Within the group, 
the most hardworking is specially rewarded and respected by the others. On the other hand, 
jokes are made about the lazy ones, but they are also helped if it becomes obvious that they 
cannot finish their work. In this way group solidarity is strengthened. Of course there are 
extreme cases of laziness that defy sympathy from the members of the work group and even 
from immediate family members. Okonkwo, the hero in Achebe’s “Things Fall Apart” hated 
his father because he was such a lazy man who, despite the goodwill of his kinsmen in 
                                                 
47 Ames, W. D., “Wolof Co-operative Work Groups”, In: Continuity and Change in African Cultures, edited by        
William R. Bascom and Melville J. Herskovits, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, 224. 
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lending him seed yams and money, failed to rise up in the society. Unoka, Okonkwo’s father 
was described as ‘lazy and improvident and quite incapable of thinking about tomorrow’.48   
 
Group solidarity is strengthened also through social functions. Each of the work groups plays 
a major role in organizing entertainment. Ames in his already cited study of the Wolof work 
group asserts that, “aside from the feasting, joking, drumming, and singing which 
accompanies work, the male group often joins that of the young women to have a party. 
Parties, with feasting, wrestling, and dancing to drums in the village square, are held at night, 
often immediately after the harvest season”. 49  The entertainment could at times be so 
organized that members of other villages or communities are invited. In the case of the 
women, the bride’s work group has a recognized role in her courtship and marriage rituals, 
which range from helping to make public announcement about the engagement to 
accompanying the bride singing and dancing to her husband’s compound after marriage.50 
Other social activities that pertain to one of the members are also organized by the rest of the 
group members. 
 
The people of Mossi in today’s Burkina Faso have the same work group structure as the 
Wolof. In his research on the economic changes in the area, Peter Hammond observes: 
 
          Much agricultural endeavour is necessarily co-operative. Each farmer is dependent 
          on the assistance of his kinsmen to get his fields seeded, cultivated, and harvested in 
          the short time during which each of these operations must take place. However, the 
          yield from his field remains his own, to be shared only with his own wives and children. 
          Members of the lineage also work in the fields under the specific control of the lineage 
          elder. Although the harvest from these fields is stored in a granary belonging to him, he 
          can be relied upon to share with the members of the lineage if this should be necessary.51  
 
Hammond’s observation that each farmer had total control over the yield from his own field 
despite the assistance of the work group is an indication that the African sense of community 
and group solidarity is not to be understood as a form of communism. For communism holds 
that the full result of labour belongs to the workers and that it is by labour alone that capital 
becomes fruitful; hence labour has the right to all the returns. Thus, Marx’s position here as it 
                                                 
48 Achebe, C., op. cit. 4 
49 Ibid., 233 
50 Ibid., 234 
51 Hammond, B. P., Economic Change and Mossi Acculturation, In: Continuity and Change, op. cit., 243 
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pertains to capital untenable. 52  The Mossi farmer relies very much both on the help of 
members of the work group for the success of his economic endeavour and on their support if 
his crop should fail.53 And the others can count on his support, when needed. What this means 
in effect is that he is never alone, neither in times of abundance nor in times of scarcity. The 
decisions he takes are with reference to this social and economic interdependence, as when he 
foregoes working on his farm in order to attend the funeral of a deceased kinsman and/or 
group member. He has made a choice which, considered in the total context of the culture, is 
equally in accord with his own personal economic interest and for the sake of group solidarity. 
 
The introduction of wage-earning activities and cash crops which followed contact with other 
cultures has interfered with the traditional connections between family life, work group 
formation and maintenance, division of labour and property; and then the bond within 
families are weakened through migrations in pursuit of wages. Not many people are prepared 
to go into a work group anymore, as the struggle to accumulate capital has taken the upper 
hand; hence poverty sets in as the weaker can no longer rely on the help of family members. 
Every form of help which had hitherto been rendered for nothing now has its market price. 
Labour has to be bought and, in line with the law of economics, the highest bidder has more 
labour at his/her disposal. The human person is considered now more as some kind of 
instrument with a work capacity to be exploited at low cost and then discarded. Besides, more 
attention is paid to the cultivation of cash crops at the expense of food crops, since the making 
of money has become the principle goal with less attention paid to inter-personal relationship. 
Man thus now tends to realize his/her worth and dignity in his/her wealth and not in his 
person. This has brought with it much change in the perception of work and solidarity in 
African culture. One of the ethnic groups much affected by this change are the Igbos of 
Nigeria. In his remarks on the receptivity to change of the Igbos, Simon Ottenberg wrote that, 
“the larger unilineal descent groups, so characteristic a feature of Igbo society, are becoming 
less important as lineage and clan members leave home on a temporary or permanent basis, as 
traditional agriculture, normally under lineage and clan control, comes to play a less vital role 
in Igbo economy, and as belief in ancestral spirits gives way to Christianity”.54 Whether this 
change was complete or not with reference to their belief system is still debatable. Let us look 
at the African traditional belief system and its role in the economic life of the Africans. 
 
                                                 
52 O’Brien, C. M., Christian Social Principles, New York: P. J. Kennedy and sons, 1941, 462 
53 Hammond, B. P., op. cit., 245 
54 Ottenberg, S., “Ibo Receptivity to Change”, In: Continuity and Change in African Cultures, op. cit., 131 
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4.  5  African Traditional Religion and the Economic Life of the Africans 
 
The overwhelming religious sense of the African is attributed to his/her world-view that 
acknowledges the existence of the world of spirits which, though invisible, is not to be 
separated from the human and physical worlds. The African believes strongly in the existence 
of spirits. Some of the spirits are good while some are bad. God in African traditional religion 
is the supreme spirit and creator of all that exists including man. The belief in God is intuitive, 
hence there are no atheists in Africa. The other spirits are his messengers. The classification 
and functions of these spirits vary from one ethnic group to another. This is so because most 
of, if not all, the ethnic groups in Africa each trace their myths of origin to one ancestor, who 
is central in the African understanding of religion and his/her relationship to other spirits. 
African traditional religion is “the indigenous religious system and life of African peoples. It 
developed gradually, without particular founders, systematic doctrines, or written 
scriptures”.55 African religion is fully integrated into the whole life of the people so that it 
exerts its influence and presence in their world-view. Despite the disparity in the practice of 
African religion from one African society to another, there are a number of common elements 
to be found in all of them. One such common element is the centrality of the human person. 
Since the present work is concerned with man (the term is used generically), we shall consider 
the vision of man in African traditional religion. 
 
With reference to the position of man in African religion, we affirm with Mbiti that in all the 
“African myths of origin, man appears first on the world scene as a religious being.... Man 
does not emerge as a politician, nor as a scientist, nor an astronaut. These other aspects of his 
being developed later”.56  Following this portrait of man/woman, we see how the various 
stages of his/her existence are marked by religious ceremonies. Right from conception, which 
is the beginning of new life, the parents and relations of the yet-to-be-born child begin to 
make preparations in advance. These include not only the material, but also spiritual 
preparations. There are certain things, according to custom, which a pregnant woman should 
not do and certain food which she should not eat. But over and above this, prayers are said for 
her for a safe delivery, not only by the immediate family members but also members of the 
entire community, because pregnancy is not a private affair just as the child is not a private 
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56 Ibid., 56 
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affair. In this regard, the ancestors are equally invoked, since it is believed that they represent 
the family in the spirit world and would not allow any evil to befall the family. When the 
child is born, it is given the name of one of the ancestors either from the side of the father or 
from the side of the mother. In this way, it is assured that the lineage is not terminated, an idea 
which is reflected in the naming system in some African societies. The Igbos of eastern 
Nigeria give their children such names as Amaechina (literally means may your lineage not be 
terminated) which is both a prayer and an assertion. The naming of a child after an ancestor 
and/or a god or goddess at birth establishes a spiritual bond between it and the spiritual world. 
As the child grows up, the consciousness of having ‘someone’ in the invisible world deepens. 
The child comes to know that it could turn to such a force in times of difficulty or before 
engaging on a task. And the older the child becomes, the more sophiscated and ritualised this 
awareness of a divine person or a divine force becomes. After circumcision or shortly before 
marriage, the child, now a man, makes preparation for a place of worship, assisted by the 
father if he is still alive or the oldest member of the family. This process is mainly for male 
children. The fact that the girl child would eventually marry does not permit her to make any 
permanent arrangement in her father’s house. Here the mother does it for her vicariously. It is 
important to note that this effort to relate to the spiritual world is not only limited to the 
ancestors. Other deities and spirits are worshipped all with the goal of soliciting protection 
against evil spirits/persons or asking for favours such as many children, rich harvest, long life. 
And for each of these needs, there is a god who must be invoked. Because of the various 
forms of worship, which however does not negate the belief in the supremacy of God, the 
traditional African could be described as syncretic in his/her religious outlook. Bolaji Idowu 
describes the situation as “diffused monotheism”.57 This means upholding the belief in one 
God at the same time acknowledging the roles of his human or spirit agents. 
 
The African’s belief in the spirits and their influence in his/her life finds expression in his/her 
contact with nature, which serves as the medium of contact between him/her and the world of 
spirits. If he/she has found favour with the spirits, it is manifested in nature in the abundance 
of harvest, good health for members of the family and even distant relations, increase in 
livestock, protection from natural disaster and so on. If the opposite is the case, that means 
scanty harvest, serious sickness of family members or distant relations, decrease in livestock, 
premature death of children; then an enemy or an evil spirit is at work or it is because nature 
has been offended. The African believes that the human person links nature to God and God 
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to nature. The human person can personify nature, in order to interact with it, to solicit its help 
or even order it about for the sake of his/her own welfare. But at the same time he/she realises 
that nature will not obey him blindly. The human person must seek harmony with nature, in 
order to be sure to reap full benefits from nature. Thus “African religion recognises clearly 
that if man abuses nature, in return nature will strike back at him/her. In this regard, man is 
not a master over nature to treat it as he/she wishes. Instead, man is the priest toward nature – 
soliciting its kindness and expressing respect towards it”.58 The danger here is that the human 
person perpetually lives in fear of trying not to offend nature so as not to incur its wrath. 
Besides, it is difficult, in times of harvest failure, to determine whether it is as a result of 
indolence or the revenge of nature for an unreparated act of violation. Achebe narrates how 
Unoka, the father of Okonkwo, the hero of the novel went to consult Agbala, the oracle of the 
Hills and the Caves to find out why he always had a miserable harvest, even after he had 
observed all the rites for planting yams. For an answer, he was told by the oracle that he had 
neither offended any gods nor his ancestors, but that the problem was with  him – he was lazy. 
This is a version of  Caesar’s cry to Brutus that the problem is not in our stars but in ourselves. 
Thus Mbiti’s description of Africans as notoriously religious is not a compliment, because 
considered in the above light it is nothing more than religionism and fatalism. 
 
The economic aspiration of every African head of family was to acquire wealth not for its 
own sake, but to enable him/her to provide food for the family and to attain social recognition. 
The higher social status one attains in ones’ life time, the more one arose in the ancestral rank. 
Wealth was measured in the number of barns full of yams that one had, the number of 
livestock: cows, goats, sheep. The acquisition of wealth depended, as we have seen, on the 
benevolence of nature and physical prowess. With reference to the former, there are various 
forms of worship whose sole intention is directed to harnessing nature for the profitable use of 
man. The African, on the one hand, believed in physical work, for which purpose he/she is 
equipped by nature with physical strength. There were different forms of trade as well, but not 
many people were traders. Whether in trading or cultivating the earth, the influence of 
religion was immense but occasionally abused by the priests/priestesses of the gods/goddesses. 
 
In the section dealing with the African sense of community, we saw that several extended 
families came together to form a community. Many of the activities in the community took 
place first at the family level and then later in the larger community. The family is the basic 
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economic unit of the African. The first economic planning and economic activities, ranging 
from the allocation of plots of land for farming, exchange of livestock and formation of work 
groups, begin at the family level. The reason for this is that most of the agricultural fields are 
possessed in common and are rotated among members of the family in the periods of farming. 
The head of the family unit who is responsible for the family land is also the spiritual head of 
the family. And although each family is independent of the other, they are still held together 
by the community bond. The same is applicable to individual members of the family, who 
although have to cultivate the family land rotationally, have total control over the produce. 
Considered in this way the family was or is, at least in principle, a self-supporting unit of 
producers and consumers ideally capable of supplying all its own requirements but, in 
practice, able to exist only within a community of similar families who help each other in 
economic and other group-defensive ways.   
 
4. 6    C o n c l u s i o n 
 
At the end of our brief exposition of the traditional African culture before its contact with 
foreign cultures (Arabic culture through Islam and European culture through colonialism and 
Christianity), we have presented an overview of how the African perceived his/her world and 
the values that he/she cherished dearly. Central to this was the African sense of community, 
which as we saw was a network of relationships existing among the living, and between the 
living, the dead and the unborn. Furthermore, this relationship was extended to the physical 
environment, but not to the same degree as with human persons. The former was nonetheless 
treated with respect since the life of man/woman depended very much on it. Any irresponsible 
act on the part of man/woman towards the physical environment required expiation to ward 
off the disastrous consequences that could result therefrom. This was the duty of religion. And 
this dimension of relationship which was demonstrated through sacrifices served as a bridge 
between the human-physical world and the spiritual world. 
 
Among the living, the sense of community found expression in family life and in the 
formation of work groups according to sex and age. Such work groups enabled members to 
provide support for one another and sometimes for distant relations. The entire community 
benefited from the work groups as they volunteered to help where they were needed in the 
community. Apart from assistance given to members in farm work, the work groups provided 
a strong basis for social interaction among members and with other groups from neighbouring 
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communities. It was therefore rare to find anybody who was so poor that he/she had nothing 
to eat. In the event of need, he/she would turn to the members of the family or the community. 
The poor man/woman became the person who was isolated from the community, where 
he/she could turn to no one for help. But despite the fact that the human person is deep-rooted 
in the community, his/her identity as an individual is not lost thereby. The human person was 
valued above everything else and every other thing was sacrificed to save human life 
whenever it was threatened. However, the African believed that life did not end with death, 
but continued after death. And to be able to participate in the life after death, like the 
ancestors, living a good life was imperative.  
 
Opinions are divided among African scholars as to whether the extended family system and 
the sense of community are still relevant in our modern technological society. According to 
Kobina Sekyi “the ideal form of social life for humanity was best exemplified in Africa”59, 
because of the extended family system and the community spirit which made caring for 
relatives obligatory. For other scholars like H. N. Nwosu and O. U. Kalu, although kinship 
ties and the extended family system could be said to be the common features of traditional 
African culture, it should not be considered peculiar to Africans. All traditional societies 
everywhere based on agriculture or cattle-breeding maintained kinship ties and an extended 
family system60. This means therefore that the phase of kinship ties and extended family 
system has been overtaken in time and cannot be recommended as a model for contemporary 
African society south of the Sahara. Nevertheless, it has to be underscored that the value 
associated with such cultural practices as the respect for the human person transcends time. 
The problem with cultural change arises when the quest for development neglects the human 
person as the goal of every development and only pursues development for its own sake. Put 
in another way, it has the effect of divesting culture of its spiritual aspect. This process is 
termed secularization, and refers to the divorce of culture from the sphere of religion, the 
turning toward the material world as the only source of explanation for all that happens in the 
society61. The idea of progress replaces the idea of meaning to the extent that the spiritual 
dimension of man/woman is gravely neglected. The unavoidable consequence becomes the 
treatment of man/woman as a mere material entity. With this mindset, violence sets in without 
qualms of conscience. This is the worst form of poverty that confronts the modern 
                                                 
59 Sekyi, K., A Plea for the African Standpoint, cited by Okonkwo R. L., In: Readings in African Humanities:  
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man/woman, from which the Africans are not spared. But how did the Africans come to this 
stage? That every culture is prone to change is a truth we have established in the earlier part 
of this work, but whether the change is from within the culture or from external factors makes 
a great difference. Collectively, human beings struggle to master their physical environment 
and in the process create a social order. A change in the physical environment, or to be more 
precise, a change in the nature of their struggle, will alter their institutions and hence their 
mode of life and thought. Their new mode of life and thought will in turn affect their 
institutions and general environment62. This dialectical process of cultural change is possible 
only when the factors of change come from within. On the other hand, if the fact of cultural 
change is produced by external factors which fail to take into consideration the already 
existing cultural values, it meets with resistance and protest. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
              
 
                       
  
 
62 Pieterse, C. and Munro, D.(eds.), Protest and Conflict in African Literature, London: Heinemann, 1969, 56 
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                                              CHAPTER FIVE 
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AFRICA’S EARLY CONTACT WITH THE WEST 
AND THE NEAR EAST: ITS IMPACT ON THE AFRICAN CONDITION 
 
5.  0   I n t r o d u c t i o n 
 
In the previous chapter, we highlighted some of the central elements of the traditional African 
way of life as they pertain to the topic of this work. This section will focus on the dialectics of 
continuity and change that followed the first contact of the African way of life or culture with 
the cultures of the West and Near East. The understanding of this chemistry of nova et vetera 
is very necessary for the appreciation of the miserable position which Africa south of the 
Sahara (black Africa) and Africans occupy in the contemporary world scene. Considering the 
myriad of problems which besiege Africa some questions are inevitable if any new path is to 
be charted: How much of Africa’s condition could be attributed to the Africans themselves? 
And how much could be attributed to the early and continued contacts with foreign cultures? 
Where do we go from here? 
 
When we talk of Africa’s early contacts with the West and the Near East one thing that has to 
be borne in mind is that it was not a contact based on a meeting of equals. On the contrary, it 
was a meeting of an ‘inferior culture’ with a ‘superior’ one; a simulacrum of the Hegelian 
master-slave relationship. Against this background, this initial contact was characterised by 
mutual suspicion and conflicts culminating in the shameful human trade engaged in by the 
West, with other Africans acting as agents, and then the era of colonization. The history of 
Africa’s relationship with the West is one that dates back about five hundred years. This 
history was punctuated by a series of violent conflicts between cultures that were based on 
different assumptions about the nature of the universe, the purpose of human existence, and 
the moral values that ought to govern an individual’s relationship to the world and the other 
people who inhabit it1. The superiority of one culture over the other is impossible to establish 
since different people have different standards of judgment, which are deeply rooted in their 
world-view. In comparing two cultures, what is often considered is the means for doing 
something rather than the thing that is done. The consequence, therefore, is the tendency to 
judge the efficiency of means to a particular end without judging whether the end itself is 
good or bad. This was the misjudgement on the part of the westerners at the incipient stage of 
                                                 
1 Mowoe, J. I. and Bjornson, R.(eds.), Africa and the West: The Legacies of Empire, New York: Greenwood  
  Press, 1986, 3 
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their relationship with Africa South of the Sahara. To what extent this error has been 
corrected is still an open question. At what point of the relationship between the West and 
Africa did this feeling of superiority/inferiority begin and what has helped to sustain it? How 
can this be overcome so as to make room for a normal partnership? This chapter sets out to 
find answers to these questions and to explain some of the problems that still bedevil Africa, 
at least nominally, many years after her political independence from the West. We shall 
consider these issues under three broad phases: pre-colonial, colonization and independence, 
and post-colonial periods. 
 
5. 1   The Pre-Colonial Era of African Contact with the West 
5. 1.1 The Era of Myths and Prejudices about Africa and Africans 
 
The picture painted of Africa and its people in medieval history and geography is anything but 
positive. Ironically, such presentation which was taken to be the absolute information about 
the continent and the origin of its inhabitants was created at the time the West or more 
precisely Europe had little or no contact with Africa. Thus it was information or rather 
misinformation based on speculations and myths, which engendered prejudice in the 
subsequent, concrete contacts. In his book Der dunkle Kontinent, Michael Herkenhoff 
admitted of this confusion of information when he wrote that “eine große Verwirrung 
herrscht in den Quellen über die Herkunft und Verbreitung der Völker Afrikas.“2 Herkenhoff 
tried to demonstrate in his book the fact that the knowledge about Africans in the Middle 
Ages was limited to information gathered from ancient geography and the writings of the 
Church Fathers. Both of these sources in any case were inadequate, as development at that 
time did not make room for thorough research. Nevertheless they were treated as final 
statements about a people who were yet to be known. This great confusion is reflected in the 
fables circulated in medieval times about the people of Africa and their origin. A Biblical 
story serving as a basis for such fables was Noah’s division of the earth after the flood among 
his three sons: Sem, Japhet and Cham. 3  These names had meanings which served as 
description of the people who would come after them. The name ‘Sem’ is said to mean ‘glory’ 
and referred to the people of Asia; while ‘Japhet’ means ‘expansion’ and designated the 
people of Europe. Finally, the name of the third son of Noah is Cham (Ham), which means 
                                                 
2 Herkenhoff, M., Der dunkle Kontinent: Das Afrikabild im Mittelalter bis zum 12. Jahrhundert, Bamberg:  
  Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft Pfaffenweiler, 1990, 81 
3 Gen. 9, 27 
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‘sunburn’4 and was used for the people of Africa. This last son was cursed by his father to the 
effect that he and his descendants would be slaves to the other two for his unbecoming 
conduct. This pericope from the book of Genesis was used as one of the arguments justifying 
slavery. Other writings that contributed to the negative image of the Africans in the medieval 
times include the collection of  the Roman historian Sallust, who in his own account described 
the origin and development of the people of Africa in the following words: 
 
                     Am Anfang bewohnten the Gätuler und die Libyes Afrika. Sie waren rauh 
                       und ungebildet, ihre Nahrung bestand aus Wildbret, und sie ernährten sich 
                       wie Vieh von Gras. Durch keine Sitten, kein Gesetz, durch keinen Befehl 
                       wurden sie regiert. Als aber nach dem Tod des Herkules sein aus vielen 
                       vielen Stämmen zusammengesetztes Heer auseinanderfiel, setzten die Perser, 
                       Meder und Armenier nach Afrika über und besetzten die Orte an der Küste. 
                       Die Perser vermischten sich allmählich mit den Gätulern und bezeichneten 
                       sich aufgrund ihrer Lebensweise – sie suchten immer wieder neue Gegenden 
                       auf – selbst als Nomades. Den Medern und Armeniern gesellten sich die 
                       Libyes hinzu. Diese lebten näher am Meer, während die Gätuler mehr unter 
                       der Sonne wohnten, nicht weit von der heißen Zone.5 
                      
Other sources attribute the derogatory statements about the Africans to the popular 
assumption in the Middle Ages, that there were imaginary people or the so-called 
‘Fabelvölker’ (fairy-tale people) existing somewhere in the outside world6 . These people 
were described generally as “monströs, sie differierten jedoch in physischer Erscheinung und 
sozialen Verhalten von der sie beschreibenden Person. Man zählte zu ihnen Völker, die sich 
aufgrund ihrer Lebensart oder physischer Unnormalität von anderen Völkern abhoben, 
kannte aber auch wirklich fabelhafte Völker wie die Blemnyer (Kopflose)“7. Such stories were 
already present in the ancient Greek mythologies from the time of Hesiod, that there were 
mysterious human creatures, but there were not associated at that time with any particular 
people. Concerning the existence of such beings, Augustine maintained that insofar as they 
were human beings, these creatures are the children of Adam, therefore had a share in the 
                                                 
4 Borst, A., Der Turmbau von Babel. Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und  
  Völker, 4 vols. Stuttgart, 1957 – 63, 122 
5 Sallust, Bell. Jugurth. 18, 3: Sed postquam in Hispania Hercules, sicut Afri putant, interiit…In: Herkenhoff, M.,  
  op. cit., 83 
6 The notion of the world at that time was the one where the people who were making the claim inhabited. 
7 Friedman, J. B., The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and Thought, London: Cambridge, 1981 cited in 
   Herkenhoff, M., op. cit., 140 
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economy of salvation and should be treated with respect8. This teaching of Augustine was 
altered in the Middle Ages with the already cited story of Ham (Cham), which at this time 
became widespread with the influence of Isidore of Seville and his doctrine of Ecumene or the 
inhabited earth. 
 
It is not quite clear how these mysterious beings came to be associated with the Africans at 
the beginning of the Middle Ages. Historical records show that about 3,500 B.C.E., there 
were already urban cultures, first in Mesopotamia and later in the Nile Valley in Egypt, made 
possible by earliest agricultural techniques.9 These centres were and are still referred to as the 
cradle of civilization in world history. The German ethnologist and philosopher Leo 
Frobenius argues to this effect that the earliest civilization, like the earliest humans, appeared 
in Africa and that the continent contributed to the progress of humanity up to and including 
the Upper Paleolithic.10 In fact, stone-age technology in Africa was not notably different from 
stone-age technology elsewhere. Nor did the early phases of agricultural revolution occur 
differently in Africa.11 However, one may argue that one of the two centres of civilization 
already mentioned is located in Africa, north of the Sahara. It is pertinent to note that the 
region that was to become the Sahara began to dry up, changing from something like the open 
savannah country that now lies south of the desert, around 2,500 B.C.E.12 Sub-Saharan Africa 
was then cut off through desertification from north Africa, which was politically part of the 
Roman Empire, and became terra incognita. The Arabs from north Africa made the first trade 
contact across the desert with the rest of Africa around 1,000 B.C.E. 
 
Apart from the question of their origin and nature, the next issue that contributed to the 
degradation of the Africans in the world is the colour of the skin. Coming into the limelight 
through the European explorers and adventurers, the Africans with a different skin-colour 
from that of those who ‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ them, as some would put it, were regarded 
as inferior. The black skin became synonymous with things evil and ‘assoziierte sich mit ihr 
auf dauerhafteste Weise die Vorstellung von Teufel, Hölle, Verdammnis, Tod, Trauer, 
Finsternis, Laster, Unglück, Verbrechen, Schmutz, usw.’13 Unlike his/her origin and nature, 
which were in doubt in the previous ages, the colour of the black man/woman became a mark 
                                                 
8 De civitas Dei XVI, 8 
9  Mowoe, J. I. and Bjornson, R.(eds.), op. cit. 17 
10 Senghor, S. L., The Revolutions of 1889 and Leo Frobenius trans. by Bjornson, cf., Mowoe & Bjornson 77-88 
11 Ibid., 18 
12 Ibid., 19 
13 Cf., Egbulefu, J. O., Die Schwarzafrikanische Literatur: Ihre Originalität und das Problem ihrer Beziehung zu  
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that set him/her apart from other human beings and placed him/her at a disadvantage more 
than any other race. Utterances, whether in government policy, in public lectures, literary 
works or private conversation testify to the humiliating status to which the black African is 
subjected. Only a few example would suffice to buttress this, think of the policy of 
“exterminate all the Brutes” and all that was involved as documented by Sven Lindqvist in his 
book that bears the same title. In a rather more particular manner, Joseph Conrad writes that, 
“the conquest of the earth, which mostly means taking it away from those who have a 
different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a pretty thing when you 
look into it; not a sentimental pretence but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea – 
something you can set up and bow down before, and offer a sacrifice to”.14 For some others 
who did concede a human status to the black man/woman, it was not the same as that of the 
Westerner. Thus Hannah Arendt acknowledges the humanity of the black person, but added 
that he/she was created to be a labourer, animal laborans. Against this background, one finds 
it easy to understand the age-long controversy as to whether there is an African philosophy. 
Put in another way, are the Africans capable of speculative thinking? It is probably this 
question of the full humanity of the Africans, among other things, that allowed the slave trade 
last four centuries with little or no remorse. How this was possible is the theme of the next 
section. 
 
5. 1. 2  Thinking Through the Atlantic Slave Trade (1440 – 1870) 
 
The buying and selling of African young men and women as slaves started before the 
European contact with the Africans in the fifteenth century. However, the difference between 
this form of slavery and that which was practised by the European merchants consisted in the 
institutionalization of the trade. As early as the tenth century, Muslim traders had commenced 
trade contacts with Africans. This was the result of the expansion of Muslim power in West 
Africa around this time, which made possible the spread of the trade in black slaves 
northwards across the Sahara and from West Africa. But “gold was the core of this early trade. 
Other exports played their part, notably ivory, as well as the domestic slaves that figure in 
every account of medieval trade”.15 There is no written evidence to show that the buying and 
keeping of slaves from Africa by the Arab traders can be compared either in extent and 
manner to the fifteenth century trans-Atlantic slave trade. For instance, “the Cairo papers from 
                                                 
14 Conrad, J., Heart of Darkness, New York: Pocket Books, 1972, 7 
15 Davidson, B., The African Genius: An Introduction to African Cultural and Social History, New York: Back  
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the tenth to the latter part of the thirteenth century often refer to the buying and selling of the 
slaves for use as servants or as business agents, but it never appeared to be a slave trade of 
any importance”.16  This position is disputable when we consider the fact that slavery is 
officially approved in the Koran, the holy writ of Islam; which equally approves the 
conversion or killing of non-believers, the infidels. In any case, we have decided to restrict 
our investigation here to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, because of the horror associated with it 
and the duration of its perpetration, but above all, because of the mark it has left on the psyche 
of the Africans, many years after it was terminated. 
 
The trans-Atlantic slave trade was started by Prince Henry of Spain, who in the first half of 
the fifteenth century sent out sailors to explore Africa. This journey was not solely pure 
adventure as some historians hold, but had economic interest attached to it. Firstly, Prince 
Henry wanted to find a way of participating in the trans-Saharan trade between the Muslim 
Arabs and the natives on the atlantic shore of Senegal. Other sources assert that he was 
motivated by the rumour that there was somewhere a river of gold in Africa that emptied into 
the sea. Whatever might have been the reason, Thomas Hugh writes that after the initial 
attempts which met with failure, Prince Henry sent out a group of fifteen seamen on the 8th of 
August, 1444 to West Africa, who came back with a cargo of two hundred and thirty-five 
slaves.17 Thus, the first entrance of Africans into European history came in their status as 
slaves, serving as an omen to an era of merchandise in human torture and misery.18 With this, 
the trade in humans was launched and other people like Bartholomew Dias and Vasco da 
Gama followed the example of Prince Henry and his seamen. 
 
Black slaves were exchanged by the middlemen for things like mirrors, articles of clothing, 
guns, beads, brandy, cowrie shells, horses, etc. At the conclusion of the exchange, they were 
chained together and loaded in the ships as commodities. There were middlemen whose duty 
was to buy the slaves directly from the natives and then sell to the merchants. As the trade 
developed with much demand following the discovery of America (the New World), the 
system of acquiring slaves varied from direct seizure of slaves, rather than their purchase, also 
called ‘razzias’ – an odious practice of man-stealing to the waging of inter-tribal wars with the 
aim of getting captives to be sold as slaves. After the raid, the slaves were now gathered at the 
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harbours before they were bundled into the ships for transportation onward. Describing the 
sight of this human misery, Gomes Eannes de Zurara wrote: 
 
                 What heart could be so hard as not to be pierced with piteous feeling to see that  
                   company? For some kept their heads low, and their faces bathed in tears, looking 
                   one upon another. Others stood groaning very dolorously, looking up to the height 
                   of heaven, fixing their eyes upon it, crying out loudly, as if asking help from the 
                   Father of nature; others struck their faces with the palms of their hands, throwing 
                   themselves at full length upon the ground; while others made lamentations 
                   in the manner of a dirge, after the custom of their country.... But to increase 
                   their sufferings still more, there now arrived those who had charge of the 
                   division of the captives and ... then it was needful to part fathers from sons, 
                   husbands from wives, brothers from brothers. No respect was shown to either 
                   friends or relations, but each fell where his lot took him.19  
 
One of the reasons why this type of treatment was meted out on the black African slaves was 
the negative image of the story of Noah and his sons, which we already described above. The 
slave merchants believed that the captives owed their fate to the sins of their supposed 
ancestor Ham, cursed by his father, Noah, after seeing him naked and drunk. Both Christian 
and Muslim traditions maintained that the descendants of Ham had been turned black, 
because of the sins of their father.20 Some Christians like Julian Zulueta and others who 
engaged in this trade felt they were saving the slaves from perpetual curse and damnation as 
they organised the baptism of the slaves before they left Africa.21 Besides, there was the often 
but falsely cited sentence from Aristotle, in the first book of his Politics, where he asserted 
that, ‘humanity is divided into two: the masters and the slaves; or if one prefers it, the Greeks 
and the Barbarians; those who have the right to command, and those who are born to obey.’ 
Then he went further to describe the slave as ‘a property with a soul’22. In the first instance, it 
was wrong to apply this statement of Aristotle as a justification for the Atlantic slave trade, 
because the manner of getting and keeping slaves in ancient Greece and later in the Roman 
empire was characterised by a certain modicum of respect. There was a certain level of 
understanding between the slave, or better put the servant, and his master. For instance, it is 
known that Cicero’s slave Tiro was his confidential secretary and was well educated. Apart 
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from that, the practice of keeping slaves at that time was not unanimously accepted. It was 
heavily criticised as contrary to nature and interference with nature, hence regarded as unjust.  
 
The major reason, however, why the Atlantic slave trade took such a dramatic turn and lasted 
for over four hundred years has been attributed to the co-operation of some African kings and 
chiefs in the human commerce. These leaders or their delegates acted as the middle men for 
the slave merchants and helped in obtaining slaves either through man-hunt or by inciting 
inter-tribal wars which provided opportunity for taking some young men/women as captives 
to be sold as slaves. The gains they were making and the influence they were wielding 
increased inter-ethnic and inter-clan wars. Equipped with the modern guns acquired from the 
European merchants, neighbours became enemies. Tribal wars were no longer a matter of 
bows and arrows, but involved the use of guns; and the more sophiscated the guns became the 
more people were killed or captured as slaves. Clans that were weak had to solicit the help of 
other clans with the promise of sharing the booty or the land with them. It is believed that 
those wars embarked upon for the purpose of enslavement could not be compared to the small 
inter-clan skirmishes which took place among the natives before the arrival of the Western 
slave merchants.23 Hugh argues that the large labour force (there are no existing accurate 
records) of slaves from Africa would not have been available to the Europeans in the 
Americas without the cooperation of African kings, merchants and noblemen. Those African 
rulers were, as a rule, neither bullied nor threatened into making the sales.24 In line with this, 
is Voltaire’s sharp critique that, while it was difficult to defend the conduct of Europeans in 
the slave trade, that of Africans in bartering each other was even more reprehensible and 
cannot be forgotten. It is therefore unfair to apportion the whole blame to the European slave 
merchants, as central as their role was in the inhuman commerce that lasted for centuries. Can 
this not be likened to the role which the neo-colonialists in governments are playing now by 
selling the natural resources to some foreign companies and pocketing the money alone? Is it 
not in a bid to remain in power that some African leaders contract with Western powers to 
back them up with the promise of buying arms from them to be used against any opposition? 
 
Apart from the demographic reduction, Africans suffered a moral reduction through the slave 
trade, which has accompanied her history even to the present day and put in question her 
subsequent contacts with the West and Near East. The slave trade robbed the Africans of their 
sense of dignity as human persons. They were simply reified. The slave-status dogs their steps, 
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even many years after the abolition of the trade. The Africans through their actions tend to 
confirm the thesis of Egidio Colonna that if people did not have laws, and if they did not live 
peacefully under a government, they were more beasts than human and therefore would 
legally be enslaved. This is the human poverty that confronts Africa today, the resolution of 
which must precede that of material poverty. Caught therefore in this intricate condition of 
bottled anger following decimation and deprivation, Africans become reactors instead of 
actors.  
 
The next contact of Africans with Europe after the trans-Atlantic slave trade was the colonial 
era. This, unlike that of slavery, met with considerable resistance, but the greater power 
prevailed in the said civilizing mission of the savages. What follows is an exposition of what 
transpired in the period of colonization and the struggle to attain independence with its 
attendant problems. The expose´ is to underscore the cultural schizophrenia which is at the 
root of the African problem of poverty and violence.   
 
5. 2   The Impact of Colonization and the Struggles for Independence 
 
 The end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade did not mean that the contact between the West and 
Africa was terminated, rather there was only a change in form. Some of the European slave 
merchants switched over to legitimate trade in other commodities like gold, timber, gum 
arabic, skins, though some of this trade had co-existed with the slave trade. This continuity 
makes some scholars argue that the era of colonization did not begin during the late 
nineteenth century as against those who held that it started with the Berlin resolution for the 
partition of Africa. Colonization, they maintain, was only an extension of slavery, albeit 
characterised by a different policy. For the proponents of this latter theory, which Ali Mazrui 
describes as the “episodic theory of Africa colonialism”, “it is a vain venture to seek to limit 
the colonial period to the ‘brief’ seventy years between the 1884 Berlin Conference that 
partitioned and legitimized European occupation of Africa, and the early 1960s, when most of 
the African countries attained constitutional decolonisation.”25 In other words, the incipient 
phase of colonialism is traceable to the mid-fifteenth century when the European fortune 
seekers entered Africa. 
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Inasmuch as our concern here is not the duration of colonialism, but its impact on the peoples’ 
lives, it is pertinent to make reference to the meaning of the term ‘colonialism’ as a way of 
reconciling the two positions. The New Pocket Oxford English Dictionary defines colonialism 
as, “the practice by which one country acquires control over another, occupying it with 
settlers, and exploiting it economically”26. A colony, therefore, refers to “a country or area 
under the control of another country and occupied by settlers from that country”27. Thus, the 
early incursions made by the Europeans as sailors and/or traders may not be described as 
colonialism in the strict sense of the word, but that does not mean that its impact was less than 
that of slavery. In colonialism, the Africans were enslaved on their own soil as they laboured 
to maintain the home economy of the colonizers, and during the slave trade they were taken 
out of their countries to labour in the sugar and other plantations. Both exercises robbed the 
Africans of their human worth and dignity externally and internally, bringing along 
generational racial discrimination and lack of self-confidence and self-esteem. Frantz Fanon 
captured this vividly, when he wrote that “the disaster of the man of colour lies in the fact that 
he was enslaved”28. This disaster which Fanon alluded to arises from the deprivation of his 
cultural originality. It is primarily in this perspective that the impact of colonialism, whose 
mission was to civilize the savages, can be better assessed.  How far this mission succeeded is 
left to the judgment of history. 
 
The official adoption of the German doctrine of the “hinterland” in Berlin on the 23rd of 
February, 1885 was the beginning of the European colonization of Africa. According to this 
doctrine, “every nation with possessions along the African coast had the right not only to 
dispose of territory immediately behind them, but also to enlarge its borders to its own liking, 
as long as this did not harm the interests of the neighbouring European colony”.29 With this 
declaration at the Berlin conference, the so-called scramble for Africa commenced, 
spearheaded by England and France, who now overtook Portugal and Spain, who had led the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade. We had already mentioned that the abolition of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade did not terminate the contact between European merchants and their African 
suppliers, rather the trade commodities were no longer officially human persons. These 
merchants, who had developed into powerful private companies that assumed political 
responsibility even before the state intervened, inspired in no small measure the colonization 
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of Africa. The Berlin conference gave official stamp to what the companies had begun. These 
companies simply took sovereign power over enormous regions, securing them with their own 
diplomacy and administering them directly according to laws they themselves made which 
were later ratifed by the government of their home countries. 30  There was a gradual 
metamorphosis of the European traders from explorers and merchants to administrators, from 
ordinary buyers to masters. The rapidity with which the industrial revolution developed, made 
the demand for new commercial outlets and cheap raw materials very urgent. These were then 
provided by the colonies. The colonies were therefore a mercantile creation, essentially 
formidable organisations of international exchange.31 Judging from the foregoing, one could 
conclude that economic interest was masked in the “mission of civilization” which is often 
stated as the reason for the European colonization of Africa. Local man power was increased 
to produce more materials for trade, and taxe was imposed on the males to raise money for the 
home countries of the colonizers. The economies of African countries were shaped to the 
advantage of the colonial authorities as cash crops like coffee, rubber, peanuts and cocoa were 
grown for the European markets. In this way the traditional subsistence farming was 
destroyed. The consequence of this change was that the economies of the respective African 
societies became completely dependent on the economic development of the urbanized cities 
of the colonizers to whom they were subjected.  Besides, the satellite towns developed by the 
European traders and later colonial administrators in the colonies became attracted young 
boys who had to abandon farm work in the villages in search of white-collar jobs in the cities. 
The villages were thereby robbed of sufficient man-power for farm work. Furthermore, the 
community spirit created by group work was lost. 
 
The impact of colonialism at the cultural and socio-political levels was much more obtrusive. 
Every attempt by the colonizers to impose foreign ideas on the indigenous folk met with 
violent resistance. This resistance began after the Berlin Conference of 1884, where the 
participating European nations divided Africa by drawing political boundaries on maps. 
Unfortunately, those boundaries, drawn on largely inaccurate maps, cut apart ethnic groups, 
kingdoms, and historically linked regions in ways that continue to cause conflicts in Africa 
today.32 A few examples here will help to buttress this fact, as some of those affected are still 
at war today, many years after independence. The violent conflicts in Sudan and Rwanda are 
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not unconnected to the misstep in the political division of Africa. Even where the colonial 
regimes seemed to have been successfully established, the natives continued to seek for ways 
to reassert independence, an indication that colonialism was not accepted throughout Africa. 
The demonstration of the people of Shona and Ndebele against the British in Southern 
Rhodesia in 1890 and that of the people of Tanganyika, who fought against the Germans in 
the Maji Maji resistance in 1905 – 1906 are remarkable. Of course in each of these attempts 
the colonizers with their superior weapons and skill were able to subjugate the natives. The 
seeds of violence were in any case sown through such battle. 
 
Closely related to the misstep in the political division of Africa was the attempt to impose on 
the colonized people a system of leadership that did not correlate with their value systems. 
The rapid change brought about by the industrial revolution, the rise of the larger and richer 
middle class coupled with the complete reliance on reason occasioned by the Enlightenment 
gave Europe an overwhelming belief in its own moral and cultural superiority. A master plan 
was created with which all colonies were to be governed: For the British it was indirect rule, 
whereas for the French it was assimilation. However, there was no plan that worked for all the 
colonies. An interesting example of this unresolved heterogeneity is the introduction of the 
feudal hierarchical system among a race like the Igbo in eastern Nigeria by the colonial 
authorities and the Christian church. The Igbos, before the coming of the European, had been 
known to live in strictly democratic and acephalous village units, each one independent of its 
neighbour in its internal organisation and government. Unlike the Yoruba and Bini in western 
Nigeria, and the Hausa-Fulani in the north, who had evolved intricate and long-standing 
hierarchical systems of governance with the “Obas” and the “Emirs”, respectively, at the head 
of the kingdoms, the Igbo lacked such a structure. The popular saying among the Igbo people 
that, “Igbo enweghi eze” (the Igbos know no kings) underscores this cultural reality. This was, 
however, an anomaly for the British colonial authorities, who ignored this and went ahead to 
create a system of government that could make the implementation of indirect rule also 
feasible in this region. This foreign imposition of an alien idea and structure into the fabric of 
Igbo political organization was heavily resisted and led eventually to the well-known revolt of 
the women of Igboland in 1929, a revolt popularly called the women’s or Aba Riots, the 
designations referring to the group that championed it and the region where it took place, 
respectively. Realising their mistakes in the imposition of the feudal structure on a people 
who were democratic ab ovo, the British colonial authority withrew the artificially created 
Warrant Chiefs. The modified forms of the same policy proved equally difficult and were 
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resisted. Commenting on the effects of the absurdity of this mutilation of the African cultures 
by the European, Margery Perham writes: 
  
                 In Africa, we are setting heavy burdens upon native institutions which have  
                  been weakened by the abnormal strains of the last thirty or forty years. . . . 
                  (The Africans) have suddenly found themselves embraced by a world economy 
                  and an imperial order. . . their members, yesterday active, independent and self- 
                  reliant have passed under the control of foreigners remote in culture from themselves 
                  and suffer today a sense of bewilderment and inferiority that diminishes their full 
                  human nature.33 
 
The Christian church was not entirely spared this problem in the creation of parishes and 
dioceses, as some of the separate village and ethnic groups were merged together as one. This 
later gave rise to unhealthy rivalries and intrigues among the component groups. Some of 
them had to leave the mainstream churches to establish their own religious groups in order to 
assert their own autonomy and allegiance to ancestral ethnolinguistic units, thereby giving rise 
to the proliferation of churches which has continued till today. It is not therefore surprising 
that political groupings even after independence follow this trend of preserving the ethnic 
alliance, which was not destroyed in the aftermath of colonialism. As we saw in the earlier 
part of this work, violent conflicts were perceived partly as defence of ethnic pride.  
  
One other area that needs to be addressed with reference to the impact of colonization 
concerns the African personality. There are obvious reasons to believe that the African is, to a 
large extent, haunted by civilizational synthesis. After seventy-five years of colonialism 
whose mission in the words of Winston Churchill, was to “give peace to warring tribes, to 
administer justice where all was violence, to strike the chains off the slave; and to increase in 
whole peoples their capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain”34; the African 
is yet to know justice and enjoy a peaceful non-violent existence. Can one say then that the 
‘mission’ of colonization is a failed mission? Has this not left the traditional African dangling 
between the two cultures?  
 
In his second novel, No Longer At Ease, a title which was borrowed from a line in T. S. 
Eliot’s “The Journey of the Magi”, Chinua Achebe described the fate of the African as he/she 
                                                 
33 Perham, M., Native Administration in Nigeria, London: Oxford University Press, 1937, 354 
34 Churchill, W., The River War, cited in Monti, N., op. cit. 24 
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struggles to imbibe Western civilization alongside the African cultural values. The hero of the 
novel is Obi Okonkwo, the grandson of Okonkwo, who opposed the introduction of 
Christianity in Umuofia35 with the last drop of blood in Achebe’s first novel, Things Fall 
Apart. Obi is privileged to acquire a Western education thanks to the generosity of the 
Umuofia Progressive Union, that contributes to sponsoring his education in England. He 
comes back from England and he is employed as a civil servant. Obi Okonkwo becomes 
ambitious and is determined to succeed not only for himself, but also for the sake of his 
family and the entire community that contributed to sponsor his education. He falls into debt 
and is subsequently trapped in a plot where he accepts bribes to supplement his salary. 
Unfortunately for him, he is caught, tried and convicted of bribery and corruption. The elegant 
life-style in Lagos, where Obi Okonkwo now works is contrasted to the simple village life in 
Umuofia, where Obi grew up and lived before he left for studies in England. He is lured by 
the excesses of city life and tries to keep up appearances.36 The people of Umuofia in their 
bewilderment begin to speculate on the source of such behaviour that was not known in the 
community. Although the action of Obi Okonkwo is condemned outright, the people 
associated it with city life brought by Western civilization. The problem here is that of “the 
moral complications and influences of urbanization” and that “the uneasy moral ambiguities 
of cultural homogenization were not prepared for. The inevitable consequences of cultural 
amalgamation, when Africa encountered Europe, were not foreseen. Consequently, Obi 
Okonkwo’s tasting of modernity, imposed by foreign culture, is too much for his immature 
personality”.37 The crisis in Obi Okonkwo’s moral life can neither be attributed to Western 
civilization nor to his traditional Igbo cultural background, where there is no word for bribery 
and corruption, but rather to his inability to integrate the values of the two cultures. Achebe’s 
point in this novel is to show the conflict that can arise from the meeting of two cultures. 
 
Ayi Kwei Armah of Ghana in his novel, The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born, paints a 
different picture of his hero, who is simply designated as “The Man”. Like Obi Okonkwo, the 
man has the privilege of a Western education, though the author does not tell us whether he 
was sponsored by his community as was Obi. In any case, he is employed to work in a train 
station in Ghana. Since he refuses to join in the corrupt practices which were in vogue at the 
                                                 
35 Umuofia is a community in Igboland in eastern Nigeria, which Chinua Achebe used as a paradigm in his  
    novel “Things Fall Apart” to depict the clash between the Judeo-Christian culture and African Culture in the  
    early contacts of the missionaries with native customs and culture. 
36 Njoku, C. B., The Four Novels of Chinua Achebe: A Critical Study, New York; Berne; Frankfurt am Main:  
    Peter Lang, 1984, 39 
37 Ibid., 40 
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time, he is considered foolish and therefore ridiculed by friends and relatives. He is always 
compared to one of his classmates, who went into politics, was immediately made a minister, 
and became very rich. But despite the pressure, the man refuses to get on the bandwagen, he 
does not want to identify with the usual “everybody is doing it” argument, mit den Wölfen zu 
heulen. The story ends by telling us that the rich politician had to seek refuge in the house of 
“The Man” when their government is overthrown. The settings of the two novels are different, 
the one is in the pre-independent Nigeria, the other in the post-independent Ghana, but the 
common message is that of culture contact, receptivity and resilience. The problem, after all, 
was not that of the meeting of two cultures, which would have taken place even without 
colonialism, it was rather that the foreign cultural values were imposed on the natives, who 
responded in different ways ranging from reluctant acceptance to outright resistance. 
 
The struggle for independence was championed by the few Africans who were educated 
overseas. It came in a more articulated form than the sporadic resistance and violent conflicts 
which characterised the entire period of colonization. This resistance eventually caused many 
Africans their lives. Referring to the steps taken by the natives’ resistance to the colonizers, 
Churchill described the Africans as “wild peoples, ignorant of their barbarism, callous of 
suffering, careless of life but tenacious of liberty, are seen to resist with fury the philanthropic 
invaders, and to perish in thousands before they are convinced of their mistake”.38 To correct 
the mistake of a primitive method of resistance and a finished plan for self-government, the 
elites began to write and speak about liberation from the colonial powers. These first African 
elites and protagonists of African independence who did not apply what they learned in the 
West became a proof of the adage that you could take a man/woman out of his/her country, 
but you cannot take the country out of the man/woman. Writing in this regard of the error of 
the French method of assimilation in Senegal and other French colonies, Adrian Roscoe 
observed that “faced with men whom they considered barbarians, the French believed it their 
mission to convert them into Frenchmen. This implied a fundamental acceptance of their 
potential human equality, but a total dismissal of African culture as of any value”.39 For even 
though they embraced Western education, the elites were aware that there would be no real 
Africa if Africa were not independent. These Western-educated African elites had acquired 
the language of the colonizers and could speak with them directly without any 
mediator/interpreter, which gave them a certain degree of confidence. Western education was 
therefore an important instrument that helped to actualise the dream of independence. 
                                                 
38 Churchill, W., op. cit. 24 
39 Roscoe, A., Mother is Gold, London 1977, 28 cited in Egbulefu, J., op. cit. 114 
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Two external factors, however, contributed immensely to the liberation of the Africans from 
the colonial powers. The one factor was the literary works of the Afro-American blacks, who 
in the early part of the 20th century made a major contribution to the raising of black 
consciousness. Examples of the scholars who led the literary fight for the restoration of the 
image of the black man battered through the slave trade include W. E. B. Du Bois whose book 
‘Souls of Black Folk’ made a great impact. Then there was the “The Negro Renaissance” with 
the poet Claude Mckay (1891 – 1948), Countee Cullen (1903 – 1946) and Langston Hughes 
(1902 – 1967) as prominent members. The literary achievements of these people was a 
stimulus to the African elites in their quest for independence. The next factor was the 
experience of World War II with the proclamation in 1941 of the Atlantic Charter and the 
creation of the United Nations Organisation and the declaration of universal human rights a 
few years after the war. The blacks in America took advantage of this development to form 
civil rights movements. The ideas contained therein contributed to the new visions of the right 
to freedom from colonial rule that Africans began to voice. After the war, political parties 
were formed, the strongest of which were in West Africa, where European settlers were not 
many. Thus from 1945 – 1960, African nationalist parties led by men such as Kwame 
Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Leopold Senghor and Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
developed mass support, won local elections and pushed for more political rights and 
ultimately for independence.40 Most of the colonized African countries got their independence 
between 1957 and 1970, apart from Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa who became 
independent in 1975, 1980 and 1990 respectively.  
 
5. 3   Post-Colonial Africa and the Legacies of Colonization 
 
The expression “post-colonial Africa” is used here to refer to the period during which all 
African countries that were under colonial powers attained independence. Of course there 
were only two African countries that never experienced colonial rule, namely Ethiopia and 
Liberia. Thus the post-colonial period is a relatively short time for so much change to have 
taken place especially when we remember, as already mentioned, that South Africa got her 
independence at the threshhold of the second millenium, more precisely in 1990. But it is also 
within the same space of time that the former Communist countries in Europe were able to 
develop their countries after the fall of communism. On the other hand, it is quite sufficient a 
                                                 
40 Gordon, A. A. & Gordon, L. D. (eds.), op. cit. 46 
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time for a significant change to have taken place when we remember that Ghana gained 
independence in 1957, the first black African country to do so. When one considers the 
enormity of joy and great hope that came with independence and the many problems 
confronting Africa today, a multitude of questions become inevitable as to what the causes for 
these problems could be. Ali Mazrui articulates the situation in the following words: 
 
               Particularly important in post-colonial Africa has been the dilemma of development 
                and the search for an ideology of transformation. The euphoria of the early years of 
                independence has been replaced by the agonies of failure. Political instability is wide- 
                spread; food production has declined; numbers of refugees are expanding. As the saying 
                goes, the old revolution of rising expectations has indeed been replaced by a new  
                revolution of deepening frustrations.41  
 
The scapegoat mentality that blames colonialism for every problem in the post-colonial Africa 
is simply naive and unjustified. At the same time, to argue that the European colonial powers 
in Africa did not contribute at all to the present African condition would be to shy away from 
obvious historical truths. Our aim here is to examine to what extent colonialism be could said 
to be responsible for the problem of poverty and violence in Africa; and to find out why after 
the assumption of leadership the pioneer presidents of independent African countries failed to 
chart the right course for the development of Africa. To what extent were/are the African 
leaders independent in policy making? How are the socio-cultural changes that were brought 
about by colonialism affecting the human values of the Africans in the post-colonial era? 
What steps should be taken to reduce the problems of poverty and violence in post-colonial 
Africa? The point is that the African, through colonialism, was exposed to two ways of 
experiencing reality, society, authority and myth. The first was the European open culture 
distinguished by ideologies in rapid evolution and eager for exploration and conquest. The 
second was the African culture, cut off from the rest of the world and dominated by religion, 
tradition and magic. The interaction of these polarities serve to clarify some of the difficulties 
that persist in post-colonial Africa. We shall restrict our examination of these difficulties 
below to politico-economic dilemma and socio-cultural dependence. The one, because it is the 
major cause of violent conflicts and poverty; the other, because it is responsible for the loss of 
African identity. 
 
                                                 
41 Mazrui, A. A., “Cultural Forces in African Politics: In search of a Synthesis”. In: Mowoe, J. I. and Bjornson,  
    R. (eds.), op. cit. 33 – 53. 
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5. 3. 1   The Politico-Economic Legacy: A Critique 
 
In the second chapter of this work, in which we dealt extensively with violent conflicts 
resulting from the struggle for political power, we saw that ethnic interests played a major 
role in the political development and control of resources in the newly independent states. 
Political power was virtually tied to economic power, such that to secure political power 
meant and still means to gain economic power. How did the colonial authorities manage the 
problem of ethnic differences in their political structures? Why was it impossible for the new 
African leaders to apply the same strategy? To answer these questions some facts have to be 
taken into consideration. It is to be noted that the ethnic conflicts were not entirely absent 
during the period of colonization. The major concern for the ethnic groups, however, was the 
foreign power and how to be liberated from it. The ethnic differences were more or less 
submerged during the struggle for independence. Some problems such as those we have 
already mentioned, included the annexation of different ethnic groups only for political 
reasons, without regard for the cultural and boundary discrepancies.   
 
Besides, the system of government bequeathed by the colonial authorities, whether in the 
Francophone Africa or in Anglophone Africa, was a replica of the government of their 
respective home countries. This enabled them to continue to exercise influence on the politics 
of their former colonial territories. For example, the encouragement of many political parties 
in the new independent states by the colonial authorities was meant to divide the ranks of the 
nationalist movements. It is on record that all the colonial authorities apart from Portugal 
bequeathed the parliamentary systems of government with multi-partism to African states at 
independence. Thus, colonial political bureaucracies were transferred to the political elites. 
Some of the parties were sponsored from the ex-colonial powers with the aim of protecting 
their interests. The English common law provided the core of the legal system for all the 
Anglophone countries and has remained so till today. The problem was that there was no 
effort on the part of the colonial authorities to train indigenous man power for some of these 
initiatives. And then the imposition of a system of government that did not take into 
consideration the cultural heterogeneity of the people, simply because it worked in the home 
countries of the colonial authorities, could only produce more problems. About this 
arrangement, Charles de Gaulle once remarked that, “it is not certain that the concept of a 
federation, which replaces in certain areas to a certain extent the concept of colonization, is 
always very good and very practical, and particularly in Africa – but not only in Africa, for in 
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fact, that consists in automatically putting together very different peoples, sometimes very 
different indeed, and who, in consequence do not like it at all”.42  
 
On the other hand, the various institutions for the maintenance of law and order like the police 
and the army bequeathed by the colonial authorities could have been useful, though these 
were deployed by the African leaders for the advancement of personal interest and perpetuity 
in power. One noticed that the Africans who assumed leadership of the African states after 
independence became very despotic in dealing with their fellow Africans. It was a good 
example of the psychologically proven fact that victims often end up becoming perpetrators 
(Opfer wird Täter). It has been rightly observed that Africa’s worst evils in the political 
domain since independence are the danger of tyranny on the one hand and anarchy on the 
other. The leaders’ constant contact with the colonial authorities served as a confirmation of 
their legitimacy and made it difficult for a policy without foreign influence to be fashioned. 
The system resulting from this inability of the first African leaders to cut the political 
umbilical cord connecting them to the colonial powers is described as neo-colonialism. 
Consequent upon this is corruption spread caused by the leaders’s desire to acquire much 
money that would help them secure their political posts forever, for which they need the 
services of some foreign agencies. What followed was the takeover of leadership by the 
military through coup d’etats, which became widespread in all the countries of Africa in the 
first two or more decades after independence. The situation in those countries where the 
military, not trained to rule, had taken the mantle of leadership became anything but peaceful. 
 
At the economic level, colonialism did not bequeath any solid plan for the further 
development of the continent after independence. As we stated above, the colonial authorities 
emphasized the production of cash crops to the detriment of food crops in the colonies. The 
reason was that cash crops supplied raw materials for the industries in their home countries. 
This was in contradiction to a basic economic rule that industries are sited near the place 
where raw materials are produced. The rhetorical question that immediately comes to mind is, 
why were those industries not sited in the colonies where those raw materials were produced? 
Besides, the monopoly on the machinery for the production of cash crops by the colonial 
authorities did not give the natives the opportunity to learn how to manipulate the machines 
for production. What this means is that after independence the colonial masters withdrew their 
equipment and in places where they were left, there were no technicians to manipulate them. 
                                                 
42 De Gaulle, C., 1968 cited in Mazrui, A. (ed.), General History of Africa, vol.VIII, op. cit., 446 
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This led to the drastic reduction in the production of cash and food crops. To be in tune with 
the developed world economically meant to increase cash crop production. “Regrettable as it 
is, it is not surprising in such circumstances that independent Africa pursued, more vigorously 
than ever before, the development of export-crop production. Scant attention continued to be 
paid to food production. Thus, between 1960 and 1965, while export crops registered a global 
23.3 per cent increase, food crops expanded by only 6.7 per cent.” 43  Imperialism was 
continued on the economic level when colonial Africa emerged into independence with an 
economy that devoted a considerable proportion of its resources to the production of export 
commodities for which there was little domestic demand and depended on outside-African 
countries for the supply of its basic needs, even including most of its food requirements.44 It 
was in line with this that Monti argues that colonization has often been justified in terms of its 
material achievements, as defined by the West, on the continent, but the humanitarian 
component really never represented the main incentive. The Lagos Plan of Action underlined 
this systematic neglect of the small-holder peasant farmer and the production of food crops, 
stating that ‘at the root of the food problem in Africa is the fact that member States have not 
accorded the necessary priority to agriculture, both in the allocation of resources and in giving 
sufficient attention to policies for the promotion of productivity and improvement of rural 
life.’45  
  
The inherent logic in these economic twists and turns is that while the former colonies 
produced cash crops like cocoa, rubber, groundnuts, for the industries in the mother countries 
(previous colonial authorities) who determined the price at which the raw materials were sold, 
the colonies (now independent states) bought the finished products from them at a price 
determined and fixed by them. So whichever way one looks at the economy of post-colonial 
Africa, it is seen to be completely dependent on the economic policies of the ex-colonial 
powers. The state of the economy in the countries of post-colonial Africa has been 
characterised as polarised by the risk of economic dependency on the one hand and the peril 
of economic decay on the other. While dependency is a truncated capacity for self-reliance, 
decay is a truncated capacity for development. Thus, any decision on how to help Africa 
overcome the problem of poverty and hunger should begin with a change in economic policy, 
which can either empower the African countries by allowing them to determine the price of 
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their exports or the reduction by transnational corporations of the import rate on goods sent to 
Africa. This demand of developing countries led to the setting up in 1975 of STABEX that 
helped to stabilize commodity prices especially of agricultural produce. With this 
development following the call made by underdeveloped countries after the UNCTAD 
Conference of 1974, a ray of hope was cast on the demands for a ‘new international economic 
order’.  
 
Another aspect of the economy of the post-colonial African states is the total dependence on 
foreign experts and technicians. Since the operative rule in every economic venture is to make 
more  profit, there are instances where the desire to get some machines sold have led some 
companies to give the wrong information to the prospective buyers. The result is that the 
machines are installed or the project executed without being able to function. An educated and 
well-travelled police captain in Mali recounts sorrowfully this economic dishonesty in an 
interview thus: 
 
             That is the fault of the West. The West told us to build power stations, bridges, factories, 
              steel mills, phosphate mines. We built them because you said so, and the way you told us. 
              But now they don’t work, you tell us we must pay for them with our money. That is not 
              fair. You told us to build them, you should pay for them. We didn’t want them.46 
 
On the part of the African leaders, it was difficult to find an economic system suitable for the 
independent African states. Since in time the effort was to dissociate as much as possible from 
the ex-colonial authority, the leaders were keen on trying to produce something original. Most 
of the African countries established independent monetary institutions, while some others 
associated economic decolonization with the desire to direct their societies to socialist goals. 
This move attracted more stringent economic measures from the West, given the division 
already existing between capitalism and communism. The most radical socialist strategy of 
economic decolonization was that of Tanzania and the ideology of ujamaa vijijini or village 
socialism which was based on a policy of self-reliance. This form of socialism, as Julius 
Nyerere articulated it in his manifesto, was to be based on the traditional values of the village, 
emphasizing the group and mutual support in contradistinction to the individualistic and 
exploitative values of capitalism.47 
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But the greatest problem still facing the economies of the post-colonial African states is the 
corruption of their leaders. It is a verifiable fact that “in Africa the richest people are the heads 
of states and their ministers”.48 Corruption has almost become institutionalised as an avenue 
for siphoning money out of the government coffers as the inflation of bureaucracy to provide 
jobs for henchmen increased; the economy is squeezed for its surplus. The greater percentage 
of foreign aid ends in numbered accounts abroad.49 We have already dealt with the problem 
of the corruption of political leaders in Africa in the earlier part of this work. At any rate, 
what remains incomprehensible for the majority of the African people is how the same 
monetary aid which comes from concerned foreign organisations and institutions flows back 
unquestioned to the foreign banks through the private accounts of the African leaders 
unquestioned. The real foreign aid should begin with the making of policies preventing 
African politicians from transferring money from poor countries to their overseas bank 
accounts.  
 
Finally, it is pertinent to underscore the fact that economic development, like other forms of 
development in the countries of post-colonial Africa, needs time and planning. It took Europe 
centuries to achieve a well developed economy, why should Africa be expected to do so in 
mere decades, especially after the recent distortions of colonialism?50 Even the not-too-long 
economic and technological courtship between Africa and China cannot provide a solution to 
the African problem because of the disparity in the human and moral values that distinguish 
the two.    
 
5. 3. 2    The Legacy of Socio-Cultural Change: An Appraisal 
 
European contacts with Africa through colonialism brought a lot of changes to the social 
institutions and cultural values of the latter. Since cultures are the summation of a people’s 
way of life, and hence carriers of their identity, these changes had great influence on the 
African peoples’ perception of themselves and their values. Some of these changes have 
contributed immensely to the positive image of Africa in the world history today. For instance, 
the use of European languages, thanks to colonialism, serves as a bridge between Africa 
South of Sahara and the West. Armed with this instrument of communication, the African is 
able to find his/her way everywhere in the world. It has also been argued, on the other hand, 
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that this practice interrupted the development of African languages as the speaking of native 
languages was forbidden in the schools in the colonial days. 
 
Christian missionaries played an important role in establishing schools in every community 
for the education of the natives. Even in some areas where this was resisted, efforts were 
made to convince the parents of the importance of Western education for their children and at 
times incentives were provided. The schools became equally the medium for transmitting 
Western cultural values. But in some areas, especially in Muslim-dominated regions, Western 
education was rejected outright as a vehicle of Western values. A typical example of this is 
the case of the Hausa-Fulani in northern Nigeria, where the British, fearful of upsetting 
Muslim sensibilities and anxious to make use of the Islamic institutions, discouraged the 
Christian missionaries’ penetration of the north, and also discouraged the introduction of 
Western education, at least for some time. This development came to be a source of insecurity 
and regional cleavage between the northern and southern parts of the country. The Muslim-
dominated north felt disadvantaged in the Western linguistic and literary skills which became, 
after independence, the basis of a new intelligensia. It is against this background that one can 
understand the occasional protest by some Muslims in the northern part of the country against 
Western education and its values even in the 21st century. The so-called ‘quota system’51 was 
then introduced by the government to close the gap arising from the difference in the number 
of educated people in the north and south. 
 
The schools, coupled with the Christian churches as indices of Western civilization had, great 
impact on traditional Africa that gave rise to the conflict of cultures which influenced, in no 
small way, the mode of life of the Africans. The most significant impact came from the 
introduction of a socio-economic order which saw the payment of regular wages to 
individuals instead of families. Such an arrangment gave the individual a sense of private 
power, altering the traditional structure and the sense of community. The levying of taxes on 
him directly which were paid by him personally, his personal accountability for debts which 
he incurred, and his personal expiation, under the metropolitan jurisdiction, of crimes he 
committed, the conversion of individuals instead of families to Christianity, the exclusive 
accountability of the individual conscience to God, all this put together increased his sense of 
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solitariness. He was thus encouraged to think and act more on an atomistic, and less on a 
communalistic, basis.52 These and other similar influences became the dominant theme of 
African writers and artists in the post-colonial era. We have made reference to some of these 
authors in the course of this work, like Chinua Achebe in whose Things Fall Apart, get an 
impressive delineation of the traditional culture, its values and its salient characteristics. In his 
detailed study on the subject of culture contact and conflict, E. N. Obiechina articulates the 
problem in the following words: 
 
                   It is the overwhelming awareness that the old traditional culture with its 
                    attendant values is breaking up and is being replaced by a new culture  
                    with its emergent values which has made culture change the all-pervasive 
                    theme in the West African novel. Because novelists share the background 
                    of the generality of the people they write about, they feel with them that 
                    the culture change is the most important reality of modern West Africa.53 
 
Both the Anglophone and Francophone African elite experienced, though differently, the 
difficulty associated with the adjustment to the alien socio-cultural mentality while at the 
same time remaining Africans. And since the elite were the ones that took power after 
independence, two routes were open to them: The one was to reject in protest everything 
Western and return to the ancient traditional African cultural values (a form of cultural 
necromancy), which would be impossible and unnecessary, while the other was to take over 
all the values of colonialism and pretend to behave like the colonial authority, aping them in 
everything down to the minutest detail (cultural alienation). The tension between these two 
poles was felt more among the French-speaking elite than among their English-speaking 
counterparts owing to the French colonial policy of assimilation. Thus ‘nationalism, whose 
concrete form is the demand for independence, arose much earlier in English-speaking 
African countries. This is because British colonial policy did not pass through the detour of 
assimilation.’54  The bluntest epitome of the elite’s cultural dilemma was captured in the 
article written by Joseph Bipoun-Wum in Presence Africaine in the 1970s. According to 
Wum, the African elite did not emanate from African society rather, it was created to 
accomplish the colonial design. And in order to play its designated role, the elite  had to leave 
                                                 
52 Abraham, W. E., The Mind of Africa, op. cit. 136 
53 Obiechina, E. N., Culture, Tradition and Society in the West African Novel, Cambridge: Cambridge  
    University Press, 1975, 263 
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its own milieu (the traditional socio-cultural values). He further argues that the African elite (a 
term he sees as a euphemism) must first obtain a certificate of authenticity if it is to be a true 
elite. What that means is that the elite has to be a product of  an internal revolution of the 
African society and not an extension of colonization. In other words, the African elite has to 
undergo a cultural renaissance; he/she must become African again while remaining 
‘civilized’.55 A true African elite that has really integrated the Western values with his/her 
African identity will have to go beyond wearing a suit and tie, acquiring social prestige to 
offer the African society a model that can influence the masses and give the African a better 
future. Such a vision of a true elite or what is equally called a ‘modern African’ must, 
according to Chinweizu, grow out of the African tradition and must be seen as a revitalizing 
factor of that tradition.56 This would, however, not be an easy task: V. Y. Mudimbe argues 
that “the humiliating stranglehold which the West holds on Africa (through the elite) is based, 
supported and propagated by an underlying ethnocentrism of knowledge serving an 
ethnocentrism of power”.57 
 
It is, however, in the realm of religion that major conflict was experienced. The two religions 
of Islam and Christianity after they made their debut in Africa, not only fought each other, but 
fought together to discredit and eliminate the traditional religion. Even among the different 
Christian denominations, there were frequent conflicts and rivalry in a bid to win more 
converts. This led to the loss of societal cohesion as Christians tried to operate their own rival 
community within the community. At the personal level there were uncertainties in the 
individual conscience arising from conflicting beliefs and moral codes.58 Consequent upon 
the loss of social cohesion was the disintegration of traditional values due to influences and 
pressures from the urban, commercial culture. In line with this triple religious heritage, in the 
words of Ali Mazrui, Nkrumah advocated a synthesis of all the three various religious 
traditions in his ‘Philosopical Consciencism’, the aim of which would be to “contain the 
African experience of Islamic and Euro-Christian presence as well as the experience of 
traditional African society, and, by gestation, employ them for the harmonious growth and 
development of that society”.59 This he believes would enable the modern African society 
come to terms with the reality of its socio-cultural past and gain strength to face its present 
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situation. The fact of socio-cultural change is a reality Africans cannot deny, and the manner 
and mode of facing it is at the same time a task they cannot escape. And when we talk of 
culture, we are not merely concerned with identity and its many levels; we are also concerned, 
above all, with a sense of direction and with development; which does not, in any case, mean 
sacrificing the former for the benefit of the latter. Culture as development in modern Africa 
has to rediscover those authentic qualities or what Tom Mboya of Kenya calls ‘positive 
tribalism’, which include the resilience of the Africa heritage, the values of collective 
responsibility and the principles of sharing, the traditions of respect for the aged and concern 
for the young, the imperatives of hospitality and the bonds of the extended family60. An 
Africa deprived of these values is the truly poor Africa and any help rendered to the African 
society that fails to take these into consideration may make Africa materially rich but it will 
make it humanly poor. The worst form of poverty is anthropological poverty. This was 
underscored by Benedict XVI, who has constantly warned that a purely economic and 
technological understanding of progress, to the extent that it fails to acknowledge its intrinsic 
limitations and to take into consideration the integral good of humanity, will inevitably 
provoke negative consequences for individuals, peoples and creation itself. 
 
5. 3. 3  Migration as a Consequence of Poverty and Societal Dysfunction 
 
One of the most challenging issues for post-colonial Africa south of the Sahara is the problem 
of migration. The history of humanity shows that man/woman, through the ages, has always 
been forced to move from one place to the other in search of better living conditions. Whereas 
migration was laden with many difficulties in the ancient times as it involved trekking for 
long distances lasting for many months and sometimes years, the advancement of technology 
has made migration easier and less dangerous. The world, as it were, has become a global 
village, and Africa forms a part of this village sharing in its joys and sorrows. 
 
 Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest number of migrants in the world. The last United Nations 
World Population Prospects Report puts the number of migrants from Africa to other 
countries outside Africa at 16 million at the beginning of the third millenium61. This accounts 
for more than half the number of all the world’s migrants. There are also cases of migration 
within Africa which are not included in this number. The phenomenon of migration in Africa 
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is very dynamic and complex when compared to other countries. This complexity is reflected 
in the large number of women who migrate, the issue of brain drain, the extreme cases of 
human trafficking, and the explosion in the number of refugees. 
 
The causes of migration are attributable to many factors ranging from poverty to social 
insecurity. Africa’s problem of migration hinges on these two factors. With its large 
population and poor economy, Africa is confronted with an unstoppable exodus of her young 
men and women to foreign countries, frequently involving the loss of lives on the seas or 
dying by installment through starvation. The nature of the economy inherited from the 
colonial authorities which placed much importance on cash crop production and less emphasis 
on staple food crop production coupled with a disintegration of socio-cultural institutions, has 
plunged Africa into a miserable condition so that Africans are forced to leave their countries 
to look for greener pastures. African men and women, both trained and untrained, 
increasingly migrate as a family survival strategy. The destinations vary from one country to 
another. While most of the female doctors and nurses from Nigeria go to Saudi Arabia in 
search of jobs, their counterparts from Ghana are in the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America.62 Like the destinations, the reasons for the migration of trained personnel 
vary from poor payment to poor working conditions. 
 
The group with the greatest difficulties among the migrants are the untrained young men and 
women who leave their home countries for other countries in search of job opportunities. 
While some move on their own intiative, others are lured to move hoping to find something 
doing in the foreign countries. Some of them end up as drug dealers or if they are women as 
prostitutes. Additionally, there are still those who are physically forced into leaving their 
countries of birth. This group consists of those that make up the statistics of Africa’s human 
trafficking and smuggling. The children among them end up as farm labourers and domestic 
workers, whereas the young women are sold for sexual exploitation or coerced to work in the 
sex industry. Most of these people in the course of their journey are stranded in Dakar and 
Morocco. In fact, hundreds of undocumented immigrants and trafficked persons, especially 
from West African countries, are stranded in Morocco en route to Spain for as long as four 
years. Most end up living in shacks, and some women give birth under these poverty-stricken 
conditions. Many others perish during perilous attempts to cross the sea to Spain in rickety 
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boats. Others who manage to find their way into Europe are often apprehended and deported 
on arrival or soon thereafter.63 
 
Research shows that parents in some cases are often forced by poverty and ignorance to enlist 
their children, hoping to benefit from their wages to sustain the family’s deteriorating 
economic situation. Young girls and women abducted from conflict  zones in East Africa are 
forced to become sex-slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men in Sudan and the Gulf 
States. 64  The matter is made more complex by the support of the parents, who, lacking 
sufficient knowledge of all that is involved, persuade their children to join the team of 
migrants. Besides, the agents whose duty it is to recruit the people paint a very positive but 
false picture of the destination and the ‘work’ they have to do. On the whole, African 
migration is summarized as mostly forced migration and the more the social norms are 
neglected the more the cases of migration increase. Some scholars have described the 
situation as a second slavery for Africa and her children. What has happened to the traditional 
African value of respect for life and the human person? Have the Africans lost their sense of 
community and group solidarity, which left nobody a begger in the traditional society?   
 
5. 3. 4  Post-Independence Africa and the Dialectics of Foreign Aid 
 
Post-independent Africa is, as we have seen in the above analysis, economically dependent on 
the West either as producers of the goods that are then marketed in Africa, ranging from 
foodstuff to every article of clothing or as major buyers of raw materials, from agricultural 
produce like cocoa to crude oil and other minerals. And since the basic economic law the 
world over is to maximize profit and minimize loss, it becomes difficult to understand how a 
trade relationship organised in this form can be of benefit to Africa. If a trade relationship 
with the West, characterised by imbalance as it is, cannot help Africans come out of poverty, 
it is much more difficult to see how foreign aid can provide a solution to the problems of 
poverty in Africa. In the early part of this work, in which we dealt with poverty, especially the 
section dealing with ‘leadership and foreign policy’, it was shown that most of the purported 
aid to Africa remains unfulfilled by most of the countries that make the resolutions. It ends up 
in much talk and less action. For some of the countries that resolve to really assist, such aid 
comes with conditions which at times do not reflect the needs of the people. The same thing is 
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applicable to the international organisations and institutions. Even when it is tagged a loan, 
the interest required to service the loans are always unbearable. Be that as it may, the whole of 
Africa seems to have no other option than to rely on foreign aid. 
 
It is difficult to reconcile the number of years that have gone by since most African countries 
got their independence with the claims made by countries or institutions with reference to 
assistance to Africa in its present deplorable state of poverty. Two incompatible factors may 
account for this condition: The first is that the West does not render sufficient assistance to 
enable Africa to become economically independent. The second is that Africa has become 
addicted to foreign aid to the extent that it has become incapable of standing on its own feet 
economically. In other words, imported economic empowerment for Africa has turned into 
impoverishment. It is in this context that I would paradoxically classify foreign aid as a 
contributing factor to the poverty in Africa. A ten-year old child who is still being carried by 
its mother is certainly behindert. Africa in her bid to liberate herself from the shackles of 
poverty in the face of foreign aid is either behindert or verhindert.  
 
5. 4.  C o n c l u s i o n 
 
The above exposition shows that the early contacts of Africa with the West and the Near East 
were characterised by struggles, whether it was in the era of the trans-Atlantic slave trade or 
during colonialism. These two events have in no small measure contributed to the perception 
and position of Africa and Africans across the world today. These were painful experiences 
from which the Africans have yet to recover, not only because they were profound, but much 
more because they have given rise to consequences which have continued to follow them 
wherever they go and often affect their reactions to life and its problems. Africans have to 
accept these uncomfortable aspects of their history and learn to live with them. To behave as 
if these never took place is to deceive oneself. At the same time, to spend the whole time 
ruminating on their historical past, an die Vergangenheit angekettet as it were, is to refuse to 
grow with time. After all, there is scarely any country or continent of the world without its 
historical wounds and regrettable past. 
 
On the other hand, we saw that for the West to pretend to assist Africans while equally 
making them economically dependent through market policies that give no room for Africa’s 
participation on the international exchange, amounts to a contradiction. Furthermore, the poor 
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image of Africans based on myths, which was presented to the wider world by the European 
colonial authorities and which continues to be spread through the media, needs to be corrected. 
This is the first step towards the restoration of self-esteem and self-confidence in the Africans 
themselves, without which poverty and violence can hardly be overcome. For instance, David 
Hume’s assertion in his essay ‘on national character’ is completely untenable today. Hume in 
this essay had written: 
 
                   I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There 
                    scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that complexion, nor even any individual 
                    eminent in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers amongst them, 
                    no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, 
                    such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent 
                    about them...Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen...if nature 
                    had not made original distinction betwixt these breeds of men...65 
 
This and similar philosophical prejudices like that of Hegel, who wrote that there is nothing 
harmonious with humanity to be found in the Africans, hence all thought of reverence and 
morality must be laid aside in dealing with them.66 Kant, in his essay, Observations on the 
Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764) had documented that the Negroes of Africa 
by nature have no feeling that rises above the trifling. These utterances can no longer serve as 
parameters for determining the relationship between the Africans and the West. If they were 
used in the past to justify slavery and/or colonialism, it is absurd to still hold tenaciously to 
unscientific and unverifiable statements meant to denigrate the Africans. The perpetration of 
such calumnies can only lead to conflicts and violence which may not be limited to Africa, 
but may spread to other parts of our highly interconnected world. In this regard Hans Küng 
wirites: 
                     It has become increasingly clear to me in recent years that the one world in 
                       which we live has a chance of survival only if there is no longer any room in 
                       it for spheres of differing, contradictory and even antagonistic ethics. This one 
                       world needs one basic ethic. This one world society certainly does not need a 
                       unitary religion and a unitary ideology, but it does need some norms, values, 
                       ideals and goals to bring it together and to be binding on it.67 
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.              
                                                
Africans have to make their own contributions to these norms, values and goals through their 
many humane cultural values in a fast growing mechanised world. But we have seen that the 
major problem of the post-colonial African countries has been the inability to integrate the 
triple heritage of traditional African, Euro-American and Muslim Arabic values. It is in this 
synthesis that the future of Africa depends, for it is in the knowledge and consciousness of its 
past that an identity can be formed, which is very important for charting a new path to the 
African future. This path is one that will bring to the awareness of Africans both the leaders 
and the led that African problems of poverty and violence must not necessarily be solved a 
l’occidentale. That is why our historical exposition serves as a ‘creative memorial’. It is not 
intended to reproduce the hates, the violence, and the corruption which characterise our 
past.68 For as Küng states in the above-cited section, there is a need to put aside differences 
and seek those things that are common and that can advance the solidarity of humanity. Hence 
the third and last part of this work takes up the idea of human dignity as the way out of abject 
poverty and violence. The term ‘dignity’ is to be understood in this regard as something 
unique to every individual, but at the same time relational. Our world has sufficient resources 
to sustain its population if there is a just distribution of the goods of the earth
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Part Three: The Problematic of the Discourse on the Dignity of the Human  
Person vis-a-vis the Challenges of the Social Problems of Poverty and  
Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa Today 
 
 
                                                  CHAPTER SIX 
A RE-APPRAISAL OF THE THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 
FOR THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL 
QUESTIONS 
 
6. 0   I n t r o d u c t i o n 
 
The debate on the dignity of the human person, both as a concept and in practice, remains 
controversial today. Thanks to the discoveries in the natural and the human sciences, the 
mysteries which surrounded man/woman and  the world in ancient times have been very 
much illuminated. Almost every bit of the human constitution can be studied and described. 
The knowledge thus gained has been of immense help in the control of diseases that endanger 
human life and has equally assisted in providing better standards of living. On the other hand, 
this knowledge, equipped with empirical data about the human person allows the human 
person to be considered solely as a material being, thereby affirming the doctrine of evolution 
at the expense of that of creation. 
 
On the social level, the degree of violence, torture, fear, injustice, intolerance, in toto man’s 
inhumanity to man continues to re-awaken the question of who the human person is and what 
life is all about. The question of the value or worth of the human person calls for a re-study, 
because the notion of human dignity is not a mere abstraction fit for the entertainment of 
philosophers, it is the standard of measure for how men/women should treat one another in 
every social setting. It is in this context that we can understand Etienne Gilson’s assertion that 
‘morality is normality’. Hence, for a rational being to behave without reason or against it, is to 
behave not exactly as a beast, but as a beastly man/woman, which is worse: for it is proper 
that a beast acts as a beast, that is, according to its nature, but totally unfitting for a 
man/woman, because that means complete negation of his/her nature and therefore of final 
destiny.1 As plausible as this argument may appear, it is partial, for it reduces human dignity 
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to activity, which is the second level of its comprehension. Furthermore, the logical 
conclusion that arises from Gilson’s argument is that the human person can lose his/her 
dignity. This is contrary to the teaching of the Church that sin or bad behaviour inflicts a 
wound on the human dignity but does not destroy this dignity. The primary level then is the 
fact that it is, that means it is inseparable from the being of every person. It is the nature of the 
human person. For just as it is impossible to think of light without its brightness, it is 
unimaginable to think of a human being without dignity. But what does it mean to talk of 
human nature? What makes human beings different from other animals? Does the presence of 
‘intelligence’ in some higher mammals make them share the same worth with human beings? 
Does the claim to superiority of the human person empower him/her to treat other animals and 
the entire creation arbitrarily or are there some basic rules that govern the human persons in 
their relations to one another and to the entire creation? Our task here is to re-appraise the 
traditional but ever valid understanding of the dignity of the human person and to show how 
the crisis in the society, especially with reference to the social issues of poverty and violence, 
is always an extension of the crisis in the interpretation of the dignity of the human person. It 
is our conviction that a clear recognition of the proper human values, without the old mistake 
of exaggeration, would require a sharp and positive picture of the position and worth of the 
human person as the crown of creation and the only creature in the image of his/her Creator. 
This task is imperative, as the survival of our society and the human species depends very 
much on the rediscovery of our dignity as human beings irrespective of colour, culture and 
creed. This entails, among other things, to determine what the dignity of the human person 
rests on as well as the responsibility which this imposes on us and what hope we have in a 
world where war and terrorism have made life cold and dull.  
 
The preceding chapters of this study dealt with the social problems of poverty and violence 
situated in the context of the African experience of slavery and colonialism, and of course 
their extension in neo-colonialism in the post-independent African states. The following 
chapters will focus on the concept of the dignity of the human person, the respect for which 
can guarantee peaceful existence in any human society, and the disregard of which will 
continue to give rise to human impoverishment and violent conflicts in Africa. Our study of 
the dignity of the human person is carried out mainly with reference to its ethical implications 
for the human person as a social being that realizes the meaning of life in co-existing with 
others.  
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6. 1  The Concept of the Dignity of the Human Person as a Dynamic Reality 
 
The term ‘dignity’ which comes from the Latin dignitas, is perceived both as a gift and an 
obligation. Human dignity is a gift, because it does not depend on human achievements, rather 
it is freely bestowed on every human being by the Creator. On the other hand it is an 
obligation, because as the basis on which humanity is constructed, there are certain 
expectations from all human beings as carriers of this dignity, which however do not 
determine it. With reference to this second dimension, human dignity is very dynamic. What 
this means is that, unlike the first dimension, which is static, unique and unchangeable, it is 
capable of appreciating or diminishing in worth. This dynamic perspective of the dignity of 
the human person corresponds to that which is psychologically and ethically designated as 
personality and character, respectively. Human dignity is that quality which differentiates all 
human beings from all other living beings. Other expressions that help to explain the term 
‘dignity’ include ‘worth’ and ‘value’, but unlike the former the latter can be used to qualify 
non-human objects, even non-living things. For instance, we can talk of the worth of an 
automobile or the value of a house. In each of these cases, what is implied is the price or cost 
of the said object. It is the satisfaction to be derived therefrom that is at stake. The human 
person, on the contrary, has a worth, value and dignity which is unique and priceless. And it is 
for this reason, that every person has a special and irreplaceable relationship to his/her Maker. 
In this singular relationship to his/her Creator and other creatures of his/her kind, he/her 
demonstrates dignity. Thus the notion of the dignity of the human person is to be understood 
as purely normative and never descriptive. It is not a characteristic of the human person, it is 
the substance of his/her being human; that which is every human person’s due whether as 
subject or as object. Hence it is inherent in every human being in so far as he/she is human. 
 
On the relationship between price and dignity, Kant wrote in his Foundations to the 
Metaphysics of Morals that in the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or dignity. 
That which has a price can be replaced by something else, that is, its equivalent; but that 
which is so exalted such that no price can be placed on it and for which no equivalent can be 
found, is said to have dignity.2 Furthermore, he differentiates the two by stating: 
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             Was sich auf die allgemeinen menschlichen Neigungen und Bedürfnisse bezieht 
              hat einen Marktpreis; das, was auch ohne ein Bedürfnis vorauszusetzen, einem 
              gewissen Geschmacke … gemäß ist, einen Affektionspreis; das aber, was die  
              Bedingung ausmacht, unter der allein etwas Zweck an sich selbst sein kann, hat 
              nicht bloß einen relativen Wert, d. i. einen Preis, sondern einen innern Wert, d. i. 
              Würde.3 
 
Kant, however, extended the notion of dignity to two important human acts, namely fidelity 
and good will. By doing this, he was addressing the obligatory dimension of dignity as 
already alluded to above. Fidelity and goodwill (Wohlwollen4) have their worth in themselves 
and each man should strive after them more than after happiness. The typical terms employed 
by Kant to elucidate the dignity of the human person and distinguish it from the worth of 
material things are ‘means’ and ‘end’. The human person has dignity, because he/she is 
‘bonum in se’ as opposed to material things that are ‘bonum utile’. Thus it is never 
permissible to merely use a human being to attain some end or purpose. The dignity of the 
person is very foundational and bound up with interrelatedness to other human persons and to 
the rest of creation. 5  But the problem with this position is that human dignity is then 
perceived as something that can be acquired or merited. Secondly, Kant did not point out how 
one can regain this dignity in the second dimension when it is ‘lost’ through infidelity and 
lack of goodwill. This however does not minimize the importance of Kant’s teaching, since 
the dignity of the human person behooves him to act in a proper manner corresponding to 
his/her noble status. Only in this way can we understand the human person as the imago Dei. 
Besides, for us to understand better the contributions of Kant to the meaning of dignity, we 
have to take into consideration his distinction of man as homo noumenon and homo 
phaenomenon. Thus his explanation of the Menschheit-als-Selbstzweck-Formel, 6  is of 
importance to our discussion of dignity as something that is relational in nature. This 
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dimension was clearly brought out in the fourth example cited in the foot note which 
admonishes us not to be indifferent to the needs of our fellow human beings. 
                                                
 
The dignity of the human person is to be understood as a donation. For both the adherents of 
the Judeo-Christian doctrine of creation and of the theory of evolution tend to be unanimous 
on the singular point that the human person did not make himself/herself. It is therefore 
preposterous to talk of the dignity of the human person without reference to the source, which 
of necessity has to possess dignity in its plenitude in order to extend it to others. We shall now 
turn to the traditional philosophical and theological arguments for the dignity of the human 
person, a dignity which underlies the basis of social life, and which does not create privilege 
among human beings, but is valued for all human beings.  
 
6. 1. 1  The Judeo-Christian Foundation of the Dignity of the Human Person 
 
According the to Judeo-Christian tradition, the dignity of the human person is traceable to the 
fact that every human being is created in the image and likeness of God. And this dignity is 
recognised as belonging to every human being by virtue of his/her nature as a human person. 
The concept of human beings as images of God therefore becomes the point of departure for 
understanding the Judeo-Christian teaching about the dignity of the human person. The Book 
of Genesis has two passages which express this view, the citation of which we consider 
pertinent to our discourse. The first account of creation in the book of Genesis: 
 
                Then God said, “let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them 
                  have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over 
                  the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon 
                  the earth”. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created 
                  them; male and female he created them.7 
 
This passage, also called the priestly account of creation, is the better known and more widely 
quoted of the two accounts. The second account which contains the same truth proceeds from 
another perspective of the same event. The major point that distinguishes this account from 
the first account is the conspicuous omission of the fact that God created man in his image 
 
7 Genesis 1: 26 – 27 (RSV) 
 208
and likeness. The next omission to be noted is that of the creation of the human person as 
male and female. This second account is recorded in Genesis thus: 
 
                  These are the generations of the heavens and the earth when they were created. 
                    In the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens, when no plant of 
                    field had yet sprung up for the Lord, God had not caused it to rain upon the earth 
                    and there was no man to till the ground; but a mist went up from the earth and 
                    watered the whole face of the ground – then the Lord God formed man of dust 
                    from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became 
                    a living being. And the Lord God planted a garden in Eden, in the east, and there 
                    he put man whom he had formed.8 
 
We leave the exegesis of both texts to biblical scholars, but suffice it to say that the two 
accounts agree on the main point that God created man. While the first states that man/woman 
were created in the ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ of God, the second reports that God breathed into 
his/her nostrils the breathe of life. This act makes explicit the chemistry of our life which 
depends on this breath, the loss of which leads to death. The Christian’s claim to the dignity 
of the human person is based on the fact that every human being bears a ‘piece’ or a ‘part’ of 
God. The human person in the God-given dignity becomes the Stellvertreter und Partner 
Gottes in his creation thanks to the gift of the high status and privilege of being created in the 
likeness of God.9  This dignity perdures to the extent that the human person understands 
himself/herself as the likeness of God. This likeness is not a quality of the human person, it is  
what it means to be human. It transcends human feeling, thus the human person cannot define 
his/her being as that of beasts and assert, ‘sentio, ergo sum’(I feel therefore I am), nor can this 
be limited to human thinking alone leading to the Cartesian error of ‘cogito, ergo sum’(I think, 
therefore I am). The error in this latter position is that Descartes exchanged what the human 
person is for what he/she can do (Gnade mit Leistung10). But Descartes’ cogito ergo sum’ can 
also be interpreted as an affirmation or rather an acceptance of oneself, a recognition of ones 
existence that is fundamental. The human person in the words of Friedrich Dürrenmatt is, 
however, not a ‘thinking animal’, he/she is a human being. In other words, whatever he/she is 
capable of doing, cannot be used as the criterion for assessing this dignity, since it is a gift 
from God, but it needs at the same time a response on the part of the recipient. This 
                                                 
8 Genesis 2: 4 – 8 (RSV) 
9 Begrich, G., Menschwürde im jüdisch-christlichen Dialog, In: Brose, T. & Lutz-Bachmann, M. (Hrsg.),  
  Umstrittene Menschenwürde: Beitrage zur ethischen Debatte der Gegenwart, Berlin: Morus Verlag, 1994, 106 
10 Ibid. 
 209
interpretation leads to the placing of more emphasis in the expression that the human person 
was created ‘in the likeness of God’ than ‘in the image of God’. The reason for this emphasis 
is to direct more attention to the obligations that are expected from the person, even though 
we have asserted that the non-fullfilment of these obligations does not deprive the person of 
dignity. 
 
The New Catechism of the Catholic Church corroborates the Biblical story of creation of the 
human person and asserts that ‘the dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the 
image and likeness of God; it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine beatitude’.11 With this 
passage from the Catechism a new perspective is introduced in the understanding of the 
dignity of the human person as that which ‘shines forth in the communion of persons, in the 
likeness of the union of the divine persons among themselves’.12 Following this dimension, 
the ‘likeness of God’ concerns more the spiritual aspect of the human person than the material 
aspect, even though the human being is a unit that cannot be separated. But what is often 
meant with the expression that man/woman is ‘created in the likeness of God’ is the inherent 
capacity for moral decisions coupled with rationality and freedom. It is the capacity which is 
able to transform similitudo Dei into capax Dei. The human person is not only a likeness of 
God, he/she is capable of God. This does not, however, mean that the human person out of 
pride strives to be like God as it is recorded in the account of the fall of our first parents, 
where the serpent told them that they would be like God if they ate the forbidden fruit. On the 
contrary, it is to be understood in the sense of being ‘perfect as our heavenly father is perfect’.  
 
The dignity of the human person theologically considered obliges him/her to treat not only 
his/her fellow human beings, but also the animals and the whole of creation with respect. In 
this way every man/woman demonstrates his/her dignity which is rooted in his/her creation in 
the likeness of God. A rabbinic tradition narrates a legend according to which Moses was 
called by God because He had seen how tenderly he took care of the sheep entrusted to him; 
for whoever could show such affection to the animals would certainly be able to lead the 
people of God out of slavery from Egypt. 
 
St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes among three forms of dignity proper to the human person. 
The first is the dignity human beings have by virtue of being made in the image and likeness 
of God. In other words by simply belonging to the human family, every human person has 
                                                 
11 CCC, 1700 
12 CCC, 1702 
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this dignity as explained earlier in this section.  The second is the dignity that they have as 
beings who know and love God by conforming to his grace, but in an imperfect way as 
sojourners in this life. At this level every human person by virtue of being endowed with 
dignity has the duty to fulfill the obligations which the status demands of him/her. Both 
his/her decisions and actions are expected to correspond to his/her dignity, which is the 
foundation, agere sequitur esse. Lastly, there is the dignity of the human person as a being 
now living in complete union with God, and this is the dignity of the blessed.13 The three 
distinctions of dignity could better be understood when we realise that Aquinas’ concept of 
ethics is essentially bound to theology as demonstrated in his famous theological work, 
Summa Theologica. This opus magnum is divided into three parts.14 The first deals with God 
as the origin of all things; the second concentrates on human acts by which rational creatures 
turn to God; while the third focuses on Christ and the sacraments, which provide a means to 
attain the third form of dignity. Karol Wojtyla writes that “because of this dignity a human 
person is a good toward which the only adequate response is love”.15 The theme of love as an 
adequate response to the dignity of the human person was continued by him as Pope John 
Paul II in his Encyclical, “Redemptor hominis”, where he argued that man/woman is a being 
that is love-oriented, such that without the real experience of love and without his/her loving 
himself/herself is unable to find himself/herself and so remains a puzzle to himself/herself. 
The perfect form of this love is clearly depicted in the life of the son of God. 
 
The most radical and intimate love of God made manifest in Jesus’ saving mission is that 
which reveals man/woman to himself/herself. This is the human dimension of the mystery of 
salvation, and in this dimension the human person discovers the greatness, the dignity and the 
worth which is fundamentally united with his/her being human.16 To see the human being 
through the eyes of Christ, the encyclical continues, reveals those things which are deeply 
human such as the search for the truth, the unquenchable thirst for the good, the hunger for 
freedom, the desire for beauty and the internal voice of conscience.17 These are the  human 
values that form the basis of Christian anthropology and are indispensable for living together 
in the society, as John Paul II clearly said.  
 
                                                 
13 STh, I-II, q. 93. a. 4 
14 Pope, J. S. (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas, Washington D. C: Georgetown University Press, 2002, 30 
15 Wojtyla, K., Love and Responsibility, trans. by W. Willelts, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1981, 412 
16 Redemptor Hominis, 10 
17 RH, 18 
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Two factors are essential for the discussion of the theme human dignity, viz reason and 
freedom, but dignity cannot be reduced to either of them. We shall now consider the 
relationship between reason and freedom on the one hand and the dignity of the human person 
on the other, as echoed in the philosophical traditions of the various ages. Next, we shall try to 
demonstrate the possible moral consequences of identifying human dignity with reason and 
freedom. Of course, it is pertinent to underline the central position which reason and freedom 
occupy in the discussion of human dignity, but we equally know that the human person has 
different phases of development, during some of which the existence of reason and freedom 
are not clearly demonstrable, although they are latent. Besides, the human person may be 
impaired in his/her actions as a rational and free being, but this does not destroy the dignity. 
Then, there are other philosophical approaches that consider the human person as completely 
determined, in the sense that human activities are considered purely dependent on biological 
stimulation of the neurons and the entire nervous system.  
 
6. 1. 2    The Philosophical Arguments from Reason and Freedom 
 
The point of departure for the philosophical arguments for the dignity of the human person is 
the understanding of man/woman as a free and rational being, animal rationalis. The 
background for this understanding is the capacity which the human being has to organise 
his/her life based on personal decisions. This singular ability is clearly demonstrated in the 
organisation of human society. Since its beginning among the ancient Greeks, philosophical 
ethics has taught that the possession of reason, and the fact that all his/her actions are 
rationally determined, is that which distinguishes the human person from all other animals. 
Thus, Socrates (470-399 B.C.E) describes the principle of action according to reason as the 
highest form of morality. He went further to assert that he would follow reason or wisdom, 
and consequently dissociated himself from the status quo of simply acting according to 
tradition or obeying the biological drives. Socrates would later interpret the injunction from 
the Delphic Oracle, ‘man know thyself’, as the admonition to act in accordance with reason. 
The possession of reason, and freedom became for him the unique and peculiar property by 
which the human person18 is to realise himself/herself through his/her actions. This is not to 
be understood as a form of individualism, since for Socrates and his contemporaries the 
highest good was to be found in the laws of the city-state (polis).  
                                                 
18 Rager, G.(Hrsg), Beginn, Personalität und Würde des Menschen, Band 32, Freiburg/München: Karl Aber  
   Verlag, 2009, 343  
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Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.), who raised ethics to the status of an independent philosophical 
discipline19, arguing along the same lines as Socrates maintained that what distinguishes the 
human person from other living beings is not only that he/she lives, but that he/she has the 
capacity to organise his/her life to attain an end. This end, which for Aristotle, is the same as 
the Good is happiness. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he dealt extensively not only with the 
nature of the end to which every human action is directed, but equally with the fact that the 
human person is equipped by nature to strive to that end, he called eudamonia (happiness). 
With the help of reason the human person is able to know what is essential for his/her life and 
then aided by freedom he/she would be able to make the right choice and execute it, all with 
the aim of attaining his/her end, telos. Otfried Höffe points out that Aristotles’ teleological 
ethics is sometimes confused with Utilitarianism in the modern ethical debates. Jeremy 
Bentham and John Stuart Mill, the proponents of this theory hold that the goal of every human 
endeavour is to maximize pleasure for the greatest number of people. Aristotles’ eudamonia 
cannot be equated to Utilitarianism, the tenets of which was later contrasted by Kant’s 
deontological ethics.20 Despite the difficulties that arise in interpreting and contextualizing the 
Nicomachean ethics in our contemporary epoch, the ethical legacy of Aristotle, more 
especially as it concerns the hierarchy of good/goal, has to be acknowledged. 
 
Freedom (eleutheria), according to Aristotle, is central to life in the Polis, where the good of 
the city should be protected by every citizen. Paradoxically, the city of Athens at the time of 
Aristotle had both free citizens and slaves. The co-existence of slaves and free men was not 
considered a problem at the time, because most of such cases was based on agreement. Could 
this mean that there are two forms of dignity, namely the dignity of the free citizen and the 
dignity of the slave? Can one really talk of the freedom of the slave? Of course, to talk of the 
dignity of the slave is self-contradictory, since freedom is the basis of human dignity. On the 
other hand it is not plausible to argue that a slave has no dignity as a person. This has often 
led to the evaluation of Aristotle’s doctrine of freedom as mainly political freedom which had 
little to say about freedom of the will, which is metaphysical.   
 
It was the Stoic philosophers who later conceived the normative status of the human person as 
essentially constituted in his/her rational nature. The two important principles of this rational 
nature are the principle of ought/duty (Kathekon) and the principle of conscience (Syneidesis), 
which should give human actions their unique and peculiar characteristic even though they are 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 344 
20 Höffe, O. (Hrsg.), Aristoteles: Die Nikomachische Ethik, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995, 7 
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sometimes subject to error. It is, however, not clear how this position is to be reconciled with 
the Stoics’ teaching on determinism.  
 
It was, nonetheless, in consideration of the Stoics’ understanding of the inherently rational 
nature of man and the ability to fulfill his/her duty in accordance with his/her conscience that 
influenced Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.) to first make use of the term ‘dignitas’ not only, “um im 
traditionellen Sinn die Würde zu bezeichnen, die einem Menschen aufgrund des sozialen 
Ranges zukommt, den er erworben hat, sondern um die herausragende Stellung (excellentia) 
zu kennzeichnen, die dem Menschen kraft seiner Natur innerhalb des Kosmos eignet“21. For 
the first time among the ancient thinkers there is an explicit reference to  dignity as something 
valid for all human persons with no conditions attached. 
 
Thomas Aquinas as we already pointed out above, conceives the dignity of the human person 
as closely connected to freedom, which for him is fulfilled in law, more precisely the natural 
law – lex naturalis. For Aquinas, the natural law is the form of participation in the eternal law 
peculiar to human persons as rational beings. Human act, actus humanus, is possible because 
the human person is free, argues Aquinas. 22  However, he recognises the fact that the 
instinctus naturae and the instinctus gratiae can affect human willing directly, according to 
the nature of the will.23  Aquinas’ position on the freedom of the will and the effects of 
original sin is a synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Augustinian tradition, even though 
his position is moderate when compared to that of Augustine24. The summary of Aquinas’ 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 345 
22 Aquinas, T., STh, I-II, 1c. Cf. also Baumann, K., The Concept of Human Acts Revisited: St. Thomas and the  
    Unconscious in Freedom, In: Gregorianum 80, 1, 1999, 147 – 171  
23 Ibid., I-II, 6, 1 ad 3, 9, 6; 10, 4 
24 Augustine taught that the sin of Adam affected the human will so gravely that man/woman is incapable of  
   choosing the good without the grace of God. According to him original sin destroyed human nature  
   completely and enslaved the will to the extent that there is no other remedy except from God. This position of  
   sparked off controversy as to what role freedom can play in the activities of man. For if the fate of man/woman  
   is completely determined by God, then the concept of free will is irrelevant, but if he/she is able to choose what  
   he/she wants and strives to realise it, then the freedom of the will was not completely destroyed by original sin.  
   To resolve this problem, Augustine distinguished between liberum arbitrium (freedom of choice) and libertas. 
   While the former was not destroyed by original sin as man/woman still exercised his/her of choice in daily life, 
   the latter, libertas, which consists in man/woman’s affirmation of his/her origin in God, who is love, was  
   lost through sin. The fallen man/woman, the sinner, no longer does anything out of love but of selfish interest. 
  The only way out of this situation is the grace of God. Pelagius, who continued this line of thought from  
  Augustine, while acknowledging the distinction between liberum arbitrium and libertas, argued that libertas  
  was not concerned with man/woman’s relationship to God, but was to be understood as simply the embodiment 
  of human nature. It is possible for the human person to will and to become that which according to nature 
  he/she should be. In any case Pelagius did not explain further what this nature consists in. Cf. also the debate  
  between Erasmus, the humanist, in his ‘De libero arbitrio’ and Luther, the theologian and reformer, in his ‘De  
  servo arbitrio’. 
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concept of freedom is based on the principle that the human person from nature strives 
towards the good. This could be interpreted as part of his heritage from the classical 
philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, where the whole of nature is designated as acting towards 
an end (telos). For Aquinas, every living thing from its nature strives towards its bonum 
conveniens. What characterises the human being in his/her striving to attain that end is the 
intellectual knowledge, the ratio, whose formal object is the common good. Freedom 
therefore does not mean arbitrariness but is realised in the ordered pursuit of the good 
enlightened by reason. Laws are made to protect the common good from individual arbitrary 
acts, which are an abuse of freedom. Aquinas talks in this regard of ‘regula et mensura’25. 
Reason plays a very crucial role in freedom, because it points out the means to be chosen so 
as to attain the summum bonum, which is equally the finis ultimus. Thus a man/woman whose 
free choice and actions are guided by reason fulfills his/her dignity and ultimately attains 
his/her goal. Two main objections could be raised against Aquinas’ teleological ethics: One is 
the notion that the human person is by nature conditioned to strive after the good, which does 
not leave much room for freedom. The other is the futuristic comprehension of the goal of 
ethical acts leading to a form of ‘postponed transcendental utilitarianism’. It is difficult to 
generalize this form of teaching in our fast-moving and multi-cultural world. Nevertheless, we 
have to underscore the position of Aquinas on the common good, for the protection of which 
laws are made. Laws, nomos, are not opposed to freedom, but help to guide and direct 
freedom from arbitrariness, since laws for Aquinas are the ordinances of reason for the 
common good promulgated by one who has authority. Freedom simply put is the freedom to 
do good. This for Aquinas is founded in God, who, 
                                                
 
                ...als die erste Ursache aus göttlicher Freiheit uns in unsere menschliche Freiheit 
                 versetzt, seine Geschöpfe „freigegeben“ hat und zugleich das letzte notwendige 
                 immer und in allem angestrebte Ziel unseres Wollens und Handelns, daher auch 
                 die letzte Norm für unsere freie Wahl der Mittel zum Ziel ist.26  
 
This corroborates the thomistic understanding of the dignity of the human person, as already 
discussed above, which finds its fullfilment in the life of the blessed. On the question of what 
could be taken as a common basis in a discussion with people who do not share the same 
belief like the pagans and the muslims, Aquinas observed that since there is no common 
ground for discussion in the area of faith, what remains as the basis for dialogue becomes then 
 
25 Ibid., STh. I-II, 90, 1c 
26 Coreth, E., Vom Sinn der Freiheit, Innsbruck – Wien: Tyrolia Verlag, 1985, 50 
 215
the general notion of man/woman as a rational being from nature 27 . And nature here is 
understood as “constituted in a teleological sense, oriented towards an end, designed in 
keeping with a plan and definition”28 It is partly this interpretation of nature that altered the 
direction of the debate on human freedom in the modern and post-modern periods. Equipped 
with such philosophical systems as rationalism, empiricism, idealism, existentialism and the 
enlightenment project – which demanded unlimited freedom of reason on the one hand, the 
modern and post-modern era broke away from the traditions of the medieval age in its 
understanding of freedom. Internal freedom, otherwise called subjective freedom or freedom 
of the will was questioned owing to the triumph of natural science that conceived the world 
and man as reducible to mathematical entity. On the other hand, external or objective freedom 
gained acceptance in social and political structures. The concept of freedom became more 
abstract, having no more connections with concrete situations. Hence ethical, social and 
political norms were regarded as binding and therefore opposed to human freedom. Without 
intending to stretch the historical discussion further, it suffices to briefly highlight the 
positions of Locke and Kant as key figures on these polarities as they pertain to the central 
theme of our investigation. The reason for selecting John Locke and Immanuel Kant for 
separate discussion in this work is to show the two aspects of looking at freedom, which are 
relevant for the interrelationship of persons in the society. Locke represents what I may 
describe as the outward form of freedom of every individual living in a society where other 
individuals are found. What this means is that in pursuing my goal, care should be taken to 
see that I do not harm others or prevent them from pursuing their individual goals. Moreover, 
the pursuit of my individual goal should not take precedence over the common good. Since it 
is not always easy to act in this way, Locke opined that Laws be used to check abuses in this 
regard. Kant, on the other hand stands for the inward form of freedom. By this I mean that 
ability of the individual, assisted by education, to come an awareness of his/her dignity as a 
person, who is expected to act according to his/her conscience and at the same time to 
acknowledge same in the other person. Here we recount the two things that fill Kant with awe, 
the starry heavens and the voice within. Thus, the ideas of the two philosophers, if put into 
practice could help to alleviate poverty by demanding a just distribution of goods and prevent 
violence by reciprocally acknowledging the worth and uniqueness of every person in the Sub-
Saharan Africa. What now follows is a brief survey of the doctrine of Lock and Kant on the 
subject of freedom and dignity, and the corresponding basic human rights. 
                                                 
27 Aquinas, T., De Veritate, quaestio 18, art. 6ff 
28 Schockenhoff, E., Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in an Historical World, trans. by Brian  
    McNeil, Washington, D. C: Catholic University of America Press, 2003, 4 
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(a)  John Locke (1632 – 1704)  
The English philosopher, John Locke introduced the concept of ‘person’ into the discussion of 
freedom and human dignity at the beginning of the modern era. Locke maintained that morals 
and rights are to be understood as referring to acts which are determined by laws. In other 
words, the subject to which a moral or legal act could be attributed is that being that can 
consciously initiate its own actions and which could be held responsible by law for the same 
actions. It is only the human person that qualifies as such a being. According to Locke, to say 
that the moral subject is a person is to say that he/she is capable of acting freely and 
consciously and being held responsible for his or her actions. It is in this perspective that the 
human person is said to be free. Self-consciousness plays a very central role in the Lockean 
understanding of person and dignity. Parting ways with the traditional notion of substance, 
Locke described the term ‘self’ which he sometimes uses in place of ‘person’ as, “that 
conscious thinking thing which is sensible, or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of 
happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as consciousness extends”. 29  
Personal identity and hence dignity for him is founded on consciousness and not on the 
traditional concept of substance of either the soul or the body. And this consciousness is 
nothing other than the repeated self-identification of oneself.30 It is as Hans-Georg Gadamer 
says, a distinguishing of oneself from oneself.31 The dignity of the human person, in the 
context of the foregoing analysis, consists in the fact that being equipped with reason, 
consciousness, memory and concern for the future, it serves as a basis for all men/women 
having the same interest on their future happiness and striving towards it.32  
 
The influence of his father, who was a country lawyer and a captain in the Army, can be seen 
in Locke’s use of legal terms, especially with reference to the status of the person. It has to be 
pointed out that the emphasis on self-consciousness as the core of the human person and 
therefore of his/her dignity is very restrictive. Going by this measure, a part of humanity is by 
implication denied human dignity, because of an absence of self-consciousness either because 
these persons are not fully developed or because they are deprived of their dignity through 
sickness. What then is the status of the unborn, the mentally deranged and the aged suffering 
dementia? Are they no more to be considered as human persons? Besides, Locke failed to 
account for how two different states of consciousness in the same person can be evaluated, as 
                                                 
29 Locke, J., An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) edited by Roger Woolhouse, New York:  
    Penguin Books, 1997, 307  
30 Ibid., 308 
31 Gadamer, H. G., Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1965, 239 
32 Rager, G., op. cit. 349 
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in the case of sleep or accident, which temporally deprives one of one’s consciousness. 
However, we have to understand the context of Locke’s liberal thought, which was mainly to 
oppose authoritarianism, both on the level of the individual person (his father, for example) 
and on the institutional level. Furthermore, he wrote to explain the nature of the civil society, 
which unlike the Hobbesian state of nature, provided man/woman the favourable conditions to 
freely pursue life, health, possession which constitute the basic rights. His thoughts, according 
to some authors contributed to the birth of the Enlightenment and shaped its ideals especially 
with reference to socio-political organisation. Locke elevated the role of Law as a necessary 
instrument in keeping the society together. What this means is that the first step towards the 
prevention of violence in any society is to have good and enforcable laws. The same can also 
help in forestalling corruption and oppression which give rise to poverty. Sub-Saharan Africa 
has much to learn from Locke with reference to the making of just and enforcable laws. But 
since laws alone cannot keep a society together without proper education for the citizens to 
realize the need for peaceful co-existence, it is imperative to help the individual in the process 
of self development. It here that we shall explore the contributions of Kant.  
 
(b)  Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) 
Kant’s understanding of freedom and hence of the dignity of the human person is based on the 
individual’s ability to respect the humanity which is found in every person. Hence his 
formulation of the imperative that this humanity, whether in one’s person or in that of the 
other, should never be treated as a means but an as end. In other words, the freedom with 
which the human person is endowed  demands that he/she uses it to do good. Like Locke, 
Kant made use of the concept of the person as a subject of rights to elaborate his teachings on 
freedom. In the introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, he writes of the Person as the 
subject to whom actions could be attributed as one capable, whereas moral person is the 
freedom of a rational being subjected to moral laws. But the said laws are not external laws, 
rather they are generated by the subject itself. It is a fact of reason and an intellectual certainty 
that every human person has a claim to or at least feels a certain sense of moral obligation. 
Freedom for Kant is freedom only if it is conceived as the fundamental self-determination of 
the will. Self-determination of the will means that one does not allow one’s will to be 
determined by anything other than reason. 
 
By elevating self-determination or autonomy of the will above heteronomy, Kant charts a new 
course for the understanding of freedom. Kant ascribes the autonomy of the will to that aspect 
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of reality which he designates as the Noumenon, otherwise called thing-in-itself. Unlike the 
Phaenomenon, the thing-as-it-appears to us, the noumenon is not subject to the physical laws 
of necessity. It is so to speak a law unto itself, but never to be regarded as arbitrary. 
Consequently, Kant argues that we can attribute freedom only to things-in-themselves, not to 
things as they appear. So, given the arguments that we must think of ourselves as free, we 
have to suppose that we are free as long as we are ‘in ourselves’ but at the same time subject 
to empirical causation as ‘appearances’.33 Reason is what constitutes the human noumenon. 
And since reason is required if we are to be able to derive actions from laws, the will is 
nothing else than practical reason, not speculative reason. This postulation, which conceives 
human freedom as transcendental as introduced by Kant, has its merit in the fact that it is not 
conditioned by anything not even the object of the will. In this way, the human person as 
Zweck an sich selbst (end in itself) is rescued from discrimination based on social status. 
Furthermore, the arguments of Kant in favour of freedom put to rest the long debate on 
freedom and determinism. 
 
However, by attributing freedom only to the noumenon, the intelligible world, Kant created 
an unabridgeable gap between the intelligible world and the experiential world. It is more or 
less a revival of the Platonic world of ideas which Aristotle attempted to resolve through his 
matter and form doctrine. Descartes then brought this back in the duality of res cogitans and 
res extensa. For this position, Kant’s concept of freedom has been criticised as transcendental 
and almost unrealisable. Besides, the great emphasis placed on self-determination and 
autonomy of the will leaves no room for the manifestation of heteronomy as experienced in 
the upbringing of children and the legal organisation of the society and its institutions. Thus 
laws, morality and the state are perceived as limitations to freedom. Hegel for whom freedom 
is “Bei-sich-sein”34 criticises this assertion and opines that freedom which is limited by law, 
morality and the state cannot be freedom but arbitrariness. Since spirit and freedom, reason 
and freedom are the same, freedom is essentially reasonable freedom. Law and morality, 
Hegel maintains, cannot be limitations to freedom, but favourable conditions for its realisation. 
It is interesting to note how he distinguishes two aspects of freedom that,“der Mensch an-sich 
ist frei, doch muss er ‘für sich’ frei werden”. The one is a precondition for the other. The laws 
of the state guarantee the freedom of the individual in the second sense by helping to check 
                                                 
33 Kant, I., Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals transl. by Thomas E. Hill Jr. and Arnulf Zweig,  
    New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 143 
34 Hegel recapitulates through this expression the ancient teaching on freedom which goes back to  
   Aristotles’ hautou heneka (to be what one is), Thomas’ in seipsum (self-possession), Descartes’ cogito ego  
    sum (I think therefore I am) to Kants’ Zweck an sich selbst (End in itself). 
 219
arbitrariness in society. Hegel’s absolute spirit, in any case, has no space for individual 
freedom and can only lead to totalitarianism. 
 
The contemporary philosophical debate on the freedom of the human person and hence of 
his/her dignity does not only have to contend with opposing philosophical systems such as 
materialism and evolutionism35 but also with the findings of neuro-psychology, molecular 
biology and genetic engineering. According to these branches of study and new research36, 
the hitherto accepted truths about the human person like freedom, ratio, conscience, etc are 
reducible to neuronal processes of the human person; hence the concept of dignity is obsolete 
and irrelevant since it cannot be scientifically established. Although this work does not intend 
to explore these areas as they fall outside the scope of our investigation, it should be stated 
that the consequences of such relativism can be dangerous for human society. To permit the 
use of human embryos for research, the cloning of animals and humans, the eugenic selection 
of humans and is undue inteference with the nature and dignity of the human person. This can 
only lead to what Karl Polanyi described as the transformation of the human society into a 
market society. Scientific research is to be promoted, but limits have to be set if the integrity 
of the human person is to be assured. The human person is more than the sum of its parts. 
In concluding this section, we underline the necessity of good laws if the countries of Sub-
Saharan Africa have to stop the looting of their resources by a few and if the prevalent cases 
of violent conflicts must be controlled.  
 
6.  2  The Dignity of the Human Person and the Social Questions 
 
Human society is the arena where the dignity of the human person is acknowledged or 
disregarded, protected or abused, defended or violated. It is not relevant here to delve into the 
theories of the origin of human society. However, it is an existential fact that the capacity to 
live in a society is central to the dignity of the human person. Hence, the Aristotelian dictum 
that whoever is incapable of living in a society is either a god or a beast; the one because he is 
self-sufficient and lacks nothing, the other because he is irrational and cannot form an 
                                                 
35 Materialism as a philosophical system holds that everything is matter and that there is only material reality.  
    The human person is constituted of the same elements as other material things in the world and is subjected  
    to the same physical laws. Materialism gave rise to other systems such as positivism championed by Auguste 
    Comte (1798 – 1857) and evolutionism of Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882), which served as a bridge between  
    spirit and matter and led to another revolution of the image of man. 
36 The Libet Experiment which demonstrates that the decision to act in a particular way is determined in the  
    brain half a second before the action is consciously ratified. In other words, what appears as a process of  
    decision making is nothing more than a confirmation of what has already been decided physically. 
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association. Of course we know that some lower animals form an organised society with well-
planned and assigned roles, but that does not make them a human society. They are simply 
being driven by instinct and not reason. Besides, none of them could, like the human person in 
the society, assert itself by saying, “I am”. The human person is the only creature endowed 
with the capacity for self-assertion and self-transcendence, and can thereby enter into 
association with his/her likes. The dignity of the human person is at the centre of social life. 
The society does not confer this dignity, rather it has the duty to acknowledge and safeguard it.  
 
According to Pius XI, each human being is called by God to become a member of the human 
society. As a means for the self-realisation of the human being, society should be the 
promoter of human values so that the human being can be assisted by the society to reach his 
or her purpose in life37. There is no human society without human persons. And the continued 
existence of every human society is dependent on the continued existence of the human 
persons. The society helps to form the human persons and the human persons build the 
society. It is this reciprocity that guarantees a stable society. 
 
To be able to fulfill its role, the society is consists of institutions (political, economic, social, 
cultural, etc,) whose goal is the achievement of human development by promoting the 
common good. Experience, however, shows that this does not always function harmoniously 
as the struggle to control the institutions and the distribution of goods and opportunities 
creates tension between groups, and between individuals and institutions. The pastoral 
constitution of the Church in the modern world sees the human struggle in our contemporary 
society as a struggle for the formation of a new humanity in social life. It bemoans the 
imbalance between the claims of group living and the needs of individual reflection and 
contemplation.38 The human person as an individual and as a member of society craves a life 
that is full, autonomous, and worthy of his/her nature and dignity as a human being; he/she 
longs to harness for his/her own welfare the immense resources of the modern world39 so that 
the society in which he/she finds himself/herself can create the proper conditions.  
 
But the moral question of how one should conduct oneself in the face of loss or deprivation of 
social goods remains controversial. Since the dignity of the human person flows from God 
and to do good is to act in accordance with this dignity, it is much more the one who does evil 
                                                 
37 Acta Apostolica Sedis (AAS), 29 (1973) 79 – 80  
38 Gaudium et Spes n. 8 
39 Ibid., 9 
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that tarnishes his/her God-given dignity than the one who suffers it. The story of the biblical 
Job provides some lessons as to what should be the proper attitude for the Christian when 
confronted with the loss of material goods. However, it is pertinent to point out that the case 
of Job was not as a result of social imbalance or deprivation. But the bottom line is that he 
suffered loss of health and property, which is at the heart of social questions. 
 
6. 2. 1.  Suffering and Dignity: Lessons from the Story of Job 
 
There are two versions of the story of Job or rather two parts of the same story. The first part 
of the story is that commonly referred to as the ‘Testament of Job’ in the Hellenistic-Jewish 
context in the first century before the Christian era. In this work, an effort is made to provide 
an explanation for the suffering of Job, namely that he pulled down the temple of an idol 
when he was a king. The suffering of Job described in the canonical book of Job is understood 
then as a revenge to this act of “desecration”. What is significant in the first version, that is 
the testament of Job, is that an angel warns Job in advance of the trouble that he will bring 
upon himself, if he tears down the temple, but also promises retribution at the “consummation 
of the age” (4:7-11). Job responds by affirming, “till death I will endure. I will not step back 
at all” (5:1). Unlike his canonical counterpart, this Job gives expression to the view that, as a 
righteous man, there awaits for him in the next life a reward that will more than compensate 
him for his losses in this life (18:8; 33:3-9).40 From a lay perspective, the testament of Job 
seems to be in conformity with what one could expect in an ordinary life situation. It is easier 
to imagine a man suffering so grievously for doing something, no matter how insignificant, 
than for doing nothing. However, our study is based on the canonical Job, who is presented as 
having suffered innocently. Let us now see how the background and motif of the story 
influenced its canonisation. 
 
The Bible begins the story of Job thus: “There was once a man in the land of Uz called Job: a 
sound and honest man who feared God and shunned evil.”41 Without intending to go into the 
biblical exegesis of this first sentence and the entire story, it is pertinent to note that Job’s 
place of birth is located outside the territory of Israel. Uz is found somewhere south of Edom 
(Gen. 36:28), and here are to be found the Edomites who are the descendants of Esau, the 
twin brother and enemy of Jacob, therefore of Israel. In this sense the story is supposed to be a 
                                                 
40 Smith, B. D., Paul’s Seven Explanations of the Suffering of the Righteous, New York: Peter Lang, 2002, 20 
41 Job 1:1 (Jerusalem Bible) 
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lesson for the Israelites. It could have also been that the author wanted to present a pagan in a 
good light, as in the story of the good Samaritan (Lk. 10:29). Like his place of birth, the name 
Job (‘iyyob) is found in various forms outside of Israel. It probably means, “where is my 
father”42 which to the ears of an Israelite sounds similar to ‘oyeb’ which means “enemy”.43 
But since the name of a person is not considered as important as that of his fatherland, the 
location of the place of birth of Job outside the territory of Israel gives the story universal 
validity. This point is crucial to our understanding of the problem of the suffering of the 
innocent and the proper psycho-social attitude to it. 
 
The second part of the verse describes Job as “a sound and honest man, who feared God and 
shunned evil”(1:1b). Barry Smith writes that the term ‘righteous’( tam) is used to designate a 
person who habitually obeys God. Although not perfect, the righteous at least wholeheartedly 
strives to be so.44 This recalls another Biblical saying that the righteous man falls seven times 
a day, but from his sins the Lord delivers him.45  In addition to being called “a man of 
integrity” – a description that emphasizes the internal coherence of his personality – Job is 
also said to be “honest” (yashar).46 With these religious and ethical profiles, Job’s innocence 
in relation to God and to his fellow human beings is confirmed. 
 
The text went further to describe Job as a man of great wealth. There is a nexus between the 
integrity of Job, his fear of God, and his opulence. The psalmist similarly says: “How happy is 
he who fears the Lord...he will have riches and wealth in his house”. 47  It is therefore 
remarkable to note how Job during his suffering maintained his integrity even though he lost 
his wealth. His integrity is independent of his wealth. 
 
There are two scenes to the real temptation of Job. The first scene takes place in the heavenly 
court, where the plot is agreed on; and the other is on earth, where the execution of the plot 
takes place. It is God who announces that Job is a different man from all others, of whom he 
is proud. Satan48, a name which means accuser, objects to the motives of Job’s works, which 
                                                 
42 Schökel, L. A. Diaz, J. L. S., Giobbe, Commento teologico e letterario, Roma: Edizioni Borla, 1985, 112 
43 Ibid., 112 
44 Smith, B. D., op. cit. 3 
45 Prov. 24: 16 
46 Gutierrez, G., On Job: God-talk and the Suffering of the Innocent, trans. by Matthew J. O’Connell, New York:  
    Orbis Books, 1987, 4 
47 Psalm 112: 1-3 
48 The Satan is an obstacle, opposition on one’s way to do good. It could be used to refer to the fallen angel also  
    called demon, or to human principle opposed to God’s plan. As far as the story of Job is concerned, Alphonso  
    Schökel observes that il satan non e´ un’ affermazione teologica, bensi un personaggio funzionale nella storia. 
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he says are not for nothing. The author captures in this objection the religious 
Weltanschauung of the time  that was reward-oriented, a view which the friends of Job 
corroborate. God contests this point as far as the person of Job is concerned and gives him 
(Satan) the permission to test Job, saying “all he has is in your power, but keep your hands off 
his person” (1:12). The second scene of the temptation takes place on earth. With the 
conclusion of the dialogue between God and Satan, Job receives the news of the death of his 
sons and daughters and the loss of all his possessions (1:13-19). Job does not reproach God. 
He is the rich man whom Ben Sirach describes as blameless, because he does not go chasing 
after gold (Sir. 31:8). In Job 2:3 God openly proclaims the innocence of Job amid his 
sufferings. He chides Satan for achieving nothing and provoking Him to ruin Job. Satan feels 
that by attacking directly the person of Job, he would win, and again requests permission. 
This permission is now granted. Job falls ill, afflicted with malignant ulcers from the soles of 
his feet to his head, “he sits among the ashes” (2: 7-8). He is now a sick as well as a poor man. 
To the death that is at work in his flesh, there is added social death, for at the time persons 
suffering from incurable illness were cast out of the society. A factor that contributed to this 
attitude was the conviction that poverty and sickness were a punishment for the sins of the 
individual or family.49 
 
Then there was the solidarity visit of the three friends of Job – Eliphaz of Teman, Bildad of 
Shuah, and Zophar of Naamath (2: 12). Their intention was to share in the suffering of their 
friend and render some assistance. They sit with him on the ground for seven days and seven 
nights, but never speak a word. At the end of the seven days and seven nights, it is Job who 
breaks the silence by cursing the day he was born (3:1). Worthy of note is the repeated use of 
the numbers three and seven in the story of Job. Earlier on we read of seven sons and three 
daughters of Job, followed by similar numbers referring to the animals, and lastly the same 
pair of numbers three and seven – three friends, seven days and seven nights. At any rate, the 
numbers three and seven stand for perfection in Biblical numerology. The action of the three 
friends is quite significant. The first step towards assisting one who is suffering is identifying 
with the person’s condition.50 Somehow it is therapeutic, when such gesture like that of the 
three friends elicits some words from the sufferer. The spoken word generally gives one an 
idea of where to begin and what to say. Sometimes those suffering need only the presence of 
friends, fellow human beings, to be able to express their grief. An unexpressed grief can lead 
                                                                                                                                                        
    (Schökel, L. A. Diaz, J. L. S., op. cit.116) 
49 Gutierrez, G., op. cit., 10. 
50 Cf., Matt. 25: 35 – 40. 
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to depression. When grief is given expression, the problem is to some degree resolved. This is 
the phase in which suffering finds a language of pain and lament, according to Dorothee 
Soelle. For as one begins to speak, to emerge from passivity and utter helplessness, the 
isolation is gradually broken.51 It is a step towards the integration of what cannot be changed. 
The social teaching of the Church lays great emphasis on the need to show solidarity with the 
suffering and disadvantaged. This may include, but is not confined to material help, as the 
three friends of Job demonstrated in the foregoing story. 
 
From Job, we learn the proper attitude to the transient things of this world. The text presents 
him as a righteous and prosperous man. In other words, his wealth came solely as a result of 
his industry was not a product of deceit. He was an upright man, but still had to suffer. Instead 
of cursing the Lord, he praised him, “...Jahweh gave, Jahweh has taken back, blessed be the 
name of Jahweh” (1:21). The undeserved suffering of Job is not the last instance of such 
suffering. All of human history is replete with cases of undeserved suffering. And not only is 
that to be found in the pages of history, but are recurrent issues of the human society. The 
drama of Job, unfortunately, is continuously replayed. It comes in various forms and evokes a 
cry of lament that no moral person desires to hear but which no moral person can ignore. 
Whether it is the everyday violation of human rights, murder, the gory experience of the slave 
trade, the torture that we find so blameworthy in the Jewish holocaust of World War II, the 
humilition of races regarded as inferior, discrimination against women, especially women 
who are poor, sytematic social injustice, a persistently high rate of infant mortality, exiles and 
refugees, terrorism of every kind52 – the person of Job comes to mind. However, Job reminds 
us that suffering whether personal or social should not be an excuse for doing evil. Eye for 
eye makes the world blind sang a popular musician some decades ago. 
 
Furthermore, the patience of Job may be relevant to a fast-moving society that wants to see 
the positive result of everything hic et nunc. The need to wait for God’s kairos is important in 
every condition of suffering. This point is missed by most of the people who suffer. The 
immediate situation beclouds reason and makes it impossible to project into the future. It 
becomes difficult to think of the silver lining that is to found behind every cloud, or to accept 
the reality that the night is followed by the day, and that Good Friday if is followed by Easter 
                                                 
51 Newsom, A. C., The book of Job, In: The New Interpreter’s Bible: A Commentary in Twelve Volumes, vol. 4, 
    Nashville: Abingdon, 1996, 372. 
52 Gutierrez, G., op. cit., 102. 
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Sunday. That the predicament was not the end of Job’s story is described in the final verses of 
the book of Job (42:7 – 17). God redoubled Job’s lost riches and restored his health. 
 
6. 2. 2  Dignity and the Social Teachings of the Church 
 
The Church teaches that the dignity of the human person, as we have shown above, is rooted 
in the fact of his/her creation in the image and likeness of God, and that the human person 
realizes this dignity to the extent he/she reflects the image of God in all his/her doings here on 
earth, since the goal of all his/her endeavours is to be with God, his origin and goal, Herkunft 
und Zukunft (Rahner). However, the social realities sometimes constitute a great hindrance for 
the human person in  his/her bid to lead a life worthy of this dignity. The social teaching of 
the Church therefore, tries to transmit the proper attitude to be adopted in the face of such 
social problems. It attempts to provide answers to such existential questions as to what should 
be the role of a Christian in times of war; how should a Christian in politics conduct 
himself/herself in matters of public interest while keeping his faith; to what extent should a 
Christian trader obey market rules that are incongruent with Christian ethics; is it at all part of 
the mission of the Church to work for the change of economic or political policies in a 
country. 
 
The Church’s response to social questions has followed different patterns in the course of 
history depending on the nature of the social problem peculiar to the period. But in all, it is 
the person and message of Jesus Christ that provide the paradigm. For his part, Jesus offered 
no specific economic or political message; instead he proclaimed the coming of the kingdom 
of God and the redemption of people from sin. The toil and suffering that marked the lives of 
most people, especially the poor, was not the ultimate reality. There was another superior 
reality of grace and redemption, joy and love.53 To the young man who ran to him appealing 
for his intervention in a case of inheritance between him and his brother, Jesus replied, ‘who 
appointed me your judge or the arbitrator of your claims’ (Lk 12: 13). On the other hand, he 
called on his apostles to provide food for the hungry crowd instead of sending them away to 
look for food. He identified himself with the hungry, sick, naked, imprisoned saying that what 
was done to any of these was done to him. This ambiguous legacy on things concerning social 
issues has remained unresolved, hence giving rise to a turbulent life for Christ’s followers. 
We have already devoted a reasonable portion to this theme in the earlier part of this work 
                                                 
53 O’Brien, J. D. and Shannon, A. T., op. cit. 2 
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dealing with poverty. Thus it is not exigent to revisit it here. However, it is important to 
delineate two streams of thought that have polarized Christians as far as social questions are 
concerned. These streams could be referred to as the idealist and the realist camps. 
 
For the idealists, what is expected of Christians is a life of gospel simplicity like that of 
Francis of Assisi, denouncing the things of this world and the arrogance of the rich and 
powerful. They argue that the Church should be discouraged from getting involved in the 
business of the  world, since that is opposed to her mission, namely that of educating 
Christians on their call to an ethic of perfection by the revelation in Christ of a God who is 
love.54 This position rests largely on a view of the experience of the Church in the later 
Middle Ages, was an economic institution of prime importance. The result then was less 
emphasis on the proclamation of the Gospel. 
 
The realists, on the other hand, hold tenaciously to the fact that alleviating the social 
conditions of the people is the very core of the Gospel. To back up their arguments, appeal is 
made to the life of Jesus and the early Christian community, which practiced a heroic ethic of 
uncompromising love, sharing what they had with one another. The problem with this 
position is that it creates the danger of reducing the mission of the Church to social work. 
Consequently, the salvific message is equated to material well-being. This is the error of 
Protestant socialism following the Reformation in Europe and some versions of liberation 
theology in Latin America.  Neither the idealists nor the realists taken separately have 
represented the human person, who is both spirit and flesh, correctly. 
 
Catholic social teaching steers a middle course combining relevant elements from the two 
groups, at the same time guarding against extremism. At the basis of this teaching is the 
principle that individual human beings are the foundation, the cause and the end of every 
social institution. 55  And this principle stems from Christian anthropology, namely that 
man/woman made in the image and likeness of God was raised by the Incarnation to a dignity 
beyond compare such that the Son of Man is in a certain way united to each man/woman.56 
Because of this dignity the human person cannot be treated as an instrument or reduced to an 
anonymous entity in the human society.  
 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 6 
55 John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, 1961 nr. 219 
56 John Paul II, Redemptor Hominis, 1980 nr. 37 
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On the level of praxis, the Church demonstrates solidarity by sharing with the poor and less 
privileged through her charitable organisations, and encourages others to do so. There are 
innumerable centres for justice and peace all over the world established with the goal of 
defending the voiceless and mediating in times of conflict. The poor and the marginalized 
would have certainly been worse off without the Church. Apart from her not unlimited 
resources, which makes it difficult for her to reach all those in need, the Church is prevented 
from operating in some countries. This lack is taken care of by the writings of the Popes, 
which are often in the form of appeals to the secular powers on the need to recognize and 
defend the dignity of human persons especially, the poor and marginalized. The purpose of 
the Papal social encyclicals is inter alia to provide guidance on rights and responsibilities in 
the light of the dignity of the human person. We see this in all the social encyclicals from Leo 
XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891), whose motive was to defend the human right to private 
property as an aspect of dignity expressed in a man’s/woman’s remunerative labour, to 
Benedict XVI’s Caritas in Veritate (2009), which drawing extensively from Paul VI’s 
Populorum Progressio (1967), addressed the truth of the human person as a being created out 
of love and called to love. The catch-words of the encyclical which form the title, love in truth, 
describe the activities of the human person, whether the individual or as a group in the society 
where he/she lives. Even beyond the individual sphere, social institutions be they political, 
economic, scientific or technological, should have it as their obligation to promote the good of 
the whole person.  
 
Benedict XVI in the mentioned encyclical went further to appeal to those responsible for aid 
programs to pay more attention to the training of human resources, which are the true capital 
and the growth of which can guarantee a stable future for the developing countries.57 He 
equally appealled to the developed countries to create economic policies that will make it 
possible for the developing countries to participate in the international markets. The problem 
of the developing countries is to be found in nothing so much as in the connection between 
poverty and unemployment. In many cases, the poor are the result of the infringement on the 
dignity of human labour owing to the limitation of its possibilities, such as unemployment or 
under-employment, which leads to the deprivation of the right and reward of the person and 
his/her person.58 Work59 is an expression of the dignity of the human person in the society, 
                                                 
57 Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, 2009, nr. 58 
58 Ibid., nr. 63 
59 The kind of work meant by the pope is one that is freely chosen, which enables the working man or woman  
    to take part in the development of his/her community, to meet the needs of the family and send his/her  
    children to school. It is a kind of work to which the worker is not forced and which gives the worker sufficient 
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since it is at the same time the expression of the being of each individual man or woman in the 
society. But the Pope warns equally that help should never be limited only to the material 
aspect but should also include the spiritual growth of the person, because the human person is 
a unity of body and soul.60 While appealing for the material assistance of the person, the 
Church primarily occupies herself with the spiritual advancement of the human person. In this 
connection we can understand the often cited statement of the Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) 
of Pergamon that the unique contribution of the Orthodox Church to the European integration 
process is the experience of the Divine Liturgy. For during periods of occupation, which 
resulted in ecclesiastical censorship, educational prohibition and the thwarting of public 
outreach, the Liturgy alone has prevailed as a means for the preservation of the faith and the 
prosperity of the faithful. By preserving the faith, the person is saved, and by prospering the 
faithful, the community is safeguarded.61 What this means is that the support of the state is 
indispensable if dignifying living conditions for the human person are to be created. This 
brings us to the role of the state in the protection of the fundamental human rights. 
 
6. 2. 3   Dignity and the Challenges of Basic Human Rights  
 
One of the most controversial aspects of human dignity in the social context concerns its 
relationship to the basic human rights. This controversy arises on the one hand in tracing the 
foundation of the dignity of man/woman to his/her creation in the image of God in a 
pluralistic society, where the belief system is diversified. On the other hand, there is no 
consensus in many societies on what constitutes the basic human rights, the existence of the 
international human rights organisation notwithstanding. Any discussion on the theme of 
human rights invokes a chain of questions: What does ‘human rights’ really mean? What are 
the components of the rights of the human person and what are not? From what source(s) do 
they derive their force? Are such rights due to every human person irrespective of age, gender, 
social status, colour or creed? Should they be understood as valid at all times and in all places 
or are their interpretations subject to varying and various contexts? What is the relationship 
between human dignity and fundamental human rights in a multi-cultural society? 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
    room to his/her own person, the family and enables him/her to find his/her spiritual roots, guarantees a worthy  
    wage. 
60 Ibid., nr. 76 
61 Dobrijevic´, I., Solidarity and Social Justice: The Mission of the Serbian Orthodox Church Towards European  
    Integration, In: Gabriel, I. and Gassner, F.(Hrsg), Solidarität und Gerechtigkeit, Ökumenische Perspektiven,  
    Stuttgart: Matthias Grünewald-Verlag, 2007, 158 – 173. 
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In discussing the rights of the human person, we are referring to the relationship of the 
individuals to one another and to the society/state. It is a relationship which obliges the state 
both to acknowledge and defend the basic rights of her citizens as individual persons endowed 
with dignity, and to demand that individuals respect such rights reciprocally. The dignity of 
the human person serves therefore as the foundation for such mutual interaction which the 
laws of every independent state are meant to define and safeguard. Although the term human 
dignity has philosophical and theological origins, it is applied legally to designate the 
difference between human beings and other living things in the society. In the words of 
Ronald Dworkin, dignity is a philosophical and theological “concept”, with a legal 
“conception”.62 But whereas philosophy and law can postulate the dignity of man, it is only 
theology that can provide its metaphysical foundation. Thus, to talk of the rights of the human 
person without at the same time alluding to its metaphysical foundation in the dignity of the 
human person is tantamount to a contradictio in adjecto. Without much ado about the 
theological/metaphysical legitimization of human rights, the concrete exercise of the rights of 
the human person is always ladened with a lot of problems the evidence of which are to be 
found in history.  
 
Two positions on individual-state interactions can be delineated. The first is the liberalist 
position that pays much attention to personal rights, according to which the individual must 
not be prevented from exercising his/her rights, but helped to this by the state. This view is 
justified by the argument that the individual predates the state. The second position defends 
the interests and power of the state under the auspices of protecting the common good, at 
times to the detriment of individual rights. The concept of human rights follows these 
positions with the former defending a naturalistic conception of human rights, while the latter 
supports the positivistic outlook.63 It is the tension between these two positions that is the 
subject of human rights which has a long history in theory whose roots are to be found in the 
American and French revolutions of the 18th Century that sought to create national polities 
based on broadly shared human rights. Then later on this attempt to define laws broadly based 
on human rights continued at the international level with the founding of the United Nations 
Organisation in 1945 following the events of  World War II. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights by the United Nations on 10th December, 194864 was to serve as an official 
                                                 
62 Dworkin, R., Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, University of Chicago Law  
    Review 59, 1992, 381 – 432. 
63 The naturalists define human rights as conferred on man by God, founded on divine law and discernible by  
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acknowledgment of the struggle to project liberalism into a realist world – a world dominated 
for several centuries by sovereign states and their collective interests and characterised by 
abuses. Paradoxically, the countries that championed the universal Declaration of human 
rights still have to contend with several cases of human rights violation. Be that as it may, the 
principles contained in the Declaration provide a basis for both interpersonal and inter state- 
relationships that could be applied anywhere in the world. 
 
From an operational perspective, human rights involves the equal protection of individuals as 
well as group rights in a polity. A former U.S. Secretary of State defined human rights in a 
broader context to include: 
  
                -The right to be free of violations of the integrity of the person. Such violations include 
                  torture; cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or 
                  imprisonment. They also include denial of fair public trial, and invasion of the home. 
                  -The right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. 
                  -The right to enjoy civil and political liberties; freedom of thought, religion, assembly, and 
                  speech; freedom of the press; freedom of movement both within and outside one’s country; 
                  and freedom to take part in government.65 
 
 It is remarkable to notice the order in which Vance articulated human rights. To begin with 
the freedom from violations of the integrity of the person, before mentioning the fulfillment of 
vital needs such as food, shelter, health care and education, is of much importance. It shows 
the central role that human dignity, which we can also translate as human integrity plays in 
the application of human rights. The fact that the other person has dignity/integrity like myself 
independent of his/her possessions and/or achievements has to be acknowledged as the basis 
of other rights. Benedict XVI in the already cited encyclical writes in this regard, “I cannot 
                                                                                                                                                        
    Independence Declaration of 1776, and the Bill of Rights of 1791 which was amended nine times in a bid to 
    accommodate the interest of all citizens and all parties. The essential elements of the two documents which  
    were incorporated and elaborated in the universal declaration include the right to life, liberty and the right to  
    strive after happiness. Even with all these modifications and clarifications some countries like China,  
    which not only did not sign, but allowed circa 30 million lives to perish in famine between 1958 and 1962  
    during Mao’s regime in pursuit of state sovereignty (cf., Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: China’s Secret  
    Famine, London: J. Murray, 1996). Despite the criticisms from Asian conutries that there is too much western  
    emphasis on civil and political rights, and not enough attention to the social, cultural and economic aspects of  
    human rights which after all is the commonly agreed end product (cf., David P. Forsythe), there is a new basis  
    for cooperation between the international community and the states which goes beyond war and trade to  
    human rights.  
    
65 Vance, C., Law Day Address on Human Rights, In: Donald P. Kommers and Gilbert D. Loescher (eds.),  
    Human Rights and America Foreign Policy, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 
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give what is mine to the other, without first giving him what pertains to him in justice“.66 To 
this end, Starck articulates the essential duties of the state as comprising the guarantee of 
peace, and the assurance of freedom and social equality.67 Where this fails, the result is what 
President Roosevelt decried, namely that aggression grows out of deprivation and 
persecution.68 It boils down to the fact that the state can only make the living together of 
human persons possible through its laws, since Ubi societas, ibi ius. It is from just laws that 
security arises, from security curiosity and from curiosty knowledge, which leads to 
development. However, the enforcement of the law by the state sometimes conflicts with 
individual human rights and dignity in some regions of the world, like the controversial moral 
issue of torture and capital punishment deployed as a means of protecting the common good. 
 
The next crucial challenge to the issue of human dignity and human rights is the liberal 
concept of rights as a malleable and evolving notion. There is no doubt that new human rights 
norms would have to be adopted and new meanings read into existing documents, as new 
threats to human dignity emerged. By making the cloning of animals possible, science led us 
into a new debate on the ethics of cloning and the corresponding laws. The same thing applied 
to the freezing of sperm and delayed in vitro fertilization of the human egg69 and the most 
current issue of stem-cell research. Threats to human dignity change with time and place. 
International human rights standards, as a means to ensure minimal standards of human 
dignity, change as well. In the midst of the flux on this central question of dignity and human 
rights, there is a process of debate in an effort to retain what is still sound and valid, and to 
make changes as moral and political judgments dictate.70 Here the Church’s position is clear. 
 
Without intending to repeat the position of the Church which we have stated above, it is 
important to underline the fact that for the Church the value of the human dignity cannot be 
compromised for whatever reason. This dignity does not refer to an abstract nature, but to 
concrete or ontological beings that are unique and irreplaceable.71 What this implies for the 
social life of the human person is that he or she must be treated as a human being and never as 
                                                 
66 Caritas in Veritate, nr. 6 
67 Starck, C., Menschenwürde als Verfassungsgarantie im modernen Staat, JZ 36, 1981, 457 – 464, In: Vögele,  
    W., Menschenwürde zwischen Recht und Theologie, Op. Cit., 379. 
68 Townsend, H. and Douglas, B., Friedrich D. Roosevelt and the Creation of the UN, New Haven: Yale  
    University Press, 1997, 56 
69 With reference to which the assertion of the daughter of the blind Seer, Teiresias, in Seneca’s version of the  
    Oedipus tragedy could be applied: Natura versa est, nulla lex utero manet – Nature is distorted, hence the  
    womb is no longer governed by any laws. 
70 Forsythe, P. D., op. cit. 49 
71 Stagman, D., “The Implications for Theology of the Acting Person”, The Thought of Pope John Paul II: A  
    Collection of Essays and Studies (Roma: Editrice Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1993), 216. 
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an object. The human person is and remains the goal of all social activities and the subject of 
the inalienable human rights.72  The dignity of the human person and his/her basic rights 
constitute the central framework of relational experience even in the emergence of a new 
humanism which has given rise to a new social structure and a new anthropology in the 
world.73 The creation of a conducive and humane society is therefore imperative if the dignity 
of the human person is to be realized. This involves not only distributing material things justly, 
but creating opportunities to enable the people to develop themselves and contribute to the 
good of the entire society. Although there may be disparity in the possession of material 
goods within a society as a result of the disparity in the physical and intellectual endownments 
of people, this should not constitute a basis for the violation of the rights of persons. The 
Church cannot preach the Gospel without defending the rights of the human person, because 
human rights flow from human dignity, which is a Gospel value.74 Addressing the Third 
General Conference of the Latin-American Episcopate in Puebla, John Paul II outlined the 
areas where human rights and hence human dignity can be infringed upon thus: 
 
                  Human dignity is infringed on the individual level when due regard is not had 
                    for values such as freedom, the right to profess one’s religion, physical and mental 
                    integrity, the right to essential goods, to life... It is infringed on the social level and 
                    political level when man cannot exercise his right of participation, or when he is  
                    subjected to unjust and unlawful coercion, or submitted to physical or mental torture.75 
 
It is not easy to separate the discourse about the dignity and rights of the human person in the 
social context from the mission of church ad gentes. Therefore the Church as mother and 
teacher has to continuously provide counsel in subject-related matters. Besides, the Church’s 
human rights teachings should be able to create dialogue between diverse religious believers, 
so that the moral dilemmas of a religiously pluralistic and increasingly secular society could 
be collectively tackled. For in the end, it is not the state, but the Church that provides the 
legitimacy for the doctrine of the dignity of the human person and human rights, since its 
foundation is traceable to God after whose image and likeness76 the human person is made. 
                                                 
72 Les moines de Solesmes, Le droit a la vie dans l’enseignement des papes : Volume 4, Sable sur Sarthe :  
    Abbaye Saint-Pierre de Solesmes, 1981, 16. 
73 Julio de la Torre, L’ emerge di un nuovo umanesimo e la Gaudium et Spes, L’etica tra quotidiano e remoto:  
    Studi di etica sociale in onore di G. Mattai, Bologna: Edizioni Dehoniane, 1985, 25-37. 
74 John Paul II, Message to the Secretary General of the United Nations on the XXXth Anniversary of the  
    Universal Declaration of Human Rights, In: AAS 71, 1979, 121. 
75 Ibid., Esta hora to the Third General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate in Puebla, In: AAS 71,  
    1979, 198. 
76 There is a dimension to the concept of image and likeness being propagated by some scholars, according to  
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6. 3.   C o n c l u s i o n 
 
In this section we focused on the notion of the dignity of the human person as the pivot on 
which every discussion about man/woman rotates. Two central dimensions to this concept 
were explored, namely, the essentialist approach and the existentialist approach. Whereas the 
former considered dignity as a given, valid for all human beings, the latter concentrates on its 
realization. Even though the approaches cannot be treated independently, the essentialist 
approach corresponds to the Judeo-Christian tradition and the existentialist approach 
corresponds to the philosophical view. However, Thomas Aquinas’ three-stage conception of 
dignity attempts to unite the two positions. According to him, the dignity of the person as 
rooted in the image of God is not something static, rather it is goal-oriented, and this goal is 
the life of the blessed. Reason and freedom to which philosophy appeals as the core of human 
dignity are hollow, if they do not enable the human person to discern what is good and true 
and to choose the same; and the highest good is God himself. 
 
The revolutionary thought of Kant in his categorical imperative led to the birth of a new 
humanism whose aim was to regain the central position of man in the history of humanity. 
That the human person is an end-in-itself and should never be treated as a means to an end is 
the main message of Kant’s moral philosophy. It is the self-worth which the human person 
possesses that distinguishes him/her from other living beings. Such an intrinsic self-worth 
consists for Kant in the freedom and autonomy of each individual person. How the individual 
autonomy is to be upheld in a society where other individuals live and work without conflicts, 
in the absence of an external law, heteronomy, was however not explained by Kant. 
 
The social context provides a basis for the juridical and political understanding of the dignity 
of the human person as that which is realized in the recognition and defence of human rights. 
The society is the arena where human dignity can be recognized and defended. It is also the 
                                                                                                                                                        
    which a differentiation is made between the nature of the human person as “Abbild” and “Vorbild”. In other 
    words, when we talk of the creation of the human person in the image and likeness of God, does this refer to  
    what he/she is or to what he/she should be. But the answer to this seemingly difficult question is to be  
    found in the connection between creation and salvation. What God did at creation, which was disturbed  
    through the fall of man was restored through his son Jesus Christ. Thus we do not talk of two creations, but  
    one, and the salvific work of Christ. Redemption is never to be understood as an after-thought on the part of 
    God butrather a restoration of what was damaged by the sins of our first parents. The original plan remains the  
    same, but each person, owing to the effect of the Fall, will now have to struggle through his/her deeds to  
    appropriate that which Christ has won for us through His suffering, death and resurrection. It is illogical in this 
    context to separate what man/woman is from what he/she should be, while the one presupposes the other  
    intending to say that both are the same.    
     
 234
topos where this dignity can be infringed upon by omission or commission. The state does not 
grant human dignity, its duty is to recognize and defend it through its rules and laws. In 
interpersonal relationships, respect for the dignity of the other person has to be underlined 
with a clear-cut distinction between meum et teum, to make peaceful co-existence possible. 
Both the church and the state are stakeholders in the affairs of the society, but while the one 
has a goal which transcends the material well-being of the human person, directing his/her 
gaze to the things of heaven, his/her real homeland, the latter is principally concerned with 
worldly matters. The story of Job was presented with its moral lesson that the loss of material 
goods, even the loss of health, is not a sufficient reason to do evil, as the latter leads to the 
‘loss’ of dignity more than the former. Hence poverty and the quest for material possession 
cannot and do not justify violence. The visit of his friends served as an impulse for Job to find 
meaning in his situation. This is what the Church recommends in her call for solidarity. 
 
However, since as a member of the society, the human person can expect certain things as a 
privilege, like the visit of Job’s friends, there are others which he/she should demand as a 
right. We tried to explore the development of the concept of human rights, purposely 
neglecting to delve into the theories of the origin of society, as that falls outside the scope of 
our work. Rights are due to the human persons, because they are endowed with dignity. The 
idea of rights is therefore employed according to Franck ‘as a defense against abuse of power 
everywhere’.77 Thus, it is difficult to discuss human rights without reference to human dignity, 
which is held to be universal. 
 
Whether considered theologically, philosophically, legally or otherwise, one central element 
running through the various conceptions is that the word dignity is a relational concept. It is 
that ‘humanness’ which I appreciate and value highly in myself, which the other person 
expects that I appreciate and value in him/her, and vice versa. When considered from its 
source, the term dignity makes one aware of the fact that one is not a product of chance, but 
that one owes one’s being to a greater Being, God. And any attempt to understand human life 
which falls short of its source and goal ends up making it a walking shadow, a tale told by an 
idiot full of sound and fury signifying nothing.78  
 
                                                 
77 Franck, M. T., “Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?” In: American Journal of International Law 91, 4  
    (October, 1997), 593 – 627). 
78 Shakespeare, W., Macbeth, Act 2, Scene 5. 
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n for all?  
                                                
What can the relational notion of the dignity of the human person contribute to the reduction  
of poverty and violence in the countries of Africa, south of the Sahara? What are the points of 
agreement/disagreement between human dignity as a relational concept and communitarian 
ethics? Can the notion of relationality provide a new basis for interpersonal relationship in a 
pluralistic society like Africa with her triple heritage of Christianity, Islam and African 
Traditional Religion? In what ways can the term relationality be integrated in the programme 
for the furtherance of civil, basic and human rights79? Is it possible to talk of human rights 
and human dignity in a society where more than 90% of the population are ignorant of their 
rights because they lack education? Is not the first step towards the protection of one’s rights 
the knowledge of those rights? Could it be that the overwhelming ignorance of what 
constitutes human rights among the ruling and the ruled has led to the impoverishment of the 
ruled by the rulers, and unleashed violence in much of Africa and other developing countries? 
Is the road to solving or at least reducing poverty in Africa not through educatio
 
The following chapter introduces us to a broader consideration of the term relationality or 
encountering the other as lived human dignity, which forms the crux of the African 
community spirit and Christian anthropology. 
 
  
 
 
  
                     
                     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 The three terms, civic, basic and human rights are often used as synonyms, however there is a subtle difference  
    between them. Civic rights refer to those rights accruing to person in his/her status as a citizen of a particular  
    country, whereas basic rights are the rights due to a person living in a country but not yet a citizen of that  
    country. Human rights on the other hand are those rights which flow from the dignity of the human person;  
    they are inalienable and universally valid for every person irrespective of age, sex, or social ranking. 
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                                                       CHAPTER SEVEN 
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF POVERTY AND VIOLENCE 
BASED ON THE AFRICAN WORLD-VIEW AND CHRISTIAN ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
7. 0  I n t r o d u c t i o n 
 
In the previous chapters, we tried to analyse the nature of the phenomena of poverty and 
violence as experienced in Africa south of the Sahara, paying attention to the possible natural, 
human and historical causes. In the penultimate chapter, we dwelt extensively on the notion of 
the rights and dignity of the human person. Since the social problems of poverty and violence 
center on man/woman, who is by nature a social being, but whose goal of existence 
transcends the society, it became necessary to underscore the indispensable role of human 
dignity in discussing social issues. The human person is a being endowed with dignity, 
because of his/her creation in the likeness of his/her Creator. The rights and duties of the 
human person derive therefore from his/her dignity. It is the duty of the society/state to 
recognize and protect these rights, even though the state cannot grant them. 
 
Our aim in this section is to survey another approach to the social issues of poverty and 
violence as far as the African world-view and Christian anthropology are concerned. What 
lessons can be derived from the African values and the Christian anthropology that could help 
in the reduction of the discussed problems? To be able to answer this question, we shall first 
of all try to highlight some of those ethical values in the African world that are almost being 
forgotten, but whose recovery could help in combating the twin problems of poverty and 
violence. Then we shall present the elements of Christian anthropology as the paradigm of 
what the human person is expected to be as epitomized in Jesus Christ, the God made man. 
We shall be doing this in the conviction that any attempt to provide a solution to the problems 
of poverty and violence that does not take into consideration the ethical norms, which of 
course are rooted in the dignity of the human person, remains inadequate. And these norms 
are present, albeit in shadowy forms, in all cultures of the world, African culture inclusive. 
 
A re-examination of those traditional African values here and their contribution to the African 
quest for identity in a plural and progressive world is pertinent. The Africans have to embark 
first of all on a journey of self-discovery and self-definition before a meaningful effort 
towards development can take place. The beginning of every development, as it is said, is the 
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development of the mind. This exercise has to begin with the givens. By this we mean those 
things that an African can say of himself/herself of which he/she is proud like the respect for 
life and the sense of community. This is the way I understand the view that African problems 
can only be solved by Africans. Perhaps it is equally important to find out whether there is a 
correlation between the level of poverty experienced in Africa today and the individualistic, 
self-centred modern society, the influence of which the continent is not immune to. 
 
Subsequent to this, we shall take a brief look at some tenets of Christian anthropology, which 
serve as the only links that connect Africa to the rest of the world on a more or less equal 
basis. The awareness of the dignity of the human person, which stems from his/her creation in 
the image and likeness of God, has a two-fold message for the Africans on the one hand, and 
for the rest of the world in their relationship to Africa on the other hand. For the former, it 
means to leave the circumscribed African world and begin to think more globally. And for the 
latter, it a clarion call to unite and fight human problems as a human family, irrespective of 
where these problems are found. This will involve in more concrete terms such specifics as 
aid, environment, migration and the ethical basis for globalization.  
 
7.  1.  The African Sense of Community and the Challenges of Poverty 
7. 1. 1 Traditional Community Model and its Limitations 
 
In the section dealing with the traditional African values and worldview, we saw that the 
respect for life and deep sense of community occupy primacy of place. The concept of 
community, as already explained, incorporated God, the ancestors, the living and the unborn. 
Of course, only the living constituted the visible members of the traditional community. The 
other members were invisible, but played a vital role in the religious and moral behaviour of 
the community. Members of a particular community traced their origin to a common ancestor 
and were held together by socio-cultural bonds expressed in meals and conscious avoidance 
of evil deeds. The community spirit was lived in its intensity in the villages, where the people, 
bound together by their natural religion, defended another form of civilization, which though 
modest in its material achievement was proud of arts and moral values.  
 
The crucial question is whether it is still reasonable to advocate for a community way of life, 
as was obtained many centuries ago, in our modern complex society with its mega-cities. The 
city as opposed to the traditional community is larger and highly diversified. Here the 
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individual disappears in  the anonymous group, sometimes ending up in isolation, and 
morality becomes more of a private than public matter unlike in the community where he/she 
is the son/daughter of so-and-so, or a member of this or that family. The fact that one is 
known strengthens the sense of identity and makes it feasible to ask and render assistance. We 
have to admit that this age has passed. This is so, because the advancement in information and 
communication technology has made it possible for every part of the world to be in touch 
with all other parts, from Jakarta to Geneva; Hamburg to Honkong and from Tokyo to Tripoli. 
Be that as it may, there is something positive about the community spirit that will have to be 
retained if Africa is to emerge from her poverty. And that is what I call ‘community 
sensibility’, which is not only required for Africans alone, but valid for other regions since the 
world has become one. Put in another way, technology and communication have brought 
human beings in our modern society together thereby making them neighbours, but they are 
yet to made brothers and sisters. The latter can only be achieved through a sense of 
community, which is opposed to radical egoism and pursuit of self-interest. There is the need 
to develop this idea of the community further before discussing how this could be 
demonstrated concretely. 
 
7. 1. 2  The Christian Community Model as More Inclusive 
 
The definition of community that serves our purpose in this section is one which involves 
notions of diverse people sharing common geography, interest, faith and hope1. This form of 
community allows people to act as private individuals much of the time, but also guarantees 
them the possibility of exercising their individual commitment, attachment, and civic 
obligations to the entire group. As a result, the concept of the community as axiological and 
normative is  emphasized much more than is the ontological. This is better expressed in 
Cardinal Wojtyla’s analysis of participation and community in The Acting Person. Wojtyla 
explains the meaning of participation in two steps, focusing first on participation with respect 
to the person’s action and, second on participation with respect to the person’s subjectivity. 
What this implies is that community does not deprive one of one’s individual freedom, but 
gives it expression, since it is through the personalistic value of action that the individual 
comes to grips with the necessary subjective dimension of the common good. And this 
subjective dimension of the common good carries a normative obligation for communities to 
                                                 
1 Weber, M., The Sociology of Religion, Fourth Edition, trans. by Ephraim Fischoff, Boston, Massachusetts:  
   Beacon Press, 1991, 60. 
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conduct action in such a way that it fosters the self-fulfillment of persons.2 The value and 
significance of participation consist in its role as a check both against ‘individualism’, which 
arises when the individual sees himself as the supreme good and regards others as limitations, 
and ‘objective totalism’, which subjects the individual to the collectivity in an unconditional 
and coercive manner. The common good which binds the individual to the community and 
vice versa, demands commitment and self-sacrifice on the part of individuals, because it is 
only through their commitment to it that they can fulfill themselves in action. 
 
We have already treated the concept of common good in the earlier part of this work, but it is 
important to note the place which Wojtyla gives it in the discourse on the human community. 
His analysis of participation and the community simultaneously manifests the dynamic nature 
of the common good and its intrinsic dependence upon human virtue. The human community 
has two dimensions which complement each other. The one is the interpersonal dimension, 
which occurs when the I and the thou reciprocally affirm the dignity of the other. The other is 
the social dimension that denotes a relationship in which persons act together in pursuit of a 
common good. The latter dimension cannot be realized if the former is not fully experienced. 
In the social dimension of community, the interpersonal element is only indirectly indicated, 
while the multiplicity brought about by the relations of persons is directly brought into focus. 
All the activities which take place in the social dimension of community are related to a single 
value, the common good, which includes the requirement that confirming the personal 
subjectivity of each must be one of the goals of communal action. 3  The community is 
responsible for the interaction of persons, who in turn have the obligation of building up the 
community by working together for the common good in the spirit of justice.4 
 
Notwithstanding its merits, the limitations of the model of African community presented by 
Bujo as a basis for communitarian ethics become obvious vis-a-vis the foregoing discussion. 
                                                 
2 Wojtyla, C., The Acting Person cited In: Beigel, G., Faith and Social Justice in the Teaching of Pope John Paul  
   II, New York: Peter Lang, 1997, 24. 
3 Beigel, G., Faith and Social Justice in the Teaching of Pope John Paul II, Op. Cit., 29. 
4 Without the intention of going into an elaborate discussion of justice, it is exigent to point out that the concept  
  of social justice originated from (mis)interpretation of Aquinas’s notion of legal justice (STh, II-II, q. 58, a. 6,  
  ad. 4). According to Aquinas, legal justice is the form of all justice, which may be differentiated into  
  distributive and commutative justice. While the one regulates the relationship of the whole (the state or the  
  community in our case) to the parts (the individuals), the other regulates the relationship of the parts  
  (individuals) to one another. Some scholars, however, separate legal justice from distributive and commutative 
  justice and assign it the role of regulating the relationship of the individuals to the state. In otherwords, it is  
  concerned with the duties of the parts to the whole in the form of obedience to the laws. Of course, we know  
  that the differentiation of these forms of justice can easily be made theoretically, but the concrete application is  
  very controversial and inconclusive. However, our concern in the work is more with community (Gemeinschaft) 
  than society (Gesellschaft). 
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Since the African idea of community, according to Bujo, is based on a common ancestor who 
founded the community or clan,5 it is susceptible to exclusivity and instead of widening the 
human family ends up in radical atomization. The tendency not to treat any person outside a 
particular ancestor-circle as a person is not ruled out. And within a particular region where 
many ancestor-based groupings are found, struggle and rivalries can hardly be controlled. 
What this means is that there is the need to search for an all-embracing foundation for the 
understanding of community as a solid framework for ethical thoughts and behaviour.  
 
Recent studies by African theologians such as Nyamiti, Bujo and Uzukwu, would not want 
that the idea of ancestor be erased completely, instead they project Jesus Christ as the ancestor 
per se, who through his life death and resurrection brought mankind new and full life (Jn. 10: 
10). The Christian communities gathered at worship, whether at the parish level or the 
diocesan level, anywhere in the world, are drawn together by Jesus Christ, their common 
ancestor and primogenitor. There is the awareness that all who have been admitted as 
members of the body of Christ through baptism and who share in the mystery of the 
incarnation and resurrection have mutual obligations to one another. The Christian 
community model is therefore broader than the traditional African community and is at the 
same time open to more growth. This community is regulated by the law of Jesus Christ, the 
ancestor, which is the law of love (Jn. 15: 17). This love is not restricted to only the members 
of the community, but extends to ‘the other sheep that are not of this fold’ (Jn. 10: 16). The 
objection may be raised as to the fate of those other people who do not share the Christian 
faith, but live in the same community. The response to this objection is to be stated 
categorically following the teaching of the Church that what is truly Christian is equally truly 
human. In other words, the saving message of Christ is not alien to any person. 
 
An expression which brings out clearly the form of this Christian community is John Paul II’s 
“communion of persons”, communio personarum. This expression designates “the type of 
community proper to human beings, which involves interpersonal affirmations of the dignity 
of the other and a corresponding social consciousness that aims at the common good while 
respecting the subjectivity of each member of the ‘we’.”6 The entire Christian anthropology is 
based on this fact and is the fulcrum of Christian ethics and the social teaching of the Church. 
The formulation of the common good emphasizes particularly the good of interpersonal 
communion, which is indicated as the basic ethical task of human beings. The communion of 
                                                 
5 Bujo, B., The Ethical Dimension of Community, op. cit. 54 
6 Beigel, G., op. cit., 61 
 241
persons is characterised by its anthropological, Christological, ecclesial and universal 
dimensions. This insight shows that any partial approach to the communion of persons or the 
community and common good is unacceptable. It is with reference to this that John Paul II in 
his encyclical on human work, Laborem exercens, paved the way for a new understanding of 
human relationship to work. He argued that “the basis for determining the value of human 
work is not primarily the kind of work being done, but the fact that the one who is doing it  is 
a person”,7 citing Christ’s own work as a carpenter as revelation of the full subjective value of 
work. With this new perspective, the very basis of the ancient differentiation of people into 
classes according to the kind of work done was abrogated. 
 
Thus we can see from the interaction between the communion of persons and the common 
good the anthropocentric foundation for the theology of the preferential option for the poor. 
However, we are aware of the heated debate which this has generated both within the church 
and in the secular society. Since the theological perspective of the option for the poor always 
involves analyzing the phenomena of poverty and oppression, and uncovering the underlying 
structural causes, it is mostly perceived as tending towards Marxist ideology.8 Furthermore, it 
is judged as an insufficient theology, being limited to historical praxis as its source neglecting 
thereby theology’s dependence on revelation. The position of the Church on the question of 
the preferential option for the poor, which is also part of the theology of liberation is clearly 
outlined in the two documents Libertius Nuntius (1984) and Libertatis Conscientia (1986). 
Our position on the matter as far as the goal of this work is concerned is that of a ‘fusion of 
horizons’, borrowing the expression of H. G. Gadamer. The Christian community (recipient 
and subject of theology), understood as a communion of persons, is a family, and as in the 
natural family, is regulated by mutual respect and concern for one another irrespective of the 
diversity in roles and functions of the members. The promotion of the common good goes 
pari-passu with personal well-being.  
 
                                                 
7 John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, nr. 6 
8 The expression is commonly used to refer to the promotion of class struggle. Marx himself, however, admits  
   that no credit is due to him for discovering the existence of classes in modern society and the struggle between  
   them. What heaccepts as his contribution in this regard is proving that the existence of classes is bound up with 
   particular historical phases in the development of production. Secondly that the class struggle necessarily leads  
   to the dictatorship of the proletariat; and that this dictatorship itself constitutes the transition to a classless  
   society (Cf. Letter to J. Wedemeyer, March 5, 1852; Marx-Engels Werke, Berlin, 1962, 28: 507f). Lenin  
   corroborates this by asserting that those who recognize only the class struggle are not yet Marxists, rather a 
   Marxist is one who extends the acceptance of the class-struggle to the acceptance of dictatorship of the  
   proletariat (V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (1917), New York, 1943, 30). 
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This model of community as expounded and expressed in Christian anthropology provides a 
medium for the reduction of poverty and violence in Africa south of the Sahara both from 
within and from without. What now follows is an attempt at using the above discussed 
principles of Christian community as communion of persons to help in providing solutions in 
some selected areas of the peoples’ life, which, as we have pointed out, would include both 
internal and external interventions if any meaningful impact is to be made. 
 
7. 1. 3  Contextual Internal Application of the Principles of Community Spirit 
 
There are vital areas where the principles of community as communion of persons could be 
applied if a change is to be brought about in the poverty conditions in Africa south of the 
Sahara. This requires a two-dimensional approach. The first dimension has to focus on the 
role of the Church in projecting the idea of community as communion of persons, both in her 
lifestyle and teaching. It is expected that as the originator of the concept, the Church, should 
in her leaders and members demonstrate concretely the meaning of communion of persons in 
the effort to reduce poverty and violence. The second dimension concerns the political 
dimension, which as we have seen in the historical analysis of the nature, causes and effects 
of poverty and violence in the first part of this work, is the origin of most of the social 
problems in that part of the continent. With regard to this latter dimension, we shall limit 
ourselves to only three areas which we consider very fundamental and relevant to our 
objectives. These areas are improving governance and preventing conflicts; investing in 
people; and reducing aid dependence and strengthening partnership.  
 
(a) The Role of the Church as Communion of Persons in the Existential Solidarity with the 
Poor and the Oppressed: An African Perspective 
 
We have seen that the notion of community is one of the most important values that African 
culture has in common with Christian theology. But whereas the one limits the membership in 
this community to sanguine relationship based on a common biological ancestor and founder 
of the clan, the other leaves it open to all men/women of good will, who confess their faith in 
Jesus Christ, the son of God and are baptised. Those who fall into the second group form a 
new community known as the Church and are bound together by a common mission, namely 
that of the founder. Since the role of the Church in any society is that of a leaven, her 
approach to the social problem of poverty is very crucial to the entire society in which she 
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finds herself. The Church in Africa is not only a young Church, it is also a poor Church, 
sharing as it were in the poverty of the people of the continent. The African Church struggles 
with the dialectics of the relationship between theory and praxis, teaching and life, which is a 
peculiar problem that confronts the Church at its beginning anywhere in the world. As a result 
of this, the temptation to reduce the Church to a social institution concerned primarily with 
the material well-being of the people is always there. This has to be avoided. At the same time, 
to remain indifferent to obvious cases of material deprivation, because ‘his kingdom is not of 
this world’, is to treat a serious matter with kid gloves. The question is not so much about 
what is taught concerning the new community that is the Church, but more about how the new 
community is lived as a communion of persons. Are people really integrated into this 
community so that they feel welcomed? Is the tie among members which the new community 
promises strong enough that the members are not tempted to go back to the traditional 
community? How is the life-pattern of the leaders of the new community a source of 
consolation and solace to the poor and deprived? Can the secular society take an example 
from the life of the Church with reference to issues concerning the right attitude to wealth and 
poverty? Is the Church in her leaders and members a reference point of a mutual and peaceful 
co-existence in a society torn apart by conflicts and violence? 
 
The Church in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in its leadership is tending regrettably towards 
the critical observation of J. B. Metz that the Church has become bourgeois, at least in its 
mentality and its language, in its formation programs, in the values behind its decision making, 
in its lifestyle, and in many other ways. The source of this tendency is the fact that the African 
Church according to Uzukwu inherited clericalism from the early missionaries.9 In this model 
of the Church, the priest is perceived as a symbol of power. When he commands, the people 
have to obey, not only among his Christians, but even among other Christian denominations 
and non-believers. With the training he received and the above-average material well-being he 
enjoys in a social context where most of the people are poor, it is often difficult for the 
Church leader to condescend to the level of the poor either in his ministerial or social 
functions. In his research on the conflict between the Igbo frame of reference and the 
European-Christian frame of reference as it is played out in the life of Igbo seminarians, C. J. 
Uzor tried to establish the extent to which societal ideals can affect the institutional ideals of 
priestly formation and to point out the areas of conflict.10 The problem may not be attributed 
                                                 
9 Uzukwu, E. E., A Listening Church: Autonomy and Communion in African Churches, op. cit., 120 
10 Uzor, C. J., Living Between Two Worlds: Intrapersonal Conflict Among Igbo Seminarians in Nigeria,  
   Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation in Theology, University of Innsbruck, Austria, 1999, 192. 
 244
to the program of formation alone, but also to the changing values in the society where the 
seminarian finds himself. If this conflict fails to be resolved and the candidate is ordained a 
priest, both the priest and the ministry to which he has been called naturally suffer. The 
incongruity resulting therefrom is manifested in the areas such as the priest’s attitude to 
temporal goods, which includes, on the one hand, the acquisitive tendency, the sheer desire to 
have money, things and titles; and on the other hand, the use of money or the things acquired, 
that is, the display of wealth and affluence.11 The same thing applies to the struggle for and 
the exercise of authority which is directly opposed to the disposition of the founder, the Son 
of Man, who did not come to be served, but to serve. The question is whether this type of 
atmosphere can lead to real community life and the communion of persons that should follow 
it. Of course not. On the contrary, it brings about avarice, discontentment and conflict among 
the faithful. For the poor who hoped for a refuge in the Church community, there is simply 
little or no room for them, as the Church mirrors the society from which they seek to escape. 
 
It is against this backdrop that the clamour for existential solidarity with the poor becomes 
imperative if the transforming message of the Gospel is to bear fruit. It is only in this way that 
the prevailing ethos of selfishness can be countered. Such solidarity is imperative, because: 
 
                It seeks to be a visible statement that theology is a faith-based scientific enterprise 
                 in the service of a world of fraternity and human dignity, without which God’s design 
                 to create human beings in the image of his Triune life is frustrated. By the same token, 
                 it seeks to unmask the greed that lies behind the comfort and pseudo-culture of the 
                 privileged.12 
 
This is first the responsibility of the priest, as theologian and articulator of the faith of the 
Church, to remind the Church community under his charge of what it believes and what it is 
called to be, namely the servant and the sacrament of a renewed humanity that gives thanks to 
God. In our times, this will consist principally in the Church facilitating by example the 
emergence of a new quality of human solidarity possible only on the basis of simplicity of 
lifestyle.13 Here the people naturally look up to the spiritual leader, since the best manner of 
teaching in matters of faith and morals is not always by words but by lived example. 
 
                                                 
11 Okeke, U. C., Expectations of Life as a Priest: A Comparative Study of Igbo Catholic Diocesan and Religious  
    Seminarians, Rome: Gregorian University Press, 2003, 74. 
12 O’Brien, J., Theology and the Option for the Poor, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1992, 81. 
13 Ibid., 82. 
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There is no gainsaying the fact that the priest and the faithful have a vital role to play in their 
solidarity for and with the poor for their mutual enrichment in the truth. By living an austere 
life, the African priest in his community can and must learn from the poor, in their particular 
experience of God, which not only complements his academic knowledge but acts as a 
corrective to overvaluing it. This knowledge is in principle more primordial and privileged, 
since the poor and marginalized are the primary recipients of the gospel (Lk. 4:18f). The 
priest, in spite of his academic qualifications, is present to the poor and the oppressed first as a 
learner. Therefore, seeking to read the book of their experience requires genuine solidarity. 
For, the world of the poor, unlike the academy, is a ‘culture of silence’ where the people have 
never been allowed to speak for themselves, where they have deeply internalized the 
prejudice that would mark them off as inferior. To speak for the poor is first of all to speak 
with them; to speak with them is to create conditions under which they can speak for 
themselves. This can better be achieved in the Christian community lived as a communion of 
persons under the guidance of the priest-theologian. In the real sense of the word, there can be 
no theology that is not a reflection on ecclesial faith; and there can be no ecclesial faith 
without koinonia; but there can be no koinonia if there is no solidarity with the poor. Only an 
ecclesial situation that exists in function of the rights of the poor to express and celebrate their 
experience provides the basic material for theological reflection on the Church community as 
communion of persons, because anything less than this neglects not merely one element of the 
Church, but its most significant element.14 Hence the role of the Church is inevitable in this 
perspective of living out its mission and in overcoming the anthropological poverty of the 
materially poor within the church community.  
 
The recently concluded second African Synod of Bishops (6th – 25th, October, 2009) under the 
theme, “the Church in Africa at the Service of Reconciliation, Justice and Peace” stressed the 
need for a convinced and convincing personal witness on the part of all the members of the 
Church. One of the areas where this is to be demonstrated concerns life in the community 
with particular attention paid to the dignity of women and the support for the underprivileged. 
If ‘the joys and hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the people of this age’ are also those of 
the followers of Christ, then the principle issue for a theological concept of the Church as 
communion of persons is certainly how to deal with poverty and oppression. The necessity of 
this cannot be overemphasized if the role of the Church as a custodian of morality in the 
transformation of the society is to be retained. For the African, for whom the society is not an 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
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entity existing outside man but a web of relations and interactions between man and God, man 
and man, and man and nature, this is indispensible. The human person has the obligation by 
the nature of his/her ontological existence and connectedness to manifest this spirit in his/her 
activities. 
 
 The large number of the members of the official churches makes personal contact difficult in 
some regions, which has given rise to the proliferation of pentecostal churches with the 
promise of more solidarity among members. This is a pastoral problem and we prefer to leave 
it to pastoral theologians but we have to say that there are already small Christian 
communities beginning in some dioceses as a way of strengthening personal contacts and 
mutual assistance, which is one way of reducing poverty among members.  
 
   (b) The Socio-Political Dimensions of the Principles of Community Spirit 
 
As vital as the role of the Church community may be in supplying the needs of the poor and 
marginalized by way of solidarity and as a means of preventing crime, the effort remains 
subject to the socio-political context. Of course, in discussing the importance of the 
community as a communion of persons, the aim was far from suggesting it as an alternative to 
the functions of the society or state. On the contrary, it was to show how better the state or 
society can function if at the community level members appreciate one another for what they 
are – human beings endowed with dignity and destined for a common mission. When this is 
realized, social institutions and governance will be positioned to realize more effectively their 
goal, which is the good of all persons. A system of governance formulated in view of the 
human community as a communion of persons will have a broad base for more participation 
and be accountable. Opinions of the citizens will be considered with regard to major decisions. 
 
Improving governance and preventing conflicts is what Sub-Saharan Africa basically needs. 
For, given the widespread civil conflicts, enormous costs are imposed on the region’s meagre 
resources and already heavy debt. These conflicts do not stem from ethnic diversity as it is 
commonly assumed. Rather, in a pattern found around the world, these conflicts are driven by 
poverty, under-development, and lack of economic diversification, as well as by political 
systems that marginalize large parts of the population. But conflicts at the same time 
perpetuate poverty, creating a vicious circle that can be reversed only through special 
development efforts. Genuine development is, however, human oriented. 
 247
The problem with government in Africa is traceable to some factors among which is the 
cultural dilemma that besieged the continent after the colonial era. The nature of the dilemma 
consists in having to make a choice between the traditional form of leadership and modern 
democracy and, of course, being ready to accept whatever consequences either choice entails. 
Furthermore, majority of the political parties in the Sub-Saharan Africa suffer the inherent 
flaw of addressing the urban proletariat, the small tradesmen and the civil servants, which is a 
tiny section of the population, whereas the majority in the rural areas are neglected.15 As a 
result of this fundamental mistake the parties produce candidates, whom Fanon describes as 
“spoiled children of yesterday’s Colonialism and today’s governing powers, who oversee the 
looting of the few national resources.” 16  We have dealt extensively with the different 
traditional leadership forms in the earlier part of this work. It is still difficult for the African 
leaders to end the traditional leadership forms and embrace modern systems of governance. 
And what accounts for this type of behaviour is that some political leaders fail to consider 
their position as that of service to the community of persons, who make up the state. Until the 
awareness is created, that both the leaders and the led form an integral part of the communion 
of persons, it is hard to envisage a solution to the problem of governance. Jürgen Habermas’ 
model of moral consciousness and communicative actions17 may be an alternative route for 
Africans in a quest for an effective governance. But this presupposes a society where the 
majority if not all are literate. This brings us to the next point, which is the need for universal 
education, if Africa is to combat poverty and reduce violent conflicts through dialogue.   
 
Investing in people through education is very essential for accelerated poverty reduction in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Many African countries are unfortunately caught in a trap of high 
fertility and mortality with a low level of education especially of women (less than one 
quarter of poor rural girls attend primary school), high ratios of dependents, and low savings. 
Education has an inestimable role to play in the development of the individual and society 
anywhere in the world. It remains the best investment that any country can make for its 
citizens and from which it can later reap abundant fruits. An educated man/woman has wealth 
in himself/herself, so goes an ancient adage. The form of education, ex-ducare (to lead out) 
that we are talking about here refers to that of liberating the individual from the darkness of 
ignorance to the light of knowledge, which includes among other things the capability to set 
                                                 
15 Fanon, F., The Wretched of the Earth, op. cit. 64 
16 Ibid., 12 
17 Habermas,  J., Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 2, Frankfurt a. M, 1987, 145 
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priorities. Francis Bacon calls it liberation from idols18 or personal and social prejudices. 
Apart from this, the number of years spent in schools and colleges help to reduce early 
marriages for girls and juvenile delinquency on the part of the boys. 
 
But the next issue with respect to the problem of education in Africa concerns the exodus of 
the few educated Africans to foreign countries in search of greener pastures, the well-known 
‘brain drain’19 This is sometimes caused by the unfavourable policies of the government that 
fail to acknowledge the role of education in nation building by denying the academically 
trained commensurate pay. In some cases, the know-how of the intellectuals is left untapped 
for partisan reasons. On the harm this attitude is doing to Africa, Afolayan writes: 
 
                There is no qualm that an unquestionable co-dependency does exist between variables 
                 of education, cultural production and social reproduction. The zapping away of products 
                  and sources of education in a society will certainly eat away the stability of the society.20 
 
In an article published in The African Monitor, Biruk Girma explained how brain drain costs 
Africa $4 billion dollars annually. According to him, citing the report of Kemal Deris, the 
UNDP administrator, at the 11th international conference of the ILO, ‘to fill the human 
resources gap created by brain drain, Africa employs up to 150,000 expatriate 
professionals’.21 Statistics show that some of the countries with high percentage migration of 
professionals have poor economy. For example, 70 % of educated Somalis live outside the 
country, and 60 % of all Ghanaian doctors trained in Ghana since the 1980s are said to have 
left the country.22 But the irony of the situation is that those professionals who have left their 
countries for greener pastures abroad are either underutilized or in some cases unutilized, and 
so their talents if not they themselves will sometime be buried in the wasteland. The literary 
icon, Nobel laureate, Wole Soyinka, describes them as ‘members of a wasted generation’. 
However, there are those who have made their marks on the international scene like the 
computer wizard, Philip Emeagwali of Nigeria, whom ex-US president, Bill Clinton described 
                                                 
18 Francis Bacon used the term “idols” in major work Novum Organum, to refer to certain prejudices which can  
    obstruct the acquisition of real knowledge. Bacon’s idols are mental fixations rather than physical symbols.  
    These include: Idols of the tribe, idols of the cave, idols of the marketplace and idols of the theater. 
19 The expression brain drain refers to large scale emigration of individuals with technical skills or knowledge,  
    it is normally due to conflict, lack of opportunity, political instability or health risks. It was coined by the  
    Royal Society to describe the emigration of scientists and technologists to North America from post-war  
    Europe. It occurs more often in societies that need to desperately hang onto such indispensable manpower. 
20 Afolayan. O. M. (ed.), Higher Education in Post-Colonial Africa: Paradigms of Development, Decline and  
    Dilemmas, New Jersey: African World Press Inc., 2007, 328. 
21 Girma, B., Brain drain costs Africa $4 billion annually, In: The African Monitor, Thursday, March 4, 2010 
22 Afolayan, O. M., op. cit. 328 
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as ‘one of the great minds of the information age’, for designing the fastest computer known 
to the world at the time. On the other hand, it is not certain that the likes of Emeagwali could 
have had the same opportunity had they stayed in their countries of origin. Hence, some 
consider the phenomenon of brain drain as a dividend of globalization. 
 
In any case, what we are saying is that there is a good number of trained personnel who are 
forced out of many countries in Africa to seek a better means of existence outside their 
fatherlands, because of unconducive socio-political conditions. Their services are so much 
needed in different areas of specialization, and they could contribute through their talents and 
collective efforts to the reduction of poverty and advance development in Africa. This is the 
result of the individual and materialistic tendencies encouraged by Western liberal democracy 
infiltrating into Africa, which has destroyed the traditional egalitarian society with its security 
system, whereby the haves took care of the have nots through certain accepted institutional 
frameworks. The community spirit has to be regenerated and revived. 
 
The next point concerns the reduction of dependence an aid and the strengthening of 
partnership. With reference to this, there are two levels to be clarified. On the level part, 
dependence is to be considered as an internal factor, since it is the disposition of the leaders 
and the led that make room for the perpetual in-flow of aid. The other aspect of aid 
dependence which concerns foreign assistance will be treated later in this section. Coming 
back to the point, the community spirit, which demands that individuals assist one another, is 
sometimes exaggerated. A peculiar situation exists, for instance in a family of twelve, where 
only one person is working to support the other members of the family for an indefinite period 
of time. And it is not that the others are too young to work, some may even be older than the 
one working. Nevertheless, they expect that their needs be met. The situation is taken for 
granted that even the dependents demand such assistance as rights. Of course, this is one of 
the sources of conflicts in many families and communities. Yet much more disheartening with 
reference to this practice is the tendency of many dependents to live beyond their means. 
Unlike in many countries of Europe where a person leaves the parents’ house at eighteen in 
order to be self-dependent, an African, even at the age of fifty lives with and receives 
everything from his parents. The matter is different with women, who have to leave their 
parents earlier to be married. Thus this dependence syndrome has to be addressed if poverty is 
to be reduced. Certain lacks have to be endured at some points of one’s life to enable the 
individual to attain maturity. The same is applicable to the family, community, and state. If 
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the people of Sub-Saharan Africa want to overcome poverty, they will have to adopt some 
internally self-imposed measures which demand sacrifices on individual lifestyle. All the 
countries of the developed world had their own desert experience before they reached the 
promised land. The most recent emerging economic world power, China, has its own story.  
 
7. 2.  Sub-Saharan Africa in the Context of the World Community of Persons 
 
To discuss the problem of poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, whether from the 
point of view of their causes or possible solutions, is to explore the position of that part of the 
continent in relation to contemporary world order. How do other issues of world interest 
affect Sub-Saharan Africa? To what extent are the internally self-articulated plan of action 
against the scourge of poverty subject to external factors over which the Africans have no 
control? Can the current world order be assessed based on any other standard apart from 
material progress? If yes, where does the African come in, and if no, how does the African fit 
in? Is Africans’ dependence on foreign aid helping to combat poverty in that continent or is it 
increasing it? Where does Africa stand in the on-going discussion on globalization and 
environmental degradation? We do not intend to provide answers to all these questions, but it 
suffices to have them posed for further reflections. Our attention, nonetheless, will be directed 
to the last three that have to do with Aid, globalization and climate/environmental change. 
 
7. 2. 1.  A Critique of Africa’s Aid dependence and the Cost of Debt Services 
 
Africa is generally described as the world’s most aid-dependent and independent region. To 
be more exact, the area that is commonly meant by this assertion is Sub-Saharan Africa, since 
North Africa shares only geographically the fate of Africa in this regard. Such foreign aid 
flows annually into Africa either as officially approved by the government of the donor 
country or through non-governmental organisations. One wonders whether Africa could do 
without aid as ‘the average African country derives between 15 and 30 percent of its budget 
through aid’23 . There are several opinions today as to whether the continued support for 
Africa should not be stopped to enable the Africans to find the solution to their own problems 
themselves. The proponents of this view argue that most aid does more harm than good to the 
Africans. On the other hand, recent studies of world-wide aid come to the conclusion that aid 
                                                 
23 Kpundeh, S. J., Democratization in Africa: Africa View, Africa Voices, Washington D. C : New Academy   
    Press, 1992, 62 
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is inevitable for developing countries, but the way it is handled needs to be modified. Before 
delving into the moral intricacies of this apparently simple act, aid, it is pertinent to clarify its 
concept. 
 
The word ‘aid’ refers to help or support; food or money given to a person or country in need. 
It is similar but not identical with the word ‘grant’, which means a sum of money given by a 
government or public body for a particular purpose. In any case, we shall apply the term here 
to cover financial grants, the free supply of goods and services other than for military 
purposes, and loans given at less-than-commercial rates of interests.24 However, a broader 
understanding of aid usually includes the rendering of military assistance, and the granting of 
loans at commercial interest rates. This is sometimes classified under the category of debts. 
We have noted that aid to Africa come from two main sources25, namely as a government 
package and from voluntary agencies such as Save the Children Fund, Christian Aid and so 
forth. Although the total amount that comes from the latter is said to be only one-tenth of 
government aid, it is viewed as more effective in terms of reaching the poor to whom it is 
directed. This brings us to the problems associated with the flow and management of aid. 
 
The difficulties associated with the flow of aid to Africa range from its insufficiency when 
compared to the problems it is meant to solve, to the type of aid Africa receives – military 
hardware, capital-intensive projects, salaries to professionals hired by donor-countries – 
which are seen as not very useful, because they come in the tactical and not strategic 
categories of aid. Most aid to Africa, it is believed, falls, as a matter of fact, under tactical 
category. What this means is that such aid usually facilitates the drain on resources and 
encourages capital flow. On the other hand, the donor-countries maintain that there is no point 
in rendering assistance to corrupt governments that have shown very little desire or ability to 
use public resources for the public. However, some donors are alleged to become corruptors 
as they collude with corrupt leaders in transactions that are not transparent. In this case, aid is 
given and siphoned back by corrupt leaders to the donor country. Any meaningful assistance 
to the tropical African countries, we dare to reiterate here, should begin with the control of 
capital flow either from the corrupt leaders or their external collaborators.  
 
                                                 
24 O’Connor, A., Poverty in Africa, op. cit. 142 
25 The third type of aid to Africa comes as emergency aid, which may not be treated here as a stable source, since  
    such emergency situations are not regular events. The kind of emergency situations that attract foreign aid in  
    this regard includes natural disasters such floods and drought both of which lead to famine.  
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The third and most difficult problem concerns the aid process, which often impinges on the 
sovereignty of African nations by dictating, imposing or otherwise predeterming the content 
of projects. The leaders of aid-dependent countries feel that the donor countries impose a lot 
of condition that make it impossible for them to exercise their sovereignty. But one would not 
expect the donor countries to keep on pouring money into countries whose leaders are not 
ready to use the aid for the good of the poor masses. That would be equivalent to throwing 
one’s pearls before swine. African leaders have to accept the reality that donors will continue 
to press for political and economic reforms as a precondition for aid, where such reforms are 
called for. 
 
The issue of debt and debt-servicing poses much more of a problem than that of aid in tropical 
Africa. In the first instance, the countries or institutions concerned set stringent conditions that 
are difficult to meet. Then there is the huge amount which has to be paid annually or bi-
annually, as the case may be, to service the debts. In the face of such arrangments, it is hard to 
understand the co-existence of aid programmes meant to improve the life of the poor people 
in tropical Africa and the huge amount that those countries have to pay to service their 
external debts. For even though it would not be easy to grant debt forgiveness, it is be 
unreasonable and unethical for donors to demand that African countries continue to use 
disproportionate amounts of their resources for debt servicing.  
 
Both aid and debt have made great and unquestionable impacts on the lives of the Africans 
south of the Sahara, especially in the areas of productivity, employment and better living 
standards. On the whole, the people are materially better off than they would have been 
without aid and debt. However, in very many cases, the economic benefits have been far 
smaller that would have been expected. Hence, instead of helping to alleviate poverty, it 
creates and reinforces dependence. It is in this direction that something has to be done if the 
aim of aid to Africa is to liberate the people from poverty and create better social conditions. 
Considered from the side of the donor countries, it means raising the amount sent as aid to 
Africa and granting loans without interest. On the part of the recipient countries, it involves 
ending corruption and allowing the aid to reach the poor masses. This is possible only if the 
human community, be it at the state, national or international level is understood as a 
communion of persons, where what affects one affects the other. And it is only in this 
perspective that the process of globalization can yield its expected fruits. 
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7. 2. 2.  The Meaning of Globalization for the African Poverty Condition 
 
The term ‘globalization’ has come to occupy a central position in contemporary language. 
Although it is a word that has many connotations, it denotes originally the process by which 
businesses start operating on a global scale. Globalization, therefore, has the sole aim of 
increasing the connectedness and interdependence of the world’s markets and businesses. 
Globalization, as a programme that is still in progress, has made a dramatic impact in the last 
two decades, as technological advances make it easier for people to travel, communicate and 
do business internationally. The two main driving vehicles of the globalization process are the 
advances in the telecommunications infrastructure and the rise of the internet. And the major 
justification for it is that the connection of economies to other economies leads to increased 
opportunities for all as well as increased competition, which makes agents of production more 
efficient. This position is espoused by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), which are great supporters of globalization. 
 
The anti-globalization groups, on the other hand, argue that certain groups of people who are 
deprived in terms of resources are not currently capable of functioning within the increased 
competitive pressure that will be brought about by allowing their economies to be more 
connected to the rest of the world. Examined closely, one observes that this group is not 
opposed outright to the goals of globalization, rather it pleads that certain basic conditions be 
fulfilled if the prospective aims are to be realized. It was in line with this appeal that a group 
of NGOs in the developed countries considered debt cancellation for the third world countries 
at the beginning of the Millenium to be a moral issue and called on all concerned countries to 
act accordingly. If Africa is to benefit from the process of globalization, economic policies of 
the developed countries, which are said to discriminate against exports from Africa, would 
have to be revised. Subsequent to this, an international financial system that discriminates 
against traders and enterpreneurs from Africa26 needs to be corrected. For, since globalization 
has the increase in competition as one of its objectives, there should be a fair playing field for 
all the participants in the game. To neglect these aspects is to cut Africa off from the rest of 
the world and reduce it to a status which President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania described as 
‘having no image beyond geography, no identity besides colour and no decency except flags... 
worse it will end up competing to do the master’s urging in the neighbourhood.’27 Africa, for 
                                                 
26 Kieh, K. G. (ed.),  Africa and the New Globalization, Surrey – England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008, 31 
27 Mkapa, B., Address at the Nwalimi Nyerere Foundation, April, 2002 
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its own part, needs as a matter of urgency the reconstitution of the nation states which will be 
based on institutional reforms as a preparation for the current process of globalization. 
 
At this juncture, it becomes pertinent to evaluate the morality of globalization as a process 
geared towards the increment of opportunities and the enhancement of competition in 
business. Scholars of economics are divided as to whether it has any need of ethics, since 
economics has its own method and laws which permit the optimum combination of means for 
the maximization of output together with the minimum use of scarce resources.28 The Church 
teaches that even though the aim of every economic activity is to some extent the making of 
profit, nonetheless the theorem that the fundamental purpose of economic activity has to be 
‘profit and domination’ must be rejected completely.29 This is the error of liberal capitalism, 
the social effects of which are strongly felt in our contemporary society. 
 
As important as the making of profit is to every economic venture, it can only lead to socio-
economic injustice 30 , if it is made the primary purpose of any economic enterprise. 
Globalization faces the danger of being reduced to socio-liberalism and utilitarianism by 
merely emphasizing profitability and the maximization of produce. Utilitarian ethics, when 
examined in the light of the demands of universal justice and Christian faith, is always found 
wanting. The Church’s position on this matter is clear and simple, namely that the ultimate 
and basic purpose of economic process, including globalization, “must be the service of man, 
and indeed of the whole man, viewed in terms of his material needs, the demands of his 
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and religious life. And when we say man, we mean every man 
whatsoever and every group of men, of whatever race and from whatever part of the world.”31 
This is the task that challenges globalization as far as Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned. And 
to the extent that this task is accomplished, to that extent will it be meaningful to that part of 
the Continent, otherwise it will become an ideology. 
 
Another aspect of the process of globalization pertinent to the theme of our work is the 
cultural dimension. One expects that what is meant by globalization from the point of view of 
                                                 
28 Peschke, H. K., Christian Ethics: Moral Theology in the Light of Vatican II, Vol. 2, op. cit. 716 
29 Gaudium et Spes 64 
30 A typical example of this is the scandals of 1988 surrounding the dumping of toxic wastes from Europe in  
   African countries, which are not equipped to cope with, but who were constrained by poverty to accept the  
   dumping of such poisonous material at a ridiculous price of $ 2. 5 per tone at the risk of human and animal  
   lives. The same thing happened in 2003 in Ivory Coast when Holland, at the end of civil war in that country, 
   brought several tones of toxic materials and deposited there, again at a very negligible sum.   
31 Gaudium et Spes, 64 
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culture is to create an avenue whereby many cultures of the world could be made accessible to 
as many people as possible, so as to enhance interaction and dialogue. In other words, to 
create a cultural pantheon, where peoples of the earth will be able to identify by name what is 
native to them, a Kennzeichen, while at the same time appreciating those of others. This is a 
wonderful idea. But if on the other hand, the Leitmotiv of cultural globalization is to propose a 
monoculture for all people, then it is bound to fail. The reason is that there would be no room 
for dialogue between cultures, as all will be lumped together into an amorphous cultural 
context, deprived of cultural identity. Benedict XVI criticised this as a kind of 
commercialization of cultural exchange which has the danger of kulturelle Verflachung, 
which will eventually lead to the distortion of the basic questions of life.32 
 
7. 2. 3 Environmental Degradation/Resource Control: Its Impact on Poverty 
           Alleviation and Prevention of Violent Conflicts 
 
The relationship of the human person to his/her physical environment, like his/her relationship 
to fellow human beings, has been a controversial issue in human history. The question of how 
and to what extent man should make use of created things for his/her need is as old as man, 
but has assumed a greater weight in recent times owing to several factors such as increase in 
population, far greater demands on nature’s resources and growing contacts among peoples. 
For instance, the clearing of farmlands by fire and large-scale deforestration were already 
practised in earlier human history. However, the damaging effects at the time were restricted 
to the locality. With the rapid increase in industrialization in the second part of the 20th 
century, there was an acceleration of environmental constraints destruction. Now the effect 
could no longer be confined to a particular area. 
 
Two positions are to be discerned with respect to the issue of environmental destruction and 
the exploitation of natural resources for human needs. The first of these goes back to 
interpretation of the Biblical passage in the account of creation where the Creator empowered 
the human person to take control of the earth and exploit it for his/her use. The protagonists of 
this position argue that, Christianity, by making man/woman the master of the created order, 
invested him/her with an unlimited authority and dominion over it. Hence the human person is 
conceived as the centre of the world, whereas in actual fact he/she should be viewed as part of 
nature. Alfons Auer criticises this accusation as ironical since right from the period of the 
                                                 
32 Caritas in Veritate, 26 
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Enlightenment, Christianity has been accused of a mentality which distrusts the natural 
sciences and stands in the way of the progress they promote.33 But as we have already pointed 
out above, the exploitation of nature is as old as mankind. For there was the exploitation of 
nature even where Christianity did not exist. The Bushmen of Australia who lived by hunting 
exterminated all large animals in their environment. The desertification of North Africa is 
partly attributed to intensive grazing of animals and imprudent cultivation.  
 
The second group, inasmuch as it is not opposed to the use of the environment and its 
resources for the benefit of man, argues that such use should be guided by moderation and 
prudence, since what affects nature affects the human person also. Nature, they contend, 
should not be regarded as mere raw material at the disposal of the human person for his/her 
use, for whatever constructs and purposes that are useful, challenging and pleasing.34 
 
It is against this background that the impact of globalization on the problem of environmental 
degradation/resource control in Africa can be appraised. The first decade of the new 
millennium has seen Africa’s problem of poverty and deprivation increase and at the same 
time witnessed an unprecedented increase in the rate of exploitation of the continent’s 
environmental resources and agro-ecological degradation with the inevitable consequences of 
violent conflicts. The events of the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria is known all over the 
world, where the Shell Oil company is inflicting serious damage on the environment – a threat 
to the lives of the people. Arable lands have been destroyed by oil spill-over, and rivers 
polluted. The situation may have contributed to the attention which has been paid by other 
continents to the effects of ecological degradation on the African peoples. A similar situation 
is played out in the Democratic Republic of Congo that is rich in natural resources used for 
the manufacture of mobile phones and other electronic equipment and.  
 
Two variables are responsible for the continuous environmental degradation through the 
exploitation of natural resources in Africa. The one is the transnational organisations that need 
these resources. The other is the corrupt system of government that cooperates with the 
foreign organisations to exploit the resources without corresponding compensation with the 
further result of a grave threat to sustainability in the management of the environment. 
According to John Mbaku, the two variables have a common root, namely the colonial 
                                                 
33 Auer, A., Umweltethik. Ein theologischer Beitrag zur ökologischen Diskussion, Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1984,  
    206. 
34 Peschke, K. H., op. cit., 748 
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structures which annexed African lands and established colonies out of them with the hope of 
exploiting the resources of the captured territories and providing raw materials for the 
industries of the Western economies.35 He goes further to state that even after independence, 
these structures are still maintained with the post-colonial leaders acting as middlemen for the 
previous colonial masters. Despite the fact that most African countries have been independent 
for more than forty years, the patterns of resource exploitation established during colonialism 
remain in place and continue to govern national economies.36 He concludes by calling for the 
provision of economic and political structures that are relevant to African realities.37 This has 
to include the introduction of property rights regimes, which are not in themselves sufficient 
but are necessary conditions. For without resource benefits, ownership is realized only upon 
capture. And if the assurance to future claims to resource benefits is absent, no incentive 
exists to limit use. The African resources are overexploited, because there are no clearly 
defined property rights either internally or with reference to international organisations. 
 
Without intending to go deeper into the intricacies involved in the international economic 
policies, since that could be explained better by experts in economics and international 
relations, it is germane to point out that to neglect the notion of the human community as a 
communion of persons will lead inevitably to undue competition and crisis. It is irrelevant 
whether that concerns the internal structures of a given country or has to do with other 
countries. The process of globalization will make the conditions of Africa worse, as far as 
environmental degradation/resource control is concerned, if the moving forces in 
globalization fail to acknowledge the fact that the building blocks of the global structure are 
individual persons with dignity. Thus whenever the pursuit of material well-being is pushed to 
the detriment of the human person directly or indirectly through the misuse of the 
environment, then a fundamental mistake has been made. It is usually a one-sided orientation 
towards material values that leads to a neglect of environmental needs and concerns. The 
tendency by a given regime to cooperate with trans-national organisations to exploit 
maximally the resources of some countries in Africa is to be adjudged as unethical. This is the 
core of our argument in this section, namely that the exploitation of natural resources be 
guided by respect for human health/life; and that the people from whose land the resources are 
taken should be adequately compensated. 
                                                 
35 Mbaku, M. J., The Environment and the New Globalization in Africa, In: George Klay Kieh, Jr.(ed.), Africa  
    and the New Globalization, op. cit., 129. 
36 Ibid., 130 
37 Ibid., 131 
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The Church teaches that the proper attitude to nature and its resources should be that of love 
and gratitude. Only the human person is able to love the things created by God, and ought to 
do so. He can receive them from God and respect and reverence them as constantly flowing 
from His hand.38 This love, though differing in degrees according to the hierarchy of values 
realized in various beings, is in appreciation for the goodness and beauty of nature and in 
respect for the purpose to which all things have been destined. This is manifested in the 
exemplary life of Francis of Assisi, for whom all creatures, be it the moon, the sun, the stars, 
the birds etc were brothers and sisters. Furthermore, since love entails reverence, 
environmental ethics demands that the environment be treated with reverence and not be 
vandalized for any reason(s). Dialogue is necessary between the Western mechanistic and 
materialistic approach to nature and the Africans’ nigh divinized relationship to nature. The 
freedom which was granted man by the Creator is not an absolute freedom to use and misuse, 
but one that is characterised by responsibility. It is so, because, “when it comes to the natural 
world, we are subject not only to biological laws but also to moral ones.”39 The moral laws 
therefore challenge the human person to treat the earth with due reverence, for it is not only 
through the act of creation, but also through the Incarnation, that God manifests his 
immanence in the world. For since the essence of sin is the refusal to abide by the will of the 
Creator made manifest in the order in creation, it follows that if the human person does not 
live in peace with God, he/she carries the same negation of peace to the environment,40 both 
human and physical. Conversely, a reckless and imprudent exploitation of nature is a denial of 
the dominion of God over the earth. The attitude of reverence, which we have proposed here 
is based on the fact that life and all that exists have their own goodness and value, which 
cannot be limited only to the utility they may possess. Hence, “the reason why humans ought 
not to devastate their world is not simply utilitarian. Nor is the reason why humans ought not 
to waste what they derive from it solely economic. More deeply it is moral: to destroy 
heedlessly, to pluck and discard, to have and leave unused, is an act of profound disrespect to 
the eternal worth of nature. For, nature in its integrity is not simply a reservoir of raw 
materials. It is also a presence of value.”41 Owing to the intrinsic value in nature, which does 
not necessarily imply usus, the human person has the obligations of responsibility towards it; 
                                                 
38 Gaudium et Spes, 37 
39 John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, 1987, nr. 34. 
40 Auer, A. Umweltethik, op. cit., 275. 
41 Kohak, E., The Embers and the Stars. A philosophical inquiry into the moral sense of nature. Chicago:  
    University of Chicago Press, 1984, 72. 
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an obligation that is not only for the good of nature but equally for the good of the human 
person himself/herself. 
 
7. 3.  C o n c l u s i o n 
 
In the just concluded chapter attempts were made to recapture the traditional value of 
community as an effective approach to the problem of poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. We saw that community has the advantage of not only being original to the Africans’ 
Denkschema, but is shared by Christian anthropology, which makes dialogue between the two 
systems possible. However,  whereas the Africans limit their understanding of community to 
sanguine ties to a common ancestor, who is in most cases the founder of the clan, Christianity 
has a more inclusive model, though it maintains an official admission into this community 
through baptism. The underlying principle in both of them is that of recognising and 
promoting our common humanity. The Christian concept of community complements that of 
the traditional Africa. But to avoid the error of superficiality, since the idea of community is 
no longer as forceful in contemporary African society as it was in the past, we introduced the 
expression, “communion of persons”, borrowed from John Paul II. The aim was to underscore 
how closely related the human person is to the other, so that to neglect to show concern where 
a human person is suffering or to be the cause of such suffering is to violate this communion. 
But we observed equally that the human person does not lose his/her identity in this 
communion of persons but rather is enabled to fully develop himself/herself. The truth of this 
fact was expressed by Goethe, who many years ago stated: “How little are we, or do we 
possess, what we in the strictest sense call our property; we must all receive and learn  not 
only from our predecessors, but also from our contemporaries. Even the greatest genius would 
not get very far if he had to rely solely on what he had in himself.”42 
 
Apart from offering a broader perspective on the concept of community or communion of 
persons, the Christian model of community has social structures like the parishes and dioceses, 
which would make the implementation of the community spirit feasible. But we equally saw 
the danger that may arise, namely that the leaders of the new communities, Church leaders, 
could be lured into personal enrichment neglecting the poor and oppressed. Even where this 
danger is not envisaged, it was noted that the resources available to the Church leaders in 
Africa cannot be sufficient to take care of the poor members of the community, therefore the 
                                                 
42 Cited in: Meissner, J., Fundamentals of Christian Sociology, Westminster, Md: Newman Press, 1962, 21. 
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support of the state is needed in the socio-economic empowernment of the people as a way of 
escaping the grip of poverty and the resultant violence. 
 
A more concrete effort in this direction would involve a socio-political reform that is people- 
oriented and that creates room for more participatory governance, bottom-up. This has to be 
intiated from the grassroots through the instrumentality of the Church leaders and the Church 
community. One crucial way of doing this would be the establishment of social centres, to 
which people could turn in moments of paralysing need. The theological option for the poor is 
making some impact in this direction, but this impact is still to be felt in Africa, where its 
awareness is at the level of textbook knowledge without concrete steps towards its 
implementation in most places. 
 
Finally, we reviewed the different forms of foreign intervention in alleviating poverty in Sub-
Saharan Africa, paying particular attention to such indices as aid support, the role of 
globalization and the management of the environment and its resources. In evaluating the 
impact of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, we discovered that the continued increase in 
material poverty in that region of the continent is disproportionate to the sum of money that 
flows into that region in the form of aid. As a result of this, some scholars proposed that 
foreign aid to Africa be withdrawn, but this opinion is not widely represented, as facts show 
that it is currently impossible for Africa to survive without aid. One other difficulty associated 
with aid is that of servicing foreign debt, which is said to siphon of the aid that is given to 
reduce poverty. Some scholars are of the opinion that what would be of help in combating 
poverty is interest-free loans. This, nevertheless, presupposes a system of governance that is 
honest and accountable to the populace. Faced with these two problems, there arises the moral 
question of the justification of debt-conditionalities and state sovereignty. To what extent can 
external organs, be they governments or institutions intervene in the internal affairs of a given 
country as a condition for giving a loan? On the other hand, is it wise to simply lend money, 
without conditions to a country whose leader is corrupt? 
 
Then we were confronted with the issue of globalization, which promises many opportunities, 
but not without some difficulties. Since the primary interest of this system is the economy, we 
argued that certain preliminary steps will have to be taken if it is to help reduce poverty in 
Africa, such steps include inter alia, creating equal trade opportunities. We appraised, too, the 
contribution of globalization in the area of information technology which has transformed our 
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age and brought Africa closer to the rest of the world. Closely related to the question of 
globalization is that of environmental degradation and resource control. Our analysis led to 
the conclusion that although nature and their resources are there for the benefit of the human 
person, its use should be guided by respect for their value, which is not mainly utilitarian, and 
regard for the Creator. The misuse of nature is often occasioned by human greed and avarice, 
the consequences of which are felt not only by nature, but by the human person himself. A 
balance needs to be struck between profanation and divinization of nature and its resources.    
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                    GENERAL EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION:    
Africa, South of the Sahara in the Context of World Order – Between Hope and 
Resignation. 
 
I. Preamble 
 
In concluding this work, it is proper to present a resume´ of the key points that guided the 
investigation. The first part of the research examined the phenomenon of poverty and violence 
in Sub-Saharan Africa with the intention of establishing the connection between the two 
realities. Particular attention was here paid to the meaning, nature, causes and consequences 
of poverty in Africa. We saw that the problem of poverty in Africa cannot be attributed to one 
factor alone, but is traceable to a chain of factors ranging from climate, disease (especially 
malaria and HIV/AIDS – the latter is, however, recent), ignorance, socio-political instability 
to unjust international trade policies. It was also shown that most of the factors that cause 
poverty are the outcome of poverty as well. In other words, there exists a reciprocal 
relationship between the causes and the consequences of poverty in Africa. It is here that the 
issue of violence comes in. Hence poverty is often a contributory factor or a compounding 
element in violent conflicts. The prevalent violence in Africa is widely considered to be 
caused by the widespread problem of poverty and acts at the same time as a factor militating 
against the alleviation of poverty by discouraging foreign investments. A clear picture of the 
reciprocal role of violence as cause and consequence of poverty is seen in the disintegration of 
the social order with its indices of migration, joblessness and aggression. However, some 
scholars like Konrad Lorenz1 argue that violence has its source in the dangerous tendencies in 
human nature, which can be triggered by social factors. In theological language, violence is 
the effect of original sin. Violence can also arise in the attempt to prevent violence, for 
instance when the police or the army is deployed to stop social uprising so as to maintain 
order in the society. 
 
As a way of situating the work within the purview of theology, we undertook an extensive 
discussion of the historical development of the understanding of poverty in the context of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition. Here we saw what impact the age of the Reformation had on the 
                                                 
1 Lorenz, K., Der Abbau des Menschlichen, München: Piper Verlag, 1983, 64 
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notions of wealth and poverty. This impact is said to have contributed to the introduction of 
liberal capitalism in which religious ethics are removed from the socio-economic process. 
This is an ongoing problem, for in market economies the largest question of all is, in the view 
of the author, how to balance the crave for profit against service to the public interest, 
understood as an inclusive conception of the common goal. When the economy of any society 
is left to the whims and caprices of the merchants and traders, the role of ethics in the 
economy is relegated to the background, and the society suffers for it. Africa is confronted 
with this problem as the wealth of many nations has been left in the hands of a few, while 
majority of the population wallow in poverty. It was in this connection that the Second Synod 
of Bishops for Africa in one of its proposals appealed for an economy in service of the poor 
and strongly denounced the unjust economic order which has led to the perpetuation of 
poverty in the continent. 2  Faced with the growing tendency of the economic system to 
develop its own rules independent of social ethics, there is the need to ask for the purpose of 
the economy to the society. Is the economy serving the society or vice versa?  
 
To talk of poverty in Africa is to talk of material poverty. As central and crucial as this 
dimension of poverty may be in social science research and political programmes, we 
concluded that behind all the problems surrounding material poverty is anthropological 
poverty. By this we mean the devaluation of the human person; the denial of a person’s worth 
and uniqueness. This assumes the superiority of a person or groups of persons over others 
based on what they know or have. And with reference to this, the inferior groups are denied 
opportunities to participate in the socio-economic and political systems of the society to 
which they both belong. Anthropological poverty arises when the culture (here understood as 
source of belief, values and lifestyle of a group of people) is disregarded as nonsense. The 
Sub-Saharan Africans have suffered under this prejudice in the course of their contact with 
colonial authority and still suffer it at the hands of their own sons and daughters, the neo-
colonialists. These are the cadre of Africans, who, having been introduced to a certain 
minimum of Western education became influenced by Western ideals, which they tacitly 
accepted as being valid for African societies. And since this cream of Africans was seen to be 
closely associated with the Western sources of power, colonialism, they acquired a certain 
prestige and rank which were not conducive to the harmonious development of their own 
society.3 This group, which formed the new class of leadership in Africa after the colonial 
                                                 
2 The Second Synod of Bishops for Africa: The Church in Africa in Service to Reconciliation, Justice and Peace,  
   Vatican City; 4 – 25 October, 2009 (Issued by the Catholic Secretariat of Nigeria – CSN). 
3 Nkrumah, K., Consciencism, op. cit. 69 
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epoch, developed an identity crisis, which had deleterious impact on the socio-economic and 
political policies. Hountondji cautions that the problem of Africa no longer has to do with 
comparing the relative values of European and African modes of thought, such that the one 
should be appreciated or depreciated in relation to the other. It is rather the problem of the 
present and the future, that is, the destiny of Africa. Hence, African scholars and leaders must 
from now on think independently, and open, by so doing, new problem fields, rooted in the 
actuality of our history of today.4 It was in response to this that we took a look at those values 
which are original to Africa, trying to place them at the service of the human person, who is 
both the victim and culprit of poverty and violence. We discovered, as Nkrumah put it, that 
the traditional face of Africa includes an attitude towards man which can only be described in 
its social manifestation as egalitarian. But the traditional African society was equally known 
for its maltreatment of women, the killing of twins, who were regarded as evil omens, the 
rampant cases of witchcraft and ritual murder. It would therefore amount to hypocrisy to 
pretend that everything was perfect in the Africa of yesterday, such that one could use it 
uncritically as a reference point. Christianity, by elevating the human person to a special 
status among other creatures, helped to purify those practices in Africa that are contrary to the 
dignity of the human person. In view of this, in the second part of the work we explored the 
traditional but ever relevant concept of human dignity as the foundation of fundamental 
human rights and the basis for mutual existence in any society. And since the human person is 
capable of feeling pain and tends to avoid it, the same reason should make him/her not to 
inflict pain on others, whether directly or indirectly. At the same time, he/she is to be moved 
to pity and compassion when any of his/her kind is subjected to pain. This is the meaning of 
compassion, which cannot be considered as an attribute of individual human subjects, but 
rather originates in and shapes relationships. In this context, therefore, the goal of fighting 
with the poor against poverty will be understood as an act of compassion and not as an effort 
to reverse the social imbalance and to create new injustices. This capacity to be affected by 
the sufferings of others, that is deeply rooted in every ‘normal’ human being, is an essential 
aspect of the dignity of the human person. Can this be what Africans are gradually forgetting 
that makes their poverty condition unbearable thereby increasing the rate of violent conflicts? 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Hountondji, K., Occidentalism, Elitism: Answer to Two Critiques, In: Philosophie, Ideologie and Gesellschaft  
 in Afrika, Christian Neugebauer(Hrsg.),Frankfurt am Main – Bern – New York – Paris: Peter Lang, 1989, 39-59 
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II. The African Condition and the Search for Identity 
 
Since the twin problems of poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa are social problems 
and the human person is the architect of the social process, it follows that the best place to 
look for the solution to these problems is to re-examine the traditional African understanding 
of the human person against competing ideologies. And when we talk of the traditional 
concept of the human person, we refer to those qualities which are inherent to being human 
such as the priceless worth of the human person, the uniqueness of each person but also 
his/her propensity to social interaction. The term ‘tradition’ is to be understood here in its 
etymological sense of tradere – to hand over/down something authentic, and not in the sense 
of preserving what is already old, antiquated or obsolete. Whereas the former enables 
continuity, the latter creates an unalterable dichotomy between traditionalism and modernism. 
This re-examination of the African person entails equally a search for an African identity, 
which involves a critical and free relationship with the African history of slavery and 
colonialism. Because until the Africans come to terms with these historical realities of their 
past, it will be difficult to accept the present and impossible to plan for the future. 
 
The first step in the search for an African identity and authentic personality as the basis for 
tackling the social problems of poverty and violence is the cultivation of a culture of truth. 
The one-sided story, spread in the West, of Africa as a poor, undeveloped, disease-infested 
and conflicted-dominated continent can only be corrected by the Africans themselves. Firstly, 
by telling other stories about Africa, unknown or known but neglected, to the world. This 
includes the awareness of the fact that the problem of poverty is a world-wide issue and, even 
though Africa is much more affected than other parts of the world, she cannot be defined by 
this or other problems afflicting her. Africa is poor but Africa is not poverty. It is the truth that 
the alleviation of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be left to so-called foreign aid, some 
of which is given with unfavourable conditions that amplify the problems it is intended to 
solve. The road to economic improvement, alias poverty reduction, may not be easy, but it is 
better freely chosen than imposed. Besides, Africa of the 21st century is materially better off 
than Africa of the 19th and 21st centuries, but with regard to human values worse off. 
 
The culture of truth we mean here demands that Africa through her leaders and intellectuals 
work to recover the spirit of community, which she has traded for Western individualism. For 
a leader to appropriate for himself/herself that which belongs to the people is neither African 
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nor Western in character, it is a product of an identity crisis, a pathology of disordered value 
orientation. There is the need to educate the political class once more to understand that 
leadership means service. One who is elected to be a leader is chosen to be a custodian and an 
administrator of the common good. As long we Africans practice a politics of winner-takes-it-
all, there can never be peace in that continent, because there can be no peace without justice 
and fair play; and there can be no justice without truth. And to come to this level, elections to 
public offices have to be democratic with less monetary-value attached to political positions. 
Subsequently, political leaders have to be made to be accountable both while in office and 
when they are out of office. With this, it would be easier to investigate the source of wealth of 
the citizenry where such is suspected to be dubious. 
 
The same attitude should be inculcated into the populace to learn to live within their means by 
cherishing the things produced in their countries of origin instead of striving to buy imported 
goods where their local equivalents exist. Many Africans do not appreciate the things with 
which nature has blessed that continent. More attention is devoted to complaining of what we 
do not have in Africa with little or no time left for considering what we can make out of what 
we have. Two examples suffice to buttress this point. Think of solar energy, for which Africa 
would have been the greatest supplier, but it is produced by the people who have much less 
sunshine throughout the year. The recently completed World Cup in South Africa in June 
2010, showed how a European was able to make millions of dollars from the local instrument 
called ‘vuvuzela’, which both added colour to the games and projected something original 
from the host country. Such creativity needs an atmosphere where people are looking for what 
to contribute to the world and not what to take from it. However, it is equally true that in some 
places where such creativity is discovered, adequate support is unfortunately denied, owing to 
tribal politics. 
 
The next crucial factor is the organization of the social order. In most parts of Africa, as we 
pointed out in this work, the society was hierarchically structured for the purposes of co-
ordination and division of labour. The Igbos of eastern Nigeria had such groupings, among 
which were those of ‘titled men’ and those according to age. These groups were charged with 
different responsibilities in the society apart from their occupation; that is, they were not paid 
for such services, which were rendered to sustain the society. The irony of it is that, while 
these structures are dying away in Africa as a result of modernity, the Westerners, who are the 
architects of modern civilization, are sustained by the same structures. When I talk of these 
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groups in the West, I am referring to such voluntary social services as the Red Cross and other 
charity organisations, the fire brigade, hunting associations and marching bands. Africans 
need to revive similar groups, because that will act as a check against the all-encompassing 
cash economy that tends to place a price on everything, thereby destroying mutual communal 
assistance for which the traditional African society was known. It was equally from such 
groups that the village vigilante was created to see to the security of the villages. However, 
we pointed out in the body of the work that this type of structure was easy to manage in the 
traditional society, because of the centrifugal role of the ancestors in the family lineage. 
Modern society is not only complex but multiplex and includes groups whose constitution 
depends on other interests than blood relationships.  
 
Two factors are indispensable for the organization of the social services which we propose 
here: First and foremost, the use of statistics as the core of sociometrics is inevitable in 
planning the society. In thinking about the development of a society, the image of the human 
body quickly comes to mind. For just as the human body is constituted from the smallest unit 
of life called the cell, to tissues, organs to the entire organism, so must the improvement of 
every social set up begin with the families, villages, towns etc. And for this to be effective, 
accurate figures have to be provided. To follow this would be to create an objective standard 
for the distribution of benefits and opportunities to the members of the society. Immediately 
this is established, the lifestyle of the people is reshaped. And the goals of society such as 
good health and the absence of violent behaviour can be better managed. In the words of 
Michael Novak, social co-existence demands that people be prepared to pay one another the 
honour of taking each other seriously both on the part of the leaders and the led. This 
relational obligation is inextricably bound up with the dignity of the human person. This is the 
area of social ethics, which concerns structures within which individuals act and how these 
strucures shape the ethos of their choices on the one hand, and how communities are judged to 
provide the basis for trust, that is necessary for good personal and community relationships on 
the other hand.  
 
At this point, education becomes imperative as an instrument of development and poverty 
reduction. Development as a product of education is to be understood in two different, but 
closely related dimensions, namely moral development and material development. Moral 
development is the moral education of the human persons in the society in ways that make 
them pursue a life of hard work, honesty, justice, forgiveness and suppression of wrath, 
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among others, while material development refers to scientific and technological development. 
Chronologically, moral development should precede material development if the socio-
cultural values that underpin the human society are to be preserved. We have dealt with this 
aspect in this work, maintaining that science and technology should be made to serve the 
human person and not vice versa. Although Africa has not made its debut in the areas of 
science and technology, the moral foundations based on the life and dignity of human person 
should be laid now as a preparation. This is what the Synod Fathers meant when they 
cautioned that although Africa is experiencing a crisis in education, it (education) cannot be 
reduced to academic learning only, but should be understood as a means to transmit to the 
young the profound meaning of life.5 The Synod Fathers further argued that church and the 
state work together as partners in the education of the people. Following the principle of 
subsidiarity, the state has to give all the necessary support to the churches for the moral 
education of the citizens, since as a moral institution the churches have the obligation to see to 
the moral development of children and youth. This includes among other things helping to 
liberate Africans from the schackles of superstitious beliefs. Although, this position does not 
exclude recognizing the merits of science and technology in modern society, we still maintain 
that to pursue solely the latter without a strong moral foundation can lead to the disintegration 
of the society. Social life would be, as it were, a game without rules. This is so because it falls 
outside the purview of science and technology to define what is good or bad, and right or 
wrong. 
 
III. Is Globalization Possible Without Global Ethics? 
 
The problem of poverty and violence in Sub-Saharan Africa today can no longer be regarded 
as a regional issue, because of the process of globalization that is very much underway in our 
time. It is impossible to consider it an African problem alone. For although the Africans are 
affected by poverty and violence more than any other peoples of the world, their spread to 
other places, because of globalization cannot be doubted. Fighting poverty therefore requires 
from a methodological point of view, drawing upon the fruits of economic and sociological 
research into the many aspects of poverty. Yet the reference to globalization should also alert 
us to the spiritual and moral implications that we all share in a single divine plan: we are 
called to form one family in which all – individuals, peoples and nations – model their 
                                                 
5 The Second Synod of Bishops for Africa, op. cit., no. 19. 
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behaviour according to the principles of fraternity and responsibility.6  We cannot talk of 
global benefits without at the same time talking of global deficits. We appreciate the 
achievements so far in the areas of information technology and the resultant geographical 
widening of the radius of economic activity as the outcome of globalization. But on the other 
hand, one needs only to think of the problems generated by immigration policies and 
terrorism, which have become matters of serious concern for all the countries of the world. 
The questions that arise from this situation are not uncomplicated: Can there really be 
globalization without global ethics? And is global ethics possible in our pluralistic society of 
cultural diversity, different political ideologies and increasing religious fundamentalism? 
What would be the contents of such an ethics? What institutions would be responsible for 
promulgating the said global ethics in a society that is working very hard to dethrone religion 
and enthrone secularism?  
 
In the attempt to provide answers to these questions, two contrary positions emerge. On the 
one hand are the protagonists of global ethics, who maintain that such ethics will save the 
world from total collapse. The other group perceives global ethics as an unrealizable project, 
because of diverse cultural values and world views. It may not be necessary to go into an 
elaborate discussion of these two positions here, but it is nonetheless pertinent to give a sketch 
of the views which the two groups hold with more attention paid to those supporting the 
necessity of a global ethics as a check to increasing global capitalism and its concomitant 
economic imbalance. 
 
Let us begin first by considering the point of view of the opposers of global ethics. According 
to this group, given the rate at which historical developments are moving in today’s world and 
the unprecedented development of human possibilities, it is unimaginable to think of a 
universal ethics. Besides, since the process of globalization is mainly underpinned by strict 
economic logic, most of which does not coincide with ethical rules, it is illogical to want to 
define ethical norms to regulate the economic process. And even though economic thinking 
has a lot of influence in the life of the people, certain actions that might be termed irrational in 
economic language are rational when considered in terms of moral motivations.  
 
Furthermore, experience shows that ‘in the process of encounter and mutual penetration of 
cultures, ethical certainties that had hitherto provided solid foundations have largely 
                                                 
6 Benedict XVI, Fighting Poverty to build Peace, Message for World Peace Day, Dec. 11, 2008 In:  
   http://www.zenit.org/article-24524/english.  
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disintegrated. The question of what the good is (especially in the given context of our world) 
and of why one must do the good even when this entails harm to one’s own self – this 
fundamental question is continually debated’. 7  For these reasons scholars like Robert 
Spaemann strongly criticise the idea of a ‘world ethos’ as proposed by Hans Küng, on the 
grounds that there is no common basis for it. Not even the idea of natural law as developed by 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) among others, which 
established reason as the instrument whereby law can be posited in common, could provide 
such foundation. This is because the idea of the natural law, which presupposed a concept of 
nature in which nature and reason overlap since nature itself is rational, has been overcome by 
the theory of evolution.8 As plausible as this position may seem, the fundamental question 
still remains, whether we can really envisage a globalization devoid of global ethics. In other 
words, can there be a worldwide interdependence without common ethical guidelines. And 
since globalization, originating within economically developed countries, has spread to 
include all the economies of the world, acting as a driving force for development, it needs the 
guidance of charity in truth in order to avoid causing unprecedented damage and creating new 
divisions within the human family. 9  Given this situation, the invention of a global ethic 
becomes not only imperative but also urgent. We shall now turn to the arguments put forward 
by the protagonists of  global ethics. 
 
The advocates of a global ethic acknowledge the dominance of multi-cultural values on the 
world scene, but at the same time argue that the rate at which globalization is moving makes a 
universal ethic indispensable. In the second chapter of this work, where we devoted a section 
to the theme of globalization, we came to the conclusion that what is commonly understood 
under the topic of globalization today is mainly the widening of the economic frontiers. Other 
forms of this process, be they political, cultural, or otherwise, derive their importance more or 
less from their place in the economic system. Following this trend of thought, it is easy to 
understand the proposed global ethics as one meant to direct global capitalism. It is one meant 
to govern the behaviour of market and non-market actors, in order to minimize the transaction 
costs of some cross-border activities like trade, technology transfer and internet 
communications. But if this were to be the only goal of the said global ethics, the result would 
be nothing other than the enlargement of the gap between the rich and the poor countries. This 
                                                 
7 Schuller, F., Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger: The Dialectics of Secularization – On Reason and  
   Religion, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006, 56 
8 Ibid., 69 
9 Benedict XVI., Caritas in Veritate no. 33 
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is, however, not the case, as proponents of global ethics like Michael Novak held that cross-
border economic integration should be guided by the concept of solidarity. 
 
The aim of the globalization of morals, according to John Dunning, is to “formulate universal 
guidelines of behaviour while respecting the richness of cultural pluralism and the dignity of 
difference between nations.” 10  Therefore, global ethics does not intend to introduce a 
uniformity of all values, but rather to create “a family of resemblances” by gathering together 
the cultural equivalents from different cultures of the world. Put another way, it is meant to 
highlight the common elements that run through all cultures, despite their diversity, and to use 
these as the basis for mutual relationship around the globe. For instance such virtues as 
gratitude, fidelity to promises, honesty, hard work, etc are acceptable in all cultures. Similarly 
their opposites are abhored by all peoples in every aspect of human endeavour.  
 
The proponents of global ethics having clarified its goal, identified four sources of moral 
behaviour on which global ethics could be based to include tradition, religious faith or 
philosophy, reputation and status, and societal (or peer) values.11 Among these sources, it is 
religious faith or philosophy that can be said to have influenced more the pattern of life and 
behaviour of people throughout the ages. Although secularism is spreading from the West to 
other parts of the world, religious teachings have been the dominant sources and drivers of 
behavioural mores, even when that is not always acknowledged. It is not within the scope of 
this work to determine the role religion should play in fashioning the proposed global ethics in 
a postsecular society. But it is relevant to underscore the fact that if religion is to make an 
impact, it has to speak with one voice and resolve those differences that are based on 
unsubstantial issues. In any case, to put religion aside and work towards a global ethic can 
only end in futility, because religion is known to produce in its adherents motivations and 
attitudes that are societally desirable, if they are not driven to extreme. But our society is a 
complex one, and as such the constitutional state has the duty of handling matters concerning 
both the believing as well as unbelieving citizen. 
 
Globalization is not a dream but a reality that affects every facet of our lives as animalis 
socialis. The process of globalization, especially economic globalization (global capitalism) 
cannot be allowed to function independently of any reference to the beliefs or conduct of its 
constituent parts as Friedrich Hayek argues. It has to follow the rules which govern the 
                                                 
10 Dunning, H, J., op. cit., 349 
11 Ibid., 354 
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society. In other words, non-market institutions, especially the government and supranational 
entities have to pursue policies which themselves promote social goals. The Marshall Plan of 
the Post-War period and the Millennium Agreement on debt relief to the poorer countries are 
examples of such policies.12 In this regard, we share the opinion of Deepak Lal, who suggests 
that we return to the values of traditional societies, but reconstitute them to meet the needs of 
the 21st century. Since one of the essential elements of a true society is justice, an ethic of 
globalization that fails to reduce economic imbalance is partial. Africa south of the Sahara 
will need a development Plan from the developed world to alleviate her poverty and equally 
forestall the ever increasing trade in arms. Global ethics may have other factors opposed to its 
realization, but if globalization is to stand the test of time, it has to be supported by ethical 
guidelines, the obedience to which demands cultural humility. A global ethic will, among 
other things, help to protect the weaker countries from the economic power of the stronger 
countries and equally safeguard the identity and cultural values of the former from extirpation. 
The United Nations Organization can provide a common platform for enforcing such an ethic. 
 
IV. C o n c l u s i o n 
 
Thus far we have seen that the problems of poverty and violence in Africa south of the Sahara 
perdure as a result of grave irresponsibility and corruption of the leaders of the countries in 
that region, as well as the economic policies of the developed countries. Secondly, we have 
closely analysed the relationship between poverty and violence, with the conclusion that 
abject poverty could lead to violence either directly or indirectly. In this regard, the work 
showed the connection between the spread of terrorism with poverty, where a few rich people 
use their wealth and influence to entice jobless youths. Part of the fight against the spread of 
terrorism will have to include creating sufficient job opportunities for the young, who will 
also need to be restricted from having access to arms. With reference to the latter, foreign 
countries need to revisit their trade policy on arms, especially as it concerns the third world 
countries. But most importantly, both the peoples of Africa south of the Sahara and other 
countries that have anything to with that region need a paradigm shift in their mindset as 
individuals and as institutions. There is need for, theologically speaking, a healing from the 
roots (sanatio in radice). 
 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 354 
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But should we give up on Africa as an irremediable case? Do we have any reason to be 
optimistic or are we caught in a dark alley of pessimism? I am personally optimistic that 
Africa will rise from the present condition of misery. The hope is nurtured, on the one hand 
doubtless because of my faith as a Catholic priest; hence I agree with Benedict XVI that if we 
cannot hope for more than is effectively attainable at any given time, or more than is promised 
by political or economic authorities, our lives will soon be without hope.13 But equally, on the 
other hand, because Africans have the knowledge, resources and capabilities to do something 
for themselves. As I pointed out earlier in this work, what is needed is to define our 
programmes and commence with them. That may demand a lot of time and patience. That 
should not, however, constitute any problem. No country or continent ever did it overnight. 
Africa should not expect rulers with a Midas touch. And the first step as already indicated, 
would be to get our priorities right as individuals and as institutions. We have to begin 
restructuring the society at the village unit. This would entail taking a record of how many 
people make up a particular village. And from the figures given, which have to be real and not 
manipulated, we have to find out how many are educated, how many have jobs that sustain 
them and their families. What are the possibilities of establishing school(s) for the children, 
hospitals and markets? Right from a tender age, children should feel the impact of a 
responsible leadership, only then can it be expected that they themselves will act responsibly 
in the future.  
 
The moral teachings of religious faiths and cultural traditions on the dignity of the human 
person, most of which are basically the same, have a vital role to play in the emerging global 
market society, of which Africa is a part. If the condition of Africa is to be altered, the 
religious institutions have to take a more and more prominent, active and conciliatory 
approach in influencing the attitudes and thinking of those in the higher echelons of power 
both at the national and international levels. In the end, it is they who act as a moral stimulus 
for the individuals and communities which they represent; and it is the ambience they create 
which affects not just our attitudes to, and behaviour in, the society, but the very fabric of day 
to day individual and social relationships.14  Religious institutions may not be experts in the 
logic of economic and market systems, but could act as umpires for the sake of the good of 
the society, for in the words of the Cambridge economist John Eatwell, the market can only 
be a good servant of the people, but a bad master. The unrestrained pursuit of profits which 
characterises global capitalism will eventually, if unchecked, lead us to Marx’s description of 
                                                 
13 Benedict XVI., Spe Salvi, nr. 35. 
14 Dunning H. J., op. cit. 366 
 274
a capitalistic society, where the accumulation of wealth at one pole at the same time leads to 
the accumulation of misery, agony, ignorance, servitude, brutality, and mental degradation at 
the other pole. Therefore the caution of the English philosopher Edmund Burke needs to be 
take seriously, namely that civil liberty can only flourish if individuals ‘put moral chains on 
their appetites’ and that this can only be achieved if society places a high premium on such 
virtues as self-restraint, duty, benevolence, encouragement, example, and the development of 
character. An African renaissance is possible only the Africans become deeply conscious of 
the need for it and continue to talk of this awareness. We still do not have any perfect society 
on earth, where everything is as it should be. But the major difference between the third world 
countries (Africa for example) and the developed countries is that the latter identify their 
problems and keep on talking about them with the hope of finding a solution, where the 
former either are not able to identify their problems or prefer not to talk about them. This 
work is a small attempt to help identify what our problems as Africans are. It might have 
achieved its goal if it sparks off chains of discussion and even criticisms on the issues raised. 
The greatest honour one can do to a scholar is to criticise his/her work, for it is only through 
such means that more discussions can ensue, leading to a better result. Good reasons should 
always make way for better ones. That is progress! 
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                                                          Anhang  I 
 
                                                         ABSTRACT 
Die Probleme der Armut und Gewalt sind die zwei größten Probleme, die der Kontinent 
Afrika, aber insbesondere die Region Afrikas südlich der Wüste, belasten. Es geht nicht 
darum, dass viele Menschen in Afrika arm sind, weil überall auf der Erde Arme zu finden 
sind. Es geht vielmehr darum, dass das Problem der Armut in Afrika unüberwindbar zu sein 
scheint. Trotz der unzählbaren Strategien von Gruppen und Organisationen zur Bekämpfung 
der Armut verschlechtert sich der Zustand Afrikas. Das Paradoxon unserer Zeit besteht darin, 
dass in einer Zeit, wo der Lebensstandard sich in vielen Ländern verbessert hat, Afrika 
rückschrittlich bleibt. Gibt es vielleicht eine Wechselwirkung zwischen der verbreiteten 
Armut und den ständig gewaltigen Konflikten in Afrika? Kann man mit Recht argumentieren, 
dass der Kontakt Afrikas mit den westlichen und den Nahost-Ländern durch Menschenhandel 
und später durch Kolonialismus, Christentum und Islam eine unheilbare Identitätskrise 
hinterlassen hat? Ist diese Krise nicht mindestens teilweise die Ursache der fortdauernden 
Armut und der schrecklichen Folgen von Gewalt? Warum haben die einheimischen Führer 
der Länder Afrikas nach der Unabhängigkeit von Kolonialmächten nicht vieles geändert? 
Diese und ähnliche Fragen wurden in der Arbeit behandelt.  
            Der Autor geht davon aus, dass eine richtige Armutsbekämpfung von den Afrikanern 
verlangt, ihre Werte wieder zu definieren. Dies ist jedoch schwierig ohne die eigene 
Geschichte zu kennen und zu akzeptieren. Solche Werte, die der Autor als grundlegend 
empfiehlt, sind das kommunitäre Leben und der Respekt vor menschlichem Leben. Der 
Mensch als Würdenträger nimmt in der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung Vorrang ein. Seine Würde 
ist unantastbar. Daher ist jede Gesellschaft als eine Gemeinschaft von unantastbaren Personen 
zu betrachten. Das bedeutet, dass man alles, was dazu beiträgt das Leben zu bewahren, 
fördern und das Gegenteil verhindern muss. Weil die Würde der Menschen relational ist, d. h. 
dass sie den anderen braucht, soll der Schutz dieser Würde die erste Aufgabe der Regierenden 
sein. Weiter argumentiert der Autor, dass, entsprechend unserer Zeit, das gemeinschaftliche 
Leben über die Ahnenwurzeln hinaus steigen soll. Er ist der Meinung, dass alle Programme 
von außen, die nicht auf dieser Ebene beachtet werden, misslingen. Dabei soll der erste 
Impuls in dieser Richtung von den Afrikanern selbst kommen. Wir Afrikaner müssen 
aufhören die Reagierenden zu sein und anfangen zu agieren. Daher ist eine Renaissance in 
Afrika dringend. Dazu liefert diese Arbeit einen kleinen Beitrag.   
                                                          Anhang  II 
                                                  
                                                         ABSTRACT 
The paradox of our time consists in the increasing level of poverty all over the world despite 
the great achievements in science and technology. There is a significant rise in the standard of 
living everywhere in the world, but there are also many more people who have to live without 
food or water. With the help of mechanized system of agriculture a lot of foodstuff is 
produced, nevertheless many people die daily of hunger. Closely related to the issue of hunger 
is the denial of opportunities which constitutes a major index in the problem of poverty. The 
frequency of violent conflicts in some parts of the world is not unconnected with this and 
similar imbalance in our society. Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions 
where the problem of social imbalance is exceptionally extant, leading, as it were, to 
widespread cases of poverty and violent conflicts. If the problem of poverty in Africa south of 
the Sahara is to be solved and the attendant violent conflicts minimized, the welfare of all has 
to be taken into consideration in the making and execution of policies that govern the 
countries of that region. This presupposes the recognition of the inalienable dignity of man. 
 
This work undertakes a critical voyage into the history of Africa paying particular attention to 
its contacts with the West and the Near East: The one through the Slave Trade, Colonialism 
and Christianity, and the other through trade and Islam. The author argues that these contacts 
made much impacts on the Africans and their World-view(s) to the extent that it is no longer 
easy to talk of what is originally African. This identity crisis is at the root of some of the 
social problems confronting Africa today. The author further argues that a rediscovery of 
those African values such as the community spirit and the exaltation of the human person 
above material things, could be the first step in solving the problems of poverty and violence. 
The form of community which the author recommends goes beyond the ancestral roots as was 
the case in traditional Africa, hence we talk of solidarity based on the unique and inalienable 
dignity of the human person. It is therefore a community of persons endowed with dignity. 
The recognition of and respect for this transcendental dimension of the human person is an 
indispensable tool for the construction of a just social order and lasting peace among Africans 
within Africa and between Africa and the rest of the world. Africa needs a renaissance which, 
of course, has to be initiated by Africans themselves before requesting for external assistance. 
It is an exercise in self-discovery and self-acceptance. This is the basis for the strength of 
character without which any plan for development is bound to end in futility. 
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